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ABSTRACT 
Limited competition among the few fuel retailers in rural and remote locations results 
in fuel pricing problems, such as high rural fuel prices and rural-urban fuel price 
differentials. Thus, the regulation of fuel retailing activities in these locations is 
expected to resolve these problems, and thus contribute to a rural development policy. 
These problems are of concern to governments and rural communities, primarily 
because high fuel prices generate significant multiplier effects on the cost of rural 
living and economic activities. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to investigate 
the potential contribution of the regulation of fuel retailing activities to resolving these 
problems. The UK and Australian fuel retail sectors provided contrasting settings in 
which to conduct this investigation. Preliminary research outcome indicated that 
governments’ responses to these problems were generally in the form of regulatory 
support mechanisms and fuel subsidy schemes (a form of state aid). 
 
The study focused on two research questions. The first question relates to whether the 
regulation of fuel retailing activities could resolve the fuel pricing problems in rural 
areas, and thereby contribute to a rural development policy. The second question deals 
with the necessity or otherwise of the use of state aid in resolving the problems of fuel 
retailing in rural and remote areas. This study investigated the research questions by 
adopting the qualitative comparative methodology, involving three actions. The first 
action entailed the use of a set of common comparators to examine fuel retail 
regulations in the two jurisdictions. The comparators consisted of the following 
regulations: sites, licence/franchise, retail/wholesale price, fuel tax. The second and 
third actions involved a comparison of state aid policies and trends in rural 
development policies in both jurisdictions. 
 xxiv 
The study revealed that these fuel retail regulatory measures have limited 
effectiveness in addressing the research problems. However, the author argues that 
regulation of fuel retailing is likely to contribute significantly to resolving the research 
problems within the context of an integrated approach to rural development. The 
author further argues that this approach could lead to a paradigm shift in the mix of 
fuels consumed in rural and remote locations, and hence cause a reduction in fuel 
prices as well as the rural-urban fuel price differentials. 
 
The key recommendations flowing from this study was that the UK Government 
could take advantage of the various EU state aid provisions to promote a robust and 
integrated rural development policy. On the other hand, the Australian Government 
could consider developing a more formal and integrated approach to rural 
development policy, rather than its current ‘ad-hoc’ approach. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Some market-oriented governments have been known to use regulatory support 
mechanisms in the form of statutes to promote the activities of independent fuel 
retailers regardless of whether they are based in urban or rural areas. Similarly, the 
use of subsidy schemes for fuels has been a popular tool for governments in 
addressing the special needs of rural populations. The vulnerability of such population 
groupings to probable predatory pricing practices from established fuel suppliers or 
limited competition among the few fuel retailers in such locations has encouraged the 
design of policy instruments to counteract the attendant fuel pricing problems.1 Some 
of these support measures have been used to cushion the effects of high fuel prices on 
rural inhabitants and businesses, or reduce the rural-urban fuel price differentials. 
Others have been directed at curtailing the market power of the oil majors. Yet 
questions may be raised about the long-term usefulness of such policies and their 
compatibility with the goals of a rural development policy.  
 
The UK and Australian fuel retail sectors provide contrasting settings in which to 
examine these regulatory measures, and what significance they might have for rural 
development. Each country has a slightly different legal regime and is at a different 
stage in the cycle of fuel retail trade liberalisation.2 Thus, this thesis examines 
whether the regulation of fuel retail activities could resolve the problems of high rural 
fuel prices and rural-urban price differentials, and thus contribute to a rural 
                                                 
1 The nature and degree of these fuel pricing problems are clearly defined in Chapter 3. 
2 Other countries that have tried petrol retail liberalisation would include US, and most West European 
countries, e.g. France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, etc. The reasons for choosing the two 
jurisdictions are contained in the heading, ‘Justification for the Choice of Countries’. 
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development policy; and whether state aid is essential in promoting fuel retailing 
activities in rural and remote areas. 
 
This chapter sets out the justification for the study, the relevance of a rural 
development policy, and the relevance of independent fuel retailers in the context of 
rural development. The second part of this chapter deals with the analytical 
framework for the study, which includes a statement of the research problem, the 
research questions and hypotheses, the objectives and purposes, the methodology, and 
the thesis structure. 
1.2 Justification for the study 
Petroleum products, like education, training etc. are classified as ‘impure public 
goods’ or ‘special products’ because their supply has multiplier effects on the socio-
economic and political life of a community. Although such goods and services do not 
have the basic characteristics of a ‘public good’ (e.g. roads, national defence, 
policing, etc.), they do however contain some ‘public good’ dimensions.3 ‘Impure 
public goods’ can be traded in the market but require periodic regulatory interventions 
because they may be subject to some degree of market failure, with disastrous 
consequences for society.  
 
As a source of fuel, petroleum products have high energy content compared to gas 
and coal. Their fluidity creates economies of scale during storage. There are no 
adequate substitutes for petroleum fuels in transportation, and virtually none in the 
field of lubrication. These qualities have combined to make petroleum products the 
                                                 
3  Ogus, A.I., Regulation: Legal Form & Economic Theory pp. pp. 32-33 (1st ed., 1994). 
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fuels of choice in modern transportation.4 Therefore, any disruptions in fuel retailing 
activities within a given location will likely result in socially undesirable outcomes. 
 
The economics of the petroleum retail trade creates an equally unique situation. The 
demand for the products is not price elastic i.e. an increase in price does not produce a 
corresponding decrease in demand (and vice-versa). Thus, petroleum fuels could be a 
source of potential abuse by governments (through taxation) or by fuel retailers 
(through high pump prices). These have severe potential implications for rural fuel 
consumers, cost of rural living, and a rural development policy. 
 
No study has yet been carried out to determine the potential contribution of the 
regulation of fuel retailing activities to a rural development policy. Therefore, the 
result of this research could contribute to the current debate on approaches to a rural 
development policy. The research outcomes could be of interest to the myriad of 
government ministries/agencies, local governments, and local associations that 
articulate and coordinate rural development policies. The research findings could also 
be of interest to most developing countries as they pursue a strategy of even 
development. 
1.3 Does a rural development policy matter? 
A vital insight into the OECD indicators describing rural areas of member countries is 
the diversity within and between rural areas. Rural areas are not uniform and have 
been categorised by various agencies and individuals. For instance, Sharp identified 
                                                 
4 For more details, see Frankel, P., Common Carrier of Common Sense pp. 3-25 (1989). See Mitchell, 
J., The New Economy of Oil: Impacts on Business, Geopolitics & Society 62-63 (2001). 
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three types of rural areas in England as follows:5 (a) remote areas with scattered 
populations and access difficulties; (b) areas strongly under the influence of towns 
and cities; and (c) areas of rapid change, e.g. mining closures. The 1996 Scottish 
Rural Life Update Report identifies five distinctive area types: remote rural, less 
remote rural, mixed urban/rural, remote settlement dominated, and prosperous high 
growth.6 Also, according to the OECD rural typology, there are three types of rural 
regions: predominantly rural, significantly rural, and predominantly urbanised.7 
 
The implication is that articulating effective rural development policies is not an easy 
task, as ‘one size fits all’ rural policies cannot be effective.8 Another major challenge 
stems from the disparity between the structure needed for the formulation and 
implementation of territorial policies (i.e. horizontal, multi-sectoral, and 
collaborative) and the structure of government policies in member states (i.e. vertical, 
sectoral, and hierarchical). Yet a diverse group of ministries must be involved (as well 
as the private sector), if rural development policies are to be effectively conceived and 
implemented. 
 
Rural development policy is concerned with thinly populated areas and small towns. 
These areas face major challenges created by the globalisation of both production and 
demand of goods and services; rapid changes in technologies, information flows, and 
the composition of markets; and the need to enhance and safeguard environmental 
                                                 
5 Sharp, R., Public Policies for Rural Development p. 33, in Rural Europe: Rural Development Policies 
for the 1990s. A Joint Conference of the European Community and Highlands and Islands Enterprise, 
Inverness, 2 & 3 July 1992 
6 The Scottish Parliament Information Centre (Rural Affairs Committee); Employment, Housing and 
Poverty in Rural Areas 2 (Research Note 99/29, 1999). Available online at 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/pdf_res_notes/rn99-29.pdf, last visited on 20 April 
2009. 
7 OECD Documents., Better Policies for Rural Development p. 98 (1996). 
8 See id., p. 23. 
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conditions.9 Yet economically viable and environmentally healthy rural areas are an 
indispensable part of a strategy for balanced national development. 
 
Rural development as defined by the OECD rural development programme is a 
societal goal, but not a social (transfer) programme.10 In other words, rural people 
who fall below social norms of well-being established by individual countries may be 
targets of policies and programmes aimed at improving their condition. These policies 
and programmes are not executed because they are rural peoples, but because they are 
citizens of the nation state (same partners in the social contract). Prior to the 1990s, 
governments sought to overcome the disadvantages of distance and low density 
through transfer payments or through regulatory measures that necessitated businesses 
to provide uniform levels of service. These approaches have been costly for both 
private businesses and governments and seem unattractive for the future because 
social transfer programmes cannot operate indefinitely. The measures that are 
promising for the future seem to be those that seek to create the basic conditions 
necessary for broadening and building an indigenous economic base, stimulating 
entrepreneurship, and improving the skills for rural residents with the support of all 
levels of government and related government agencies. However, the specific social 
policies and programmes and their implementation strategies are likely to differ 
between urban and rural residents.  
 
                                                 
9 See OECD Documents; supra note 7, at pp. 17-19. For more details on economic globalisation and 
rural transformation, see Hoggart, K. et al., Rural Europe: Identity and Change pp. 144-184 (1995). 
10 See OECD Documents; supra note 7, at p. 25. 
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There is also a growing importance of environmental concerns for rural areas.11 These 
concerns relate to issues of sustainable development. Since the 1990s the 
environmental debate has been intense, particularly after the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development in 1992.12 Bartels argues that these areas do not 
always capture the ‘fair’ return from society’s use of their environmental, cultural, 
and historical resources. With growing income levels, demand for these resources is 
increasing. However, the trade-off that rural areas face between economic 
development and environmental preservation is difficult to resolve (i.e. the need to 
meet the goal of sustainable economic development). The author argues in part that to 
resolve this difficulty could require cooperative action within communities by 
businesses, local organisations, and various levels of government. Coordinated 
investments from public and private sources might be needed to improve human 
capital, upgrade rural infrastructure, and modernise rural transport, energy, and 
information technology services. 
 
                                                 
11 Bartels, U., Public Policies for Rural Development p. 39, in Rural Europe – Rural Development 
Policies for the 1990s (A Joint Conference of the European Community and Highlands & Islands 
Enterprise), 1992. For details on the environmental debate and lobby, see Winter, M., Policies for 
Agriculture, Forestry and the Environment pp. 170-192 (1996). Also see Hoggart, K. et al., Rural 
Europe: Identity and Change pp. 228-257 (1995). 
12 The one definitive statement on “Sustainability” which has been accepted globally is the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development of June 1992. Principle 3 of the Declaration states that 
“the right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental 
needs of present and future generations”. The Declaration contains 27 principles. Other principles 
assert the need for conserving and restoring the Earth’s ecosystem and eradicating poverty “as an 
indispensable requirement of sustainable development”, and encouraging citizen participation. For 
more on Rio Declaration on Environment & Development, see the web link 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163 , last 
visited on 25 May 2009. Also see Strange, T. & Bayley, A., OECD INSIGHTS- Sustainable 
Development: Linking Economy, Society, Environment pp. 24-34 (2008). For details on rural 
sustainability see, The Land is Ours – Defining Rural Sustainability: Fifteen Criteria for Sustainable 
Developments in the Countryside together with Three Model Policies for Local Plans (1999). Also see 
Selman, P., Local Sustainability: Managing and Planning Ecologically Sound Places pp. 1-18 (1996). 
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Among the OECD member states, rural areas comprise 90% of the land mass and 
almost one-third of the population.13 Therefore, rural areas are expected to contribute 
to national economic growth, if the overall economy is to effectively exploit its full 
potential. Such a prospect bodes well both for rural inhabitants and for other citizens, 
including tourists. For this reason, rural development is considered an important and 
integral part of policy agendas among OECD countries.14 
 
Prior to the 1990s, rural development was mainly a question of agriculture and its 
development, or a matter of securing wildlife, environmental, or recreational issues. 
More recently, rural areas have been put on the political agenda for all OECD and EU 
countries for a number of reasons. Firstly, it has become clear to many governments 
that agricultural activities can no longer employ all the people live in rural locations 
or who may wish to relocate to these areas. Moreover, far-reaching structural 
rationalisation of the agricultural sector is taking place in most OECD countries, 
especially EU countries, and this is expected to have a significant effect on the culture 
of agricultural society. Tangiv argues that there are large numbers of people interested 
in living in rural areas, and this, coupled with the concept of democracy and the 
associated issue of decentralisation, has resulted in the current focus on the 
development of rural areas.15 Particularly, EU policies on rural development through 
Agenda 2000,16 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP),17 and the EU Leader 
                                                 
13 See id., p. 9. OECD member countries include United Kingdom, Australia, United States, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Japan, Finland, New Zealand, Mexico, Czech 
Republic. 
14 See European Commission, Rural Development Policy 2007-2013: Why have a Rural Development 
Policy? Available online at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rurdev/index_en.htm, last visited on 25 May 
2009. 
15 Tangiv, H. W., Rural Innovative Strategies – A New Paradigm for Rural Development p. 3, a paper 
delivered at the conference titled European Rural Policy at the Crossroads (2000). 
16 Agenda 2000 is an EU action programme aimed at strengthening community policies and preparing 
the EU for enlargement. The actions include a reform of the CAP, and increasing the effectiveness of 
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Programme18 have played a decisive role in focusing the rural development agenda in 
many EU countries and in some OECD member states. Government policymakers in 
Australia, in line with neoliberal rationalities, have also taken the view that ‘rural 
adjustment’ as recognised in Europe will ultimately be beneficial in effect when 
efficient firms replace lost production from failed farms.19 This new policy direction 
is in line with the new round of WTO trade talks in 2000 (Uruguay Round Agriculture 
Agreement URAA), which emphasised market competitiveness, reductions in 
domestic support, elimination of export subsidies, and increased market access.20  
 
Secondly, the concept of globalisation introduces a steady process of adjustment in 
societies. However, that adjustment process is not uniform throughout national 
territories. Moreover, globalisation does not automatically generate uniform socio-
economic and environmental benefits.21 Therefore, it is the responsibility of 
governments to enable all parts of their territory to be strong enough to adjust. 
Thirdly, the balanced development of national territories deals partly with the notion 
of economic equity designed to enable all citizens to benefit from growth, regardless 
                                                                                                                                            
EU Structural Funds (including the European Social Fund, and the Cohesion Fund). For more details, 
see AGENDA 2000: Strengthening the Union and Preparing the 2004 Enlargement. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agenda2000/index_en.htm, last visited on 25 May 2009. 
17 The CAP was recently reformed in 2003 with the objective of weakening the link between subsidies 
and production. However, to prevent abandonment of production, member states were advised that they 
‘may choose’ to maintain a limited link between subsidy and production, albeit under well defined 
conditions and limits. In place of the subsidies, ‘single farm payments’ were devised and linked to 
maintaining environmental, food safety and animal welfare standards. For more details see CAP 
REFORM – a Long-Term Perspective for Sustainable Agriculture. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/capreform/index_en.htm, last visited on 25 May 2009. 
18 The LEADER programme is EU’s programme for community-led rural economic diversification, 
and funded through the EU Structural Funds. The programme was lunched in 1999 and ran from 2001-
6. LEADER+ Programme covered all of Northern Ireland, whereas LEADER II promoted community-
led projects and initiatives in rural Scotland (Inverness, Nairn, etc). 
19 Dibden, J. et al., Contesting the Neoliberal Project for Agriculture: Productivist and Multifunctional 
Trajectories in the European Union and Australia pp. 299-308, Journal of Rural Studies 25-3 (2009). 
Journal Homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jrurstud . 
20 Potter, C. & Tilzey, M., Agricultural Multifunctionality, Environmental Sustainability and the WTO: 
Resistance or Accommodation to the Neoliberal Project for Agriculture 1293? Geoforum 38 (2007) 
21 For more details on uneven development and social change, see Hoggart; supra note 9, at pp. 185-
227. 
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of where they live or work. This also is of political importance, because the 
harmonious development of an entire national territory is a basic condition for 
fostering social cohesion within a country, and consequently for its political 
stability.22 
 
In a nutshell, the significance of a rural development agenda is derived from the 
impact of globalisation on rural communities and the search for balanced 
development of national territories. Globalisation has placed certain rural areas in a 
precarious state, thereby requiring them to make far-reaching adjustments. For 
example the use of new technologies in agriculture, fisheries, forestry, etc. has led to 
the disappearance of a significant number of rural jobs.23 Manufacturing industries 
which could have acted as a source of new jobs are already experiencing an overall 
decline. Service activities are not well developed in most rural locations in the OECD 
member states. These factors put together have led to large-scale movements of local 
labour towards the urban cities. Thus, rural development is a question of designing 
multi-sectoral policies, requiring close cooperation between the various authorities 
involved. 
 
Rural areas are generally viewed in many jurisdictions as economies specialising in 
traditional resource-based industries (agriculture, mineral extraction, forestry, fishing, 
etc.). However, in many areas there is considerable diversity of economic activity. 
Rural areas are subject to the same forces that drive economic change in the national 
                                                 
22 Joerges, C. and Rodl, F. “Social Market Economy” as Europe’s Social Model pp. 2-3? European 
University Institute, Florence Working Paper LAW No. 2004/8 (2004). See Treaty Establishing the EU 
(Part 3- Community Policies); Economic and Social Cohesion (Articles 158 and 159). Available online 
at http://europa.eu/eur-lex/en/treaties/selected/livre239.html , last visited on 07 March 2009. Also see 
the EU Social Charter. Available online at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/035.doc, 
last visited on 07 March 2009. 
23 See OECD Documents; supra note 7, at p. 18. 
  
10 
economy, and so continuous pressures to improve the competitiveness of its 
products/services in order to compete in global markets will continue to increase the 
substitution of capital for labour in resource industries. Therefore, these industries 
will innovate with the help of new technologies (capital goods) and are not expected 
to provide major sources of new employment. Thus, specialisation in many rural 
economies has made them vulnerable to business cycles and resource depletion. 
Typical examples are the depletion of ground fish in Atlantic Canada that led to the 
collapse of the ground fish industry; and the closure of coal mines in parts of England 
and Wales which affected the sectoral-dependent rural economy.24 
 
The decline in employment in traditional sectors in some rural areas has led to the call 
for active encouragement of diversification as an economic strategy. Nevertheless, 
traditional resource industries will perhaps remain the economic base of many rural 
areas in the future. Diversification strategies usually develop from within sectors and 
focus on creating new value-added opportunities within sectors.25 However, strategies 
that sustain sectoral dependence tend to create better economic stability on the 
condition that the new value-added base is less price-sensitive than the traditional 
production activity. 
 
A comprehensive diversification strategy enhances the development of activities both 
related and unrelated to the existing dominant industry. However, in terms of 
competition in global markets (based on competitive advantage) diversification may 
not offer a viable alternative to further development of the existing resource base. The 
reason is that the small size and limited resource base of most rural areas makes it 
                                                 
24 See id., p. 49. 
25 Mengin, J., Diversification in the Rural World pp. 49-51, in Rural Europe – Rural Development 
Policies for the 1990s (1992). 
  
11 
difficult for them to assemble a critical mass of skills and resources to be competitive 
in the global markets. 
 
In many rural areas, tourism is seen to offer the potential as a new source of 
employment and its development is based on a holistic exploitation of local resources, 
scenic, cultural, or historic amenities, possibly in association with the traditional 
industry.26 Much of manufacturing activity has been linked to the traditional resource 
sectors. However, since the 1990s manufacturing activities (particularly in the older 
industrial economies) are increasingly being outsourced to developing economies, due 
to lower labour costs. As a result, rural areas in industrial economies can only adapt 
their economic base and remain competitive by developing new products and services 
in which to specialise, and to create niche markets in which they can secure 
competitive advantage. Therefore, rural areas can either be encouraged to seek new 
types of business enterprises not associated with their traditional sectoral dependence 
(diversification), or to pursue an economic strategy that is directly related to the major 
resource base (micro-specialisation).27 
 
In choosing between specialisation and diversification strategies for a given rural 
location, it is necessary to consider the significant differences among rural areas in 
relation to their population, economy and environment.28 A number of other points 
need to be considered. Firstly, a specialisation strategy is not possible for all rural 
areas because by its nature it requires a large initial capital outlay, high-skilled labour, 
and market access. These conditions tend to limit its application to areas where 
                                                 
26 Bryden, J., Situation and Trends in Rural Areas p. 18, in Rural Europe: Rural Development Policies 
for the 1990s (1992). 
27 For more details on rural development strategies, see Champetier, Y., Local Development Initiatives 
pp. 53-58, in Rural Europe: Rural Development Policies for the 1990s (1992). 
28 See OECD Documents; supra note 7, at pp. 56-58. 
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economic activities are already vigorous and to firms which already profit from a 
large accumulation of capital, land, and skilled labour. Therefore, specialisation is 
applicable to economically integrated areas but may not apply to remote areas.  
 
Secondly, a diversification strategy may be resilient to market changes in the 
economy as a whole, but individual markets will often be volatile. Thirdly, in remote 
rural areas, a diversification strategy usually has a better chance of success in the 
medium/long-term than a specialisation strategy. This is because specialisation is too 
expensive for some areas and there is a risk involved in the shift of technology and 
labour. However, the establishment of networks between small and medium-size 
enterprises (SMEs) can be a success factor in remote areas because it makes it 
possible for these areas to be sufficiently competitive in order to respond to market 
changes and consumer demands. 
 
Fourthly, new technological development will contribute positively to both 
development paths, although to varying degrees. For instance, biotechnology is useful 
in the development of high value-added agricultural products as in the case of 
specialisation, and also for developments in the food industries to aid their 
diversification. 
 
Rural areas need economic incentives to enable them to decide which development 
path to follow, or whether this should be a combination of both. This is a source of 
challenge for policymakers at different levels who are directly responsible for 
designing rural development policies. Having established the relevance rural areas 
and a rural development policy, the role of government could be to create an 
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economic and social environment in which rural areas can take the initiative for their 
development. The decision as to which path rural areas should choose would depend 
on the best allocation of their resources (i.e. natural, human, cultural, environmental). 
However, neither a ‘single policy for all rural areas’ nor a ‘specific area for each 
policy’ could be applied with much success. 
1.4 The importance of and threat to rural independent fuel 
 retailers (UK and Australia) 
The large number of UK independent fuel retailers in the past (i.e. between 1960 and 
1990) made it difficult for the refiner wholesalers to abuse their market power. Since 
the mid-1990s, a significant reduction in the number of independent retailers deprived 
the market of an essential competitive counterweight. However, this balancing factor 
has been provided by the supermarkets who operate in urban areas and to some extent 
out-of-town locations, but not in rural and remote communities. 
 
Rural communities, and activities that take place within these locations, are 
particularly dependent on private transport, partly because of the nature of rural living 
but also because of the lack of public transport serving these less populated regions. 
Therefore, rural fuel outlets often serve as centres for services other than fuel sales, 
e.g. vehicle sales and servicing, village shops, post-offices, taxi services, video shops, 
etc. While these ancillary services provide employment for rural residents, they also 
help to retain skills within rural areas.29  
 
Rural activities that are also affected either by higher fuel prices and fuel price 
differentials between urban and rural areas, and/or high closure rates, include: farming 
                                                 
29 HC 384 Parliamentary Trade & Industry Committee Session 1987/88, Report on Petrol Retailing in 
the UK xvii (July 1996). 
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and compost makers; rail and marine transport; manufacturing companies; rural 
hospitals, nursing homes, homes for the elderly, and other medical institutions; 
forestry; mining; construction, quarrying, and dredging companies; brewing and 
distilleries; local government road construction and maintenance; commercial 
electricity generation for remote communities, etc.30 
 
When rural garages are forced to close in large numbers, not only will rural 
communities lose an important amenity, but there will also be consequences on 
commercial activities in and around these locations, as well as environmental 
consequences. It is likely to trigger the dreaded rural–urban migration, with 
consequences for rural commercial activities, and also neglect and under-development 
of a large expanse of land and resources. 
 
The Rural Development Commission (UK) has identified a significant loss of 
business for rural garages since the mid-1990s, especially for those in more accessible 
areas, owing to the combined attractions (or convenient convergence) of bulk grocery 
shopping and cheaper fuels which tend to draw customers from those rural 
communities to supermarkets (see Table 1.1). The current intensity in price 
competition has further exacerbated this trend. Consequently, those rural areas closest 
to urban areas where fuel is cheaper tend to feel most effects of price competition 
from supermarkets and high-volume urban sites.31 
 
Generally, independent fuel retailers in rural areas face severe disadvantages 
compared to their urban counterparts. Due to the higher distribution costs, the 
                                                 
30 Commonwealth of Australia; Report on Fuel Tax Inquiry 8 (2002). Available online at 
http://fueltaxinquiry.treasury.gov.au/content/report/default.asp , last visited on 13 March 2009. 
31 See Parliamentary Trade & Industry Committee Report; supra note 29, at p. xvii.  
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wholesale price of fuels is higher. It was estimated in 1995 that the cost of distributing 
fuels to the Highlands and Islands in the UK was about 16.6% higher than to 
Scotland’s urban areas.32 Another issue concerns turnover, which is typically lower 
for rural areas; and as a result the independent fuel retailers operating there cannot 
benefit from bulk-buying discounts and other financial assistance offered by the oil 
companies to larger and more profitable sites. As a result, larger wholesalers 
discontinued direct supplies to rural outlets not only because of their low-volume sites 
but also considering the difficult terrain and extended distribution networks required 
to supply these sites. The smaller wholesalers who took over the function of supplying 
these sites are unable to offer the price support necessary for them to compete against 
the cheaper urban sites.33 Consequently, rural pump prices tend to be significantly 
higher and occasionally force residents to drive several miles to find cheaper fuel. 
 
Table 1.1 Retailer groups – ownership, percentage volume and average 
throughput, 2006 
Groups No. of 
Sites 
% of Sites % Volume Avg. Volume 
(ml) 
Major oil companies 
 
5,431 61.5 57.6 3.8 
Supermarkets 
 
1,175 12.0 31.4 9.5 
Branded minors 
 
1,620 13.5 7.9 1.7 
Other minor brands 
 
464 1.4 1.0 0.8 
Unbranded 
 
1,089 11.2 2.2 0.7 
UK Total 9,779 100 100 3.6 (Avg.) 
 
Source:  Catalist (UK Petrol Retail Consultants) 
 
                                                 
32 See id., xviii. 
33 See id., xviii. 
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The Petrol Retailers Association (PRA) is of the view that it is not socially and 
environmentally acceptable for motorists to drive 30–40 miles for each fill-up. The 
PRA Chairman was recently quoted as saying for example that ‘the average distance 
that someone in Scotland has to drive to find an open forecourt is now seven miles’.34  
 
Furthermore, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) UK survey of 1998 recognised that the 
number of independent fuel retailers had fallen disproportionately in recent years, and 
attributed this to their low volume of sales, higher cost of delivery, and probably, less 
well diversified outlets.35 However, they argued that this was not a cause for serious 
concern since the independents do not appear to be ‘pivotal in setting retail prices’ nor 
the ‘prime drivers of petrol retail competition generally’. Nevertheless, they agreed 
that concerns might be raised when the loss of rural independent retailers led to some 
areas of the UK being underserved by a few retail outlets leading to customers having 
to drive unreasonably long distances to obtain fuels. Although they recognised these 
concerns, they argued that other government actions rather than competition 
legislation would be capable of addressing such issues. The DG (OFT) was quoted in 
2006 as saying, ‘it would be wrong to take action under the competition legislation to 
prevent price competition now in order to avoid some risk that in future competition 
might be a little less, provided that current competition is based on efficiency or scale 
advantages rather than predatory pricing and that the market is adequately 
monitored’.36 
 
                                                 
34 IFFE Energy Institute Seminar, UK Forecourt Market Trends (2006). 
35 For more details, see Briefing Paper from the UK Petroleum Industry Association (UKPia): Fuel 
Supply to Rural Filling Stations (2009). Available online at 
http://www.ukpia.com/Portals/0/Repository/Documents/UKPIA%20Briefing%20Rural%20Petrol%20S
tations.pdf, last visited on 07 October 2009. 
36 See id., p. xv. 
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The Parliamentary Trade and Industry Committee (Sixth Report, 1995-6) also 
maintained that concerns may arise if a significant closure of a large number of fuel 
outlets in rural areas led to the creation of local monopolies or oligopolies, in which 
case a certain retailer or group of retailers having a large share of the local market 
could abuse their position. The OFT’s study of fuel prices in different regions of the 
UK, and the specific market conditions identified in the Highlands & Islands by 
Halcrow Fox (transport consultants) have provided clear evidence of the existence of 
local markets in rural fuel retailing.37 
 
Fuel retail sites are also governed by environmental and safety regulations and the 
costs of compliance are hardest for those retailers with low-volume throughput and 
low margins (basically the case with independent retailers in rural areas).38 The Rural 
Development Commission had expressed concerns in recent years about the cost of 
complying with regulatory standards in rural areas. Although exemptions and 
derogations had reduced this burden on some fuel retailers, however the discretion 
available to the enforcing agencies is limited and their approach varies from area to 
area.39 Stage I of the EU Petrol Recovery Directive has already taken its toll on rural 
fuel sites, owing to the extra cost of equipment replacement. It is feared that the 
number of rural sites that would be forced to close if stage II of the EU Petrol 
Recovery Directive is implemented could be higher, because the cost of equipment 
replacement might range from £20,000 to £60,000 per rural outlet.40 All EU member 
                                                 
37 See Parliamentary Trade & Industry Committee Report; supra note 29, at xix. 
38 House of Commons (Trade and Industry Committee Sixth Report), Petrol Retailing xix (Session 
1995-1996). 
39 See TIC Report; supra note 29, at xx. 
40 House of Commons (Parliamentary Environmental Committee 1st Report), Volatile Organic 
Compounds, Para. 143 (Session 1994-95). 
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states are required to comply with this directive (EU Directive 96/63/EC)41 not later 
than 1 January 2012. However, under UK legislation, sites with fuel sales above 3.5 
million litres per annum are expected to install petrol vapour recovery equipment 
(Stage II) before the 1 January 2010 deadline (2012 for Scotland).42 The implication is 
that smaller outlets retailing less than 3.5 million litres will not be affected by the 
directive. 
 
In the case of Australia, supermarkets’ entry into fuel retailing is now well established 
and independent fuel retailers are beginning to lose significant market share. Tables 
1.2 and 1.4 show market share by sales volume by brand in 2001 and 2006-7 
respectively. The supermarkets normally buy products from independent importers or 
oil majors or both. They retail fuel at their own outlets and are usually managed by 
agents on a commission basis.43 The major players are Woolworths, Safeways and 7-
Eleven, a wholly owned subsidiary. Woolworths expanded its network from 85 
outlets to about 200 by the end of 2000.44 They have been offering their customers 
competitively priced fuel and a further discount per litre with minimum purchase 
                                                 
41 See the Adoption of EU Directive 96/63/EC by the European Parliament and Council on 11 
September 2009. Available online at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st03/st03669.en09.pdf, last visited on 07 October 2009. 
42 See UKPia Briefing Paper: Stage II Vapour Recovery. Available online at 
http://www.ukpia.com/industry_issues/climate_environment_air_quality_health_safety/vapour_recover
y_at_filling_stations.aspx, last visited on 07 October 2009. For more details see the Consultation Paper 
from the Scottish Government on Stage II Petrol Vapour Recovery. Available online at 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/consultations/environment/pvr2_consultation.pdf, last visited on 07 
October 2009. Also see the European Commission (DG Environment): Stage II Petrol Vapour 
Recovery – Final Report. Available online at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/pdf/entec_report.pdf, 
last visited on 07 October 2009. 
43 ACCC, Report from Frontier Economics on Economic Implications of Terminal Gate Pricing p. 6 
(2001). 
44 Roarty, M., Petroleum Refining & Marketing in Australia – Changes Ahead 11, Parliament of 
Australia: Current Issues Brief 11 1999-2000. Available online at http:// 
www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cib11.htm, last visited on 21 April 2009.  
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vouchers obtained from their grocery stores. Similar to the independent retailers, 
supermarkets are not affected by the Franchise and Sites Acts.45  
Table 1.2 Market shares of petrol retailer groups in Australia, 2001 
 
Company/Group % Market Share 
BP 17 
Mobil 16 
Shell 17 
Caltex 19 
Independents 20 
Woolworths 
(Supermarket) 
11 
Total 100 
 
Source:  IBIS World Australia; Automotive Fuel Retailing in Australia (2001). 
 
The entry of supermarkets into fuel retailing in Australia represents a ‘rapid and 
massive change’46 to fuel retailing and represents the greatest threat to rural 
independent fuel retailers. Recent significant changes in the supermarket segment 
include a co-branding arrangement between Woolworths networks and Caltex in 
November 2003, and also an alliance between Coles Myer Ltd (CML) and Shell in 
May 2003. Woolworths/Caltex joint-venture offers their customers a fuel discount of 
4 cpl which it intends to extend to their 450 retail stations nation wide.47 Based on the 
terms of the joint venture (JV), a subsidiary of CML will operator Shell’s core retail 
                                                 
45 Commonwealth Numbered Acts, Petroleum Retail Marketing Sites Act No.140 (1980). Available 
online at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/prmsa1980352/ , last visited on 9 April 2009 
OR see Commonwealth of Australia Numbered Acts, 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/1980/ & Commonwealth Numbered Acts, Petroleum 
Retail Marketing Franchise Act No. 139 (1980). Available online at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/prmfa1980359/ , last visited on 9 April 2009 OR see 
Commonwealth of Australia Numbered Acts, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/1980/  
46 Australian Institute of Petroleum (AIP), Downstream Petroleum 5 (2003). Available online at 
http://www.aip.com.au/pdf/Downstream_Petroleum_2003_Report.pdf , last visited on 20 April 2009. 
47 See id., p. 17. 
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network of 584 service outlets. Also in September 2003, Independent Grocers of 
Australia (IGA) launched a fuel offer which tied the purchase of $30 worth of 
groceries bought from an IGA store to a 4 cpl refund on fuel purchased from any 
supplier.48 These alliances offer fuel discounts to grocery customers (shopper docket 
schemes). With these discounts, the supermarkets’ share of the fuels retail market is 
set to grow rapidly within the next decade (see Table 1.3). 
 
Table 1.3 Projected future outlook of supermarket market share in 
Australia (estimates as at 2004) 
Sources of market share % Market share 
Woolworths/Caltex JV 11 (Actual) 
Coles Myer/Shell JV 22 (Actual) 
Coles Myer discount offers + Woolworths  
    Planned Increase in Sites from 285 to 400 
17 (Estimates) 
Estimated market share by 2010 50 
 
Source:  This research. 
 
In February 2004, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 
investigated the impact of these shopper docket schemes and released its report into 
discount offers as they affect competition in the fuel retail market.49 The report 
concluded that it has encouraged competition and lower fuel prices. It also argued that 
supermarkets have been an integral part of the French and UK fuel markets for over 
10 years and have captured substantial market share while delivering competitively 
priced fuels. The ACCC contended that these countries have remained competitive in 
                                                 
48 See id., p. 17. 
49 ACCC Report, Assessing Shopper Docket Petrol Discounts & Acquisitions in the Petrol and Grocery 
Sectors p. 2 (2004). Available online at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/501158/fromItemId/655475, last visited on 10 
March 2009. 
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delivering fuel to consumers in spite of the advent of supermarkets into fuel retailing 
arrangements.50 
 
The Service Station Association (SSA) are of the view that shopper docket offers an 
indirect means by which supermarkets subsidise below-cost selling of fuels from the 
proceeds of grocery sales and considers it as unfair trading practice against other 
competitors in the fuel retailing business.51 They also consider ‘below-cost selling’ as 
unsustainable on its own unless cross-subsidised by a different commercial activity. 
 
The SSA observed that the two joint ventures between Woolworths/Caltex and Coles 
Myer/Shell have resulted in about 40% of fuels in Australia being sold through a 
supermarket outlet.52 With the exception of BP and Mobil (the remaining non-aligned 
majors), there are no other players in the fuel retail industry that have the financial 
capacity to sell fuels below cost on a sustained basis. They observed that the 
Coles/Shell experience in Melbourne produced an average of 60% increase in fuel 
sales across the entire Victorian network in the three weeks of the rollout.53 These 
higher volumes are being maintained. The Caltex/Woolworths JV is expected to result 
in JV sites making sales at the rate of between 800,000-1,000,000 litres per month. 
The total fuel retail market is estimated at about 1,900 million litres (ML) per month. 
The SSA estimates that 580 Coles/Shell sites should sell about 650,000 litres per 
month while the 450 Caltex/Woolworths outlets should each sell about 900,000 litres 
per month. Therefore, the two major supermarkets were estimated to sell about 790 
                                                 
50 Australian Government (DITR), Energy Markets: Delivering Australia’s Transport Fuel Needs 7. 
Available online at http:// www.industry.gov.au, last visited on 16 March 2009. 
51Service Station Association; SSA Letter to ACCC Regarding Proposed Joint Venture Between 
Woolworths Ltd and Caltex Australia Ltd p.1. Available online at 
http://www.ssa.org.au/overview_admin/ssa_accc_wooliescaltex.htm, last visited on 20 March 2009. 
52 See id., p. 1. 
53 See id., p. 2. 
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ML per month, leaving about 1,110 ML per month for the remaining sites in the 
country. Considering a minimum viability of 400,000 litres per month and the total 
number of fuel retail sites of 8,000, the remaining 1,110 ML per month will only 
allow about 3,000 sites to operate out of the total non-supermarket outlets of about 
7,000.54 Therefore, some 4,000 outlets are expected to close. 
 
The SSA calculated that Shell’s market share of 22% (which now comes under 
Coles’s control) plus Woolworths’ share of 11% yields a total share of 33% to the two 
major supermarkets. With an estimated further increase in market share of about 17% 
coming from Coles discount offers and the Woolworths planned increase in sites from 
285 to 400, the supermarkets are poised to capture about 50% of the fuel retail market 
in Australia in two to three years. Table 1.4 shows the relative market share by sales 
volume by brand in 2006-07, and confirms these projections of the market share of 
the supermarkets. 
Table 1.4 Market share by sales volume, Australia: 2006-7 
BRAND MARKET SHARE (%) 
Woolworths/Caltex 22 
Coles Express 22 
BP 19 
Caltex 16 
Mobil 11 
Shell 3 
Independents 7 
TOTAL 100 
 
Source:  Report of the ACCC Inquiry into the Price of Unleaded Petrol (2007) p. 76. 
 
                                                 
54 See id., p. 2. 
  
23 
The SSA contends that the real impact of such concentration of market power will be 
to put immense pressure on independent service stations, particularly those in rural 
and regional Australia and will inevitably lead to the closure of many of these, 
thereby depriving regional communities of necessary fuel supply services. Moreover, 
the mechanical repair business associated with most of the rural and regional sites will 
also disappear.55 The SSA contends that since the independents have little access to 
substantial financial support, they will be decimated within a few years under such a 
market environment, unless the government places restrictions on the activities of 
supermarkets. Future rises in fuel prices are anticipated, should the projected large 
number of retail outlets be allowed to close. 
 
The SSA concluded that the supermarket offerings will result in a massive 
realignment of the supply–demand balance in the fuel retail industry, such that 
between 40% and 50% of currently existing fuel sites will not be viable and will have 
to close. Most of the independent outlets are expected to disappear and with them the 
only real capacity for increasing the scope of competition. They argued that as a 
minimum the government should outlaw ‘loss leading’ in the fuel retail trade as 
represented by the shopper docket offers or offer comfort to such rural and regional 
areas as might be affected by the widespread closure of rural fuel outlets. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 See id., p. 1. 
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1.5 Analytical framework 
 
1.5.1 Research problems 
The presence of few fuel outlets in rural and remote locations results in pricing 
problems, such as high rural fuel prices and rural–urban pump price differentials. A 
resolution of these problems is expected to boost rural development activities. Fuel 
retailing in such locations is an endogenous economic activity. However, these 
problems pose concerns not only to rural communities but also to governments, 
because high fuel prices generate significant multiplier effects on the cost of 
transportation, and by extension the prices of all consumer goods/services, and rural 
business activities. This situation suggests that some regulation of fuel retail activities 
(as an exogenous input) in such locations might be necessary. However, the question 
arises as to whether the regulation of fuel retailing activities in rural areas would 
contribute to a rural development policy. 
 
Preliminary research outcome indicates that government responses are generally in 
the form of regulatory support mechanisms and fuel subsidy schemes. The former 
encourages and promotes the activities of independent rural fuel retailers whereas the 
latter sustains those activities. Another question arises as to whether state aid is 
necessary in order to promote effective fuel retailing activities in rural areas. 
 
1.5.2 Research questions 
The two main research questions are:  
(a) ‘How can the regulation of fuel retailing activities contribute to a rural 
development policy’? 
(b) ‘Is state aid essential in promoting fuel retailing activities in rural areas’? 
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1.5.3 Hypotheses 
This study hypothesises that:  
(a) The regulation of fuel retailing activities, as an exogenous factor, could contribute 
to a rural development policy if regulatory support mechanisms and fuel subsidy 
schemes are targeted at rural transport, and energy infrastructure reforms.  
(b) State aid is necessary in promoting fuel retailing activities in rural areas, 
particularly where market failures have been identified, because economically viable 
rural areas are necessary conditions for balanced national development.  
1.5.4 Research objectives 
The objectives of the study are to:  
(a) review the literature on regional development theories and approaches to rural 
development policy in order to identify appropriate theories or approaches that could 
be applied to the research project;   
(b) identify the variety of regulatory support mechanisms and fuel subsidy schemes 
used to promote fuel retailing activities in rural areas in both jurisdictions; 
(c) determine the current relevance and applicability of identified regulatory support 
mechanisms and fuel subsidy schemes in the regulation of fuel retailing in rural areas; 
(d) examine state aid instruments in both jurisdictions in order to determine whether, 
and if so, how state aid could assist fuel retailing activities in rural areas and/or how 
state aid instruments could be used to facilitate a rural development policy; 
 (e) investigate trends in rural development policies in both jurisdictions in order to 
explain possible differences in approaches to rural development (if any), and to 
determine the role of fuel retailing activities in an overall rural development strategy; 
(f) propose how the regulation of fuel retailing activities could contribute to a rural 
development policy; 
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(g) propose or recommend additional regulatory measures that could enhance the 
regulation of fuel retailing activities such as could boost rural development. 
1.5.5 Research purpose 
The outcome of the author’s extensive review of the literature on research methods 
and methodology indicates that research scholars have identified four main purposes 
for research activities: explanatory, descriptive, exploratory, and prescriptive 
purposes.56 Patton contends that clarity about purpose is the controlling force in 
research because decisions about design, measurement, and analysis all flow from it.57 
Therefore, he suggests, the researcher should identify the purpose/s for his/her 
research project (as different from research objectives) by correlating the research 
questions to the research objectives. 
 
1.5.5.1 Explanatory 
Wisker explains that “explanatory research serves to clarify the relationship between 
variables and the components of the research problem/s. It highlights the complex 
inter-relationships existing within a particular phenomenon and contained within the 
research problem/s”.58 Punch reinforces this idea by stating that explanatory (causal) 
research clarifies the nature of the problem under investigation and explains the basis 
for any proposed solution. Therefore, this kind of research helps “to explain the 
                                                 
56 Wisker, G., The Postgraduate Research Handbook pp. 119-122 (2001). Also see Hart, C., Doing a 
Literature Review: Releasing the Social Science Research Imagination p. 47 (1998). The author’s 
chosen reporting style for this section and the methodology section is to clarify what the literature on 
research methods and research methodology says about these sections, and then to relate these to the 
author’s chosen research purpose and methodology. The aim of this reporting style is to make the 
choices of purpose and methodology more explicit and clearer. 
57 Patton, M. Q., Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods p. 213 (3rd ed., 2002). 
58 See Wisker; supra note 56, at p. 120. Also see Miles, M. B. & Huberman, A. M., Qualitative Data 
Analysis pp. 90-91 (2nd ed., 1994). 
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complex web of interrelated variables identified and follows from a clearly stated 
central research question/s and hypothesis/es”.59 
 
Both research questions in this thesis possess a fundamentally explanative intent. 
Responding to these questions requires the clarification of the research variables such 
as regulation of fuel retailing activities, state aid as a regulatory tool, and a rural 
development policy. The research questions can only be answered satisfactorily, and 
the requirements of research objectives (b), (d), and (f) properly addressed, if the 
relationship between these three variables is explained. To this extent, this research 
adopts an explanatory purpose. 
 
1.5.5.2 Descriptive 
Miles and Huberman explain that “descriptive research serves the purpose of 
collection, organisation and summarisation of information and data about the research 
problem and issues identified therein. This entails an adequate examination of the 
research problem for the specific purpose of describing the phenomenon by defining, 
measuring and clarifying it”.60  
 
All research is partly descriptive in nature, especially with regard to the ‘who’, ‘what’, 
‘when’, ‘where’, ‘why’, and ‘how’ of the study. Therefore, this research adopts a 
descriptive purpose in parts. To answer the research question and test the proposed 
hypotheses, it is necessary to address the following research sub-questions:  
(a) What are the essential components of a rural development policy? 
                                                 
59 Punch, K. F., Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches pp. 14-16 
(2nd ed., 2005). For details on the role of research questions, developing research questions, and 
hypotheses formulation, see pp. 33-37. 
60 Miles, M. B. & Huberman, A. M., Qualitative Data Analysis pp. 90-91 (2nd ed., 1994). 
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(b) What are the existing theories on rural development? And if none, what 
approaches could be deduced from existing theories on regional development? 
(c) If so, what are the likely approaches to rural development? 
(d) How does the concept of regulation relate to rural development, universal service 
obligations, and the principle of universality? 
(e) How can the concepts of subsidies and state aid be defined and differentiated in 
relation to the research questions? 
 
These research sub-questions correlate with the research objectives (a)–(f), are 
integral to the testing of the hypotheses, and are necessary for answering the research 
questions. However, these questions can only be answered implicitly through the 
literature review (Chapter 2) and accordingly impose a partly descriptive purpose to 
this research. 
 
1.5.5.3 Exploratory 
Wisker suggests that the primary purpose of exploratory research “is to explore a 
complex phenomenon, with the objective of clarifying the identified complexities and 
the revelation of the underlying nature of the phenomenon”.61 As Sekaran further 
clarifies, “exploratory research investigates a specified phenomenon/problems for the 
purpose of shedding new light upon it and, consequently, uncovering new 
knowledge”.62 Wisker explains that exploratory research can be carried out through 
case studies, focus group interviews, structured or semi-structured interviews with 
experts, and a search of the relevant literature. 
 
                                                 
61 See Wisker; supra note 56, at pp. 119-120. For more details, see Miles & Huberman; supra note 60, 
at pp. 172-174. 
62 Sekaran, U., Research Methods for Business: A Skill-Building Approach pp. 119-120 (4th ed., 2003). 
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This research adopts the case study approach in investigating the research questions, 
and in testing the hypotheses.63 The first research question is essentially exploratory 
in nature and correlates with research objectives (b), (d), and (e). 
 
1.5.5.4 Prescriptive  
Wisker contends that a prescriptive research study is a one that aims to propose well 
defined solutions to the investigated research problem. Prescriptive research 
prescribes a set of solutions or recommendations, but also presents a well defined, 
comprehensively explained, and feasible solution.64 Patton further clarifies that 
descriptive, explanatory, and exploratory purposes tend to focus upon facts on the 
ground, but the prescriptive purpose focuses on what should be and what should not 
be done.65 Other research scholars66 agree that research that embraces the prescriptive 
purpose tends to be more valuable than that which eschews it, since it adds to and 
expands the parameters of the field. 
 
The first research question, the research hypotheses, and research objectives (f) and 
(g) impose a prescriptive purpose upon the study. Simply, one of the main objectives 
of this study is to generate a set of solutions and recommendations (based on research 
findings) on how the regulation of fuel retailing activities in rural areas can potentially 
contribute to a rural development strategy. Accordingly, the ultimate purpose of the 
research is prescriptive in nature. 
 
                                                 
63 See details of the case study design in the methodology section of this thesis. 
64 See Wisker; supra note 56, at pp. 121-122. 
65 For clarifications of the difference between basic research and applied research, see Patton; supra 
note 57, at p. 217. 
66 These include Sekaran 2003, Punch 2000, etc. 
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1.5.6 Methodology 
 Hart defines research methodology as “a system of methods and rules to facilitate the 
collection and analysis of data. It provides the starting point for choosing an approach 
made up of theories, ideas, concepts and definitions of the topic; therefore the basis of 
a critical activity consisting of making choices about the nature and character of the 
social world (assumptions). This should not be confused with techniques of research, 
the application of methodology”.67 Thus, research methodology is slightly different 
from research design. 
 
Research design refers to the research blueprint by which it is possible for other 
researchers’ to replicate the process, whereas research methodology refers to the 
procedural rules for the evaluation of research claims and the validation of the 
knowledge gathered. Therefore, research design is an integral aspect of research 
methodology. 
 
Hart clarifies that research methodology is of critical importance because it identifies 
the research tools and strategies that will be employed in a research project, and 
relates their use to specified research aims. This is consistent with Sekaran’s 
suggestion that “the relevance of a research methodology stems from the fact that it 
defines the activity of a specified research, its procedural methods, the strategies for 
progress measurement, and the criteria for research success.  
 
                                                 
67 See Hart; supra note 56, at p. 28. 
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On the other hand, the function of the research design is to articulate the strategies and 
tools by which data and information will be collected and analysed.”68 The research 
design also connects the research questions to the data/information and articulates the 
tools by which research hypotheses could be tested and research objectives achieved. 
In order to exercise these functions, a research design proceeds in four steps. The first 
step involves the articulation and selection of the research questions. The second step 
requires identification of the relevant data/information. The third step involves a 
determination of the data/information collection focus. The fourth step deals with the 
selection of the method by which data will be analysed and verified.69 
 
1.5.6.1 Research approaches 
According to Sekaran, the selection of research approach or approaches is a critically 
important decision, because it gives the researcher the opportunity to consider how 
each of the various approaches may contribute to, or limit, his/her study.70 This allows 
the researcher to satisfy the articulated objectives and research questions and to design 
the research to satisfy its requirements.71  
 
Hart explains that the research approach embraces the quantitative versus the 
qualitative, and the deductive versus the inductive. Each set of approaches is 
perceived as referring to polar opposites. However, a researcher should not limit 
him/herself to any particular approach, but could use a variety of approaches as 
required by the study. 
                                                 
68 See Sekaran; supra note 62, at pp. 117-119. For details on issues and options in research design, see 
Hart; supra note 56, at p. 49. 
69 Creswell, J. W., Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches pp. 73-
86 (2nd ed., 2003). Also see Punch; supra note 59, at pp. 62-68. 
70 See Sekaran; supra note 62, at pp. 117-119. 
71 See Punch; supra note 59, at pp. 19-27. 
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1.5.6.1(a) Deductive versus inductive approaches 
The deductive approach may be referred to as a testing of theories.72 Sometimes, 
theories are not available for use for particular research projects, in which case the 
researcher may opt for testing derived or explicit approaches, or conceptual precepts 
to the subject area. Hart explains that in the case of the deductive approach, the 
researcher proceeds with a set of theories and conceptual precepts in mind and 
formulates the study’s hypotheses on their basis. The researcher then proceeds to test 
the proposed hypotheses. Conversely, the inductive approach commences with a set 
of observations from collected empirical data and proceeds to formulate concepts and 
theories in accordance with the observations.73 The choice of which method to adopt 
would largely depend on the research questions, the proposed hypotheses, and the 
research objectives.  
 
This research opted for the deductive approach, in line with the proposed hypotheses 
and research objectives. This research adopts the territorial concept of rurality and a 
mix of endogenous and exogenous approaches to rural development as the basis for 
argument.74 
 
1.5.6.1(b) Justification for the choice of territorial approach 
There are two main approaches to the concept of rurality: rural as a distinct locality, 
and rural area as a social representation (i.e. territorial approach). The concept of 
rurality chosen depends largely on the problem to be solved and the case studies 
                                                 
72 Porta, D. D & Keating, M., Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralistic 
Perspective pp. 63-66 (2008). For details on the deductive and inductive approaches, see Hart; supra 
note 56, at pp. 81-87. See Sekaran; supra note 62, at pp. 27-32. See McConville, M. & Chui, W. H., 
Research Methods for Law p. 113 (2007). Also see Patton; supra note 57, at pp. 55-58. 
73 For more details, see Hart (1998); supra note 56, at pp. 81-83 
74 The territorial concept of rurality and the mix of endogenous and exogenous approaches are 
explained in more details in Chapter 2. 
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involved. In the context of this thesis, the territorial approach is the relevant one 
because it enables the author to regard rural space as a territorial entity, which 
embraces a regional economy with agricultural, industrial, and service activities. This 
choice enables the author to take into account other economic activities and 
relationships within a rural space, instead of conceiving the rural space as one meant 
for agricultural activities primarily, and every other activity as ancillary. 
 
1.5.6.1(c) Justification for the adoption of the mix of endogenous and 
exogenous approaches 
This approach emphasises the need to forge a link between local actors 
(entrepreneurs, local and municipal governments, local investors, local associations, 
etc.) and external institutions (regional and national governments, external private 
investors, etc.).75  
 
According to this approach, rural development can be seen as a complex interplay of 
networks involving these local actors and external factors whereby resources are 
jointly mobilised and deployed, and control of the rural development process becomes 
the responsibility of local and external forces. 
 
The nature of fuel retailing in rural areas, the associated rural problems, and by 
extension rural development would suggest the need for such interplay of local actors 
(fuel retailers, local governments, local associations, etc.), and external institutions 
(regulatory ministries, regional administrations, national governments, etc.). 
 
                                                 
75 For details on this mixed approach, see Chapter 2 (Literature Review) pp 24-26. 
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1.5.6.1(d) Quantitative versus qualitative approach 
Punch clarifies that qualitative analysis usually follows from qualitative research 
techniques, using for instance interviews, case studies, etc.76 Conversely, Creswell 
contends that quantitative tools are commonly used for the production of statistical 
data and data analysis. The tools are structured in such a way as to guarantee 
objectivity, generalisability and reliability.77 In this case, the results that are generated 
through the application of the tools are expected to be constant if the study is 
replicated, regardless of the identity of the researcher. This also involves the inclusion 
of a random and unbiased selection of respondents. 
 
The first of these tools (means, standard deviations and frequency distribution) is a 
cost-efficient method of reducing close-ended questionnaire data into straightforward 
statistics.78 These statistics would represent the average and variability of responses, 
with frequency distribution acting as the graphical representation of the numbers of 
times particular responses were given. The second tool (scattergram and regression 
analysis – correlation coefficients)79 goes a step further in that it helps the researcher 
to draw conclusions on the relationship between the variables. The third tool 
(difference or variance tests)80 measures one sample against a control group or 
baseline for the purpose of examining the differences between specific variables over 
a timeframe. 
                                                 
76 For details on designing a qualitative research, see Punch; supra note 59, at pp. 133-148. See Miles 
and Huberman, Framework for Qualitative Data Analysis; supra note 60, at pp. pp. 5-11. See Patton; 
supra note 57, at pp. 209-222. For details on hypothesis testing with qualitative research, see Sekaran; 
supra note 62, at pp. 109-112. For details on qualitative research procedures, see Creswell; supra note 
69, at pp. 179-197. 
77 See Creswell; supra note 69, at pp. 153-166. For details on quantitative research design and 
collecting quantitative data, see Punch; supra note 59, at pp. 62-103. For details on experimental 
designs, see Sekaran; supra note 62, at pp. 144-163. 
78 See Punch; supra note 59, at pp. 109-111. See Creswell; supra note 69, at pp. 172-173. Also see 
Sekaran; supra note 62, at pp. 311-314. 
79 See Punch; supra note 59, at pp. 118-124. Also see Sekaran; supra note 62, at pp. 397-405. 
80 See Punch; supra note 59, at pp. 113-117. 
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From the foregoing, it could be deduced that the conditions necessary for the use of 
quantitative tools are based primarily on the presence of quantifiable research data 
and the goal of reducing that data into statistical representations that generate 
observations and patterns. This study does not lend itself to the quantitative approach, 
but historical data are used where necessary to buttress an argument. This research 
confines itself to a variant form of the qualitative approach – the comparative 
contextual analysis.81 Banaker and Travers explain that in socio-legal studies, 
methods can only be better understood by looking at the different theoretical 
traditions that underpin the research project. Therefore, methods in socio-legal studies 
are not just techniques that can be employed to obtain facts about the social world, but 
can be used as part of a commitment to a theoretical perspective or approach.82  
 
The selection of research questions and the proposed hypotheses lend themselves to 
this approach. Therefore, this thesis employs the comparative contextual analysis (or 
what Gerring refers to as qualitative comparative analysis83) as the methodology for 
contrasting the regulation of fuel retailing activities in the UK and Australia; the 
application of state aid in rural fuel retailing or for boosting rural development in the 
two jurisdictions; and rural development objectives in both jurisdictions. This choice 
is informed by the fact that this methodology takes into account the reality of social, 
economic, political, and historical variables impacting on fuel retailing activities in 
different jurisdictions.  
 
                                                 
81 Findlay, M. & Henham, R., Integrating Theory and Method in the Comparative Contextual Analysis 
of Trial Process, In Research Methods for Law pp. 104-127 (2007). 
82 Banakar, R. & Travers, M., Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research pp. 19-20 (2005). 
83 Gerring, J., Case Study Research: Principles and Practices 4 (2007). 
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Testing of the hypotheses of this study involves choosing common comparators for 
investigating and analysing fuel retail regulation in the two jurisdictions, and likewise 
state aid provisions for facilitating rural fuel retailing or rural development, and rural 
development objectives. 
 
The first action involves choosing common comparators for fuel retail regulations 
which are:84 fuel retail site regulation; licence/ franchise regulation; retail/wholesale 
price regulation, fuel tax regulation; and environmental regulation. Sites and 
licence/franchise regulations are relevant comparators in the context of this study 
because the number of sites belonging to the different categories of fuel retail 
operators and the licence/franchise agreements between the oil majors and their 
dealers affects the concentration levels of the fuel retail sector and by implication the 
barriers to entry. Price and fuel tax regulations are useful comparators because these 
are directly related to the research problems, i.e. the problems of high rural fuel prices 
and the rural-urban fuel price differentials.  
 
Environmental regulation has been included as one of the comparators (under fuel tax 
regulation) because of the current emphasis on combating climate change and 
protecting the rural environment. Moreover, there is a relationship between modern 
fuel tax objectives, fuel subsidy schemes and environmental objectives. 
Contemporary fuel tax objectives include: improvement in air quality and reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions; supporting rural and regional development through 
promoting the production of petroleum product substitutes using agricultural 
products; and supporting industries that manufacture equipment required to use 
                                                 
84 These comparators are based on the identified regulatory support mechanisms and fuel subsidy 
schemes used by both governments in dealing with the research problems. These mechanisms and 
schemes are summarised in tables 3.1-3.4 (Chapter 3). 
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petroleum product substitutes (e.g. LPG conversion kits). However, competition 
regulation is not included in the set of comparators because of the absence of effective 
competition in most rural/remote areas as a result of the presence of relatively fewer 
outlets. Moreover, the solution to the research problems does not lie in competition 
legislation and the two jurisdictions did not provide for such solutions under their 
respective competition legislations. 
 
The second action involves a comparison of the UK/EU approaches to state aid with 
the Australian perspective. This includes an identification of the fuel subsidies that are 
applied in both jurisdictions to promote fuel retailing in rural areas, and their 
implications for modern fuel tax objectives. The third action involves a comparison of 
the rural development models in both jurisdictions and a determination of whether 
these objectives align with an endogenous, or exogenous, or a mix of endogenous and 
exogenous approaches to rural development. 
 
1.5.6.2 Research Strategy 
This study identifies three basic research strategies, or plans for addressing research 
question/s. These are the survey, the experimental, and the case study strategies. 
Others might include histories, and economic and epidemiologic research.85 A 
researcher may select one, a combination of several, or all of these strategies 
depending on the nature of the study and the research objectives. Scientific researches 
tend to use experimental strategy, while the social sciences tend towards survey and 
case study strategies. 
 
                                                 
85 Yin, R. K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods p. 2 (4th ed, 2009). 
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However, this study adopts the case study strategy based on the conceptual model 
approach. The conceptual model that is adopted for the purpose of this study is the 
mix of endogenous and exogenous approaches to rural development. “Case studies are 
the preferred method when (a) ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are being posed, (b) the 
researcher has little control over events, and (c) the focus is on a contemporary 
phenomenon within a real-life context”.86 This situation distinguishes case-study 
research from other types of social science research. Fundamentally, the two research 
questions which this study aims to answer are ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions,87 and the 
issue of fuel retail regulation as it relates to rural development policy is not an abstract 
but a contemporary issue within a real-life context. Contemporary issues are not 
within the control of the author of this research, as should be expected in non-
experimental research. Table 1.5 shows the relevant situations for different research 
methods. 
 
Yin argues that conceptual models are useful for the collection of well defined 
information and its later analysis and discussion.88 He explains that this approach is 
more often used when an issue or issues are being compared and contrasted, and 
enables the mapping of the issues and for their analyses. Yin further explains that this 
method enables the explanation of facts through theories or conceptual approaches; 
the expansion of knowledge through the classification of the relationship between 
reality and theory or conceptual approach; and most importantly, is best suited for the 
comparison of two entities.89  
 
                                                 
86 See id., p. 2. 
87 Answers to these questions should ultimately yield a set of recommendations on the best way 
forward in resolving the research problems. 
88 See id., pp. 130-132. 
89 See Miles & Huberman; supra note 60, at pp. 172-177. 
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Table 1.5 Relevant situations for different research methods 
METHOD Form of research 
question 
Requires control 
of 
behavioural 
events? 
Focuses on 
contemporary 
events 
Experiment 
 
How, why? Yes Yes 
Survey Who, what, where, how 
many, how much? 
No Yes 
Archival analysis Who, what, where, how 
many, how much? 
No Yes/No 
History 
 
How, why? No No 
Case Study 
 
How, why? No Yes 
 
Source: Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (4th ed., p. 8). 
 
The nature of the research questions, research objectives, and proposed hypotheses 
would suggest the adoption of this research strategy. 
 
1.5.6.2(a) Case study strategy: Justification for the choice of countries 
The study compares the UK and Australian jurisdictions on three issues which are 
interrelated: the regulation of fuel retailing activities in rural areas; the state aid 
instruments adopted for regulation of fuel retailing sector and/or for facilitating rural 
development; and the rural development objectives. The primary reason for choosing 
these countries is because of the seeming contrast between the positions of rural 
independents in both jurisdictions.90 Concerns have been raised by regulatory 
institutions in the UK and Australia about the possible implications of a high rate of 
retail site closures in rural areas, which includes high pump prices; effects of higher 
cost of living in rural areas; and the impact of high fuel prices on rural businesses. 
                                                 
90 This refers to the relative position of independent operators in both jurisdictions as at the time of 
commencing this research in 2004. 
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However, the measures put in place for dealing with this situation vary between the 
two countries. 
 
The choice of countries was based on other interesting similarities and differences. 
For instance current reports confirm that fuel retail sectors in both countries are 
operating competitively. Both countries have a well developed independent fuels 
retailing sub-sector, serving both urban and rural areas. Their fuel retail market 
structures are also similar comprising oil majors, dealers or franchisees, unbranded 
independents, independent chains, supermarkets. Rural fuel prices in the two 
jurisdictions are significantly higher than urban or metropolitan prices. 
 
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 show comparison of both jurisdictions, using five basic criteria: 
economic, legal, political, social systems and historical backgrounds (with respect to 
fuels retailing). The results also indicate that the two countries share almost the same 
characteristics on all five dimensions. However, they differ in their legal and political 
set-up. The UK operates a unitary parliamentary democracy, whereas Australia 
operates a federal parliamentary democracy. Both have devolved administrations 
(component states or regions) for the purpose of dealing with localised issues.  
 
They both have sophisticated legislative and institutional frameworks. Moreover, the 
Australian system is essentially patterned after the UK, due to historical affiliations. 
However, there is a major difference in their legal systems, which might affect the 
issues of regulatory reforms and granting of certain forms of subsidies or state aid. 
Both countries operate the English common-law traditions. However, as a member of 
the EU, the UK is bound to apply and to abide by EU rules and regulations, while 
Australia, as a non-EU country, is not bound by any regional laws and/or regulations.  
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Moreover, the research identified that they operate at different stages in the 
development of their respective fuel retail sectors. For instance, Australia developed a 
sector-specific fuel retail legislation which existed between 1980 and 2007. These 
differences could reflect the differential treatment that both countries may have 
adopted in dealing with the problem of high pump prices in rural and remote 
locations, and those related to the high rural-urban fuel price differentials. 
 
Canada and the US also share the same historical affiliations with the UK and could 
have been possible comparators in the context of the study. However, the structure of 
the fuel retail trade in Canada differs from that of the UK. The supermarkets are yet to 
be involved in fuels retailing in Canada. Similarly, in the US the component states 
have different regulatory instruments guiding their fuel retail sector. France and 
Germany are also some of the EU countries that have fuel retail structures similar to 
those of the UK. However, due to language difficulties and the impact of the civil law 
tradition on their administrative processes, the author decided not to choose these as 
possible comparators. 
 
Table 1.6 Choice of countries (similarity mapping) 
 
Criteria Economic 
 
Legal Political Social Historical 
(petrol 
trade) 
Completely 
similar 
         
Similar 
 
      
Rather similar 
 
     
Dissimilar 
 
     
Source:  This research. 
. 
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Table 1.7  Justification for choice of countries (UK and 
Australia)  
Country/ 
criteria 
Economic 
system 
Legal 
system 
Political 
system 
Social 
system 
Historical 
background 
UK Operates a 
free and 
competitive 
market 
economy. 
 
UK is a 
member of the 
OECD. 
Common 
law 
tradition; 
accepts ICJ 
jurisdiction; 
bound by 
EU rules 
and 
regulations. 
Head of State: 
Queen 
Elizabeth II. 
Operates a 
unitary 
parliamentary 
democracy, 
made up of 
the Houses of 
Commons & 
Lords. 
Welfarist 
and 
egalitarian 
society. 
Initial entrants into the 
petrol retail trade were 
the oil majors and also 
a few independents 
who were quickly 
absorbed. To 
consolidate their 
influence, the majors 
introduced the solus 
trading scheme in the 
1930s as a basis for 
commercial 
relationships with 
dealers and 
independents. The 
supermarkets emerged 
from 1965-75 and are 
currently threatening to 
control 50% of the 
trade. 
Australia Operates a 
western-style 
capitalist 
economy 
(patterned 
after the UK 
system, based 
on historical 
affiliations). 
 
Australia is 
also an OECD 
member state. 
Based on 
English 
common 
law; accepts 
ICJ 
jurisdiction; 
but not 
bound by 
any regional 
rules and 
regulations. 
Chief of State: 
Queen 
Elizabeth II. 
Operates a 
federal 
parliamentary 
democracy, 
made up of 
the Senate and 
the House of 
Representativ
es 
(patterned 
after the UK 
political 
setting). 
 In line 
with the 
UK value 
system. 
Initial entrants were 
also the oil majors, 
followed by a few 
independents that were 
subsequently acquired 
by the majors. To 
consolidate their 
control on the trade, the 
majors introduced the 
solo marketing scheme 
in the 1960s aimed at 
establishing contractual 
business relationships 
with dealers and 
independents. 
Supermarkets entered 
the trade in the mid-
1990s, and based on 
future outlook they 
could control about 
50% of the trade. 
 
Source: This research. 
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1.5.7 Sources of evidence 
The research coverage includes primary and secondary sources as forms of evidence. 
The primary materials would include legal documents (including statutes and cases). 
The secondary materials include reports from regulatory authorities in both 
jurisdictions; publications by industry and trade associations; books; journal articles, 
monographs, conference papers, institutional research projects, speeches, and other 
internet sources. It was relatively easier to collect relevant data, reports, and 
publications on the two jurisdictions, because both governments have enacted a 
Freedom of Information Act,91 and have similar institutions/agencies and regulatory 
instruments. Some examples are: the OFT (ACCC), Institute of Petroleum (Australian 
Institute of Petroleum), Petroleum Retailers Association (Service Station 
Association), etc.92 
 
1.5.8 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured in three parts.  
Part 1 (Setting the Scene) consists of three chapters: introduction; literature review; 
and an overview of rural fuel supply (with emphasis on rural fuel pricing) in the UK 
and Australia. 
 
Part 2 (Investigation Phase) documents the outcomes of the comparative study and 
analysis and consists of four chapters: comparative analysis of sites and 
licence/franchise regulation in both countries; state aid instruments for rural 
                                                 
91
UK Freedom of Information Act, 2000. Available online at http://www.cfoi.org.uk/foiact2000.html , 
last visited on 2 May 2009. Australian Freedom of Information Act, 1982. Available online at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/legislation/actcompilation1.nsf/0/6364FF89B3CA5ADECA2573D
4001B0AD6/$file/FreedmInfo1982_WD02.pdf , last visited on 2 May 2009. 
92The words in brackets refer to the Australian equivalents of UK institutions/agencies, and regulatory 
instruments. 
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development in both jurisdictions; fuel price and tax regulations; and a comparative 
analysis of the rural development trends and objectives in both countries. 
 
Part 3 (Conclusions and Recommendations) is a chapter that discusses and assesses 
the research outcomes, validates the hypotheses, answers the research questions, 
reaches conclusions and makes recommendations based on research findings.  
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Hart defines Literature Review as “the selection of available documents (both 
published and unpublished) on the topic, which contains information, ideas, data, and 
evidence written from a particular standpoint to fulfil certain aims or express certain 
views on the nature of the topic and how it is to be investigated, and the effective 
investigation of these documents in relation to the research being proposed”.1 
 
The objectives of this literature review are firstly, to develop a conceptual linkage 
within and across key theories, concepts, and ideas relating to the subject area; 
secondly, to review and discuss the major issues and debates about the research topic; 
and thirdly, to use the output of this review to justify the choice of research topic, 
approaches and case studies. 
 
Chapter 1 identifies broad categories of rural areas. The implication is that rural areas 
are not uniform in their degree of rurality, and therefore rural development policies 
will have to consider the peculiar needs of each of these categories. However, this 
chapter clarifies the meaning of rurality, and reviews regional development theories as 
well as approaches to rural development. The contribution of this exercise is to assist 
the author in identifying a rural development approach/s for the formulation of 
hypotheses for this study.  
 
                                                 
1 Hart, C., Doing a Literature Review: Releasing the Social Science Research Imagination p. 13 (1998). 
This definition integrates all aspects of the purposes of a literature review. 
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This chapter also reviews the related concepts of regulation, public service obligation 
and universality, and state aid/subsidies. The contribution of this objective is to 
furnish some insight into, and to develop rationale that explains, why governments 
intervene in the workings of markets, and to determine whether regulatory measures 
(including public subsidies) are applicable to the fuel retail sector. This chapter 
equally contributes to an understanding of the factors to be considered when analysing 
the applicability of different categories of public subsidies to a given situation.  
 
2.2 Review of the theories of rural economic development 
This aspect of the literature review will commence with a definition of the concept of 
rurality, followed by a review of rural development theories and approaches. The 
review is aimed at providing a source of factors that affect economic development in 
rural and remote locations, and provides useful insights into the means by which 
economic growth in industries and services can be encouraged. 
 
There are two parts to the review of rural development theories. The first part deals 
more specifically with the debate on economic development in rural regions, which 
involves three approaches: the exogenous, endogenous and the mixed 
exogenous/endogenous approaches. The mixed approach conceives rural development 
as interplay of networks comprising local and external actors, in which case resources 
are mobilised and the control of the development process rests with both local and 
external factors. 
 
The second part deals with a general review of regional economic growth theories, 
and how these theories relate to the three approaches to rural development. This part 
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will review the following models: traditional, pure agglomeration, local milieu, and 
territorial innovation models. 
 
2.2.1 The concept of rurality 
The debate on approaches to rurality is at the heart of rural studies.2 Two main 
approaches can be distilled out of the numerous meanings attributed to rurality. The 
first approach deals with concepts that describe a rural area as a distinct type of 
locality and the other deals with concepts that perceive a rural area as a social 
representation. In other words, the approaches can be seen as ‘the rural as space, and 
the rural as representing space’.3 These approaches to the definition of rurality are in 
turn briefly discussed below. 
 
2.2.1.1 The rural as space  
A variety of land-use variables or socio-economic variables create the basis for spatial 
classifications of rural areas.4 This approach can be sub-divided into two categories 
(spatial and territorial) in order to refine the meaning of ‘rural’.5 
 
The spatial approach is based on the notion that rural space has some characteristics 
that are different from urban spaces, and is also rooted in models of spatial economics 
whereby space is seen as a set of points in which economic agents (i.e. producers, 
                                                 
2 Pratt, A. C., Discourses of Rurality: Loose Talk or Social Struggle? p. 71 (pp. 69-78), Journal of 
Rural Studies 12-1 (1996).  Also see Measuring Rurality: What is Rural? US Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), Economic Research Service. Available online at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Rurality/WhatIsRural/, last visited on 12 April 2009.  
3 Halfacree, K. H., Locality and Social Representation: Space, Discourse and Alternative Definitions of 
the Rural p. 34 (pp. 23-37), Journal of Rural Studies, 9-1 (1993).  
4 Errington, A., The Peri-Urban Fringe: Europe’s Forgotten Rural Areas p. 367 (pp. 367-375), Journal 
of Rural Studies 10-4 (1994). 
5 Blanc, M., ‘Rurality: Concepts and Approaches’ – Paper presented at the 48th Seminar titled “Rural 
Restructuring within Developed Economies”, European Association of Agricultural Economists, 
Dijon, 20-21 March 1997. 
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labourers, and consumers) have to find out their optimal location.6 Spatial models are 
mostly linked to a hierarchical vision of space, a ranking of goods and services, and 
the presence of agglomeration and dispersion forces.7 With such models, structuring 
of space commences with a concentration of economic activities at the centre 
(referred to as urban areas) on the basis of transport costs and economies of scale.8 
The concentration of firms and labour forces at the centre then attracts retail 
businesses and services, which in turn deliver a diverse range of products, skills, and 
information. This diversification acts as a further incentive for another round of 
settlements of firms and labour forces in the centre. This agglomeration becomes a 
cumulative process that continues until the forces of dispersion are triggered. As 
competition for land use and negative externalities (e.g. pollution and congestion) 
becomes manifest, activities and agents are pushed out of the centre. Therefore, 
activities that are less land-intensive and people who enjoy fewer of the benefits that 
accrue to the centre tend to move away.  
 
Owing to this complex interplay of agglomeration and dispersion forces, a functional 
specialisation of spaces emerges. The space thus becomes structured such that the 
centres and peripheries differ in terms of the density of jobs and people, and also in 
the structure of economic activities and the characteristics of households. Therefore, 
the further away a rural location is from the centre, the more likely it is to find fewer 
basic services, less intensive land-use activities, and a relatively higher proportion of 
unemployed people. The periphery is often regarded as having traditional economic 
                                                 
6 See id., pp. 1-3. 
7 Mulligan, G. F., Agglomeration and Central -Place Theory: A Review of the Literature pp. 1-42, 
International Regional Science Review 9-1 (1984). 
8 Wood, G. A & Parr, J. B., Transaction Costs, Agglomeration Economies, and Industrial Location pp. 
1-15, Journal of Growth and Change 36-1 (2005). Available online at 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118586379/PDFSTART, last visited on 24 April 
2009. 
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and social structures, and likely to have a dependent relationship with the urban 
centre. On the basis of the spatial models, ‘rural’ means the ‘periphery’. Therefore, 
indices of rurality within the spatial approach would include population density, built-
up areas, land use, share of agriculture in employment, density of societies, and crime 
rates. 
 
In contrast with the spatial approach, which emphasises a strong connection between 
rural and agriculture and the urban–rural dichotomy, the territorial approach focuses 
on the economic diversification of rural areas. In this case, space is divided into 
territorial entities that embrace a local or regional economy. Therefore, each territorial 
entity consists of one or more centres and ‘open space’ and includes industrial, 
service, and agricultural activities. Some of the territorial entities are referred to as 
urban territories because they are densely populated, have a metropolitan centre, and a 
small area of open space. The other territorial entities are referred to as rural 
territories because they have low population density, one or more small- to medium-
sized towns, and a relatively large area of open space. A wide range of different 
settings exists in between the two extremes. However, the interrelationship between 
the different territories is not conceived as based on dependence, but rather is 
perceived in terms of a set of non-hierarchical competing local economies.9  
 
The down side to this approach is that the concepts of territory, local, and regional 
economy used are vague. These concepts refer to spatial entities in which political, 
economic, and socio-cultural life is structured and whose size may be different from 
                                                 
9 Saraceno, E., Alternative Readings of Spatial Differentiation: The Rural Versus the Local Economy in 
Italy pp. 451-474, European Review of Agricultural Economics 21-3/4 (1994). Available online at 
http://erae.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/21/3-4/451, last visited on 12 April 2009. 
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each other.10 Another down side is that although rural relates to low population 
density, this approach did not set a strict criterion for defining what ‘rural’ means. The 
implication is that the territorial approach provides for the co-existence of different 
rural territories, depending on the definition of the user for this approach. 
 
2.2.1.2 The rural as a social representation 
This constructivist approach views rural space as a mental construct that guides us in 
dealing with the complexity of the social world. In other words, ‘rural’ is a mental 
image which enables us to organise our behaviour and responses.11 Therefore, the 
mental constructs of rural will vary among actors, depending on place, time, and 
social groups. Some will refer to the rural scenic nature, open space, recreation, 
backwardness, etc. Some of these social representations of rural locations conceive of 
them as productive assets and others as consumption assets.12 The various social 
representations reflect the conflicts and controversies about alternative uses of rural 
space and are also related to the issue of power.13 Such conflicts might involve 
farmers’ interest groups, who prefer to exploit rural space and adapt some landscape 
elements; and tourists or nature conservation interest groups who prefer to retain the 
natural and cultural values of rural space. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Keating, M., The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political 
Change (1998). 
11 See Halfacree; supra note 3 , at p. 29 
12 Hoggart, K, et al. Rural Europe: Identity and Change p. 28 (1995). Also see Halfacree, K. H., 
Talking about Rurality: Social Representations of the Rural as Expressed by Residents of Six English 
Parishes pp. 1-20, Journal of Rural Studies 11-1 (1995). 
13 See Pratt; supra note 2, at p. 70. 
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2.2.2 Review of theories on broader regional economic development 
and approaches to rural development 
It might be useful to discuss the broader regional economic development theories, 
before going into the narrower development approaches for rural regions. The 
different theories have ramifications for the choice of rural development options in 
different jurisdictions. 
 
Three approaches can be sifted from the debate on approaches to rural development: 
the exogenous, the endogenous, and the mixture of the exogenous and endogenous 
development approaches. These approaches are useful in the conceptualisation of 
rural development, and have varying implications for the strategies employed by local 
actors and for rural development policies. These approaches also correspond closely 
and respectively with the broader theories on regional economic development, namely 
agglomeration models, the local milieu models and the territorial innovation models. 
 
2.2.2.1 Regional economic development theories 
Rural and regional development has a body of theory, which is made up of various 
informal models. However, “there is no single, broadly accepted and formally defined 
model that is codified in economics journals”.14 Camagni defines regional 
development as “the ability of each region to produce (with a comparative advantage) 
the goods and services that are demanded by the national and international system of 
                                                 
14 Ward, W. A & Hite, J. C., Theory in Rural Development: An Introduction and Overview, p.246. 
Journal of Growth and Change 29, pp. 245-258 (1998). Available online at 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119106833/PDFSTART, last visited on 14 May 
2009. Also see Van Der Ploeg et al. Rural Development: from Practices and Policies towards Theory, 
pp. 391-408. Sociologia Ruralis 40-4 (2000). Available online at 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119038134/PDFSTART, last visited on 14 May 
2009. For more details on various approaches to regional development theory, see Dawkins, C. J., 
Regional Development Theory: Conceptual Foundations, Classic Works and Recent Developments, pp 
131-172, Journal of Planning Literature 18-2 (2003). Available online at 
http://jpl.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/18/2/131, last visited on 14 May 2009. 
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which they form a part”.15 This definition implies that the process of regional 
economic change is part of interregional interdependencies, whereby some regions 
experience more development relative to others, albeit the overall level of regional 
development may increase in the long run.16 
 
Regional firms and production circumstances tend to determine the economic 
development process considering that firms’ ability to adapt to changes is at the core 
of realising economic growth.17 Theories of regional economic growth can be sub-
divided into four groups depending on the factors in the production function: 
traditional growth theories, pure agglomeration models, local milieu models, and 
territorial innovation models. These are discussed below.18 
 
2.2.2.1(a) Traditional growth theories  
These theories emphasise that output is measured as a function of the input of capital 
and labour. The neoclassical growth theory and the Keynesian export base theory are 
the main exponents of traditional growth theories. 
 
                                                 
15 Camagni, R. P., Final Report of the Research Project on Development Prospects of the Community’s 
Lagging Regions and the Socio-Economic Consequences of the Completion of the Internal Market: An 
Approach in Terms of Local Milieux and Innovation Networks p. 1 (1992). 
16 Healy, M. J., & Ilbery, B. W., Location & Change: Perspectives on Economic Geography p. 298 
(1990). 
17 Lambooy, J. G. et al., Spatial Economic Dynamics: An Introduction into the Theoretical Aspects of 
Economic Geography p. 73 (1997). 
18 Discussion is based on the following contributors: Camagni (supra note 13); Lambooy (supra note 
15); Healy & Ilbery (supra note 16); Malecki, E. J., Technology & Economic Development: the 
Dynamics of Local, Regional, and National Change (1991); Rijswick, C. W. J., Regional Economic 
Theory: Its Usefulness for Explaining Economic Development in Rural EU Regions (1997); Molle, W. 
& Cappellin, R., Regional Impact of Community Policies in Europe (1988).  
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According to the neoclassical growth theory, the evolution of regional growth 
differences depends on interregional mobility of the factors of production.19 
Therefore, given identical production functions, it is expected that capital will 
‘migrate’ to regions or localities where labour is abundant and cheap. Likewise, 
labour is expected to move in the opposite direction. These flows are likely to 
continue until return on capital and labour are equal in each region. Ultimately, per 
capita incomes are expected to converge. 
 
Based on the neoclassical theory, the best policy to counter unequal development of 
regions is non-intervention in terms of built and cultural assets. The aim of public 
policies in this regard would be to create dynamic rural economies that help bridge the 
gaps between standards of living with urban areas. Firstly, according to this theory 
devolution of local responsibilities to local governments is advisable, because 
devolution has the potential benefit of increasing local ownership and responsibility 
for rural development policy. This process is followed by active government support 
that is coordinated with local initiatives. Secondly, active labour market policies that 
incorporate sufficient flexibility to deal with rural conditions are necessary for 
enhancing rural employment opportunities. Thirdly, the education and training needs 
of rural and regional inhabitants20 is designed to be closely linked to business creation 
and expansion policies in order to achieve the desired efficiency purpose. 
 
However, the future of rural areas is likely to be influenced or transformed by the 
availability of new information technology and the emergence of information 
                                                 
19 For more details, see Smith, D., Neoclassical Growth Models and Regional Growth in the US pp. 
165-181, Journal of Regional Science 15-2 (1975). 
20 Mathur, V. K., Human Capital-Based Strategy for Regional Economic Development, pp. 203-216, 
Economic Development Quarterly 13-3 (1999).  
  
54 
highways. These technologies will tend to mitigate the disadvantages of distance and 
low density. It appears unlikely that adequate investment in information technology 
will take place in rural areas without public support. Therefore, public policies will 
still play a crucial role in facilitating the transition of rural areas, but these must be 
tailored to the specific features of particular areas and should be flexible enough to 
deal with the diversity of rural places.21 
 
In the case of the Keynesian (export-based) theory, economic activities are divided 
into basic activities for export and non-basic activities for domestic consumption. 
Based on this theory, regional economic changes would depend on the relative 
proportion of economic activities in a region that produces goods and services for 
export from the region. A decent growth of the basic export activities are expected to 
increase the flow of money into the region, increase the demand for goods and 
services within it, and thereby caused a corresponding increase in the volume of non-
basic activities.22 The size of this multiplier effect would depend on the amount of 
money that is spent in the region. In the neoclassical model, government is expected 
to pursue active labour market stimulation, whereas in the Keynesian model, the 
production of goods and services is naturally expected to boost employment.  
 
                                                 
21 Isserman, A. M., What Do We Want from Theory in Rural Development? p. 349, Growth and Change 
Journal 29 (Summer 1998). Available online at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-
bin/fulltext/119106838/PDFSTART, last visited on 16 May 2009. 
22 For more discussions, see North, D., Location Theory and Regional Economic Growth pp. 243-258, 
Journal of Political Economy 63 (June 1955). Available online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1825076, 
last visited on 13 May 2009. See North, D., Exports and Regional Economic Growth: A Reply pp. 165-
168, Journal of Political Economy 64-2 (April, 1956). Available online at   
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1826832.pdf, last visited on 13 May 2009.  See  Krikelas, A., Why 
Regions Grow: A Review of Research on the Economic Base Model, Economic Review, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta (July/August 1992). Also see, Swales, J.K., Resource-Constrained Export-
Base Regional Multipliers: A Northian Approach, pp. 223-250. Journal of Regional Science 45-1 
(2005). Available online at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-
bin/fulltext/118646435/PDFSTART, last visited on 13 May 2009. 
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2.2.2.1(b) Agglomeration models 
Agglomeration models pursue the idea that a concentration of the factors of 
production in a specific location can create external effects or scale economies. 
Cumulative causation theories and growth pole theories are the main exponents of 
these models. 
 
The cumulative causation theory posits that in the presence of regional growth 
disparities, a self-reinforcing process starts that tends to maintain the status of 
growing areas. The outcome is divergence among regions, contrary to the neoclassical 
theory where convergence is the expected trend. This theory assumes that firms in 
wealthy regions have distinct advantages relative to firms in lagging regions. For 
instance the size of the market is larger, enabling scale economies; the possibilities for 
innovation are greater; and the quality of the labour force is better. Therefore, an 
expansion in the wealthy region leads to a migration of human resources from lagging 
regions. In addition, new firms could be attracted to the wealthy regions due to the 
already existing concentration of economic activity. This possibility could in turn 
induce another wave of expansion and migration of labour. Moreover, the production 
of consumer services will also expand to accommodate the increasing population in 
the wealthy regions. The increase in tax revenues enables the local/regional 
government to provide more and better infrastructure in the leading regions. This 
cumulative process of expansion and concentration of economic activities in the 
wealthy region implies that lagging regions would be deprived of capital and labour. 
As a result, the lagging regions would sustain cumulative disadvantages and may not 
afford good infrastructure, school systems, and other public utilities. This will in turn 
increase their disadvantages and backwardness. In the long run, a de-concentration of 
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economic activities from the wealthy region commences due to high land prices, 
shortages in the labour market, traffic congestion, etc. According to his theory, these 
‘spread effects’ are not strong enough to rectify the divergence in economic growth 
between wealthy and lagging regions. 
 
Based on this theory, the public policy responses should be in the form of active 
implementation of rural development and rural adjustment programmes and schemes 
because the theory assumes that inequalities among regions are an inherent outcome 
of the interplay of market forces.23 
 
The growth pole theories are based on the existence of a large and leading firm 
which propels and stimulates other industries and businesses through multiplier 
effects.24 This firm also acts as a growth pole, because it is relatively large, belongs to 
a growth sector, and has a high ability to innovate and to create growth. Such a firm 
can generate three forms of multiplier or polarisation effects. The first pertains to 
technical multipliers which are achieved through linkages with upstream and 
downstream industries. The second concerns income multipliers as a result of 
increased employment which increases the demand for consumer services. The third 
relates to psychological effects which accrue from the optimism that the presence of a 
                                                 
23 Vias, A.C & Mulligan, G.F., Integrating Economic Base Theory with Regional Adjustment Models 
pp. 507-525, Journal of Growth and Change 30 (1999). Available online at 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119061354/PDFSTART, last visited on 3 May 
2009. 
24 For more discussions, see Darwent, D., Growth Poles and Growth Centres in Regional Planning: A 
Review pp. 5-31, Environment and Planning Journal 1 (1969); Perroux, F., Economic Space: Theory 
and Applications pp. 89-104, Quarterly Journal of Economics 64-1 (1950); and Hughes, D., & Holland, 
D., Core Periphery Economic Linkages – A Measure of Spread and Possible Backwash Effects for the 
Washington Economy pp. 364-377, Land Economics 70-3 (1994); Olfert, M .R & Stabler, J . C., 
Multipliers in a Central Place Hierarchy pp. 288-302, Journal of Growth and Change 30 (1999). 
Available online at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119061340/PDFSTART, last 
visited on 24 April 2009. 
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large firm can generate. Based on these multipliers, the leading or propelling firm can 
become a ‘growth pool’ by enhancing a positive regional economic environment. 
 
2.2.2.1(c) Local milieu models 
According to this group of theories a number of factors within the local milieu 
(including skill base of the local labour force, technical and organisational know-how, 
and local social and institutional structures) affect the revenues from labour and 
capital inputs.25 Among these theories, there are two major categories: endogenous 
growth models and theories based on changes in labour organisation. 
 
The endogenous growth theories pertain to non-metropolitan but agglomerated areas 
with small- or medium-sized firms. These rural economies are usually characterised 
by production flexibilities, entrepreneurship, district economies, etc. 
 
Theories that emphasise the changes in labour organisation relate to variations in 
the composition of the labour force among regions in terms of number, costs, skills, 
and mobility. These differences affect firms’ location decisions. These theories 
connect with two other theories: spatial division of labour and the regulationist theory. 
The theory on spatial division of labour posits that spatial inequality is both 
produced and taken advantage of by firms in their bid for favourable conditions for 
gainful production. Therefore, investment is attracted to areas with profitable 
                                                 
25 See Kraybill, D. & Kilkenny, M., Economic Rationales For and Against Place-Based Policies, 
AAEA-RSS Annual Meeting, Montreal (July, 2003). Available online at 
http://reimer.concordia.ca/files/PlaceBased/PlaceBasedPolicyKraybill,Kilkenny.pdf, last visited on 24 
April 2009. See Bolton, R., Place Prosperity versus People Prosperity Revisited: An Old Issue With a 
New Angle pp. 185-203, Urban Studies 29-2 (1992). Also see Crescenzi, R., Innovation and Regional 
Growth in the Enlarged Europe: The Role of Local Innovative Capabilities, Peripherality, and 
Education pp. 471-507, Journal of Growth and Change 36-4 (2005). Available online at 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118685329/PDFSTART, last visited on 24 April 
2009. 
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opportunities, and disinvestment occurs in areas with exhausted opportunities. 
Consequently, a pattern of geographical differentiation appears and is constantly 
transformed by further rounds of investment and disinvestment. The regulationist 
theories advance the notion that capitalist economies develop and evolve through a 
series of regimes of accumulation, especially in the way labour is organised and 
controlled in the production process. In this case, the transition period from one 
regime (e.g. Fordism) to another (e.g. post-Fordism) can be of critical relevance 
because these are usually followed by a decline of the industrialised regions under the 
succeeding regime. 
 
2.2.2.1(d) Territorial innovation theories 
These theories extend from the local milieu models and emphasise the diffusion of 
innovations, which is critical to growth. These theories stress that technological 
ability to adapt to innovations is crucial for entry into new types of production and 
markets. Various theories come under this group, namely incubation theories, product 
life cycle theory, the theory of innovative milieu, Porter’s theory, and Storper’s 
theory. 
 
Incubation theories emphasise the natural tendency of research and development 
(R&D) and innovative activities to flow towards areas where there is a concentration 
of people and activities. These areas then benefit from external economies, 
organisational and technological know-how, and the spin-off effects of a skilled 
labour force. They create a fertile environment for further innovations. This implies 
that on the basis of incubation theories, current core economic areas are likely to be 
the future core areas because they are sustained by continuous innovations. 
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Product life cycle theory builds on the incubation theories, and can be sub-divided 
into three phases: innovation, growth, and maturity. According to this theory, 
locational shifts occur in various phases of the product life cycle. The innovation 
phase occurs in areas with a high concentration of technical and scientific labour. At 
the other extreme (maturity stage), the product requires areas with a high amount of 
low-cost labour (e.g. peripheral regions). 
 
The theory of innovative milieu conceptualises the innovation-driven industrial 
behaviour within a geographical area and connects the local milieu with innovative 
processes. Such processes generate dynamic efficiencies to the local milieu. These 
efficiencies are reflected in the capacities for reshuffling resources from declining 
production sectors to new ones while using the same technology; the capacity to 
imitate and create technology; the ability to regenerate a local economy hit by natural 
causes; and fast reaction capabilities. 
 
Porter’s theory distinguishes two types of competitive advantages for firms: lower 
costs and product differentiation. This theory asserts that firms can gain and sustain 
competitive advantage through improvement, innovation, and upgrading. Although 
the analysis was based on the competitive advantage of nations, it can also be applied 
to geographic units smaller than a nation.26 
 
Porter identified four main variables (factor conditions; demand conditions; related 
and supporting industries; firms’ strategy, structure, and rivalry); and two ancillary 
variables (government and chance) that create a regional context in which competitive 
                                                 
26 Porter, M. E., The Competitive Advantage of Nations p. 29 (1990). This is an extension of his 
previous publications on, The Five Competitive Forces that Shape Strategy, Republished in Harvard 
Business Review (2008). 
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actions of firms could be analysed. These six variables together constitute a dynamic 
mutually reinforcing system of determinants of competitive advantage for nations or 
regions (i.e. the so-called diamond). These variables are also influenced by political 
and socio-cultural factors and are transformed into a dynamic system by domestic 
rivalry and geographic concentration. Porter found that successful firms are frequently 
concentrated in particular regions within a country.27 
 
Storper’s theory conceives of regions as nexus of untraded interdependencies, which 
accounts for why specific regions keep emerging as centres for new rounds of 
economic activities at a time of increasing ease in communication and 
transportation.28 The theory explains that firms are linked to other firms through 
formal exchanges (e.g. input–output linkages) and through informal exchanges (i.e. 
untraded interdependencies). The latter would include labour markets, public 
institutions, and conventions (e.g. customs, values, etc.). According to this theory, 
untraded interdependencies are crucial in the capitalist system because all production 
systems are subject to uncertainty and these are largely resolved through conventions. 
 
There are different combinations of uncertainty and different conventions among 
regions, leading to different frameworks of productive activities. Therefore, the 
evolution of the productive or economic system is path-dependent as it involves 
interdependencies that were considered in making choices over a period of time which 
                                                 
27 Porter, M. E., Research and Practice- Location, Competition, and Economic Development: Local 
Clusters in a Global Economy pp. 15-34, Economic Development Quarterly 14-1 (2000). Available 
online at http://edq.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/14/1/15, last visited on 24 April 2009. Also see 
Porter, M. E., The Economic Performance of Regions, pp. 549-578, Regional Studies 37-6&7 (2003). 
Available online at http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/974666_792156344_713694182.pdf, last visited 
on 24 April 2009. 
28 Storper, M., The Resurgence of Regional Economies, Ten Years Later: The Region as a Nexus of 
Untraded Interdependencies pp. 191-221, European Urban and Rural Studies pp. 2-3 (1995). Available 
online at http://eur.sagepub.com/cgi/content/short/2/3/191, last visited on 27 April 2009. 
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are irreversible. These interdependencies and the underlying conventions that drive 
them tend to affect the input–output system, labour market, and knowledge system. 
The combined effect is the tendency for the production system to move from 
generality to specificity (e.g. Silicon Valley). 
 
Regional growth theories inform the growing debate on economic development in 
rural regions. As earlier mentioned, there are three approaches to a rural development 
policy, and these are discussed below. 
 
2.2.2.2 Review of approaches to rural development 
2.2.2.2(a) The exogenous development approach 
The exogenous models emphasise that rural development is externally determined and 
the benefits of development are exported from the region, while local values tend to 
be disregarded by the exogenous actors.29 
 
The model suggests that modern developments lead to a division of economic 
activities between urban and rural areas, such that urban areas become the repository 
of major industries and services and rural areas that of agricultural activities. The 
agricultural sector is seen as dependent on the urban sector because demand for 
agricultural products mostly comes from the urban sector; is a source of patronage for 
commodities used in the urban industrial sector; is a source of labour and capital for 
the industrial sector; and a source of foreign exchange to support the development 
process of urban areas. Conversely, it might rather be argued that the urban sector is 
dependent on the agricultural sector for these factors of production and consumption. 
                                                 
29 Slee, B., Theoretical Aspects of the Study of Endogenous Development, in Born from Within: 
Practice and Perspectives of Endogenous Rural Development pp. 184-194 (1994). 
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Therefore, the process of agricultural development and by extension rural 
development is perceived as externally determined by the urban sector, in the sense 
that the products cannot be entirely consumed in the locations where they are 
produced. 
 
Research shows that the dominant model for explaining rural development until the 
1970s was the exogenous development approach. For instance, the EU reflected this 
model in a rural development policy targeted at modernising the agricultural sector in 
order to stabilise the rural economy (i.e. the Common Agricultural Policy). This 
measure proved to be insufficient and subsequently the growth pole theory was 
additionally adopted, whereby manufacturing companies domiciled in urban areas 
were encouraged to relocate to rural areas in order to create employment opportunities 
for the rural population. By the late 1970s, these policies were found to have fallen 
short of the goal of sustainable economic development of rural regions.30 
 
2.2.2.2(b) The endogenous development approach 
This approach is regarded as local development engendered by local action funded by 
local resources.31 The benefits of development are retained in the local areas and local 
values are respected. The emphasis of rural policies has shifted towards a bottom-up 
                                                 
30 Lowe, P. et al., Networks in Rural Development Beyond Exogenous and Endogenous Models, in 
Beyond Modernisation: the Impact of Endogenous Rural Development pp. 87-106 (1995). Also see 
Murdoch, J., Networks – a New Paradigm of Rural Development? Pp. 407-19, Journal of Rural Studies 
16-4 (2000). Available online at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VD9-419BFNY-
1/2/5608baa20acc73472cf3785767eb9f70, last visited on 12 April 2009. 
31 Picchy, A., The Relations Between Central and Local Powers as Context for Endogenous 
Development, in Born from within: Practice and Perspectives of Endogenous Rural Development pp. 
195-203 (1994). 
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approach, rural diversification, encouragement of local initiatives and enterprises, 
support for local businesses, and provision of suitable training.32 
 
This approach is related to the local milieu models, whereby the institutional context 
of economic activities matter. Therefore, relations between firms and individuals in 
the local system are established by national and local regulations, local rules and 
customs that are rooted in the local historical culture.33 
 
This approach embodies two specific rural theories: Bryden’s theory (on the 
potentials of immobile resources for creating competitive advantages in rural areas), 
and the community-led rural development theory. 
 
2.2.2.2(b)(i) Bryden’s theory 
This theory argues that given the increased mobility of financial and capital flows, 
skilled labour, information, and other goods and services in an era of globalisation, 
these resources constitute an unstable basis for rural development. Moreover, these 
mobile resources are scarce, which implies that rural areas have to compete fiercely 
for them with each other and with urban areas. The theory thus argues that the 
development strategy for rural areas should be based on immobile resources that are 
not subject to competition.34 
                                                 
32 See Lowe et al. supra note 30, at p. 91. 
33 Iacoponi, L. et al., Endogenous Development and the Agro-industrial District, in Beyond 
Modernisation: The Impact of Endogenous Rural Development 28-69 (1995). 
34 Bryden, J. M., Development Strategies for Remote Rural Regions: What do we know so far? Paper 
presented at the OECD International Conference on Remote Rural Areas, 5-6 November 1998. See 
Bryden, J & Munro, G., New Approaches to Economic Development in Peripheral Rural Regions pp. 
111-124, Scottish Geographical Journal 116-2 (2000). Available online at 
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/378427_792156344_791004148.pdf, last visited on 25 May 2009. 
Also see Huskey, L & Morehouse, T., Development in Remote Regions: What do we know? Pp. 128-
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Immobile resources here are defined as resources that are specific to the locality and 
cannot be moved to another location. Some are tangible (e.g. property, physical 
infrastructure, and natural resources), and others are intangible (e.g. knowledge, 
values, and culture). 
 
These immobile resources reveal the constraints and opportunities for rural 
development and reflect the effectiveness of local and regional institutions in handling 
these opportunities and constraints. Based on this theory, economic development of 
rural areas can be achieved through a combination of tangible and intangible local 
resources.35 Therefore, rural development can be explained by how these resources 
interact with each other in the local context. 
 
Bryden groups these immobile resources under four categories: 
a. Local knowledge capital: this reflects the capacity of the area to generate, 
sustain, and build on formal and informal stocks of knowledge and 
information. 
b. Social capital: this includes social features, e.g. trust, norms, and networks 
which facilitate coordination and improve the efficiency of society. 
c. Environmental capital: this reflects the actual physical features and 
conditions of the space of an area. It includes natural environmental heritage 
                                                                                                                                            
137 ACTIC Journal 45-2 (1992). Available online at http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/arctic/Arctic45-2-
128.pdf, last visited on 25 May 2009. 
35 Kim, K et al., Natural Amenities and Rural Development: Understanding Spatial and Distributional 
Attributes pp. 273-297, Journal of Growth and Change 36-2 (2005). Available online at 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118685317/PDFSTART, last visited on 20 May 
2009. 
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(landscape, climate, etc.), and built environmental capital (structures of 
historical importance, physical and tourist infrastructure). 
d. Cultural capital: this includes customs, language, history, music, art, 
literature, etc., which define a particular society. 
 
Considering these four types of immobile resources, an endogenous development 
approach suggests the existence of a local growth potential in each region that is 
awaiting development. Based on this model, the emphasis in rural development 
policies has shifted towards support for local entrepreneurship; and from a single 
agency activity towards an integrated and interdisciplinary approach36; and from a 
traditional support structure towards the creation of a network structure. 
 
On the contrary, Slee argues that an endogenous development approach is a concept 
without clearly defined theoretical roots, but is a perspective on rural development 
strongly argued on the basis of value judgements about desirable forms of 
development.37 Slee considers only the existence of an exogenous model in which 
external forces are the principal determinants of rural development, with endogenous 
factors playing a role in nurturing the process.38 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Shaffer et al., Rethinking Community Economic Development pp. 59-74, Economic Development 
Quarterly 20-1 (2006). Available online at 
http://www.ci.issaquah.wa.us/Files/Shaffer%20Deller%20and%20Marcouiller%202006%20-
%20Rethinking%20CED.pdf, last visited on 20 April 2009. Also see Berman, D. R & Martin, L. L., 
The New Approach to Economic Development: An Analysis of Innovativeness in the States pp. 10-21, 
Policy Studies Journal, 20-1 (1992). 
37 See Slee; supra note 29, at p. 191. 
38 See id, pp. 193-194. 
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2.2.2.2(b)(ii) Community-led rural development theory 
This theory stresses encouragement of the self-help capacity of local actors, which is 
considered as a pre-condition for establishing and sustaining rural economic 
development. Different authorities have used different phrases to capture the essence 
of this theory, e.g. ‘community development’ (Keane and O Cinneide)39, ‘community-
led rural development’ (Murray and Dunn),40 and ‘bottom-up partnership approach’ 
(Mannion).41 
 
This theory is based on the observation that many rural regions and communities 
encounter genuine difficulties in creating economic development, due to inadequate 
institutional milieu, insufficient capacity to resolve economic problems, etc. The 
theory suggests that the key to resolving these issues lies in the building of a self-help 
capacity within rural communities. The objective is to transform an attitude of apathy 
and dependency into one of self-reliance. Reid argues that a local self-development 
project must include the three characteristics, such as local ownership and control of 
the enterprise or activity; investment of local resources; and the involvement of a 
local community organisation, e.g. the local authorities or local associations.42 
 
Some of the proponents of this view on rural and regional development include recent 
researchers who are dedicated to the development of theories about a new paradigm 
                                                 
39 Keane, M. J. & O Cinneide, M. S., Promoting Economic Development amongst Rural Communities 
pp. 281-289, Journal of Rural Studies 2-4 (1986). 
40 Murray, M & Dunn, L., Capacity Building for Rural Development in the US pp. 89-97, Journal of 
Rural Studies 11-1 (1995). 
41 Mannion, J., Strategies for Local Development in Rural Areas: the ‘Bottom-Up’ Approach, paper 
presented at the European Commission Conference on Rural Development, pp. 7-9 November 1996. 
42 Flora, J. L et al. Self-Development: A Viable Rural Development Option? Pp. 276. Policy Studies 
Journal 20-2, pp. 276-288 (1992). 
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for regional development that departs from the classic theories.43 One of these 
researchers views regional development as a combination of local characteristics and 
vertically determined flows, or as a global system consisting of local sub-systems. 
This view focuses on the relevance of local comparative advantages, especially those 
associated with qualifications, resource competence, and actual ability to operate at 
the local level. Based on this view, the researcher developed a model of analysis of 
rural areas that consists of three elements: the physical element (areas, buildings, 
roads, flow of goods and services, etc.), the economic element (i.e. business 
activities), and the social/cultural elements.44 
 
Therefore, this model emphasises local society as a crucial element in the make up of 
a rural area, and views these areas in terms of dynamic units and not passive areas. 
The model argues that a rural area needs to have a mixture of a physical, economic, 
and social/cultural elements to be considered as a ‘whole area’; thereby having a 
separate identity and hence the possibility of developing and using comparative 
advantages. Based on this concept, it is feasible to see rural locations as possible 
dynamic units that are not defined by or destined for economic utilisation of physical 
areas (i.e. classic farming). 
 
However, capacity building is a slow process and consists of two elements: the 
development of cooperative partnerships among actors, and the adjustment of 
                                                 
43 Some of these modern thinkers on regional development would include: Tangiv, H. W., Rural 
Innovative Strategies, Conference on European Rural Policy at the Crossroads (2000); Malmberg, A. & 
Maskell, P., Towards an Explanation of Regional Specialisation and Industry Agglomeration pp. 14-
39, In Regional Specialisation and Local Environment, NordREFO Vol 3 (1997); Cooke, P., Social 
Capital in the Learning Region, see the web link www.rtsinc.org/learning.-now/skills; Isserman, A. M., 
What do we want from Theory in Rural Development? pp. 344-351, Journal of Growth & Change 29-3 
(1998); Krugman, P., Development, Geography, and Economic Theory Ch. 1-3 (1995);  
44 See Tangiv; supra note 43, pp. 8-9. 
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institutional structure. According to Mannion, effective partnerships are those which 
represent and bring together all stakeholders and enable them to identify and bring 
forward development possibilities; link individual and community development 
proposals with sources of support and funding; consist of private sector 
representatives who are prepared to cooperate with community representatives by 
sharing power, experience, and responsibility; take into cognisance regional or local 
initiatives and needs.45 
 
The initiative for community-led rural development can rest with community leaders, 
but with assistance from and partnerships with regional/national authorities, 
universities, and development agencies. This approach should thrive under an 
institutional structure that encourages and responds to bottom-up initiatives. 
Therefore, an adjustment of the institutional structure is necessary due to the linkages 
between the local, regional, and national authorities. 
 
2.2.2.2(c) Mix of the exogenous and endogenous rural development 
approaches 
The mixed approach to the analysis of rural development stresses the interplay 
between local and external forces in the control of development processes and rejects 
the polarisation of exogenous and endogenous development models.46 
 
This approach relates rural development to the process of increasing globalisation, 
whereby actors in rural regions are involved in both local and external networks.47 
                                                 
45 See id., 5. 
46 Terluin, I. J., Differences in Economic Development in Rural Regions of Advanced Countries: An 
Overview and Critical Analysis of Theories pp. 327-344, Journal of Rural Studies 19-3 (2003). Also 
see Lowe et al. supra note 30, at p. 87. 
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However, the size and intensity of networks would vary among regions. These 
networks cover links among institutions, and links between firms and local or non-
local institutions. 
 
According to this approach, rural development is viewed as a complex mesh of 
networks in which resources are mobilised and whereby the control of the 
development process is the result of interplay between local and external forces. Lowe 
et al. endorse this approach to rural development and hence propose to transform the 
analysis of economic development of rural regions into an analysis of networks.48 
According to Lowe et al., the focus on networks as sets of power relations could serve 
an important purpose in integrating economic forms with social processes. Network 
analysis could generate useful insights into how particular networks produce positive 
outcomes for rural regions. Conversely, network analysis may also provide insights 
into possible inequalities and asymmetries within the networks which could be further 
strengthened.  
 
Based on network analysis, Lowe et al. recommended two important rural 
development strategies. Firstly, the creation of linkages between internal networks 
and institutions in a mutually re-enforcing manner as would put rural regions on 
viable growth trajectories. Secondly, the altering of the balance of power within the 
local/external networks such that would enable local actors to exert control and to 
retain a significant proportion of added value. Rural regions trapped in a situation of 
inequalities and asymmetries within the networks may not generate development. In 
                                                                                                                                            
47 Boland, P., Unpacking the Theory-Policy Interface of Local Economic Development: An Analysis of 
Cardiff and Liverpool, pp. 1019-1039, Urban Studies 44-5&6 (2007). Available online at 
http://usj.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/44/5-6/1019, last visited on 27 April 2009. 
48 See id, pp. 100-103. 
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such cases, the policy objective should be to recast the networks by seeking equity or 
equality of participation. This approach aligns with the territorial innovation models. 
 
Based on this model, local actors are required to play an active role in internal and 
external networks; they are expected to have the capacity (i.e. knowledge, skills, and 
attitude) to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, and to galvanise 
themselves in order to address these issues. To complement these efforts, 
policymakers are expected to act effectively in formulating and delivering facilitative 
policies; in assisting in promoting local initiatives and projects; and in attracting 
investments and public funds. Entrepreneurs, operating in tandem, are expected to 
detect, perceive, and respond to changes in market conditions.  
2.3 The concept of regulation 
The regulatory debate in most developed countries and particularly in the UK (1980s) 
came into the open as a result of the transition from public institutions to private 
enterprises. The debate called for better consideration of accountability and a clearer 
justification for adopting particular regulatory approaches to different industry 
sectors.49 
 
There is no fixed definition or meaning of the term ‘regulation’. However, generally 
speaking, regulation could be defined as ‘the act of controlling, directing, or 
governing according to a rule, principle, or system’.50 The central meaning of 
regulation suggests that it could also be defined as ‘a sustained and focused control 
                                                 
49 Prosser, T., Law & the Regulators p. 1 (1997). 
50 See id., p. 5. 
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exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by a community’.51 More 
specifically, regulation refers to ‘the legal rules and other policy measures which 
express such command and control arrangements, as different from other forms of law 
such as contract and criminal law’.52 Therefore, regulation could be seen as legislative 
or statutory intervention by a government organisation or agency. 
 
Regulation may impose requirements such as prescriptive and performance standards. 
Prescriptive standards may involve licensing and registration, information disclosure, 
dispute resolution, etc. Regardless of which method is used to pursue regulatory 
objectives, the fundamental purposes for direct government intervention in 
commercial activities are to promote efficient markets and to protect the public 
interest. It is generally thought that market mechanisms ensure the most efficient 
allocation of society’s resources. However, when hindered by externalities, imperfect 
market structures (e.g. monopolies and oligopolies, etc), information asymmetry, and 
high transaction costs, market operations tend to be distorted and may not lead to 
efficient and ‘equitable’ outcomes. This can ultimately result in market failures. 
Government intervention is often justified on this basis, and the objective is to 
enhance competitive conditions and correcting market imperfections in the interest of 
economic efficiency and social values.53 These remedial objectives can be achieved 
by balancing unequal bargaining power and information asymmetry in an industry 
sector, and reducing the impacts of externalities and moral hazard.  
 
                                                 
51 Selznick, P., Focusing Organizational Research on Regulation, in Regulatory Policy and the Social 
Sciences, p. 363 (1st ed. 1985). 
52 See Prosser; supra note 49, at p. 5. 
53 Baldwin, R., & Cave, M.; Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice p. 17 (1999). 
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Conversely, Collins argues that this narrow definition of regulation is not completely 
objective, “because the market system depends for its success on the preservation of 
the value of inequalities in bargaining position”.54 He contends that for the market 
system to provide a superior mechanism for the supply of goods and services, it must 
also provide incentives for the participants to acquire information and expertise. 
These incentives could lead to asymmetries of information and expertise which 
inevitably must be protected to secure the market system. Therefore, in regulating 
market practices, a distinction has to be drawn between asymmetries of information 
and expertise that must be protected and those which create an undesirable market 
failure. Collins suggests that to draw this distinction would require a careful analysis 
of whether these asymmetries of information, expertise, and other forms of bargaining 
disadvantage would benefit the weaker party in the long run by sustaining the market 
for that valued product or service. This general principle would ensure that those 
participants who obtain their superior bargaining power through diligent research and 
study do reap the benefit of advantageous transactions as a just reward. Conversely, 
where the superior bargaining position was obtained by taking advantage of the 
weaker participants, the general principle would suggest that the weaker parties were 
unlikely to benefit in the long run if such transactions were allowed, and so the 
contracts should be unenforceable.  
 
Collins further argues that the application of this general principle requires an 
investigation of the consequences of regulation, which cannot be determined with any 
degree of precision in advance. Nevertheless, he maintains that regardless of the fact 
that it is difficult to determine when market failures are sufficiently serious to justify 
                                                 
54 Collins, H., Regulating Contracts pp. 279-86 (1999). 
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regulation, yet such regulation can help to reduce imperfections in markets that 
provoke unfair contracts. However, he posits that regulation of substantive unfairness 
in contracts should be left to the legal system because the regulation of market failures 
through deterring practices that subvert the market system can only make an 
insignificant contribution to the reduction of substantive unfairness in contracts. The 
preference for rules devised by private law as the best approach to handling the 
complex issues raised by unfairness in contracts does not preclude the importance of 
specific public regulation in particular market sectors designed to fit the precise 
purpose. 
 
Sunstein argues that legislative (paternalistic) intervention is often more harmful to 
the groups it was designed to protect, particularly when this interferes with the pricing 
mechanism of the market.55 In other words, he contends that the harm outweighs the 
benefits of the regulation (regulatory backfiring). This throws up the debate about 
whether the protected group should be making the choice between harms; or the State 
(through the legislator) should determine the best interests of its citizens. The 
objection to paternalism is usually based on the argument that the law should not 
restrain the discretion of individuals to use the power of self-regulation through the 
auspices of freedom of contract to forge transactions and relationships of their free 
choice (i.e. the sanctity of contracts). However, Collins argues that this objection 
applies only to regulation designed to alter market prices, but does not apply to most 
regulations of substantive unfairness, because in the latter case the terms of the 
contract are brought in line with the presumed market price under competitive 
conditions (i.e. a mimicking of normal market conditions). 
                                                 
55 Sunstein, C., Paradoxes of the Regulatory State pp. 407-23, University of Chicago Law Review 57 
(1990). However, he also contends that issues of social justice in the public interest rank higher than 
the protection of markets for their own sake. 
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However, in a broad sense legislative intervention could be used to address a variety 
of forms of market failures, both in the construction of markets and in the distribution 
of market outcomes. For instance, regulation could be used to ensure the provision of 
socially desirable products and services where free markets fail to provide availability 
or continuity of these. Regulation could also be used to allocate scarce goods in the 
public interest; to ensure the availability of a public good; or to promote efficient 
market operations by preventing anti-competitive practices, e.g. predatory pricing.56 
However, legislative intervention is not limited to correcting market failure, but can 
also assist in providing access to social justice.57 These might include advancing 
public welfare interests, consumer protection, assurances of the provision of public 
goods58 and other welfare goals, and restrictions on the exercise of private power.59 
 
The core conception which could be derived from the various usages of the term 
‘regulation’ in current debates is one of public intervention which affects the 
operation of markets through command and control. This core conception relates also 
to the definitions of the term in standard economics texts, e.g. ‘In its widest 
conception, regulation is State intervention in the economic decisions of 
companies’.60 Generally, regulation is seen as one of the State’s functions that makes 
evident its constitutional dimensions. Decentralisation of power provides a credible 
                                                 
56 See Baldwin; supra note 53, at p. 17. 
57 Black, J., Critical Reflections on Regulation 27, Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1-10(2002). 
58Ogus, A., Regulation: Legal Form & Economic Theory p. 33 (1994). A ‘public good’ is defined as ‘a 
commodity or service whose benefit is shared as a whole by the public’. Public goods combine two 
basic characteristics: consumption by one individual does not leave less for others and secondly, 
society cannot exclude anyone from such benefit whether they pay for them or not. Typical examples 
are roads and national defence. In this case, the market mechanism of resource allocation cannot be 
relied upon to determine the supply of a public good because of the free-rider problem. 
59 See Collins; supra note 54, at p. 8. 
60 Foster, C. D., Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural Monopoly p. 186  
(1992). 
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rationale for it.61 The difficulty that accompanies this core conception manifests in the 
misleading notion that regulation is basically an external political constraint on 
markets. Therefore, industry sees statutory intervention as ‘social engineering’ based 
on non-economic goals and so subject to arbitrariness. Consequently, regulation is 
often resisted by corporations and this can create problems for effective 
implementation and control of statutes. However, there are possible demerits to 
statutory intervention because they can be inappropriately designed, bureaucratic, and 
rigidly enforced.62 Yet, regulation has been found to be useful for efficiency 
maximisation by providing surrogates for market forces, particularly where natural 
monopoly elements exist in an industry.63 
 
Prosser considered three different types of regulation: firstly, regulating a monopoly 
which involves attempts to mimic market forces through exercises of control on prices 
and quality of service; secondly, regulation for competition which entails creating 
conditions for competition to flourish and subsequent policing to ensure continuity, 
e.g. stipulating and maintaining standard trade practices; thirdly, regulating for social 
welfare whereby the rationale is not primarily economic but related to notions of 
public service and the principle of universality, e.g. ensuring the provision of 
universal service and achieving environmental objectives. However, some of the 
categories of support schemes for the rural fuel retail market focus on the second type, 
e.g. regulatory remedies, whereas the other categories deal with social regulation 
through subsidies and state aids.64 The failure to separate these three types of 
regulation has often led to confusion in current regulatory debates. This confusion has 
                                                 
61 Barton et al. (eds.), Regulating Energy and Natural Resources p. 16 (IBA, 2006). 
62 Black, J; Rules and Regulators p. 79 (1997). 
63 See Prosser; supra note 49, at p. 5. 
64 See Tables 3.1-3.4 in Chapter 3. 
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resulted in assertions that some types of regulation, particularly social regulation, are 
illegitimate.65 
 
Ogus argues that there is a need to recognise that regulation is a political/economic 
concept and therefore can best be understood by some reference to different systems 
of economic organisation and the legal forms that institutionalise them. He posits that 
in industrialised societies or communities, there exists some friction between the 
market and the collectivist systems of economic organisation.66 The market system 
encourages individuals and groups to freely pursue their own welfare goals, subject 
only to certain basic restraints for orderliness of society. Regulation has little role to 
play here, rather the legal form that maintains this system is an instrument of private 
law. Private law instruments tend to be facilitative, private, and decentralised. Private 
law merely offers a set of formal arrangements within which individuals and groups 
can pursue their welfare – seeking activities and relationships. Such arrangements 
involve mutual rights and obligations which are enforceable in courts where 
necessary. However, in practice it would seem too simplistic to identify the market 
system exclusively with private, facilitative, and decentralised law, since no society 
can exist without periodic government intervention. Such impositions and 
enforcement can affect some private obligations and override private agreements.  
 
Conversely, the collectivist system aims to correct perceived deficiencies in the 
market system in an attempt to satisfy collective or public interest goals. In this case, 
the state directs and encourages alternative behaviour (often through its agents) which 
it believes would not occur without such intervention. Regulation is therefore the 
                                                 
65 See Ogus; supra note 58, at p. 6. 
66 See id., p. 1. 
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legal means for achieving and implementing collective goals.67 Regulatory laws tend 
to be more directive, public and centralised in nature. These laws are directed by the 
State or its agents and compel individuals and organisations to behave in certain ways 
with the objective of realising public interest goals and with threat of sanctions for 
non-compliers. The obligations which are enforced by the state or its agents cannot be 
met by private agreements between the parties concerned. Regulation is therefore 
centralised because the state or its agents play a vital role both in its formulation and 
enforcement. In the same vein, it could be argued that regulation is not always 
directive, public, and centralised because regulatory laws are formulated and enforced 
by self-regulatory agencies that are not public institutions. Also, collective goals are 
occasionally pursued through instruments such as franchise contracts, which behave 
like private legal obligations in practice. 
 
2.3.1 The regulatory spectrum: merits and demerits 
The foregoing establishes the fact that wider conceptions of regulation do reflect more 
diverse actors in the regulatory process beyond direct government intervention (see 
Table 2.1). The other actors are markets, contracts, and court interpretation.  
 
Regulation by the markets usually occurs through market competition for terms.68 
Both domestic and international markets can be more potent instruments of control 
than government intervention. This is a form of self-regulation that has numerous 
practical advantages. Firstly, it reduces the need for direct government intervention. 
Secondly, the market mechanism for regulating contracts, in theory, is the best in 
terms of ensuring participation of all stakeholders. As a result, market regulation is 
                                                 
67 See id., 2. 
68 Gunningham, N et al.; Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy p. 22 (1998). 
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regarded as the starting point in the selection process for appropriate regulatory 
mechanisms.  
 
Table 2.1 Components of regulatory intervention 
Steps in the  
regulatory process 
Participants in 
the  
regulatory 
process 
Layers of  
governance 
Process/ 
strategies 
Instruments/ 
tools of 
regulation 
• Goal Setting • Regulators  
• Courts 
Market Types of Rules Cost of 
Service 
• Design & 
Drafting 
• Customers 
• Suppliers 
• Third 
Parties 
Contract Linguistic 
 
Structure 
Incentives 
• Interpretation 
& 
Enforcement 
• Banks & 
Investors 
• Insurers 
Court 
Interpretation 
 Standards 
-Prescriptive 
-Procedural 
-Performance 
• Monitoring & 
Review 
• Franchisor 
• Franchisee 
Legislation   
Source:  The regulation of franchise relationships (Spencer, 2009) p. 61. 
 
Conversely, Baldwin argues that self-regulation in the absence of control and 
accountability may be perceived as extending too much autonomy.69 However, market 
inefficiencies may lead to the application of other regulatory mechanisms. 
 
Regulation by contracts, like market regulation, is a self-regulatory mechanism 
because it establishes binding standards for future conduct of contracting parties. 
Once the contract is signed by the parties, the standards set constitute a form of self-
                                                 
69 See Baldwin; supra note 53, at p. 126. 
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regulation.70 The private law of contract delegates substantial powers to the parties to 
fix their own binding rules. The self-regulation is effected through the contract 
attributes, i.e. the standard form and its relational attributes. Contracts are also 
regulated by the parties through negotiations of contract terms, implied terms, and 
terms that include dispute resolution procedures. The effectiveness of contracts as a 
regulatory tool would largely depend on the relative bargaining powers of the parties. 
However, contracts as a self-regulatory tool differs from the market means of self-
regulation, in that the contract form may not represent the views of all stakeholders. 
For example in licence or franchise contracts, the contract is usually drafted and 
controlled by the licensor or the franchisor. Therefore, such contracts may serve the 
interests of the licensor/franchisor more than the interests of the licensee/franchisee. 
Therefore, licence/franchise contracts may not capture the interests and views of all 
stakeholders. As a result, public regulation may become necessary, to fill the 
regulatory gap, where the private mechanisms fail. The two public regulatory 
mechanisms are in the form of legislative intervention and court interpretations (the 
former has been discussed earlier and so we now discuss the latter). 
 
The judiciary as a public regulatory tool has the primary role of interpretation and 
enforcement of the private self-regulation of contracts and the public statutes, and so 
occupies a special place in the regulatory spectrum.71 The judiciary can also enforce 
laws that compel self-regulated market activities. The courts have powers to interpret 
both express and implied terms.72 Implied terms would include fiduciary duties, good 
faith, duty of care, unconscionable conduct. However, court interpretations of vague 
                                                 
70 See Collins; supra note 54, at p. 63. 
71 See id., p. 67. 
72 These interpretations also include evaluations of ‘reasonableness’, or ‘fairness’ (by defining suitable 
criteria for validity) or substantively by analysing the intentions of the parties (using criteria such as the 
context of the case, explicit terms, and implicit understandings). 
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principles such as ‘fairness’, ‘good faith’, ‘reasonableness’, etc., can result in 
uncertainty in judicial outcomes for the contracting parties.73 The subjectivity 
imposed by these principles reflects in courts’ unpredictable and sometimes 
inconsistent interpretations. As a result, courts require access to reliable information 
and data to guide their interpretations. Therefore, it might be argued that the courts 
have a special role to play in the regulatory process, but must be guided by the other 
tools in the regulatory spectrum. 
2.3.2 Basis for social regulation 
Cream skimming74 along with other factors such as the concepts of public 
goods/impure public goods, exceptional market conditions and the notion of 
distributional justice has compelled many commentators to advocate for regulation of 
certain industrial sectors. These are explained briefly below. 
 
Market failure can arise in relation to public goods and ‘impure public goods’75 and 
has led to calls for regulation of sectors that produce and supply such goods. Impure 
public goods are other goods and services which are not pure ‘public goods’ because 
they do not have the two basic properties of a ‘public good’, but which do contain 
‘public good’ dimensions. These are sometimes referred to as ‘impure public goods’ 
or ‘special products’, and include petroleum products, and education and training as 
typical examples. Such goods may be supplied and bought in the market but unless 
corrected by regulatory interventions, they may be subject to some degree of market 
failure. In the case of petroleum products, their supply has multiplier effects on the 
                                                 
73 See Collin; supra note 54, at p. 232. 
74 For a definition of the concept of Cream skimming, see Chen, J., Creamskimming and Competition 
1, Social Science Research Network (2009). Available online at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1395554, last visited on 10 April 2009.  
75 See Ogus; supra note 58, at p. 33. Ogus clearly established the grounds for social regulation and this 
section draws primarily from his arguments for this form of regulation. 
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economy which is driven primarily through the transport sector and industries that 
make use of these products. Regarding education and training, society derives benefits 
over and above that acquired by the immediate recipient. For example, it is assumed 
that education represents a material gain to present and future generations which 
accrues from a better trained and skilled work force. It is also thought that education 
may encourage socially responsible behaviour and thereby enhance cultural heritage. 
In both cases, a misallocation of resources may result from the unfettered operation of 
markets because the price which suppliers are able to obtain may not reflect the true 
social value of the product or service. The simplest regulatory intervention in such 
cases is for the payment of a public subsidy which will reflect the divergence between 
the private value of the product or service and its social value.76 
 
Exceptional market conditions such as acute and sudden shortages in the supply of 
goods whose demand is price inelastic or sudden hikes in prices of such goods have 
often led to calls for regulation. Goods which fall into this category include petroleum 
products, because individuals have no access to satisfactory alternatives. Rationing as 
a means of wartime distribution and control of the sales of petroleum products, food, 
and clothing is a common example. In this case, the social consequences of allowing 
the market principle to prevail would be unacceptable in distributional terms and with 
even more dangerous social consequences.77  
 
Regulation may be inspired by a need to achieve a ‘fair’ or ‘just’ distribution of 
resources, which is unrelated to efficiency objectives. Although the economic goal of 
allocative efficiency is directed at the maximisation of social welfare, it does not 
                                                 
76 See id., p. 35. 
77 See id., p. 35. 
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specify how this welfare is distributed between individuals or groups within society. 
However, different views are held on what should be considered as ‘fair’ and ‘just’, 
hence the concept of distributional justice is subject to value judgement. The liberal 
theories and socialist ideas on the conception of distributional justice vary.78 
Exponents of liberal theories tend to maintain a balance between a respect for 
individual liberty and the acceptance of distributions resulting from market processes 
but with concerns for ‘unjust’ outcomes. They posit that social arrangements within a 
society should enable all to have access to a minimum level of resources. Therefore, 
individuals and businesses with higher income must be taxed accordingly to provide 
this minimum level of resources. Conversely, the common theme for the socialist 
thinkers is pursuit of equality. This implies the abolition of advantages conferred by 
power, privileges, and wealth, and the entitlement of individuals to resources that will 
enable them to participate equitably in society. Based on this school of thought, 
private property and market processes are incompatible with socialism, rather 
absolute state control of the means of production and distribution seems the only 
solution.  
 
Nevertheless, each of these theories indicates that distributions arising from market 
processes are not necessarily ‘fair’ or ‘just’. Consequently, these theories influence 
regulatory policy both directly and indirectly. Indirect influence occurs when 
government intervention is justified on grounds of market failure. In this case, the 
distributional theories would suggest that the policymaker should try to predict the 
distributional consequences of proposed measures and design a form of regulation 
                                                 
78 See id., p. 46. 
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that would lead to outcomes consistent with what may qualify as ‘fair’ or ‘just’.79 The 
direct influence of the theories could be realised through regulatory instruments 
specifically designed to pursue redistribution goals, importantly reduction of 
inequality of income and wealth, but with an emphasis on mitigating handicaps that 
affect people’s ability to enter and participate in market processes. Thus social 
regulation can be justified and explained outside of economic analysis, since market 
failure is not the only reason for regulation, as many regulatory statutes have other 
goals besides economic efficiency. Feintuck argues that the concept of regulation in 
the public interest should be built around ideas of equality of citizenship for the 
protection of democratic values.80 Likewise, Sunstein contends that the achievement 
of social justice represents a higher value than the protection of free markets, since 
markets are basically instruments that have to be assessed by their effects on society.81 
He concluded that government action is usually the best way to resolve the twin 
difficulties of coordination of the private actions of large numbers of individuals, and 
collective action. 
 
Redistribution policies may also operate within a geographical dimension. The notion 
of ‘territorial justice’ does suggest some equalisation or redistribution of resources 
between regions, which can be achieved typically by financing or subsidising services 
from central funds.82  
 
                                                 
79For an explanation of the meaning of “fairness”, see Jenkins, O. B., The Meaning of “Fairness”. 
Available online at http://ojtr.org/faithlife/fairnessfl.html, last visited on 23 April 2009. Dr Jenkins 
explains fairness as a concept related to the concept of justice and difficult to interpret because of the 
“limitations of human experience and the balance of all desired good”. The Oxford (Advanced 
Learner’s) Dictionary defines “fair” as “treating each person, side, etc. equally and according to the 
rules or law”. 
80 Feintuck, M., ‘The Public Interest’ in Regulation (2004). 
81 Sunstein, C., After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State (1990). 
82 See Ogus; supra note 58, at p. 49. 
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The foregoing underscores the need for periodic government regulatory interventions 
in market processes when necessary to ensure that the larger public interests are 
satisfied.  
2.4 The notion of public service obligations and the principle of  
universality 
 
Public service obligation is a term closely associated with public utilities. The core 
obligation of public service is based on the principle of universality. This principle 
encompasses ‘a set of obligations which includes non-discrimination, access ‘by all’ 
to essential utilities at reasonable prices, quality, reliability and adaptation’.83 There is 
a close connection between the notion of public service obligations and the concept of 
regulation. 
 
Public utility reforms have taken place in a number of countries, notably in Europe 
and the US. These reforms are driven by two factors namely: private ownership which 
is adjudged to be superior to public ownership; and the introduction and promotion of 
competitive forces which are expected to increase efficiency and offer better 
protection of consumers’ interests.84 The most advanced regulatory reforms in Europe 
have taken place in the UK, where these two drivers have been put in practice on a 
larger scale. However, the observation has been that privatisation and competition 
have not always led to the expected results. Clearly, shortfalls have been observed 
regarding the treatment of public service obligations within the new regulatory 
framework. In order to deliver the desired results, it has been suggested that 
regulatory laws be put in place that allow the implementation of market structures 
                                                 
83 European Commission, The General Interest Services in Europe, Brussels (1996). 
84 Beesley M. & Littlechild, S., Privatization: Principles, Problems and Priorities, Lloyds Bank 
Review (1983) 
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which follow a public service orientation rather than a purely market-based 
approach.85 
Obviously, competition could have positive effects upon the provision of collective 
goods and services, which includes the reduction of rent-seeking behaviours and 
information asymmetries; a boost in productivity levels and improvement in 
organisational schemes; and creation of contestability and transparency which 
facilitate the pursuit of general interest objectives. However, competition does not 
always ensure adequate provision of collective goods and services. Although the 
privatisation process embraces the basic principle of public service (universality), it 
also leaves the industries considerable scope for discretion on how to interpret and 
implement that basic commitment.86 The danger in leaving such magnitude of scope 
for discretion lies in the fact that market forces could elicit a differentiation of 
products and prices leading to a negative discrimination between consumers and 
hence a market duplication. Profit seeking motives would naturally cause firms to 
capture the more profitable categories of customers, the fastest growing markets and 
lucrative geographic locations. In effect, firms would direct commercial efforts and 
industrial improvements towards the most lucrative parts of their operation to the 
neglect of others. Firms may also seek to exclude low income customers from the 
market through indirect means such as requesting high deposits, prepayment systems 
etc. 
 
The UK regulatory experience indicates that market forces tend to encourage firms to 
by-pass or neglect issues such as reliability and adaptation. They mostly interpret their 
obligations as precise commitments such as performance standards, quality, access to 
                                                 
85McGowan, F.; Utility Reform in the UK: The Role of Regulation & the Impact on Public Service, 
Annals of Public & Co-operative Economics, p. 66: Issue 2 (1995). 
86 See id., p. 182. 
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information, complaint procedures, etc. There is little incentive to embrace the 
broader agenda of public service and in effect reduce the scope of the universality 
principle to narrow sectoral specifications.87 
 
There are economic grounds in support of such behaviours by firms. In certain 
industries where entry is free, a competitive firm has an incentive to concentrate on 
those areas of the market that for both geographical and economic reasons attract the 
lowest costs of supply. In this instance, the effect of competition would be to make it 
increasingly less profitable for firms to supply the ‘poorer and thinner parts’ of the 
market (‘cream-skimming’ or ‘cheery-picking’).88 Consequently, services in such 
areas suffer. In an economic sense, this consequence is desirable if it reduces the 
amount of cross-subsidisation because the twin problems of transport and the need for 
scale economies makes it costlier for a firm to deliver products of the same 
description and quality to a remote area of lower demand than to a neighbouring area 
of higher demand.  
 
Economically, it is expected that prices charged in both urban and rural areas should 
reflect the costs of supply. Where uniformity of prices is imposed, it does imply the 
existence of cross-subsidisation which in economic terms is regarded to be 
allocatively inefficient. This will force demand and supply in the remote areas to be 
higher than is economically justified. 
 
                                                 
87Defeuilley, C., Competition & Public Service Obligations: Regulatory Rules and Industry Games p. 
2, Centre for International Research in Environment & Development (1998). Available online at 
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1467-8292.00098, last visited on 12 April 2009. 
88 See Ogus; supra note 58, at p. 32. 
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There are, however, products and services which society assumes should be available 
to all at certain minimum standards of quality, quantity, and frequency. Such products 
and services, e.g. petroleum products, utilities, education, certain modes of transport 
(ambulance), etc. will not be available universally without regulation because cream-
skimming will deprive certain localities of such services.89 
 
Some countries (US, Chile, Peru etc.) have created a government-managed universal 
service fund which is meant to be applied in ways that best advance universal service 
obligations. The funds could come from annual taxes on the particular sector in 
question or from general tax funds. These funds could then be used to subsidise a 
commercial entity that provides the service in question into ill served or underserved 
areas. Regulators then prioritise the areas or regions as having high, intermediate, or 
low market potential according to where the ratio of estimated social value to 
estimated cost is greater.90 This approach effectively encourages the private sector to 
expand the distribution of goods or services into unattractive locations by targeting 
subsidies to high-value regions, which subsequently spreads to the low-value regions 
as the need to achieve economies of scale on the basis of geographic proximity 
increases. 
2.5 The concept of public subsidies/state aid 
Subsidies are regarded as an important policy tool for promoting business 
development and for addressing social problems and market failures. Economic 
theory provides five main justifications for subsidies: growth promotion, income re-
                                                 
89 See id., p. 32. 
90 Peha, J. M., Tradable Universal Service Obligations p. 5 (July, 1999). 
Available online at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VCC-3X059N0-
2&_user=1669875&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000054131&_version
=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=1669875&md5=d1d37cac7b4c63b908e1811c2086c95c , last visited on 
12 April 2009. 
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distribution, externality correction, provision of special goods, and for increasing 
returns.91 
2.5.1 Definition of subsidy 
There are several conventional definitions of subsidy, ranging from the narrow to the 
very broad.92 For the purpose of this thesis, the author has chosen the contemporary 
definition of subsidy from the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) literature on ‘public 
subsidies’ because this definition is broad- based relative to the others. The OFT 
defines subsidy as ‘any intervention by the State that provides assistance to a firm or 
groups of firms or individuals’.93 This broad definition would also include 
government actions that are not expected to affect competition e.g. provision of 
general education and general infrastructure.  
 
Forms of subsidy range from direct cash grants, tax credits, loan guarantees, public 
sector equity participation, cross subsidy, in-kind subsidies such as government 
provision of goods and services at below market prices, and procurement which 
involves government purchases of goods and services at above market prices. 
Subsidies can also be classified in other ways, for instance by purpose of the subsidy 
or by the instrument used for effecting the subsidy. There could be two categories of 
subsidies on the basis of purpose, such as resource allocation (e.g. for externality 
correction, decreasing costs, etc.); and distributional purpose (e.g. addressing regional 
inequalities, income size-redistribution, etc.). Conversely, there are six identified 
instruments for effecting subsidies, such as direct cash transfers; tax concessions; 
provision of cheap credit; regulatory subsidies (where government uses regulatory 
                                                 
91 Prest, A. R., How Much Subsidy: A Study of the Economic Concept and Measurement of Subsidies 
in the UK p. 35 (1974) 
92 For more of these definitions, see id., pp. 12-17. 
93 Office of Fair Trading (OFT), Public Subsidies (2000). Available online at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft750.pdf , last visited on 16 April 2009. 
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powers to subsidise particular groups); ‘benefit in kind (where sales by State-owned 
enterprises are at lower-than-market prices); and purchase subsidies (where a 
government makes purchases at higher-than-market prices).94There is also a 
distinction between a subsidy scheme and a subsidy payment. The former is disbursed 
in a number of payments to different firms or individuals according to set criteria 
whereas the latter is an individual payment to a firm. 
 
Regardless of how subsidies might be classified, the key rationale for these includes 
its use to address market failures,95 promote economic growth and employment, and 
as a means of redistributing resources from a stronger sector of the economy to a 
weaker one. Regardless of what the objective is, the provision of subsidies to firms is 
a policy decision for government.96 However, public subsidies also have its demerits. 
 
In principle, subsidies can distort competition by changing the behaviour of the firm 
receiving the subsidy and the behaviour of its competitors. Competition distortion 
arises when the process of rivalry between firms is disturbed and firms no longer 
receive accurate messages from the market.97 Subsidies can reduce firms’ costs or 
increase its revenue. If these effects occur, the affected firms have little incentive to 
keep costs low and to compete effectively to stay profitable. Worse still, where 
subsidies are available only to some firms, or enhance some firms more than others, 
the overall effect could be that inefficient firms prosper and efficient firms may suffer. 
Both undesirable effects would make consumers, the market, and society worse off. 
Apart from allocative inefficiencies, competition distortion could also lead to 
                                                 
94 See Prest; supra note 91, at pp. 25-26. 
95 See OFT Report, European State Aid Control 37 (2005). Available online at  
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft821.pdf , last visited on 09 April 2007 
96 See OFT on Public Subsidies; supra note 93, at p. 6. 
97 See id., p. 14. 
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productive inefficiencies (through a reduction on downward pressure on costs) as well 
as dynamic inefficiencies caused by an alteration in the type and size of investment 
and innovation.98 Conversely, a quantitative research carried out by Andreoni and 
Bergstrom reveals that tax-financed government subsidies to private firms can 
increase the total supply of ‘public goods’.99 However, this is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
 
Even in international trade, subsidies are recognised as having effects on private-
enterprise producers, notably “those that increase import competition in their 
domestic market where foreign suppliers of competing products are benefiting from 
export and/or production subsidies; those that distort conditions of competition in 
foreign third-country markets where suppliers of competing products from other 
countries are benefiting from export and/or production subsidies; those that deter 
entry to foreign markets where import-substitution production subsidies are available 
to domestic suppliers in those markets; and those that create abnormal competition in 
their domestic market as a result of trade – diversion effects of distortions of 
competition in foreign markets”.100 
 
It may be argued that consumers benefit from subsidies in the short run through 
reduced prices. However, if the subsidy is such as to distort competition significantly, 
the lower prices may not be sustainable in the long run. As the subsidy erodes the 
efficiency of the market, prices could slowly begin to rise again unless the subsidy 
continues and increases. This is because production with the subsidy has become less 
                                                 
98 See id., p. 16. Also see Denton et al., Trade Effects of Public Subsidies to Private Enterprises pp. 64-
73 (1975). 
99 Andreoni, J. & Bergstrom, T., Do Government Subsidies Increase the Private Supply of Public 
Goods? pp. 1-4 (1993). 
100 Malmgren, H. B., International Order for Public Subsidies pp. 28-31 (1977). 
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efficient and so more resources will be required to produce the product or service.101 
The full cost of this extra resource employed will have to be borne by consumers.  
 
Conversely, taxpayers meet the cost of paying for subsidies. It is pertinent to also 
mention that the process of taxation distorts markets, for instance the incentive for 
individuals to work may be affected by income tax.102 
 
In November 2004, the OFT published a report based on the Frontier Economics 
research into situations whereby subsidies are most likely to cause competition 
distortions. The report concluded that public subsidies have the potential to distort 
competition but there is still some scope for implementing less distorting subsidies. 
The central objective of the research was to shed some light on appropriate design of 
subsidies to ensure limited effect on competition. However, their research assumed 
that if a subsidy is available to all firms and affects them all equally it should not be 
expected that the subsidy would have a significant impact on competition. 
 
The research also emphasises that the extent to which subsidies can distort 
competition can vary depending on the characteristics of the subsidy and of the 
market (see Table 2.2).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
101See OFT Report, Guidance on How Subsidies Might Distort Competition pp. 10-11 (2007). 
Available online at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft829.pdf , last visited on 
09 April 2007. 
102 See OFT on Public Subsidies; supra note 93, at p. 17. 
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Table 2.2  Subsidy and market characteristics 
Subsidy characteristics Market characteristics 
The absolute size of the subsidy as well as its 
size relative to the costs of the activity being 
subsidised. 
Market concentration. 
The level of selectivity of the subsidy (i.e. 
whether it is provided to one, some, or all firms 
in a market). 
A high level of product 
differentiation. 
The direct effects of subsidy on the recipient’s 
costs. 
Whether the firms in the market are 
of markedly different sizes. 
Whether the subsidy is provided once or on a 
recurring basis. 
Barriers to entry. 
Whether the subsidy is provided directly or 
indirectly to firms. 
Whether firms in the market 
compete on research and 
development. 
Source:  Case studies of public subsidies (OFT, 2006, p4).103 
 
Subsidies and state aid can distort competition in much the same way. However, the 
concept of state aid as defined by the EU is much wider than that of a subsidy. 
 
2.5.2 Definition of state aid (EU) 
Based on Article 87(1) EC, state aid which is deemed to be incompatible with the 
common market would apply to “any aid granted by a member state or through state 
resources (in any form whatsoever) which distorts or threatens to distort competition 
by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods in so far as it 
affects trade between member states”.104 
 
The concept of state aid includes the positive benefits to undertakings (such as 
subsidies themselves), but also various forms of intervention which tend to mitigate 
                                                 
103 OFT 828, Case Studies of Public Subsidies: A Report Prepared for the Office of Fair Trading by 
NERA Economic Consulting 4 (2006). Available online at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft828.pdf, last visited on 26 April 2009. 
104 Quigley C., European State Aid Law and Policy p4 (2009). 
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the charges or costs which are usually included in the budget of an undertaking and 
which are similar in character and have the same effects as subsidies. 
 
Most state aid is awarded through financial grants. However, about 25% of all aid is 
in the form of tax exemptions or social security. Other state aid measures are not 
easily identifiable as aid but have the same effects. Alternative examples are:  
(a)aid granted by the state by selling goods to an undertaking at a reduced price; 
(b)through reimbursement of part of the cost of goods and services;  
(c)through the acquisition of a holding in the share capital of an undertaking;  
(d)by granting a loan to an undertaking/s at a rate of interest below normal 
commercial rates;  
(e)by measures that protect certain industries from the effect of currency fluctuations;  
(f)by payment satisfying legal and commercial obligations on behalf of an 
undertaking such as redundancy costs or outstanding wages; 
(g)by provision of market research and logistical or commercial assistance at a 
reduced rate;  
(h)by exemption from the normal application of insolvency rules thereby allowing 
undertakings owing debts to public bodies to continue trading.105  
 
However, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) continues to emphasise that Article 
87(1) EC distinguishes between measures of state intervention in relation to their 
effects and not by reference to their causes, aims, or method of application. Therefore, 
the fact that the objective of a measure is to achieve a specific economic or social aim 
is not sufficient to put the measure beyond the scope of Article 87 (1) EC. 
                                                 
105 See id., pp. 5-6. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter achieved its purpose by clarifying the concepts of rurality, regulation, 
public service obligation and public subsidies/state aid. This chapter also reviewed the 
theories of regional development and approaches to rural development. These have 
assisted the author in generating the hypotheses for the research project. 
 
 Before the 1970s, most theories and policies on rural development were based on two 
points of view: rural areas as residual to the towns and cities; and rural areas as 
regions with basic characteristics that can only form the basis for exogenous approach 
to development. In terms of statistics, the definition of rural areas is a question of 
population density and/or residual areas or a residual to the town. This definition is 
linked to the traditional view that rural areas are determined from the perspective of 
agricultural presence and dominance. In many countries, it is the large distances of 
separation that determine regional differences between rural and urban areas.  
 
In terms of physical planning, rural areas are those left after an identification of the 
towns/cities according to a hierarchical order and size. The ‘open land’ or ‘open 
space’, usually referred to as rural districts, is largely marked for agricultural 
purposes. The reason is possibly because of the opinion or notion that the ‘open land’ 
falls within the scope of farmers. In terms of politics, rural areas are positively 
correlated to agricultural activities, and so politicians tend to adopt the sector policy 
approach to these areas as opposed to a territorial or regional policy approach. This 
trend is now changing. For instance, with the introduction of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Leader Programme in EU legislation, a lot of 
support measures (that transcend agricultural activities) now target local enterprises 
and activities. 
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Traditionally, it could be argued that rural areas are defined by low population 
density, by an area outside towns and cities, and primarily intended for agricultural 
purposes. However, this definition is in contrast to the current reality whereby many 
people live and work in rural areas without necessarily engaging in agricultural 
activities. Moreover, activities such as mineral extraction, fishing, and manufacturing 
also take place in some rural locations. Therefore, it is a significant task in itself for 
municipalities and counties to determine the object field and its numerous players 
when preparing a policy document for the development of rural areas. 
 
The gradual shift away from the traditional conception of rural areas was recently 
ushered in since the 1990s by numerous researchers with interest in regional 
development, but having an economic background. These researchers have been 
preoccupied with the development of theories about a new paradigm for regional 
development, considering the pace of globalisation and its impact on rural and 
regional areas. The point of departure from the classic theories is the notion that 
regional development takes place as horizontal interactions and responses. Most of the 
previous theories were of the view that rural development was determined and 
conditioned by or from the towns or centres (whether they served as recreational 
arrangements for township residents or as suppliers of food to the towns or as a sort of 
reserve capital). However, the actual development of rural areas in recent years has in 
some parts led to the general blurring of the difference between rural and urban, and 
the appearance of new types of rural areas that need to be examined. These have led 
to the need for new theories on regional development, new approaches to rural 
development, and the redefinition of the term ‘rural areas’. These new developments 
also justify the adoption of the territorial approach to rural development in this thesis. 
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The new paradigm shift in the approach to rural and regional development facilitates 
an understanding of rural areas as not being necessarily subject to or derived from 
area types. This has been the case in recent times, considering that technological 
advancement and global economic development has brought about new patterns of 
localisation. These developments have also resulted in new ways of organising 
business and work which comprise both vertical and horizontal flows. The new 
paradigm projects that in the future all economic activity may likely be specialised 
and localised where the comparative advantages for that particular activity is the 
highest, whereas the markets and business cooperation partners may be somewhere 
possibly distant from the location of the activity. Under such circumstances, more 
activities will be possible in rural areas, and an activity in a particular rural area may 
not necessarily be influenced by a neighbouring locality or the closest city. The 
comparative advantages can manifest through specific business activity (e.g. mining, 
petroleum extraction, fishing, manufacturing, etc.), or specific human capital that is 
specific to a locality (e.g. classic factors of production), or a specific enterprising 
workforce (e.g. entrepreneurs), or specific recreational value that attracts a certain 
type of labour force. 
 
The new paradigm is likely to emerge faster among the OECD member states because 
most rural areas in these states are not relatively underdeveloped in terms of 
population, level of education, and level of labour market activity. The technical, 
social, and administrative infrastructures are also fairly well established on the local 
level. Moreover, as a result of migration from urban areas (particularly those who 
commute to neighbouring towns), there is an increase in population base, 
qualifications, and resources. The majority of these rural areas also have enormous 
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social capital, forged through a strong sense of community drawn from cultural 
traditions from agricultural society. A significant level of social capital has been noted 
by some commentators as the most important factor for positive rural development. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the recent increased focus on rural development can be seen 
in the context of a democratic wish for a more decentralised development. Therefore, 
the author argues that policies for rural development should not focus only on support 
for agricultural activities or a kind of preservation policy, but should incorporate a 
policy for regional innovation with the involvement of both local and non-local actors 
and new actions. This justifies the adoption of the mix of endogenous and exogenous 
approaches to rural development in this thesis. The non-local actors’ category would 
include government intervention, which is usually regulatory in nature. 
 
This chapter reveals that wider conceptions of regulation would include four 
categories: legislative or statutory intervention; regulation by markets; regulation by 
contracts; and court interpretations. These multiple layers of regulatory governance all 
serve useful purposes, and statutory intervention is warranted where the other three 
layers fail .The research identified three different forms of regulation: regulating for a 
monopoly; regulating for competition (i.e. creating conditions for competition to 
blossom); and social regulation (i.e. regulating for market failures through the 
provision of subsidies). The third form was identified as being more relevant to the 
research topic. 
 
Public service obligation which is based on the principle of universality drives social 
regulation. The principles comprise a set of obligations which includes non-
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discrimination and access ‘by all’ to essential utilities at reasonable prices, quality, 
quantity, and reliability. Petroleum products are special goods and their supply and 
distribution accord with the principle of universality. This makes a case for state 
intervention, where necessary, in regard to the supply and distribution of these goods. 
 
Subsidies as a means of state intervention would also include government actions that 
are not expected to affect competition, such as provisions of general education and 
public infrastructure. The rationale for subsidies was identified as the means to 
address market failures, and to promote economic growth and employment in order to 
redistribute resources from a stronger sector to a weaker one. In principle, subsidies 
can have distortion effects on competition by affecting the behaviour of the receiving 
firms and their competitors. State aids (including subsidies) can distort competition in 
a number of ways. Firstly, they could lead firms to set output and price levels 
inefficiently. Secondly, they could keep inefficient firms in business, encourage entry 
by inefficient firms, or discourage entry by efficient firms. Thirdly, they could distort 
investment and R&D decisions. Therefore, care must be taken to design subsidies 
such that their adverse effects are minimised. In this regard, issues such as the value 
of the subsidy, the frequency of the grant, selectivity, activity-specific targets, market 
concentration, etc. have to be considered.  
 
Subsidies and state aids are similar in character and have the same effects, but the 
concept of state aid is much more than the notion of a subsidy. Subsidy is usually a 
payment in cash or kind made in support of an undertaking, but the notion of state aid 
places emphasis on its purpose and is particularly designed for a specific objective/s 
which cannot be normally met without exogenous assistance. Therefore, the concept 
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of state aid is much wider than that of a subsidy in that it covers both positive benefits 
(such as subsidies themselves), as well as interventions of different forms which 
mitigate part of the charges under the budget of an undertaking/s. 
 
Having reviewed the key concepts and principles pertaining to the research topic, let 
us examine the supply and pricing of fuel products in rural and remote areas of the 
UK and Australia and identify the forms of government support for fuel retailing in 
these locations. 
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Chapter 3 
OVERVIEW OF RURAL FUEL SUPPLY AND PRICING IN THE 
UK AND AUSTRALIA 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to unravel the sources of the problems of high fuel prices in 
rural/remote locations and rural–urban price differentials in the chosen jurisdictions 
and the impact of these pricing problems on rural and remote locations. This chapter 
also looks at what governments’ responses to the problems are; and what industry 
players and analysts think about these problems.  
 
To achieve these objectives, this chapter examines the competitive dynamics of the 
fuel retail trade, the nature of fuel pricing in rural and remote areas, the range of 
measures employed by the UK and Australian Governments in dealing with these 
problems, and a review of the opinions of industry participants and analysts regarding 
the future prospects of independent fuel retailers and supermarkets in the two 
jurisdictions. 
 
This chapter identified some specific regulatory support mechanisms and fuel subsidy 
schemes used by these governments to resolve these fuel pricing problems, which 
constitute a major part of the analytical framework for this thesis and assisted in 
defining the common comparators for fuel retail regulations in both jurisdictions. 
 
3.2 The fuel retail market 
The characteristics of the market (demand and supply) largely determine the nature of 
competition in the fuel retail market. The competitive dynamics in turn determines the 
nature of fuel pricing. On the supply side, there are three characteristics that drive the 
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competitive dynamics among fuel retailers and so affect the pricing outcomes. Firstly, 
there are interdependencies between fuel sales and the sales of other convenience 
products (non-fuel sales) e.g. confectionary, cigarettes, milk, newspapers, etc. The 
higher the volume of products sold the greater the customer throughput and therefore 
the higher the sale of convenience products and profitability.  
 
Secondly, fuel retailers incur two kinds of costs. The fixed costs are those incurred 
regardless of the volume of fuels sold and include the costs of the site and labour. The 
variable costs are those that vary with the volume of fuels and quantity of 
convenience products sold. The main variable cost is the wholesale cost of petroleum 
products obtained from suppliers. Thus, the aim of every fuel retailer is to cover the 
variable costs and also make some contribution towards the fixed costs. Inability to 
achieve this objective could lead to closure. Consequently, fuel retailers must 
maintain or increase sales through price competition. This competition continues to a 
point where there is almost no margin above their variable cost, which becomes 
unprofitable for all retailers. Afterwards, prices begin to rapidly adjust upwards, at 
which point fuel retailers begin to achieve a margin above their variable costs of 
supply in order to recover their fixed costs.1  
 
Thirdly, sales volumes are a major determinant of the profitability of individual fuel 
retail outlets. Therefore, a fuel retailer wishing to recover the fixed costs of its 
                                                 
1 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Report on Reducing Fuel Price Variability 33 
(Dec.2001). Available online at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/321896 , last visited on 19 March 2009. 
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operation must achieve a margin on some or all of their sales of fuels and convenience 
products.2 
 
On the demand side there are five major factors that determine the competitive 
dynamics and the pricing outcomes. Firstly, petroleum products are purchased 
regularly by consumers. Each purchase entails a consumer deciding on where to buy 
the products and affords an opportunity for a fuel retailer to increase or lose sales. 
This emphasises the importance of volume of sales, which is linked with the pricing 
of products.  
 
Secondly, the market demand for fuels is not sensitive to price, at least in the short 
run. The market-wide demand for petroleum products is mainly derived from 
automotive use. Commercial transporters and private car owners have no 
commercially viable alternative fuel sources to choose from and so have to purchase 
petrol, diesel or LPG. Therefore, in the short term the demand response to a non-
transitory increase in the price of these fuels is negligible. However, in the longer 
term, consumers may be able to switch to more fuel-efficient cars.  
 
Thirdly, the retail prices of fuels are easily compared since most retailers post prices 
at the entrance of their outlet. Considering that most fuel retailers locate their sites 
visibly and conveniently, the cost of price comparisons is relatively small. By 
implication, fuel retailers will have to monitor each others’ prices and adjust 
accordingly.  
 
                                                 
2 ACCC, Report from Frontier Economics on Economic Implications of Terminal Gate Pricing pp. 9-
10 (2001). 
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Fourthly, petroleum products are largely generic products. Therefore, a significant 
percentage of consumers have little or no brand loyalty. Retailers attempt to 
differentiate their products using the octane grade, however most consumers buy 
unleaded petrol, whose quality is similar across retailers. Some consumers patronise 
the agency cards and so have ties with particular fuel retailers, but their relative 
proportion is insignificant. The presence of little or no brand loyalty coupled with the 
ease of price comparison makes price an important determinant of a consumer’s 
choice of fuel retailer.  
 
Finally, the demand for fuels is localised, as there are costs incurred for searching for 
fuels outside the location where a consumer lives and works. The implication is that 
there are price differentials across localities. Price differences have also been 
observed to persist within a locality over a long period.3  
3.3 The nature of petrol pricing  
The foregoing indicates that pricing of petroleum products is of critical importance 
because it determines the volume of sales from a given outlet and by implication the 
survival rate of outlets.  
 
From the UK perspective, because there are such a high number of fuel wholesalers, 
this would likely make it difficult for them either to collude in setting prices or to 
secure unjustified margins. Nevertheless, wholesalers set retail prices for all outlets 
under their supply agreements (whether company-owned or dealers). They also exert 
indirect influence on retail prices through the auspices of the selective price support 
(SPS), which could be classified as a conditional rebate. This could be regarded as a 
                                                 
3 See id., pp. 8-9. 
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form of price discrimination.4 However, due to significant competition among 
wholesalers, the operation of SPS tends to increase price competition among fuel 
retailers. The evidence shows that its operation has not resulted in consumer harm or 
worked against the larger public interest.5 Conversely, SPS is inapplicable to most 
rural outlets because of the lesser competition they experience. This could be one of 
the justifications for the support schemes for rural locations.  
 
Under section 45A of the Australian Trade Practices Act (TPA), price discrimination 
refers to the practice of the sale of the same goods by the same supplier to different 
customers at different prices. Under the TPA, a supplier should not practise price 
discrimination between purchasers of products of similar grade, volume and quality, 
particularly when the magnitude or repetition of the practice results in a significant 
lessening of competition.6 However, the TPA also acknowledges that discrimination 
can occur in good faith to meet a price or benefit offered by a competitor and these 
are prevalent in the fuel retail trade. Different customers may be charged different 
prices based on differences in the cost of supply, conditions of payment, and risk 
allowances. These would not be considered as anti-competitive price discrimination 
and so not illegal under the TPA.7  
 
Differentials in wholesale fuel prices can occur based on differences in bargaining and 
buying power. For instance, independent distributors having large throughput and 
                                                 
4Competition Commission (CC), Collective Discrimination: A Report on Exclusive Dealing, Collective 
Boycotts, Aggregated Rebates and other Discriminatory Trade Practices 26 (1955). Available online at 
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1950_1959/010collective.htm, last visited 
on 19 March 2009. 
5 Competition Commission - The Supply of Petrol: A Report on the Supply in the United Kingdom of 
Petrol by Wholesale (1990) pp. 78-79. Available online at http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1990/265petrol.htm  , last visited on 22 March 2009. 
6Industry Commission Report No 40, Petroleum Products 83 (1994). Available online at   
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/6970/40petrol.pdf , last visited on 22 March 2009. 
7 See id., p. 73. 
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thereby high negotiating power can get the best deals from oil majors who are 
interested in maintaining their market share. However, this system of pricing places 
the single site, low-volume operators (small independents) at a severe disadvantage. 
The independent chains have substantial buying power and are not likely to be 
affected by price discrimination.8 Nevertheless, the evidence shows that price 
discrimination could be considered as pro-competitive since it is associated with 
efficiency gains and ultimately of benefit to consumers. The evidence has shown that 
eliminating price discounting by wholesalers could rather result in price increases 
which are detrimental to consumers.9  
 
The UK experience shows that pricing abuses are always alleged by a number of 
independent fuel retailers, e.g. predatory pricing. Theoretically, predatory pricing may 
be difficult to ascertain in retailing because the producers often give differential 
discounts to retailers. The implication is that the price–cost test may not be useful 
here in detecting predatory pricing, because on the basis of differential discounts 
larger retailers may be able to cut prices and drive away smaller retailers without 
incurring losses.10 
 
Particularly, there were widespread allegations of predatory pricing by the oil majors 
in the UK in the wake of the Esso Pricewatch campaign that triggered intense price 
wars between oil majors and supermarket fuel retailers.11 Consequently, the 
                                                 
8 Industry, Tourism, Resources (DITR), Downstream Petroleum Industry Framework 22 (2002). 
Available online at http://www.industry.gov.au, last visited on 26 March 2009. 
9 For details, see Competition Commission Report, Discount to Retailers (1981). Available online at 
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1981/135discounts_retailers.htm, last 
visited on 15 March 2009. 
10 Areeda, P.E. & D.F.Turner; Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act pp. 697-733 Vol. 88 (1975). 
11OFT 229 Report; Competition in the Supply of Petrol in the UK 49 (1998). Available online at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/advice_and_resources/publications/reports/transport/oft229, last visited on 15 
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competitive shake-out precipitated the exit of a large number of independent fuel 
retailers. However, the Esso Pricewatch could be seen as an attempt by the oil majors 
to meet the competition posed by the supermarkets. The motive behind this conduct 
qualifies as an objective justification. Moreover, the conduct resulted in lower fuel 
prices, which benefited consumers. Likewise, the supermarkets’ loss leading pricing 
strategy was alleged by the independent fuel retailer group as predatory pricing. 
However, the supermarkets’ lower fuel prices or loss leading did not result in 
consumer harm. On the contrary, it could be argued that supermarkets’ pricing 
strategy promoted price competition among retailers – the object of competition itself. 
Nevertheless, for a case of predatory pricing to be established in both allegations, it 
had to be demonstrated that the losses incurred through these pricing strategies could 
be recouped in the future through the charging of higher fuel prices. Also, it must be 
shown that entry barriers in the sector are high enough to prevent potential entrants 
from competing away the alleged predators’ potential future profits.12 However, the 
nature of competition between the oil majors and the supermarkets, and among the 
supermarkets themselves, would suggest little possibility for such recoupment to 
occur. Moreover, the supermarkets have continued to expand their outlets.  
 
It was recognised in the Competition Commission’s report (2000) that supermarkets 
do engage in below-cost selling and price flexing – practices which are deemed to 
operate against the public interest. However, for reasons of practicality and the benefit 
that accrues to consumers in terms of lower prices, the report made no 
                                                                                                                                            
March 2009. For details on the petrol retail price war of 1975-8, see the Monopolies & Mergers 
Commission, PETROL: A Report on the Supply of Petrol in the UK by Wholesale, 20 (1979). 
Available online at http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1990/265petrol.htm , 
last visited on 17 March 2009. 
12OFT Research Paper 13; Competition in Retailing 94 (1997). Available online at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/advice_and_resources/publications/reports/competition-policy/oft195, last 
visited on 10 April 2009. 
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recommendation for remedies. It was considered that the benefits of imposing 
remedies would be less than the adverse effects on competition.13 
 
In the case of Australia, parallel pricing/price leadership, and predatory pricing have 
also been alleged. Parallel pricing/price leadership are regular features of the fuel 
retail trade. Theoretically, they are characteristic of markets where goods and services 
produced or sold by each firm are close substitutes (i.e. little product differentiation) 
and where firms are subject to the same demand and supply conditions.14 As a result, 
no competitor can afford to lose market share by refusing to match price reductions by 
the others. This is also a feature of oligopolistic market structures which occurs at the 
refining and wholesaling levels of the downstream petroleum industry.15 
Subsequently, the effects of price discounting at these levels trickle down to the retail 
level. However, it is difficult to assess whether parallel pricing and price leadership 
occur because of fierce competition or due to collusive behaviour. It is only the courts 
that can draw inferences based on the motives behind the conduct. The worst form of 
collusive abuse would be those attributed to abuse of collective dominance.16  
 
Five conditions exist under which collusion is more likely to occur, as follows:17 
presence of a small number of suppliers; firms in the market having similar costs and 
                                                 
13 OFT Report; Supermarkets: The Code of Practice and other Competition Issues 20-21 (2005). 
Available online at http://www.oft.gov.uk/advice_and_resources/publications/reports/competition-
policy/oft783 , last visited on 15 April 2009. 
14 Competition Commission, Parallel Pricing pp. 19-20 (1973). Available online at 
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1970_1975/070pricing.htm, last visited on 
14 March 2009. 
15 For more details on oligopolistic market structures, see Friedman, J. W., Oligopoly Theory (1983). 
See Bain, J. S., Barriers to New Competition: Their Character & Consequences in Manufacturing 
Industries 53-113 & 144-166 (1965). Also see Scherer, F. M., Industrial Market Structure & Economic 
Performance Chpt.2, 8-29 (1980). 
16 Director-General, Competition (European Commission); DG Competition Discussion Paper on the 
Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses 16 (2005). Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf  last visited on 14 April 2009. 
17 See OFT Report (229); supra note 11, at pp. 100-101. 
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driven by same economic incentives; transparency in pricing; difficult entry; and 
stable market conditions. Generally, collusion is likely to occur where import 
competition is low; barriers to entry high; and little product differentiation. In the 
Australian as well as the UK fuel retail markets, entry barriers are medium; actual 
import competition is low, although the potentials are high; and products are largely 
homogeneous, although the grades and brands may vary slightly. Therefore, collusion 
among the oil majors can occur. However, these may not be sustainable in 
metropolitan cities because of the large numbers of fuel retailers, threat of imports 
from independent chains, and the periodic bursts of price discounting. Moreover, 
current profits from fuel outlets are attributed more to non-fuel goods than to fuels 
themselves.  
 
Conversely, the evidence of collusion in some rural or country areas is unclear but 
likely because there are few suppliers and relatively fewer fuel retailers. Nevertheless, 
the higher margins observed in some rural locations may be a reflection of weaker 
competitive conditions, collusion, or inertia/conscious parallelism. In Australia, the 
latter is not considered a breach of the TPA, even though its effects are similar to 
overt collusion, because it is difficult to prove that the parallel prices were agreed by 
the parties involved. Similarly, there is a thin line separating the effects of vigorous 
competition from those of predatory pricing. It may be possible for the courts and 
regulatory authorities to detect the conduct of predation by investigating the purpose 
behind the conduct. The starting point in such investigations would be in 
circumstances where the alleged predator has a market share of more than 25%. 
However, the conditions necessary to prove a case of predation has to be met, and this 
is hard to prove.  
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Also, price wars are a feature of the fuel retail trade and result from rounds of 
protracted price discounting, which then spill over to adjacent locations.18 Generally, 
price discounting in the fuel retail trade is inevitable considering the high capital costs 
of refining, product storage, distribution terminals and retail networks. The 
continuous nature of refinery operations and the need for cost savings create 
incentives for refiners to operate at full capacity. Consequently, stock build-up could 
occur during periods of low demand and refiners usually discount prices to clear the 
excess stock. This could lead to rounds of discounting at the wholesale level until 
demand rises to meet the installed capacity. Discounting at the wholesale level 
gradually trickles down to the retail level. Alternative options to clearing stock that 
has built up are either shutting down the refinery or providing additional storage for 
products. These options are considered uneconomic unless demand is projected to be 
high for a sustained period of time.19 The defence mechanism open to the oil majors 
in order to meet vigorous price competition at the retail level is by using SPS. This 
tends to aggravate the intensity of the price discounting. Unfortunately, independents 
fuel retailers (branded or unbranded) that are not in receipt of the SPS become 
exposed to price pressures and inevitably some of them are forced out of the market.  
 
In the case of Australia, the government has been protective of independent fuel 
retailers and thus argues that the use of SPS could become anti-competitive in the 
long run if it facilitates the elimination of independents or limits their ability to 
compete. Furthermore, the Australian Government argues that the anti-competitive 
impact of SPS may become lethal if it facilitates the exit of, or a reduction in the 
number of independent fuel outlets in country areas. However, considering the wider 
                                                 
18 See id., pp. 48-49. 
19 See IC Report; supra note 6, at p. 68. 
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geographic spread of country outlets, and the near absence of price discounting, it is 
unlikely that SPS will find applicability there. Nevertheless, the state of fuel retail 
competition in rural or country areas is peculiar. The motorists in these locations are 
supplied by independent fuel retailers with little incentive to compete on price. High 
gross retail margins have been observed in some of these areas as a result. Inevitably, 
high retail margins tend to affect the prices of other consumer goods and thus increase 
the cost of living for rural dwellers. Moreover, they tend to increase the operating cost 
of local businesses (farming, fishing, manufacturing, services, etc.). Therefore, it 
might be argued that to achieve effective competition in such locations would require 
a countervailing power, e.g. the presence of independent chains operating with some 
scale economies, formation of co-operatives or buying groups among rural residents, 
or government intervention.  
 
Independent chains with scale operations will likely operate only in areas that are 
economically viable. Thus, this group are not expected to operate in rural and 
particularly remote areas. Rural co-operatives are likely to be effective if they have a 
large buying power. Considering the relatively lower population densities in these 
locations and the relatively lower per capita income of rural inhabitants, it is unlikely 
that they will provide adequate countervailing power. More often, the government is 
needed to provide this power. Tables 3.1-3.4 summarises some of the identified 
regulatory support mechanisms and fuel subsidy schemes that had been applied in the 
two jurisdictions. The analytical framework for this study is based on these 
mechanisms and schemes.20 Next, let us look at the specific rural fuel supply and 
pricing situation in each jurisdiction. 
                                                 
20 See Chapter 1 (Introduction), at pp 37-38. 
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Tables 3.1-3.4 Classifications of Regulatory Support Mechanisms & Fuel Subsidy  
                Schemes 
Classifications (a) Regulatory Objectives Target 
1. REGULATORY ACTS & 
REMEDIES 
  
State Grants Petroleum Products 
Act (Australia) 
To support communities where the prices 
of petroleum products are considered to 
be high. 
Country and regional 
areas. 
Undertakings 
(UK and Australia) 
To minimise, ameliorate or eliminate anti-
competitive aspects of the oil majors’ 
activities, e.g. the single branding 
obligation, mergers and acquisitions, etc. 
The major wholesalers 
(refining and non-
refining). 
Petroleum Retail Marketing 
Sites Act 
    (Australia) 
To curtail extensive vertical integration of 
the oil majors, and create room for entry 
of independent retailers. 
Promotion of 
independent fuel 
retailers. 
Petroleum Retail Marketing 
Franchise Act (Australia) 
To minimise the imbalance in contractual 
powers by setting minimum terms and 
conditions for contracting between the oil 
majors and their franchisees (dealers). 
Protection of 
independent fuel 
retailers (franchisees) 
Petroleum Products Price 
Surveillance Act 
To carry out surveillance of petroleum 
products prices and to regulate wholesale 
prices. 
Rural and regional 
areas. 
Trade Practices (Oilcode) 
Regulation 
To institute a comprehensive downstream 
petroleum retail framework to guide its 
operations. This would include, terminal 
gate pricing, dispute resolution 
mechanisms, prior disclosure by the oil 
majors, and expiry/voluntary surrender of 
agreements by retailers and distributors. 
The fuel retail sector. 
 
Source: This Research 
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Classifications (b) Public Policy Objectives Target 
2. FUEL REBATE & GRANT 
SCHEMES  
  
Fuel Sales Grants Scheme 
(Australia) 
To reduce the differential between rural 
and urban fuel prices ; 
All fuel retailers in 
remote and rural areas. 
Petroleum Product Freight 
Subsidy Scheme 
(Australia) 
To subsidize remote fuel transporters, in 
order to reduce the cost of fuel in rural 
and remote communities. 
Fuel distributors in 
remote areas. 
Diesel Fuel Rebate Scheme 
(Australia) 
To provide a rebate on fuel excise for 
some business sectors, particularly those 
involved in primary production and 
mining. 
Primary producers and 
other businesses. 
Diesel & Alternative Fuel 
Grants Scheme 
(Australia) 
To provide fuel grants for certain heavy 
vehicles, especially those used for 
agricultural production; and to subsidize 
the use of alternative fuels in road 
transport, e.g. ethanol, LNG, CNG, etc. 
Primary industry and 
consumers wishing to 
switch from conventional 
fuels (petrol & diesel) to 
alternative fuels. 
 
Business Fuel Credit 
Scheme 
(Australia) 
To lower the effective level of fuel taxes 
for businesses. 
All businesses for fuel 
used off-road & for 
vehicles above 4.5 tonnes 
for fuels used on-road. 
Ultra Low Sulphur Diesel 
(ULSD) Subsidy 
(UK & Australia) 
To encourage its use and thereby 
improve air quality and promote a better 
environment. 
ULSD producers, 
importers, and users. 
Residential Fuel Credit 
Scheme 
(Proposed in Australia) 
To offset the excise component of 
diesel, heating oil and LPG used for 
domestic heating, cooking and 
electricity generation. 
Residents of rural 
communities who have 
no access to reticulated 
gas or mains electricity 
and must rely on other 
sources of fuel. 
Agricultural Subsidies 
(UK & Australia) 
To reduce the cost of agricultural inputs 
and the price of agricultural products. 
Farmers (usually in rural 
areas). 
Energy Grants Credit 
Scheme 
(Australia) 
To encourage local businesses, 
particularly those involved in primary 
production that consume diesel. 
 Primary industry 
                 
                               
 
 
Source: This Research 
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Classifications (c) Public Policy Objectives Target 
3. EXCISE CONCESSIONS AND  
    REMISSIONS 
  
Fuel Tax Exemption on 
Petroleum Product Substitutes 
(ethanol, other bio-fuels, LPG, 
CNG) 
 
(UK & Australia) 
To support development in rural and 
remote areas through the production 
of petroleum substitutes using 
agricultural products (e.g. ethanol 
made from wheat or sugar); and 
to achieve the environmental 
objectives of reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions (GHG) and improving 
air quality. 
Primary producers and 
consumers of petroleum 
product substitutes. 
Duty Exemption or Remission 
for Inputs Required to 
Manufacture Equipment Needed 
to Facilitate a Switch to 
Petroleum Products Substitutes 
(UK & Australia) 
To enable consumers to switch to 
cheaper and environmentally 
friendly petroleum product 
substitutes. 
Equipment manufacturers 
(e.g. LPG and CNG kits) 
that aid a switch to 
petroleum product 
substitutes. 
Duty Concession or Remission 
on Vehicles Imported into Rural 
Communities 
(Proposed in the UK) 
To reduce the cost of vehicles for 
rural residents due to the near 
absence of public transportation in 
such locations; and to cushion the 
effects of high fuel prices in such 
locations. 
Residents in rural and 
remote communities. 
Excise Concessions on the Use 
of Renewable Forms of Energy 
(UK & Australia) 
To encourage the rapid development 
of renewable forms of energy; 
reduce the high cost of living in 
rural areas; and to achieve the 
objectives of sustainability in energy 
use. 
Primary producers of 
renewable forms of energy. 
Excise Exemption on Inputs for 
Development of Renewable 
Forms of Energy 
(UK & Australia) 
Same as above. Same as above. 
 
Source: This Research 
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Classifications (d) Public Policy Objectives Target 
4. OTHER RURAL GRANTS  
    & REBATE SCHEMES 
  
Energy Savings Trust 
Scheme (UK) 
To provide grants for conversion of cars 
and lorries to LPG and CNG (greener 
fuels). 
Public motorists. 
Fuel Duty Rebate for 
Buses (UK) 
To encourage the use of Ultra Low 
Sulphur Diesel in buses for 
environmental reasons. 
Public transportation. 
Fishing Fleet Diesel Fuel 
Subsidy (UK) 
To maintain a vibrant and competitive 
fishing industry and workforce. 
Fishing industry, and 
local fishermen. 
Rural Bus Subsidy Grant 
(UK) 
To provide funding for rural bus 
transportation. 
Rural inhabitants. 
Rural Transport Grant 
(UK) 
To expand the scope of transport 
support to include improved bus and rail 
services; and innovative rural transport 
schemes, such as rural car clubs and 
boat clubs. 
Rural inhabitants. 
Rural Services Fund 
(Scotland, UK) 
To support rural bus transportation, 
local shops, post offices, petrol stations, 
and other rural services. 
Rural inhabitants. 
Rural Travel Bonus 
(Proposed in the UK) 
To reduce the cost of transportation for 
rural communities. 
Claimants with rural 
postcodes. 
Rural Council Tax Rebate 
(Proposed in the UK) 
To reduce council tax payable by rural 
residents. 
Rural inhabitants in 
remote rural areas.  
Tax-Free Travel Vouchers 
(Proposed in the UK) 
To encourage green commuting Rural inhabitants 
 
Source: This Research 
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3.4 UNITED KINGDOM: Rural fuel supply and pricing situation 
Much of the UK fuel retail market exists as a series of local markets which overlap to 
form a chain of substitution and thus almost constitute a single market. If prices rose 
abnormally in a certain locality, the situation could spark up competition from an 
adjacent area, since consumers will not have to drive a long distance to buy fuels at 
the lower price. However, this argument does not hold for remoter areas, especially 
north-west Scotland, Orkney, Shetland, the Inner and Outer Hebrides (Highlands and 
Islands), and the Western Isles.21 The consumers in these areas are considered to be in 
a captive market because the cost and inconvenience of buying fuels on the mainland 
in order to avoid higher prices are high. 
 
The main areas of concern identified by consumer representatives in these areas are: 
the higher prices of fuels at the pump relative to the UK average and the falling 
number of fuels retail outlets. The price differentials between the UK average and 
these areas are greater in north-west Scotland, Inner and Outer Hebrides, Orkney and 
Shetland. The OFT’s 1998 report concluded that the Highlands and Islands (H & I) 
should be treated as separate from the wider UK market for fuel wholesaling and 
retailing because the chain of substitution does not extend to these areas, owing to a 
sparse population (with fewer sites spread across a large area) and poor road 
infrastructure.  
 
The price differentials even within the H & I area do suggest that it does not operate 
as a single homogenous market. Additionally, the review conducted by the OFT 
                                                 
21 See OFT Report (1998); supra note 11, at p. 69. Also see annexed map of the UK. 
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(2000) in these areas found a price differential as high as 5.5 pence per litre (ppl) 
between the Western Isles and the H & I as a whole.22 
 
Significant barriers to entry into fuel wholesaling in the H & I were identified in the 
OFT, 2000, review. Wholesale supplies of fuel can be obtained from BP’s 
Grangemouth refinery, but may not be bought at terms that are comparable to existing 
swap arrangements between Shell, Esso and BP, and the supermarkets unless the 
potential entrant has refining capacity elsewhere in the UK or beyond.23 This 
automatically places a new entrant at a price disadvantage. The exception has been 
Gleener Oils, an independent fuel retailer which established as a fuel wholesaler in 
this region in 1997.24 Moreover, entry as a non-refining wholesaler requires access to 
fuel stations. Ordinarily, this access should not be difficult, considering that there are 
minimal vertical restraints at the retail level in this area. The problem, however, is that 
almost all outlets in the area have five-year solus ties with existing wholesalers; 
although a proportion of these contracts come up for renewal each year, the number of 
outlets are small.25 Therefore, it is unlikely for a new entrant to access a sufficient 
number of retail stations to operate profitably. Entry at the retail level has not been 
attractive and the cost of complying with environmental regulations has been high. To 
earn enough returns, entry has to be on a fairly high scale. The sustained closures of 
sites in this region are an indication that except for higher volume locations, entry 
opportunity is unattractive (see table 3.5). 
 
 
                                                 
22 OFT Report, Petrol and Diesel Pricing in the Highlands & Islands 4 (2000). Available online at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/transport/oft305.pdf , last visited on 18 March 2009. The 
OFT have not conducted further investigations into fuel pricing in this region since the 2000 report. 
23 See id., p. 5. 
24 See id., p. 5. 
25 See id., p. 5. 
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Table 3.5  Numbers of petrol retailers in the H& I and Western Isles 
 in 1992 as compared with 1998-9 
 
Area 1992 1998-9 
 
Highlands 
 
177 
 
139 
Western Isles 30 19 
Orkney 43 26 
Shetland 34 21 
 
TOTAL 
 
284 
 
205 
 
Source:  OFT Review (petrol & diesel pricing in the H & I) July 2000, p. 7. 
 
 
Table 3.6 shows that the major oil companies, particularly Shell, Esso, and BP, and to 
a lesser degree Gleener Oils, account for most of the wholesale supply of fuels in the 
H & I. This table also indicates the approximate market shares for each of the four 
wholesalers both in terms of the number of sites owned and the volume of fuels 
supplied. This broad picture shows that together BP, Shell, and Esso account for 
between 65% and 90% of wholesale supply, although there appear to be differences in 
market shares within regions of the H & I. 
 
Most fuel retailers in the region are solus-tie independents, having between them an 
estimated average volume throughput of 980,000 litres for both petrol and diesel (see 
Table 3.7). Although BP has the highest number of solus-tie outlets (62%), however, 
they supply lower volumes compared to Esso and Shell. The number of outlets 
operated by Shell and Esso has fallen in recent years but the remainder generally 
supply higher volumes. 
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Table 3.6  Estimated market shares in the supply of petrol in the H & I 
 (1998-9) 
 
Supplier Number of 
sites 
Site % Average annual retail 
petrol volume (litres) 
Volume 
% 
 
BP 
 
122 
 
62 
 
53,500,000 
 
43 
Esso 21 11 40,500,000 32 
Shell 17 9 14,400,000 12 
Gleaner 13 7 2,000,000 2 
Others 23 12 15,000,000 12 
 
TOTAL 
 
196 
 
100 
 
125,400,000 
 
100 
 
Source:  OFT Review (petrol & diesel pricing in the H & I), July 2000, p. 6. 
 
Table 3.7 Average annual throughput (petrol & diesel) in litres (1998 & 
1999) 
 
Supplier H & I UK 
 
BP 
 
690,000 
 
4,140,000 
Esso 2,730,000 N/A 
Shell 1,460,000 3,200,000 
Gleaner 260,000 N/A 
 
AVERAGE 
 
980,000 
 
2,800,000 
 
Note: Weighted by number of sites for H & I average. 
Source:  OFT Review (petrol & diesel pricing in the H & I), July 2000, p. 6. 
 
The foregoing partly accounts for a significant differential in the prices of fuels in 
rural and urban locations in the UK. A number of other reasons have been adduced for 
this differential including smaller number, sizes and turnover of retail outlets in 
rural/remote areas; higher cost of delivery to such areas, and ever-increasing costs of 
pump and tank replacements due to increased environmental regulatory requirements, 
etc.26 Additionally, the price of fuels exclusive of VAT is higher in rural areas. 
Consequently, the interaction of this price with VAT at the standard rate of 17.5% 
                                                 
26 UK Retail Marketing Survey, Petroleum Review, Independents: Rising to the Rural Challenges 27 
(March 2003, Ed.). 
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increases the price differential (see Table 3.8). Halcrow Fox suggested that 
government should introduce a system whereby the VAT on motor fuel varied from 
region to region, in order to mitigate the inherently higher costs in rural areas.  
 
Table 3.8  Regional comparison of prices, margins and volumes (1999-
2000) 
 
Area Average pump 
price for 
unleaded petrol 
(ppl) 
Average 
combined gross 
retail / 
wholesale 
margin (ppl) 
Average annual 
site volume 
(petrol & 
diesel) (litres) 
 
UK 
 
62.9 
 
5.3 
 
2,800,000 
H & I 66.2 8.7   950,000 
Inner Moray firth 64.2 <8.7 2,170,000 
Remote Highlands 67.0 >8.7   710,000 
Western 
Isles(Uist) 
71.7 14.1   760,000 
Isles of Lewis / 
Harris (Western 
Isles) 
71.5 14.1 1,250,000 
 
Source:  OFT Survey (2000), petrol & diesel pricing in the Highlands & Islands, p. 
16. 
 
The Parliamentary Trade and Industry Committee UK (6th Report) considered the 
suggestion as impractical, but recommended that government could consider ways in 
which the taxation levied on fuels could be adjusted to ensure that fuel retailers in 
rural areas as well as rural dwellers are not disadvantaged.27 
 
In summary, the implications of price differentials are: (a) a possible cross-subsidy 
from rural consumers to urban consumers; (b) the prices of many goods and services 
are likely to be higher in rural areas than urban areas, thereby creating rural poverty; 
                                                 
27 HC 384 Parliamentary Trade & Industry Committee Session 1987 / 88, Report on Petrol Retailing in 
the UK xix 1996). 
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(c) rural dwellers who rely heavily on motor vehicular transport in the absence of 
alternative public transport will now have to pay more for fuel than urban dwellers 
who have other alternative transport options; (d) large price differentials between 
rural areas and nearby country towns can result in rural motorists having to travel 
unreasonably long distances to obtain fuel, along with its environmental consequences 
and road congestion. 
 
The OFT also investigated the way fuel and agency cards operate to see if it 
contributed in some ways to the high fuel prices in rural communities, particularly in 
the Western Isles. Cards issued by different wholesalers operate differently, but 
basically they are meant to permit the purchaser to obtain fuel at a national average 
price. In the case of Esso’s card, the retailer is refunded the difference between the 
national average price and the displayed pump price.28 BP is by far the major supplier 
of fuel through branded sites in the Western Isles, and supplied 60% of total fuels in 
1998. In their case, BP pays a handling charge to the retailers which they claim is 
sufficient to cover the marginal cost of supplying fuel and to bring in customers (who 
would otherwise be lost to a competitor) to the outlet.29  
 
The estimates of the possible impact of an agency fuel card on retail income and 
pump prices are laid out in Table 3.9. The assumptions here are that volume, pump 
price, and retailers’ income are constant. The OFT observed that while the loss of fuel 
card facility by a retailer is hurtful to its business, however it does not necessarily 
translate to a growth in retail volume for those retailers who have the card facility. 
 
 
                                                 
28 See id., p. 18. 
29 See OFT Report; supra note 33, at p. 18. 
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Table 3.9  Possible Impact of National Average Price Agency Card Sales 
 
 With agency card without agency card 
Agency business as a % of 
total business 
% drop in retail income Decrease in pump price (ppl) 
 
10 
 
8.5 
 
-0.8 
15 13.0 -1.2 
20 17.5 -1.6 
25 22.0 -2.0 
30 26.5 -2.4 
 
Source:  OFT Survey (2000), petrol & diesel pricing in the H & I, p. 19. 
 
Since the local market in the Western Isles is said to be operating competitively, 
retailers may not be able to raise their prices to counteract the lower margins from 
agency sales; in the absence of an increase in volume, the expected outcome would be 
a closure of smaller outlets. This is because the smaller sites would be unable to 
match the lower unit costs of large volume retailers, and consequently the minimum 
efficient scale of operation will increase.30 The resultant effect of market exits of this 
type should be a reduction in outlets, increased volume at the remaining sites, and a 
reduction in their unit costs. It is clear that this reduced cost has not been passed on to 
consumers in lower pump prices and amounts to a significant consumer welfare loss 
and would indicate the characteristics of oligopoly.  
 
However, the OFT observed that prices and pricing patterns in the Western Isles do 
not suggest that they have a highly competitive market. The implication is that the 
impact of agency cards may not lead to market exits but possibly to higher pump 
prices, since the small retailers will seek to recover the retail margins lost on the 
agency cards. BP confirmed that additional price support is rarely given to retailers in 
                                                 
30 See id., p. 19. 
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this area, except those with an unusually high level of agency business, which 
compensates them for lost retail income.31 
3.4.1 Views across the industry 
3.4.1.1 Future role of independent fuel retailers 
The following is a summary of the views of industry participants based on the OFT 
survey of the fuel retail trade published in 1998.32 All industry participants agreed that 
the independent fuel retail sector in general has lost significant market share due to 
supermarket expansion and with devastating consequences for some rural remote 
areas that are currently underserved by fuel retail sites. Little future was forecast for 
poorly located, low-volume sites regardless of whether company owned or dealer 
owned. Further closures of independent sites were anticipated, particularly those in 
urban areas where competition between supermarkets and the oil majors, as well as 
between supermarkets, is vigorous at the retail level. 
 
The refining majors opined that independents who could survive were those that 
reduced their costs in addition to providing added value services. They all predicted 
that the rate of closures for independents would continue to be high unless a factor 
was introduced to alter the current industry structure.33 The main reasons adduced for 
this prediction were that independent outlets were usually poorly located and inferior 
to their competitors’ sites; and the necessary level of investment required to upgrade 
the outlets may not be justified by the additional sales. They concluded that rural 
outlets and independents located in better sites (modern operators) stand a chance of 
                                                 
31 See id., p. 20. 
32 For the OFT Survey, detailed questionnaires were sent to the majority of petrol refiners, wholesalers, 
and supermarket petrol retailers. Majority of the companies responded including all the major refiners 
and supermarkets. However, of 970 questionnaires sent to a random selection of Independent retailers, 
370 responded and this was considered enough to reach valid conclusions. 
33 See OFT Report (1998); supra note 11, at p. 81. 
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survival. It is more questionable whether independents located in cities will similarly 
survive.34 
 
Some mini-majors, e.g. Murco were of the opinion that independents could only 
survive in the current climate if they became as efficient as the larger company-owned 
sites. The main problems of the independent sector which they identified were lower 
volumes; higher unit costs; insufficient funds for expansion and re-development; and 
cost of compliance with environmental, and health and safety legislation. The latter 
would include a number of factors. First, the high cost of testing storage tanks;35 
second, the impact of Stages I & II EU Petrol Vapour Recovery Directives on rural 
fuel retailers and the associated wetstock losses;36 third, inaccuracies in fuel 
measurement and the attendant environmental impact and effect on retailers’ profits.37 
They projected that the high rate of closures of independents would lead to a more 
concentrated market and might result in collusion and abuse of market power, and 
subsequently an even higher closure rate.38 
 
Other mini-majors were divided in their views. Most thought that better and higher 
volume independent sites could survive, and that even lower volume outlets with a 
diversified product portfolio might also survive. However, they were all in agreement 
                                                 
34 See id., p. 82. 
35 See TIC on Petrol Retailing; supra note 25 at p. xix. Also see, H. Fox; Social & Economic Impact: 
Petroleum Prices & Distribution in the Highlands and Islands para. 1.2.11 (1996). See OFT Report 
(1998); supra note 11, at p. 22. 
36 House of Commons, Environment Committee 1st Report; Volatile Organic Compounds HC 39 paras 
135-143 (Session 1994-95). Info on wetstock losses, available online at 
http://www.forecourttrader.co.uk/news/fullstory.php/aid/907/Taking_control.html , last visited on 26 
March 2009. Also see OFT Report (1990); supra note 5, at p. 231. 
37 Moorhouse D., The Accuracy of Fuel Metering (A Report by National Weights & Measures 
Laboratory) 4 (Project No; 2.3.6, 2005). Available online at 
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=The+Accuracy+of+Fuel+Metering, last visited on 12 March 
2009 Australian Institute of Petroleum (AIP), Temperature Correction of Petrol 1 (1996). Available 
online at http://www.aip.com.au/pdf/tempcorrect.pdf, last visited on 26 March 2009. 
38 See OFT Report (1998); supra note 11, at p. 82 
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that the numbers would continue to fall as the market continued to rationalise; and 
that urban independents were more at risk than the rural outlets, owing to the lower 
incentive for oil companies and supermarkets to invest in rural areas.39 
 
The supermarkets were of the view that lower-volume independent sites would 
continue to find it difficult to generate sufficient income. Some observed that 
environmental legislation was as threatening to the independent sector as price 
competition. The majority of them identified three factors as key to the future survival 
of independents: servicing of local community needs; product diversification/product 
innovation; and government intervention (where and when necessary). They agreed 
unanimously that the number of independents particularly in urban areas would 
continue to fall as long as the supermarkets and company-owned outlets of major 
wholesalers engaged in a battle for market share. 
 
The Petrol Retailers Association (PRA) contends that there is a continued need for 
independent solus-tie retailers, because the rural and remote areas depend on this 
group for their fuel supplies. Another reason is that suppliers who require additional 
market share above the capacity of their own network will need to secure this extra 
volume through the independent sector.40  
 
A similar body, the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) contends that fierce 
competition between the supermarkets and the oil companies has led to a widespread 
closure of independent retailers as well as licensed and agency operated sites. 
Businesses agree that prices have fallen as a result which, although currently 
                                                 
39 See id., p. 82. 
40 See id., p. 85. 
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beneficial to consumers, could serve only in the short term. They argue that once the 
exit of independents was fully achieved, the supermarkets and oil companies might be 
able to raise prices and consumers may have to travel unreasonable distances to obtain 
fuel supplies.41 They believe that there could be additional damage to the local 
business community. In their arguments in favour of protection for the independents 
and other smaller businesses, the FSB made a number of recommendations including, 
(a) fuel retailers setting their own pump prices; (b) taking steps to avoid ‘price wars’; 
(c) local authorities taking account of the local business lobby when granting planning 
permission for new supermarkets/hypermarkets;42 (d) amendments to the uniform 
business rate to reflect the volume of sales at different sized outlets;43 (e) ensuring 
security of tenure for licensees and agents under the Landlord and Tenant Act.44 
 
As regards the root cause of the decline in the independents’ sector, opinion was 
divided across the industry. Some opined that it was a natural process brought about 
by unfettered market forces; some thought that Esso’s aggressive response to the 
supermarkets’ competitive threat (Esso Pricewatch) forced the independents to 
operate on unsustainably low margins also designed to force further rationalisation of 
the supply chain; others blame the supermarkets’ expansion as damaging to the fuel 
supply chain. 
3.4.1.2 Future role of supermarkets 
There was consensus that supermarkets have transformed the fuels retail market in the 
UK, and that they achieved this by offering fuels at lower prices and convenient 
locations. It was also recognised that they are able to charge lower prices because of 
                                                 
41 See id., p. 86. 
42 See id., 79. Also, see OFT Report (1990); supra note 5, at p. 52. 
43 For details on business rates, see id.,pp. 77-79. 
44 See id., p. 86. 
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their far higher throughput compared to roadside outlets.45 Supermarkets are able to 
derive significant benefits from fuel, being a known value item for consumers, by 
being seen to be competitive with their supermarket rivals. For instance, Murco 
commented that a competitive fuel price could boost grocery sales by as much as 
20%.46  
 
However, it is the view of the supermarkets and those of other players that the main 
driver of their pricing competition was with other supermarkets and not with 
traditional roadside outlets. Other players observed that planning, duty, and storage 
arrangements in the UK gave the supermarkets unfair competitive advantage.47 Oil 
majors, however, perceive supermarkets as their chief competitors and they all expect 
supermarkets’ growth to continue, albeit at a slower rate than in previous years.48 
They propounded a number of reasons for this assertion, as follows: current levels of 
price competition from other participants; market saturation; and planning restrictions 
on out-of-town developments. 
 
Some of the mini-majors opined that supermarkets’ growth will continue until they 
achieve a market share of 30%. Some were of the view that their growth could 
continue unchecked until they become virtual monopolists, but for planning 
permission restrictions on out-of-town sites.49 Murco was of the opinion that 
supermarkets have grown to a point where they could take full control of the supply 
chain by buying fuels at ex-refinery prices and if convenient import fuels directly 
from abroad. 
                                                 
45 See id., p. 83. 
46 See id., p. 83. 
47 For details on planning, duty and storage, see id., pp. 75-79. 
48 See id., p. 84. 
49 See id., p. 84. 
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Table 3.10  Impact of the supermarkets in UK petrol retailing,  
1998-2005 
Year Forecourt 
shops 
% share of 
forecourt 
sales 
Supermarket forecourt shops 
 
 
2005 
 
 
1,548 
 
 
25.5 
Asda; Co-op; Sainsbury; Somerfield; 
Tesco; Safeway; Morrisons; Waitrose 
2004 1,428 24.4 ,, 
2003 1,360 23.2 ,, 
2002 1,193 16.6 ,, 
2001 1,144 14.3 ,, 
2000 1,069 12.1 ,, 
1999 949 9.8 ,, 
1998 872 8.1 ,, 
 
Source:  Petroleum Review (UK Retail Marketing Survey, 2006, p. 19). 
 
They observed that the supermarkets could import and store fuels under bond at many 
different locations across the UK, which refiners could not do since they would have 
to incur duty on transit losses. However, there were mixed views on whether they 
would consider future joint ventures with the oil majors. Recent alliances between 
Esso and Tesco regarding joint development of forecourt shops would suggest such a 
future development, but more currently, virtually all the major supermarkets have 
similar alliances with oil majors. The supermarkets have strategically used these 
forecourt shops to drive their fuel retail market shares up since the middle 1990s (see 
Tables 3.10 and 3.11). 
 
Most supermarkets predicted that they would continue to increase their market share 
by expanding their networks, until the restrictive planning regime suggests no further 
expansion.50 As such, the effects on the independent sector would continue to be fatal. 
 
                                                 
50 See id., p. 85. 
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Table 3.11  Developments of joint venture (JV) shops between the 
 supermarkets & the oil majors, 1998-2005 
 
Year Sites JV forecourt shops 
2005 484 Esso / Tesco Express; BP / Safeway; Total / Somerfield; BP Connect; 
Shell / Sainsbury; Texaco / Somerfield. 
2004 395 Esso /Tesco Express; BP / Safeway; Total / Somerfield; BP Connect; 
Shell / Sainsbury. 
2003 339 Esso / Tesco Express; BP / Safeway; Total / Somerfield; BP Connect; 
Shell / Sainsbury. 
2002 243 Esso / Tesco Express; BP / Safeway; Total / Somerfield; BP Connect; 
Shell / Sainsbury. 
2001 209 Esso / Tesco Express; BP / Safeway; Total / Somerfield; BP Connect. 
2000 94 Esso / Tesco Express; BP / Safeway; Elf / Somerfield. 
1999 54 Esso / Tesco Express; BP / Safeway; Elf / Somerfield. 
1998 6 A few BP / Safeway shops. 
 
Source:  Petroleum Review (UK Retail Marketing Survey, 2006, p. 19). 
 
3.4.1.3 Projected future fuel supplies in rural areas 
The Highlands and Islands Action Group on Hydrocarbon Fuel Prices (HIAG) 
represents the interests of fuel consumers in the H & I, and is particularly interested in 
the higher price of fuels in rural/remote areas compared with other parts of the UK, 
and the high attrition rate of fuel outlets within the region. In a survey conducted by 
the HIAG in 1997, concern was expressed over the failure of oil companies to vary 
their SPS policy to take account of urban–rural cost differentials which consequently 
discriminate against low volume remote outlets leading to tighter margins, operating 
losses, and ultimate closures.51 They argue that the lack of competition between oil 
companies and their distributors kept wholesale prices high and encouraged retailers 
to charge higher pump prices to cover their costs. The HIAG insist that there is 
evidence of parallel pricing in the area, which distorted competition and kept pump 
prices high. They claim that in areas where there was only one fuel wholesale 
supplier, there were higher wholesale prices, which could be attributed to abuse of a 
                                                 
51 See id., p. 89. 
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dominant position. Moreover, they were concerned about the impact that the closure 
of independent outlets would have on small communities. They considered that 
existing safety and environmental legislation rendered unmanned or above-ground 
storage an impractical option, particularly in areas that are underserved with fuel 
supplies. 
 
The Western Isles Council (WIC) is essentially concerned with fuel supplies in 
Western Isles (Isles of Lewis, North & South Uist, and Barra), although it liaises with 
the HIAG. The population of the WI is about 300,000 but served by roughly 23 petrol 
stations.52 Owing to the absence of a public transport system, the WIC considers fuels 
as an essential commodity in the area and worries that the products are significantly 
costlier than in other areas. The WIC observed that rural retailers were struggling for 
survival due to the abuse of a dominant position by the oil companies and also 
expressed concern about the operation of agency cards.53  
 
Bruce Peter, Director of the PRA (1986-97), considered that the impact of the 1996 
fuel price war in the UK on smaller independent retailers had been severe and also 
recognised the problems associated with supplies to rural/remote areas, involving 
social, transport, and competition matters. He concluded that the UK fuels market was 
undergoing rapid change which could precipitate a less competitive market with 
further rationalisation. Additionally, he argued that many country areas might 
eventually be underserved, which might have implications for rural living and 
development.  
 
                                                 
52 See id., p. 90. 
53 See id., p. 90. 
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He made some recommendations, including: (a) a review of the fuels market by the 
OFT on an annual basis; (b) categorisation of retail outlets as sensitive and non-
sensitive, to be based on a maximum driving distance to obtain fuel of 30km; (c) 
equalisation of the business rating advantages derived by the supermarkets over oil 
wholesalers; (d) supply undertakings to be extracted from suppliers operating in areas 
with inadequate security of supplies; (e) review of the burdens imposed by 
environmental, health and safety legislation; (f) introduction of a new competition 
legislation in the fuel retail sector.54 
 
The current PRA spokesperson, Ray Holloway, projected that Britain will be down to 
between 7,000 and 8,000 fuel stations by 2010, with very few in rural areas. He 
observed that Leicestershire and the West Country are already ‘threadbare and 
motorists in Norfolk could be caught out by a complete lack of fuel stations across 
large areas of the countryside’. 
 
Louden, (at Inverness College) observes that the Highlands & Islands fuels market 
was marked by local monopoly and collusive behaviour, as the local market was 
served by few retailers. He argued that there were significant barriers to entry at the 
supply level which prevented new entrants from participation, coupled with the threat 
of environmental legislation on lower volume sites operating in the region.55 He 
opined that the current competition legislation has offered little protection to rural 
consumers, and predicted that the ‘predatory pricing’ which led to the massive closure 
of independent rural fuel stations would enable the supermarkets and oil company-
                                                 
54 See id., p. 87. 
55 See id., p. 90. 
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owned sites to earn supernormal profits in the future. He concluded that regulation 
could stop this eventuality.56 
 
To militate against the factors that affect the rural independent fuel retailers, managers 
of retail sites in rural areas have been advised to improve their food, grocery, and 
convenience goods sales primarily to maintain profitability, and to treat fuel sales, 
albeit important, as secondary. Secondly, there are indications that improvement in 
overall retail performance will hinge on cost reductions. Considering the sizes and 
locations of independent fuel retailers in remote areas, these remedies may not be 
sufficient. 
 
3.5 AUSTRALIA: Rural fuel supply and pricing situation 
Similarly to the UK situation, a series of local fuel markets in the metropolitan areas 
overlap in such a way as to create competition for adjacent locations, thereby leading 
to effective price competition. Intense price competition usually produces price 
variability within cities, which has been of concerns to motorists and the regulatory 
authorities (ACCC). Conversely, the intense price competition also results in lower 
pump prices. 
 
This overlap of local markets breaks down when it comes to rural country areas, 
because of the large distances that exist between these areas and the metropolitan 
cities. This breakdown in the chain of substitution results in substantial price 
differentials, which are of serious concern to consumers and local governments in 
country areas and provincial regions. However, of particular concern are observed 
                                                 
56 See id., p. 90. 
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price differentials within the country areas themselves, which suggest that there could 
be several markets within these areas or merely an absence of competition. The 
presence of significant fuel subsidies for rural dwellers and businesses is a major 
indicator of an absence of a national geographic market in Australia. 
 
The volume of fuels sold at a retail outlet and freight costs (to a lesser degree) are the 
main determinants of price differentials observed between regions.57 Retail outlets in 
metropolitan areas with a high volume of sales are able to spread their costs over a 
larger throughput and so reduce operating margins on each litre of fuel sold, unlike 
sites with a lower volume of sales. Conversely, outlets in country areas sell less than 
half the fuel sold by metropolitan service stations. Other determinants of price 
differentials are volume of sales of non-fuel items, intensity of competition, volatility 
in fuel prices, and geographic spread of retail sites. 
 
Similarly to the UK experience, profitability in fuel retailing in Australia is derived 
more from increased sales of non-fuel convenience goods. However, there are lower 
sales of these higher profit margin non-fuel items in country areas.58 It was estimated 
that average non-fuel revenue per litre in country retail outlets was less than two-
thirds of that in metropolitan sites, while profits from non-fuel items was just one-
quarter. This lower level of non-fuel sales tends to push up country prices for all types 
of fuel. 
 
                                                 
57 Australian Government (DITR), Petrol – Frequently Asked Questions pp. 8-9. Available online at 
http://www.industry.gov.au/assets/documents/itrinternet/200710PetrolFactSheet20071120155603.pdf  ,        
last visited on 25 March 2009. 
58 See id., p. 8. 
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Competition is generally more intense in metropolitan areas with attendant significant 
discounting and price cycles, whereas competition is less vigorous and discounting 
less common in country areas. Owing to the heavy concentration of retail sites in 
metropolitan areas, price discounting which commences in one location quickly 
spreads to other locations throughout the area. Conversely, the potential to increase 
sales through discounting is limited in country areas, particularly in towns with little 
traffic passing through. 
 
It is practically difficult to supply most country retail outlets directly from the 
terminals due to their wide geographic spread and the relatively smaller quantities 
they sell. As a result, most of them are supplied by distributors rather than direct 
supplies from the oil majors.59 The higher operational costs incurred by these 
distributors are passed on to the fuel retailers, leading to higher pump prices (see 
Table 3.12).60 
 
Table 3.12  Examples of retail volumes & unit costs  
 
Sites Location Monthly volume 
(litres) 
Unit costs 
(cpl) 
Site A SALE  
(Remoter Country) 
165,000 10 
Site B TRARALGON 
(Country) 
208,000 6 
Site C MELBOURNE 
(City) 
480,000 1.8 
 
Source:  Petroleum Products: Industry Commission Report No. 40 (1994, p. 82). 
 
                                                 
59 See id., p. 8. 
60 See annexed map of Australia. 
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3.5.1 Industry views about price differentials 
The Victorian Government acknowledged the fact that the costs of distributing and 
retailing fuels in country areas are inevitably higher when compared with city 
locations. The Australian Petroleum Agents & Distributors Association (APADA) 
estimates the average cost of providing distributor services in the country at 5 cents 
per litre (cpl).61 Consequently, this is reflected in higher wholesale prices to retailers 
and higher retail margins. The government expected country consumers to pay more 
than their metropolitan counterparts to ensure continued access to supplies. 
Nevertheless, the Victorian Government has urged the Industry Commission (IC) to 
initiate steps to reduce price differentials. This is based on their view that efficient 
operation of provincial and rural industries could be affected in a climate of wholesale 
price discrimination, absence of fair competition, and a flow of cross-subsidies from 
country to city consumers.62 
 
The South Australian Government is also concerned at the level of prices paid by 
country consumers for petroleum products, and is keen to support any policy aimed at 
minimising the city–country differentials. Several observers see the price differential 
as a clear case of cross-subsidisation. The real issue here is not the size of differences 
between retail prices in metropolitan and country outlets, but differences in retail 
margins.63 Many local government authorities, the National Farmers’ Federation, the 
Victorian Government, etc., all support this view. 
 
Of greater concern were the recorded large differences in prices between nearby 
country areas. In some of these country centres and smaller country towns, the extra 
                                                 
61  ACCC Report; Inquiry into the Petroleum Products Declaration 87, (1996). 
62  See id., pp. 81-82. 
63 See id., p. 82. 
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cost of supplying the markets does not justify the higher retail margins. In such cases, 
local factors were seen as largely responsible. 
 
Most participants also noted that the prices for many other goods and services were 
higher in the country than in large coastal cities, owing to transport costs and market 
sizes. They contend that the fuel price differential between the city and rural areas 
partly accounts for these higher prices of other goods and services in country areas. 
For instance, many country observers compared the retail prices at the depth of a price 
war and noted that large differentials of up to 20 cpl occurred from time to time. 
 
1992-3 aggregated wholesale price data illustrates the above views. Table 3.13 shows 
that the average wholesale price paid by the retailers in Melbourne and Geelong 
(urban cities) was on average about 2.3 cpl lower than that paid by retailers in other 
country areas. Also, the table illustrates a wide gap in the retail price and the 
maximum wholesale price between country areas and metropolitan cities. In some 
cases, the difference between the average retail price and the average Petroleum 
Surveillance Authority (PSA) maximum wholesale price exceeded 6 cpl.64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 See Industry Commission Report No 40, Petroleum Products; supra note 6, at p. 83. 
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Table 3.13  Average Melbourne & Victorian country petrol prices for 12 
 months (ending June, 1993) 
 
City / Town Average 
actual 
retail 
price 
(cpl) 
Average 
PSA 
price (cpl) 
Retail price 
minus 
PSA price gap 
(cpl) 
Derived 
retail price 
(cpl 
Volatility 
(%) 
Melbourne 67.7 66.2 1.5 70.0 3.4 
Geelong 67.5 66.2 1.3 70.0 5.3 
Ballarat 70.8 67.0 3.8 70.8 3.8 
Wodonga 74.2 67.8 6.4 71.6 1.2 
Bendigo 70.9 67.3 3.6 71.1 3.4 
Warrnambool 70.6 67.5 3.1 71.3 4.7 
Mildura 72.8 68.7 4.1 72.5 2.5 
Morwell 73.0 67.3 5.7 71.1 2.5 
Sale 74.1 67.8 6.3 71.6 2.3 
Horsham 73.5 67.9 5.6 71.7 2.1 
 
Source:  Petroleum Products: Industry Commission Report No.40, 5 July 1994, p. 83. 
 
 
It follows that if country areas pay wholesale prices that exceed the PSA maximum 
wholesale price, then retailers could be extracting higher retail margins. It was also 
observed that cities with the highest gap experienced the lowest volatility. It could be 
argued that prices in such locations were high and subject to little or no periods of 
discounting. It could be inferred that weak competition contributed to the large city–
country price differentials observed in some areas and could equally explain why 
retail prices in most country areas were slow to respond to falls in wholesale prices, 
thereby resulting in rare price variations. 
 
The Parry Committee opined that city retail sites may sell fuels at a reduced margin to 
induce customers to patronise the site and buy other items or services, thereby using 
fuels as a ‘loss leader’.65 However, sales of high margin ancillary non-fuel items are 
low in country locations mainly because of fewer customers; also it may not be viable 
                                                 
65 See Inquiry into the Petroleum Products Declaration; supra note 59, at p. 87. 
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for an operator to provide a large inventory of non-fuel items. On the contrary, the oil 
majors argue that market forces, especially local factors at the retail level, were 
responsible for differences between prices in city and country locations. For instance, 
Mobil insists that the dominant factors accounting for the differential are: differences 
in relative competitive forces, and volume throughput between the metropolitan areas 
and country locations.66 
 
The Australian Automobile Association (AAA) acknowledged that variations in price 
signify the existence of competition and identified four factors that were responsible 
for the differentials: the differences in volume of sales between sites; freight costs; 
differences in the operating costs of retail outlets in different regions; and discounting 
in urban areas in order to increase or maintain market share.67 However, the AAA 
believes that these factors do not always account for the enormous differences in retail 
prices that often obtain within regions in country areas. 
 
The existence of large differentials between adjacent country areas has led many 
observers to believe that there might be collusion in country fuel retailing. The 
Municipal Association of Victoria (MAV) held the view that there seems to be little 
or no competition between retail outlets in provincial and rural areas, and that browser 
prices display little evidence of competitive or customer-friendly practices. The MAV 
is not convinced that the difference in retail fuel prices between metropolitan 
Melbourne and rural Victoria can be totally explained by distribution costs, distance, 
and retail trade characteristics.68 
 
                                                 
66 See IC Report No. 40; supra note 6, at p. 82. 
67 See id., p. 83. 
68 See id., p. 82. 
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The City of Colac opined that a lack of competition evidenced by little or no variation 
in prices at outlets in the same rural areas has led to concerns about the question of 
collusion between retailers in provincial and rural Victoria. The Orange City Council 
has urged the IC to dispel any community perceptions of collusion, whether or not 
collusion actually exists. 
3.5.2 Participants views on Sites Act 
The Australian Government enacted the Sites Act in order to limit the number of retail 
outlets operated by the oil majors. Similar limitations were not imposed on the 
independent and supermarket fuel retailers. Clearly, the aim was to alter the fuel retail 
market structure in such a way as to increase the participation of independents and 
supermarkets, and reduce the dominance of the oil majors. The government thought 
that this was one of the strategies for increasing competition and reducing fuel retail 
pump prices, particularly in country areas. 
 
There are divergent views among industry players regarding this Act. The oil majors 
were of the view that the Act should be repealed because it limits their operational 
flexibility thereby placing them at a disadvantage. Caltex noted that the majority of 
their sites were operated under franchise agreements, being the only alternative mode 
of operation available to them in the face of relatively small site quotas. 
 
The Trade Practices Commission (TPC) also insisted that the Act be repealed on the 
grounds that the restriction it imposed on oil companies was unparalleled in the 
history of the private sector in Australia. They questioned the effectiveness of this 
legislation in reducing vertical integration by the oil majors, given that the franchisees 
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were totally dependent on their landlords (the oil majors) for fuels.69 They contended 
that a better response to vertical integration could be either to reduce or to remove the 
tie between the franchisees and their landlords, which was a problematic proposition. 
 
The PSA was of the view that the Act may not achieve its purpose. They observed 
that although the Sites Act may limit the exercise of the market power of oil 
companies at the retail level, there exist other avenues for the majors to exercise 
market power, e.g. through franchise agreements, wholesale pricing, and other supply 
arrangements.70 
 
The Department of Industry, Science and Technology (DIST) noted that there are 
strong arguments both for a more deregulated regime and for increased regulation. 
However, they contended that the status quo should be maintained until the impact of 
a deregulated regime is clearly assessed. 
 
The MTAA (Motor Trades Association of Australia) recommended that the Act be 
amended such that sites that sell only diesel should be subject to quotas. They argued 
that it was necessary to keep the oil companies from gaining total control of the fuel 
retail market and of retail pricing. They further advocated that possible loopholes in 
the Act should be identified and tightened in order to strengthen it. 
 
APADA held an extreme view, recommending total divestment and exclusion of oil 
companies from ownership of facilities beyond the refineries and terminals. However, 
APADA was not alone in this view, because the Victorian Government investigated a 
                                                 
69 See IC Report No.40; supra note 6, at p. 154. 
70 See id., p. 155. 
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proposal by the Victorian Automobile Chamber of Commerce (VACC) that the 
government should divorce oil majors from operating retail sites in Victoria. 
However, the government rejected the proposal on the grounds that it was unsure that 
the presence of company-operated sites reduced competition in Melbourne, and 
moreover it was not certain that full divorcement of the oil majors from fuel retailing 
would increase competition. 
 
3.5.3 Industry views on Franchise Act 
The Australian Government also put in place a Franchise Act, which was meant to 
regulate the contractual relationship between the oil majors (franchisors) and the fuel 
retailers they supply (franchisees). The main objective of this Act was to provide 
security of tenure for the franchisees. Again, the views of the franchisors and 
franchisees vary on this Act.  
 
The oil majors argued that the Act restrained their rationalisation efforts. They 
contended that rationalisation is a regular occurrence in most industries, being a 
response to commercial realities that ensure that adequate profit generation occurs to 
meet the required rate of return on a given asset. They argued that the Franchise Act 
prevented them from disposing of sites that have become uneconomic.71 In such 
situations, the franchisor may either decide to wait for the full nine years of tenure to 
elapse, or seek non-renewal of the franchise at the times provided for in the franchise 
agreement. Based on the latter, the franchisee has to be given the ‘first option to 
purchase’ the site on terms that are similar to those made to another buyer. Should the 
franchisee go ahead to purchase the site, the inefficiencies associated with that site 
                                                 
71 See id., p. 160. 
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might remain within the industry. However, BP recognised the shortfalls of the Act, 
but advocated for its retention with possible amendments that could support 
rationalisation while allowing closer scrutiny of assignees and a relaxed termination 
of contract conditions in favour of franchisors. 
 
The MTAA argued in favour of retention of the Act on the basis that it provided the 
necessary protection for certain dealers during the pre-franchise period and in the 
course of a franchise relationship. They observed that since the passing of the 
Franchise Act, the individual dealers operating oil company-owned outlets have 
gained security of tenure and have brought to an end numerous cases of short-term 
eviction of franchisees that used to occur regularly throughout Australia.72 
 
The DIST argued that the legislation achieved its aim with regard to dealer protection, 
and that franchisees regard the requirements for prior disclosure, assured tenure, 
rights of assignment, and specific grounds for termination as major benefits. They 
equally argued that the Act had provided the impetus for the development of a self-
regulatory downstream Oilcode, and so had laid the foundational rules for the 
franchisor–franchisee relationship. 
 
The TPC contended that experience in the courts regarding cases related to the 
Franchise Act has shown that the legislation route was expensive, lengthy, and 
uncertain.73 They hailed the efforts of the government in formulating the Oilcode 
which includes many aspects of the Franchise Act, thereby rendering the latter almost 
redundant. 
                                                 
72 See id., p. 159. 
73 See id., p. 160. 
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The Petroleum Retailers Association of Western Australia noted the considerable 
changes that the fuel retail market has undergone since the enactment of the Sites and 
Franchise Acts, and supports a strengthened Oilcode (in scope and structure) as a 
remedy to the situations that the Franchise Act was meant to address.74 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The objectives of this chapter were realised by identifying the concerns regarding the 
high fuel prices in rural/country locations; the urban–rural fuel price differentials, and 
their impact on rural inhabitants and businesses. This chapter isolated the causes of 
the problems and also identified the regulatory support mechanisms and fuel subsidy 
schemes that governments in both countries have applied to the research problems. 
These mechanisms and schemes have been useful in designing the analytical 
framework for this study. 
 
The research identified a number of features relating to petroleum products, which 
should be taken into account when assessing the necessity of support for locations 
(e.g. rural or remote) where market failures can occur (i.e. where competition is not 
effective). These would include the following. Firstly, petroleum products currently 
account for a significant proportion of all fuels used in transportation. Secondly, the 
products are homogeneous and competition is often based on price and volume. These 
are also positively correlated. Therefore, price volatility becomes a regular feature of 
the fuel retail trade and often leads to price wars. In the process, smaller efficient or 
inefficient competitors are forced out of the trade. Refiners have some cushion for 
coping with the price wars, for example they could resort to price discrimination, use 
of SPS to enable its outlets to cope with competition from adjacent fuel stations, or by 
                                                 
74 See id., p. 159. 
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varying the percentage yield of products from crude oil refining, depending on 
demand conditions. Thirdly, the demand for petroleum products is price inelastic, and 
in the absence of effective competition could lead to pricing abuses. The absence of 
effective substitutes deepens this concern. 
 
At the refining level, the industry operates as an oligopoly as this is dominated by the 
oil majors. Refining is characterised by high fixed costs relative to variable costs. The 
implication is that plant and equipment have to be operated at full capacity in order to 
lower the average costs and make profits. The inevitability of the continuous process 
of production has further implications for control over the fuel retail trade and price 
discounting/volatility. This situation compels refiners to control the storage and 
transportation machinery involved in the wholesaling and retailing functions.  
 
An examination of the dynamics of the fuel retail market revealed that the following 
characteristics drive the supply side competition: correlation between fuel sales and 
non-fuel sales; the need to achieve enough margins to offset fixed costs; and the need 
to achieve substantial sales volumes. On the demand side, the following factors were 
identified as determinants of the nature of competition among fuel retailers: 
consumers purchase the products regularly; market demand is not responsive to price 
rises; cost of comparing fuel prices across outlets is negligible; significant numbers of 
fuel consumers have little brand loyalty due to limited product differentiation; the 
demand for fuels tend to be localised. The combined implications of these factors are 
that price and volume competition is essential in fuel retailing, and price differentials 
are likely to occur across localities, even within metropolitan cities. However, price 
differentials within metropolitan areas is not a cause for considerable concern as 
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motorist can purchase fuels from nearby cheaper sources without having to drive 
unreasonable distances for such purchases. 
 
An assessment of the fuel supply scene in rural and remote areas in both jurisdictions 
revealed more similarities than differences. Firstly, the constituent fuel markets in 
rural/remote locations have characteristics that differ from the wider jurisdictional 
markets. In some cases, there are different local markets within some of the remote 
areas with significant price differentials between them.  
 
Secondly, fuel prices tend to be higher in the rural areas compared to the urban cities 
due to (a) lower volume throughput; (b) higher freight costs; (c) less sales of non-fuel 
goods; (d) high cost of meeting environment, health and safety regulations; (e) lower 
intensity of competition arising from a near absence of wholesale and retail price 
discounting; (f) wider geographical spread of retail sites; (g) absence of independent 
fuel retailing chains; (h) greater possibilities of conscious price parallelism and 
possible collusion among country distributors; (i) availability of under-the-canopy 
discounts; (j) the effect of oil- company agency card sales which results in retailers 
charging higher pump prices to offset such effects; (k) the greater potential for the oil 
majors to ‘claw back’ retailers’ margins which could result in retailers charging 
higher pump prices to offset the ‘clawed-back margins’; (l) supermarket involvement 
in fuel retailing, etc.  
 
Regional local governments in the UK and Australia are concerned at the significantly 
higher fuel prices that rural consumers pay and the resultant higher cost of living, and 
are of the view that these could also damage the efficient operation of provincial and 
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rural industries. These governments and other national associations, e.g. National 
Farmers’ Federation, believe that there might be a case of cross-subsidy involved as a 
result of the city–country differentials. They are of the view that the oil majors could 
be funding their competition for market shares in the major cities with the profits they 
derive from the higher wholesale prices from regional centres and rural areas. 
 
The consequences of the high fuel prices in rural areas were identified as: firstly, 
higher cost of rural living and rural businesses leading to rural poverty and 
outmigration; and secondly, the environmental impact and problem of road 
congestion caused by rural motorists having to drive unreasonable distances to obtain 
fuels. The latter usually occurs where the rural motorists have an incentive to drive to 
the nearest supermarket to obtain their fuel, groceries, do car wash and pump tyres 
(i.e. one-stop shopping). 
 
The foregoing would suggest that the problems of high pump prices in rural and 
remote locations, and rural–urban price differentials require close cooperation from 
all the internal parties involved in the fuel supply chain, and also the involvement of 
external actors, mainly government support. Consequently, governments in both 
jurisdictions have rendered support in the form of direct/indirect subsidies, and 
regulatory support mechanisms aimed at enabling rural/remote communities and 
businesses to cope with the higher fuel pump prices. The support measures could be 
categorised into four major groupings: regulatory support mechanisms (as represented 
by sites and licence/franchise regulations); fuel grants and rebate schemes; tax/duty 
concessions; and other rural grants and rebate schemes.  
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Chapter 4 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FUEL RETAIL SITES AND 
LICENCE / FRANCHISE REGULATIONS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter defined the nature and extent of the twin-problems of high fuel 
prices in rural/remote areas and the rural-urban fuel price differentials. The aim of this 
chapter is to compare the sites and licence / franchise regulatory frameworks for fuels 
retailing in both jurisdictions in order to determine whether the frameworks assists in 
solving the research problems, and by extension how these could contribute to rural 
development. 
 
This chapter examines the regulatory support mechanisms in the two jurisdictions, as 
well as the legal cases arising from the licence / franchise agreements. Legal cases 
related to licence agreements used in fuel retailing are decided in the UK based on the 
general principles of law whereas the enactment of a Franchise Act in Australia meant 
that franchise cases have to be decided based on the true spirit and dictates of the 
statute. The objectives of the comparative analysis of cases related to licence / 
franchise agreements is partly to discern whether the legal judgements reinforce the 
fuel retail licence / franchise regulations in the two jurisdictions, and partly to 
examine whether the objectives of the regulations were being met.  
 
The comparative assessment of these regulatory mechanisms is essential because the 
number of sites belonging to the different categories of retail operators and the licence 
/ franchise agreements between the major operators and their retailers determines the 
concentration levels of the fuel retail sector and by implication the level of barriers to 
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entry. Site regulation could also impact on the overall structure of the fuel retail 
industry, whereas licence / franchise regulations could affect the stability and 
regularity of fuel supplies to both urban and rural locations. 
 
This chapter contributes to an understanding of the effectiveness (or not) of regulatory 
support mechanisms as a means of achieving relatively lower pump prices in rural / 
remote locations, as well as bridging the rural-urban price differentials. 
 
4.2 Fuel Retail Site Regulation in the UK 
The major incidence of site regulation in the UK occurred in 1965, as reported by the 
Monopolies Commission (now Competition Commission).1 The solus fuel marketing 
system has been identified as the tool which enables the principal fuel wholesalers to 
exert full control over fuel retail activities. The resolve of the regulatory authorities to 
modify the solus fuel retail trading system in such a way as to serve the public interest 
led to the regulatory Undertakings (1966) from the major oil companies. 
 
The report established the argument that the solus arrangements for fuels has led to 
improvements in fuel stations; caused some reduction in suppliers’ costs which had 
exerted a downward pressure on prices; has not led to over- proliferation of fuel 
outlets; and does not restrict the consumers’ choice of fuels.  However, the power and 
resources of the major fuel suppliers are so enormous that if left entirely to pursue 
their own chosen interests and the policies that promote these they are likely to gain a 
disproportionate degree of control over the fuel retail trade as may endanger the 
                                                 
1 The Monopolies Commission (MMC), PETROL: A Report on the Supply of Petrol to Retailers in the 
United Kingdom (1965). Available online at http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1960_1969/027petrol.htm, last visited on 25 August 2009 
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public interest. This becomes more obvious considering that these suppliers operate in 
a market where their customers’ freedom of choice is restricted by the special 
problems involved in storing and dispensing fuels in addition to constraints arising 
from planning legislation and general traffic conditions.2  
 
Moreover, the history of fuel supply in the UK indicates that the major suppliers tend 
to avoid price competition as much as possible. However, it would be against the 
public interest if new suppliers were impeded from entering the fuel retail market 
particularly those that are prepared to sell at lower prices than the established 
suppliers. Equally, it was considered as against the public interest if the competitive 
incentive to save costs and deliver lower prices should be weakened by fuel suppliers 
jostling to secure most of the retail outlets and for long terms. 
 
In order to safeguard the concerns raised by the disproportionate ownership of retail 
outlets by the oil majors, the government decided to regulate the ownership of sites:3 
On this basis, the regulatory authorities argued that it is possible to have a system of 
solus trading in fuels which would not operate against the public interest. To ensure 
this, there were features of the system as operated at inception which may be altered 
or eliminated without necessarily destroying the positive basis of solus trading. Some 
of the identified features that may have some effects upon the public interest include 
the acquisition and ownership of retail premises by major fuel suppliers and the terms 
upon which these premises are let to tenants.4 
 
                                                 
2 See id., 157. 
3 See id., 159-161. 
4 See id., 142. 
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The major oil companies justify their practice of acquiring stations on the basis that it 
affords them a higher degree of security than a fixed term agreement; greater 
opportunities to ensure savings in cost; opportunities for improvements in station 
layout and standards of service at those premises; and ability to set examples which 
the independent solus retailers can copy. It is clear that company ownership of fuel 
stations has served a useful purpose by pioneering improvements in facilities and 
setting better standards of service for the fuel retail trade, although it enables them to 
exercise considerable control over the trade.5  
 
However, serious concerns were thought to arise if that control should be extended 
since ownership of the station gives the supplier permanent security and with it the 
problem of barriers to new entry. Moreover, it has been argued that a very large 
market share of vertically integrated stations is likely to lessen fuel retail competition 
because refiners directly set the retail prices.6 It would also appear that the objections 
stated regarding longer-term solus ties should apply more to permanent ties, 
principally where such permanent ties exist within a high proportion of retail stations. 
This was thought as capable of resulting in an undesirable degree of rigidity and 
concentration in the fuel retail trade and possibly between the fuels suppliers who 
would not only control effectively the retailing of fuels but would also control other 
goods which are normally sold in fuel retail outlets.7  
 
                                                 
5 For more details on company-owned outlets, see The MMC Report; PETROL: A Report on the 
Supply of Petrol in the UK by Wholesale, 37-45 (1979). Available online at http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1990/265petrol.htm , last visited on 17 March 2009. 
6 Hastings, J S., Vertical Relationships and Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets: Empirical 
Evidence from Contract Changes in Southern California 317-328, (The American Economic Review, 
Vol. 94, No. 1, 2004) 
7 See MMC Report (1965) on Petrol; supra note 1, at 153. 
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The recommended safeguards for the trade in lubricants and other petroleum goods 
were thought to be applicable to the case of company-owned stations. However, 
where a large proportion of all stations were company-owned it may be difficult to 
enforce such safeguards. It was thought that unless some limit was imposed, the 
practice of fuel suppliers acquiring retail premises may be expected to operate against 
the public interest. However, it was considered that “the form of limitation must be 
practicable; must have the effect of restricting not the number of stations owned by 
petrol companies but the percentage of companies’ total sales that pass through them; 
must not be such as would restrict newcomers and small suppliers from acquiring 
stations as a means of obtaining access to and extending their market shares; and that 
such limitations should apply to any stations where the major supplier have both 
leasehold and freehold interests”.8  
 
It was then legislated that major fuel suppliers whose deliveries of fuels in any year to 
the stations owned by them (directly or in directly, be they stations where they have 
freehold or leasehold interests) exceed 15% of their total deliveries to fuel stations in 
that year should not build or acquire any further stations or acquire any such interest 
while such excess continues. The proviso is that this restriction should not apply in 
any year in which the total deliveries by the supplier or supplier group to fuel stations 
are less than 10 million gallons.9  
 
The outcome of the 1966 undertakings10 was to remove the anti-competitive aspects 
of the solus trade and to encourage the entry of new fuel wholesalers and retailers, 
                                                 
8 See id., 154. 
9 See id., 154. 
10 For details of the ‘undertakings’, see Competition Commission Report on “The Supply of Petrol: A 
Report on the Supply in the United Kingdom of Petrol by Wholesale” 325-338, Appendix 2.2, (1990). 
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particularly independent wholesalers and retailers.11 However, the restriction on the 
major fuel suppliers regarding company-owned stations was lifted in 1968 in a major 
policy change aimed at liberalizing the fuel retail sector and has remained so till date 
because this restriction was subsequently considered as restrictive. 
 
4.3 Fuel Retail Site Regulation in Australia 
In the case of Australia, the government decided to regulate the number of sites that 
could be owned and operated by the oil majors in 1975. The objectives of this 
regulation were to limit the ability of ‘vertically integrated’ majors to set retail prices 
and to encourage participation of independent operators12 in the industry. This 
included a provision for 50% ties to be placed on oil major-owned sites. However, the 
Australian Government thought that this might not be enough to limit the effects of 
the vertical integration in the fuel trade as practiced by the oil majors. Hence, the 
1975 ‘undertakings’ were followed by the enactment of the Sites Act in 1980. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Available online at http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1990/265petrol.htm, 
last visited on 25 August 2009. 
11 UK Petroleum Retail Marketing Survey; An Independent Approach to Fuel Retailing 25 (2002). 
Independent retailers are defined as a group that comprises of hundreds of fuels and lubricants retailers 
or distributors who are either completely or partly independent of the oil majors. Those that are 
completely independent, e.g. Bayford Petroleum (UK) have the freedom to buy products from any 
source. On the other hand, the majority enter into long-term supply and brand agreements with one of 
the oil majors. Such agreements tend to limit their level of independence, e.g. Gleaner Oil and Gas 
(UK). 
12 See Report of ACCC Inquiry into the Price of Unleaded Petrol: Petrol Prices & Australian 
Consumers 74 (2007). Available online at   
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/806216, last visited on 29 September 2009.    
Independent fuel retailers tend to be smaller operators running retail outlets only. They fall into two 
categories: independent sites that are not branded by an oil company or chain brand (usually 
independents operating in rural and regional locations), or independent chain sites that are owned by a 
large independent company not aligned or owned by a major oil company, e.g. Gull Petroleum, 
Liberty, United, Neumann, etc. Independent petrol outlets and stores are thought as being the lifeblood 
of rural and regional Australia, and of local communities. 
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The criterion for quota allocation among the oil majors in Australia since 1984 has 
been the average wholesale market share over the preceding three years.13 However, it 
would seem that the ability of the Sites Act to limit the oil majors’ control of the fuel 
retail sector did not yield the desired results because the oil majors circumvented the 
provisions of the Act through other vertical arrangements such as 100% ties, multi-
franchising, and equity participation in distributorships.14  
 
It could be argued that the Sites Act rather created some distortions and inefficiencies 
in the fuel retail sector. For example, the evidence shows that although the number of 
distributorships has fallen, yet the proportion of these with oil major equity has 
increased. Therefore, it could be inferred that the majors sought equity in 
distributorships in order to influence the retail sites associated with them.15 It could 
also be argued that the Sites Act may have reduced the flexibility of the oil majors to 
respond to changing market conditions, while not affecting the non-refining 
wholesalers and importers, independents and supermarkets.  
 
The Hyde Consultancy Report pointed out that there could be certain adverse effects 
associated with eliminating all vertical restraints, for instance restrictions on the 
ability of oil majors to control downstream assets could result in their withdrawal of 
capital from their downstream operations.16 The report argued that as a result of such 
restrictions, there could be lesser investment in new infrastructure which will tend to 
generally drive downstream costs up. The ACCC noted the potentials of vertical 
                                                 
13 Commonwealth Numbered Acts, Petroleum Retail Marketing Sites Act No.140 (1980); see 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/prmsa1980n1401980379/ last visited on 29 September 
2009. 
14 ACCC Report, Inquiry into the Petroleum Products Declaration 34 (Vol. 1 Main Report, 1996). 
15 Industry Commission (IC) Report, Petroleum Products 156 (1994). Available online at 
http://www.pc.gov.au/ic/inquiry/40petrol/finalreport/index.html, last visited on 28 August 2009. 
16 See ACCC Report on Petroleum Products Declaration; supra note 14, at 34-35. 
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arrangements to enhance efficiencies and reduce cost, and rather argued that evidence 
of lack of competition between vertically integrated firms (i.e. price fixing, resale 
price maintenance, market sharing and abuse of market power) is more detrimental to 
the public interest than vertical integration per se.17  
 
However, new entrants, changing cost structures and the circumvention of the Act by 
oil majors through multi-site franchising has meant that the Act failed to meet its 
regulatory objectives. The government believes that these Acts have not halted the 
rationalization of fuel sites in the past twenty years. It is now clear that the structure 
of the downstream petroleum market has changed enough that discriminatory 
legislation like the Sites Act has been rendered ineffective.18 These views were taken 
into consideration by the Australian Government when it repealed the Sites Act, and 
based on an industry-wide consensus a new downstream Oilcode was enacted with 
effect from March, 2007.19  
 
4.4 Findings on sites regulation 
The sites regulation in both jurisdictions share some similarities and differences. The 
similarities are: firstly, the oil majors in the UK established the solus marketing 
system in 1950 and the oil majors’ operations in Australia adopted the system (under 
another title, the solo marketing system) in 1951. The common objective for this 
system is based on the need to institute a proper basis for the control of the dealers 
(franchisees) and the independent fuel retailers and by extension having full control 
                                                 
17 See id., 35. 
18 Australian Institute of Petroleum (AIP), Downstream Petroleum 16 (2003). Available online at                                                                   
http://www.aip.com.au/pdf/Downstream_Petroleum_2003_Report.pdf, last visited on 29 August 2009. 
19 The Oilcode and its provisions will be discussed later on in this chapter. 
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over the fuel retail trade. This control is achieved by determining the wholesale and 
retail prices and margins for dealers and independent retailers either through the 
rebate system or through the use of selective price support (SPS) system. The SPS 
forms part of the exclusive supply agreements and contractual arrangements that the 
oil majors have with dealers and independent retailers. 
 
Secondly, the governments of both jurisdictions carried out a quasi-regulation of sites. 
The UK Government carried out this exercise in 1966, whereas the Australian 
Government did the same in 1975 (nine years later). However, the reasons for the 
sites regulation are the same and based on the impact of vertical integration of the oil 
majors’ operations and the concerns that their large- scale ownership of retail outlets 
might have negative implications for new entry into, and exit from, the fuel retail 
business. The rise in the number of oil company-managed (i.e. majors) outlets in the 
UK fuel retail market in the early 1960s set the scene for a massive reduction in the 
number of independently-owned sites. Currently, the convergence of fuel discounts by 
supermarkets to drive their market shares in the grocery sector has produced a similar 
effect on independent operators.20 Similarly, the very high market share of the oil 
companies in the Australian fuel retail trade in the early 1960s-70s had implications 
for independent fuel retailing and particularly with adverse consequences for rural 
areas. A similar effect is presently being felt by the independent fuel retailers in 
Australia, as the supermarkets use shopper dockets (fuel discounts) to boost their 
grocery business.21 
                                                 
20 See OFT 230, Competition in the Supply of Petrol in the UK 64-65 (1998). Available online at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/transport/oft229.pdf, last visited on 29 September 2009. 
21 For more details, see ACCC Report: Assessing Shopper Docket Petrol Discounts and Acquisitions in 
the Petrol and Grocery Sectors (2004). Available online at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/501158, last visited on 29 September 2009.  
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The major difference is that the sites regulation in the UK was revised two years later 
and a full liberalisation ushered in. The government maintained that the two years was 
sufficient for a number of independent fuel retailers to take advantage of the sites 
regulation, including the supermarkets. The regulation was regarded as restrictive and 
might discourage oil company investments in the downstream petroleum sector, and 
so had to be discontinued. The evidence shows that the site regulation in the UK did 
not bolster the market share of the independent operators; rather the supermarkets 
were able to capitalize on the regulation to grow their market share (see tables 4.1 
and 4.2). 
  
 
Table 4.1 Declining Market Share of UK Independents by Retail Volume, 1964 – 
2006 
Year % Market Share 
1964           74.8 
1970           54.8 
1974           49.8 
1975           50.1 
1976           51.0 
1977           48.8 
1998             7.4 
2006             3+ 
Source: This Research (OFT Reports) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
See Report of ACCC Inquiry into the Price of Unleaded Petrol: Petrol Prices & Australian Consumers 
181-198 (2007). Available online at   http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/806216, last 
visited on 29 September 2009. See Gans J, Core Research (Competition & Regulatory Economics), 
Submission to ACCC Petrol Pricing Inquiry: Assessing the Impact of Shopper Docket Schemes (2007). 
Available online at http://www.mbs.edu/home/jgans/papers/Gans-Petrol%20Submission-07-07-09.pdf, 
last visited on 29 September 2009. See National Association of Retail Grocers of Australia Pty Ltd 
(NARGA), Submission to Petrol Pricing Inquiry on the Use of Shopper Docket Discounts (2007). 
Available online at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemId=794239&nodeId=a78ba1f1085bcecd5da87cda43c4
34d0&fn=31%20-
%20National%20Association%20of%20Retail%20Grocers%20of%20Australia%20Pty%20Ltd.pdf, 
last visited on 29 September 2009. Also see NARGA: ENOUGH IS ENOUGH Retail Grocery Market 
Share Campaign. Available online at http://www.johnston-independent.com/narga.html, last visited on 
29 September 2009. 
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Table 4.2 Market Shares by Retail Volume of Petrol Sold, 1996 
Retailer Groups Volumes Sold 
(million litres) 
% of Total Volumes 
Top 3 Majors (Esso; Shell/Gulf; 
BP/Mobil) 
13,652 49.4 
Supermarkets 7,704 27.9 
Other retailers 6,300 22.8 
Source: OFT Report (1998) 
 
 
On the other hand, the Australian Government decided that the quasi-regulation of 
sites in 1975 was not enough to cushion the negative effects of the practice of vertical 
integration by the oil majors in the downstream sector. Consequently, the government 
enacted full-blown sector-specific sites legislation in 1980. The Act placed stricter 
limits on the number of sites that could be owned and operated by the oil majors. The 
Act paved the way for the blossoming of independent fuel retailers, particularly in the 
rural (country) areas, and also led to the emergence of supermarket fuel retailers.  
 
It could be argued that the Act achieved the major purpose of altering the market 
structure in terms of market shares of the various categories of fuel retailers, at least in 
the short term. It also caused an increase in the number of independent retailers in 
rural areas (in the short term) and, may have lowered prices for fuels in some rural 
locations (in the short term) than otherwise could have been. Similar to the UK 
situation, the evidence shows that supermarkets became the long term beneficiaries of 
the sites regulation because of the convergence of fuels and grocery sales. However, 
the supermarkets do not operate in rural areas; rather these areas are serviced by the 
independent fuel retailers. Conversely, the market share of the independent operators 
has steadily declined over the years since the enactment of the Act (see tables 4.3 and 
4.4). 
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Table 4.3 Retail Outlet Ownership in Australia, 2001 
Groups No. of Sites % of Total 
Oil Company / Agents Operated 
Sites 
373 5 
Franchised Sites 2,497 30 
Branded (Owner) Dealer Sites 936 11 
Distributor Supplied Sites 
(Independents) 
3,920 47 
Independent Chains 479 6 
Supermarkets (Woolworths) 85 1 
Total 8,290 100 
Source: Parliament of Australia (Parliamentary Library), Current Issues Brief 11 
(1999-2000): Petroleum Refining & Marketing in Australia – Changes Ahead (Table 
2). 
 
 
 
Table 4.4 Market Shares of Retail Sales by Volume by Brand in Australia: 2002-03 to 
2006-07 
BRAND 2002-03 
% 
2003-04 
% 
2004-05 
% 
2005-06 
% 
2006-07 
% 
BP 20 20 18 19 19 
CALTEX 24 22 18 16 16 
COLES EXPRESS 0 16 25 25 22 
MOBIL 19 17 12 11 11 
SHELL 20 3 3 3 3 
WOOLWORTHS/ 
CALTEX 
10 14 18 20 22 
INDEPENDENTS 6 7 6 6 7 
Source: Report of the ACCC Inquiry into the Price of Unleaded Petrol: Petrol Prices 
& Australian Consumers, p76 (2007). 
 
However, the Sites Act had to be repealed in 2007 because of changing cost structures 
in the sector and the need to encourage new investments by the oil majors. Also, the 
majors rendered the Act ineffective through multi-franchising and equity participation 
in distributorships whose objective was to reduce cost and indirectly increase the 
number of sites under their control.  Consequently, the government repealed the Sites 
Act to create a level playing field for all downstream retail operators. 
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4.5 Fuel Retail Licence / Franchise Regulations 
The oil majors in the UK make use of licence agreements in their contractual 
relationships with dealers and independent retailers, whereas the oil majors in 
Australia use franchise agreements for the same purpose. The regulatory framework 
for these agreements and the court interpretations of cases relating to these, in both 
jurisdictions, are set out in details in this section of this chapter. 
 
4.5.1 UK Fuel Retail Licence Regulations 
The regulatory framework for the fuel retail sector put in place in 1965 by the UK 
Government covers all licence agreements between the oil majors and their dealers, 
and between oil majors and independent retail operators. Generally, these agreements 
are considered to be useful to both the licensors and the licensees. Firstly, these 
agreements improve the distribution of products by enabling the licensor to establish a 
uniform network with limited investment. Secondly, they may facilitate the entry of 
new competitors in the sector, thereby increasing inter-brand competition. Thirdly, 
these arrangements may permit independent retailers to set up outlets more rapidly 
and with better chances of success than if they had to set up without the licensor’s 
assistance and experience. Thus, the independent fuel retailers could possibly compete 
more favourably with large distribution undertakings. Fourthly, the combination of a 
uniform network and constant cooperation between the licensor and the licensees 
ensures a constant quality of the products and services, which is beneficial to the 
consumers and other end users.22  
 
                                                 
22 Commission Regulation (EC) No 4087/88 of 30 November 1988 on the Application of Article 85 (3) 
of the Treaty to Categories of Franchise Agreements. Available online at 
http://www.advocateromania.com/Commission%20regulation%20No%204087.pdf, last visited on 29 
September 2009. 
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However, there were features of the licence agreements that were thought to be 
detrimental to the public interest such as: length of the term of franchise agreements; 
provisions of the agreements regarding the supply of fuel equipment by major fuel 
suppliers; provisions which restrict the retailer in relation to the sale of his premises, 
including option clauses and undertakings to obtain the purchaser’s acceptance of the 
exclusive obligations; and the degree of control which is, or may be, exercised by the 
major fuel suppliers over the general conduct of their exclusive retailers’ businesses, 
including trade in lubricants, tyres, batteries and accessories. These are briefly 
summarised in the following paragraphs. 
 
Firstly, the duration of term of solus agreements varied from one year to twenty or 
more years during the early stages.23 Most of the major oil companies were not rigid 
about the length of the term which they regarded as a matter for negotiation. 
However, except where they owned the station, they preferred to obtain as long a 
commitment as possible. The reason is because longer- term agreements provided 
more security and by extension more opportunity for cost savings. Nevertheless, there 
was a contrary argument which viewed the longer term of solus tie as being 
disadvantageous to the fuel retail sector in general. Although the long-term 
commitments provided for the suppliers a greater measure of security, but this 
additional security does not appear to be in the public interest because it could 
become increasingly difficult for new suppliers to enter the market except by building 
new stations. Given this extra security, the established suppliers would likely be freer 
to pursue their own interests more rigidly and to control the trade of the retailers more 
strictly. As the suppliers were already exercising too much control over the retailers’ 
                                                 
23 For more details on the earlier terms of solus arrangements and obligations, see MMC Report on 
Petrol (1965); supra note 1, at 50-53. 
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business in lubricants at the time, it was thought that there may be a danger that they 
could also interfere with their trade in other areas. On this basis, the regulatory 
authorities recommended and the government adopted a term not exceeding five 
years, but which provides a clause for its possible continuation thereafter on an annual 
basis if neither party wishes to terminate the contract.24 The exceptional cases would 
be where the retailer has a loan arrangement with a major fuel supplier for a term 
longer than five years or is the tenant of his fuel supplier. 
 
Secondly, although the suppliers provide fuel storage tanks to some retailers on loan 
terms, but in effect the tank is like a ‘gift’ to the retailer provided he carries out his 
‘undertaking’ to use it solely to sell the supplier’s brand of fuels throughout the 
contractual period (which was usually twenty years). These loan arrangements 
involved a significant capital outlay on the part of the supplier, but in monetary terms 
there does not seem to be an additional cost which the motorist has to bear on account 
of the arrangements concerning fuel equipment. However, it was of concern that such 
loan arrangements should be a means of extending the retailer’s exclusive obligations 
under the solus contract as this will clearly operate against the public interest.25 
Therefore, the regulation stipulated that all such hire purchase agreements regarding 
fuel equipment that contain provisions restricting the retailer’s alternative use of it 
should also provide an unambiguous clause stipulating that “the property in the 
equipment covered in the agreement should pass unrestricted to the retailer at any 
time on full payment of the balance of the purchase price. Equally, agreements for the 
loan of petrol equipment which contains such restrictive provisions should provide for 
the property in the tank to pass to the retailer unrestricted on full payment of that part 
                                                 
24 See id., 143. 
25 For more details on the earlier terms of equipment supplies to retailers, see id., 54-55. 
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of the original price which is equivalent to the unexpired proportion of the original 
contractual term.”26  
 
Thirdly, most solus agreements had provisions that indicated (in effect) that retailers 
should not dispose of their premises during the term of the contract without 
transferring the solus obligation to the new owners and also without giving the fuel 
supplier the ‘first option to buy’.27 These provisions were mandatory where there was 
a loan arrangement between the supplier and the retailer. The major oil companies 
justified these provisions on the grounds that a solus agreement should provide mutual 
benefits for themselves and the retailers; i.e. benefits to the retailers through rebates 
and other financial assistances and benefits to themselves by way of security and the 
ability to plan deliveries (which become impaired if the exclusive tie is not 
maintained for the full term). The suppliers argue that clauses requiring the transfer of 
solus obligations on sale of the property would also act as a safeguard, in case the 
retailer reneged on or evaded his obligations by transferring the ownership of the 
premises while indirectly retaining control of it. Nevertheless, these arguments 
appeared invalid in situations whereby the retailer was compelled by circumstances 
(e.g. ill-health or death of the proprietor) to dispose of his station during the term of 
the contract but encounters difficulties with prospective buyers who object to the 
terms of the tie and subsequently under-price it. However, this counter-argument 
relates to isolated cases since the retail trade on the whole does not show hostility 
towards the solus system.  
 
                                                 
26 See id., 145. 
27 See id., 152. 
  
162 
Moreover, it would be unreasonable to expect that the existence of an exclusive tie 
would deter serious prospective buyers or materially diminish the realisable price. 
Additionally, since the major oil companies acquire and build their own fuel stations 
it seemed unlikely that unfair prices would be obtained for stations under sale, 
although the retailer could get a better price if he waited till the expiry of the 
agreement. It may be reasonable to infer that there could be no objections to the 
insertion of clauses requiring the transfer of solus obligations on sale of a fuel station. 
Furthermore, the suppliers seemed justified to insert the option clauses in cases 
relating to loan agreements on the grounds that they have the right to retain future 
benefits of the development to which the loan has been applied should the retailer 
wish to sell the station. However, this argument would seem reasonable in cases 
where the supplier made substantial investments in the premises but not for trivial 
loans.28 For the latter cases, such clauses could be considered as repressive and to 
operate against the public interest. 
 
Fourthly, it became necessary to assess whether the solus arrangements has led, or 
might lead to an undesirable degree of influence by the fuel supplier over the entire 
business of the retailer. There was no evidence to show that any major oil company 
had made restrictive covenants with retailers concerning their trade in other goods but 
there was a threat that some might do so in the future.29 It was considered that fuel 
suppliers should not accept from any retailer, with whom he has an exclusive 
agreement, any commission or other forms of benefits regarding the sales or 
purchases of lubricants, batteries, tyres, accessories or other goods that are not 
petroleum products, and that any existing agreement which had such an effect should 
                                                 
28 See id., 152. 
29 See id., 149. 
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be terminated. It was recommended that fuel suppliers should be prevented from 
making any arrangements with their solus retailers that involved any restrictive 
obligations in regard to the purchase, stocking, sale, display and advertising of such 
goods.30 
 
The Undertakings was further amended in 1976 which is currently in operation, and 
considered the extended use of licences, introduced provisions for the settling of 
certain disputes by reference to arbitration31, and a requirement to the effect that 
where a major oil company makes proposals to a licensee for the renewal of a licence 
it has to be on terms that are ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’.32 The ‘fairness’ and 
‘reasonableness’ if in dispute is to be judged by an arbitral panel. These Undertakings 
were further reinforced by Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome and European 
Commission (EC) Regulation 1984/83 (articles 10-13).33 However, the EC regulation 
exempted from the provisions of Article 85 certain categories of long-term exclusive 
purchasing agreements which include fuel station agreements. Such an agreement 
with an independent dealer should not exceed ten years.34 Let us examine the court 
interpretations of issues relating to some of these provisions in solus (licence) 
agreements. 
 
                                                 
30 See id., 151. 
31 See MMC Report (1979); supra note 5, at 228. The conciliation system comprised of three schemes: 
the arbitration scheme (for disputes concerning termination of licences; a compensation scheme; and 
the obligation for fair and reasonable renewal terms. The requirement for fair and reasonable renewal 
terms is enforceable because a breach of this constituted a breach of the Undertakings themselves. 
However, the right to litigation was available as a last resort. Therefore, legal cases that emerged after 
the 1976 amendments to the Undertakings of 1966 were cases that the conciliation system was unable 
to deal with. However, the oil majors, especially Esso, Shell, and BP contend that licensee’s have made 
little use of the conciliation system and tend to prefer the litigation route. 
32 See CC Report on Petrol (1990); supra note 10, at 325 (appendix 2.2)  
33 See EC Regulation 1984/83 on the Application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to Categories of 
Exclusive Purchasing Agreements. Available online at http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1991/fulltext/309a10.1.pdf, last visited on 21 September 2009. 
34 See id., 291.  
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4.5.2 Case Law on Licence Agreements in the UK 
The number of cases between the major oil suppliers and their licensees underscore 
the complexity of solus agreements. These agreements are considered by most judges 
as falling into a special category of contracts referred to as ‘contracts in restraint of 
trade’.35 The EC Treaty refers to these agreements as those that are likely to make 
“the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, 
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.”36 In most cases, the tests of 
reasonableness and necessity were employed in order to determine the claims from 
either party, or amongst parties.  
 
Table 4.5 summarises the chosen cases based on specific issues dealt with in the 
litigation arising from the solus agreements. The cases that the author chose to report 
in this thesis are those that cover more than one issue; those that are frequently 
referred to in other cases, and also those that applied relevant principles or doctrines 
of law in such a way as to guide future treatment of related cases. Cases that represent 
court decisions at the highest levels have been reported in more details.37 
 
                   
 
 
 
                                                 
35 See Lord Reid’s definition of such contracts  in the case of Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s 
Garage (Stourport) Ltd , House of Lords, (1967) 1 All ER 699. 
36 See Article 81 (1) (e) of the EC Treaty. Available on line at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12002E081:EN:HTML, last visited on 21 
September 2009. 
37 Such cases have continued to shine light on future interpretation of the law of contracts as it relates 
to contracts in restraint of trade. The most important one is Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage 
(Stourport) Ltd, (1965) 2 All ER 933, (1966) 1 All ER 725 ( Court of Appeal), and (1967) 1 All ER 
699(House of Lords). The summary of current legal principles in play in this area of law is presented 
after the report on the chosen cases. 
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Table 4.5 Cases on Licence Agreements 
Major Issues Raised in the 
Cases 
                                                 The Cases 
Termination of 
Agreements 
Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd (1997) 1 All ER 481; Esso Petroleum 
Co Ltd v Mardon (1976) 2 All ER 5; Save Petroleum Ltd and others v Kara 
(2000) All England Official Transcripts (1997-2008); Little Park Service 
Station Ltd v Regent Oil Co. Ltd (1967) 2 All ER 257; Shell-Mex & BP Ltd v 
Manchester Garages Ltd (1971) 1 All ER 841; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v 
Fumegrange Ltd and Others (1994) 2 EGLR 90. 
Conflict between Whether 
Agreement 
is a Licence or a Tenancy 
Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Fumegrange and Others (1994) 2 EGLR 90; Shell-
Mex & BP Ltd v Manchester Garages Ltd (1971) 1 All ER 841. 
Duration / Renewal of 
Agreement 
Petrofina (Gt Britain) Ltd v Martin and Another (1966) 1 All ER 126; Esso 
Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd (1965) 2 All ER 933; 
Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd (1966) 1 All ER 
725; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd (1967) 1 All 
ER 699; Little Park Service Station v Regent Oil Co Ltd (1967) 2 All ER 
257; Hill v Regent Oil Co Ltd (1962) EGD 452; Regent Oil Co Ltd v J A 
Gregory (Hatch End) Ltd (1965) 3 All ER 673; Regent Oil Co Ltd v Aldon 
Motors Ltd (1965) 2 All ER 644; Caerns Motor Services Ltd v Texaco Ltd 
and Another & Geddes and Others v Texaco Ltd and Another (1994) 2 
EGLR 54. 
Assignment of Rights and 
Interests 
Petrofina (Gt Britain) v Martin and Another (1966); Esso Petroleum Co Ltd 
v Kingswood Motors (Addlestone) Ltd and Others (1973) 3 All ER 1057; 
Save Petroleum Ltd and Others v Kara (2000). 
Protection against Price 
Discrimination 
Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd (1977) 1 All ER 481; Save Petroleum 
Ltd and Others v Kara (2000). 
Rental increases, and other 
fees, 
allowances, etc 
Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Addison and Others (2003) EWHC 1730 (Comm); 
Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Addison and Others (2004) EWCA Civ 1470; 
Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd (1997); Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Davis 
and Others (2003) EWHC 1730 (Comm); Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Milton 
(1997) 2 All ER 593; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mahoney (2000) All ER (D) 
993; Parkes v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd (1999) 1 CMLR 455. 
 
Source: This Research 
 
 
4.5.2.1 PETROFINA (GT BRITAIN) v MARTIN and Another  
This case deals with the duration of a solus agreement and assignment of rights, 
interests, and obligations under the agreement.38 The plaintiffs (Petrofina) imported 
and distributed motor fuels, greases, lubricating oils and other petroleum products. 
They supplied these to fuel stations and public garages on the basis of solus 
                                                 
38 See Petrofina (Gt Britain) v Martin and another, (1965) 2 All ER 176. 
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agreements. Petrofina’s solus agreements, in line with the practice by other 
wholesalers, contained a continuity clause whereby the owner of the garage or fuel 
station is obliged to transfer the solus agreement to a new buyer of the station should 
they decide to sell it. The practice of tying fuel retailers was prevalent at the time as it 
is today, albeit to a lesser degree because of the high number of company-owned and 
operated fuel stations in recent times. However, the exclusive sale of products 
excluded lubricating oils and greases but the use of lubricants in the lube bay within 
the licensee’s fuel station was exclusive to Petrofina’s brands. 
 
Mr Martin (the first defendant) negotiated the purchase of a garage that was tied 
through a solus agreement to Petrofina. On 1 April 1963, Mr Martin entered into a 
solus agreement with Petrofina based on the above stipulated conditions. In addition, 
he was to sell products at retail prices fixed by Petrofina; use only lubricants sold by 
Petrofina in his lube bay; and exhibit only advertisement materials belonging to 
Petrofina in regard to Petrofina’s petroleum products. The duration of the agreement 
was for a period of twelve years, with effect from 6 April 1963. Thereafter, the 
agreement might continue until determined by either party giving three months’ 
termination notice. However, there was a provision that Mr Martin was not entitled to 
give such a notice until he had taken delivery of and paid for 600,000 gallons of 
motor fuels from Petrofina. This quantity of motor fuels was calculated on the basis 
that the break-even point for fuel sales at the fuel station was about 50,000 gallons per 
year. In previous years preceding this agreement, smaller quantities than the stipulated 
50,000 gallons had been sold on a yearly basis. The implication was that the solus-tie 
was likely to last for more than twelve years. 
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After a few weeks of commencing business, Mr Martin realised that his sale of 
Petrofina fuels were unlikely to generate profits. On 30 May 1963, he started to sell 
another brand of petrol (just a day after the site was conveyed to him as free from 
legal charge). On 11 June 1963, Martin sold the garage to another company (the 
second defendant) which was incorporated on 10 June 1963, of which he was a 
director. Petrofina, on discovering about the assignment of Martin’s interests to 
another company brought an action to enforce the solus agreement by injunction.  
 
Looking at the facts of the case,39 the trial judge (Buckley J) decided as follows: The 
restriction in the solus agreement whereby Martin was to sell only Petrofina’s fuels 
                                                 
39 See Petrofina (Gt Britain) v Martin and Another, (1965) 2 All ER 176 at 181. The facts considered 
by Buckley J are contained in provisions 4, 7(b), 8, 9, and 10 of the solus agreement. ”4. The seller will 
(unless prevented by causes outside its control) supply the buyer at the said premises with motor fuel 
lubricating oils greases and other petroleum products as currently marketed by the seller and in 
consideration thereof the buyer undertakes with the seller that he will:—(a) buy exclusively from the 
seller the motor fuel and all other petroleum products (except lubricating oils and greases) as currently 
marketed by the seller which he may require at the said premises either for his own use or for resale 
and will not stock or sell or permit to be stocked or sold at or from the said premises any motor fuel or 
other petroleum products (except lubricating oils and greases) supplied by any person firm or company 
other than the seller; (b) sell exclusively such products purchased from the seller at retail prices 
published by the seller from time to time; (c) ensure that there will at all times be available for sale 
upon the said premises an adequate stock of the seller's grades of lubricating oils and greases and foster 
the sale thereof; (d) ensure that in any lubrication bay (if at any time there should be one at the said 
premises) the seller's lubricating oils and greases shall be used and sold exclusively therein and 
therefrom. 7. The buyer agrees that he will:—(a) order motor fuel in quantities of not less than two 
hundred gallons of any grade of motor spirit or (unless otherwise agreed) five hundred gallons of diesel 
fuel for road vehicles provided that the total number of gallons of motor fuel ordered at any one time 
shall not be less than eight hundred gallons. 8. In consideration of the obligations on the part of the 
seller hereinbefore contained the buyer undertakes and agrees with the seller that he will not dispose of 
the said premises or any substantial part thereof whether or not a petrol service station or garage shall 
have been erected on the said premises or any part thereof without first offering them to the seller at a 
price specified in writing by the buyer and that if the seller shall not within twenty-eight  days of 
receipt of such offer accept such offer he will not dispose of the said premises or any part thereof 
comprised in the offer at a price less than the price specified in the said offer. The current revised 
edition of the Law Society's conditions of sale so far as the same are applicable to a sale by private 
treaty shall apply to any such offer accepted by the seller. 9. The buyer shall not sell let surrender or 
part with possession of the said premises or any part thereof to a third party whether or not a petrol 
station shall have been thereon or on any part thereof nor dispose or let or licence the buyer's interest in 
any petrol station business carried on thereon to any third party nor (the buyer being a partnership) 
permit any change in the partnership unless the buyer shall have first procured such third party or the 
members of the new partnership (as the case may be) to enter into an agreement with the seller 
thenceforth to observe and perform the buyer's obligations hereunder, whereupon the buyer shall 
thenceforth be released from such obligations to the seller under this agreement and the buyer shall 
inform the seller of any of the aforementioned events in writing at least fourteen days before such 
events take place. 10. This agreement shall be for a period of twelve years commencing:—(a) On 6 
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and to some extent greases and lubricants was in restraint of trade. He considered the 
restriction as an ‘unreasonable restraint of trade’, even though it was expressed as an 
exclusive obligation to buy Petrofina’s fuel products. Consequently, the solus 
agreement was deemed unenforceable.  
 
The reasons specified by the judge for the decision were: Firstly, that a determination 
of the validity of a restriction in restraint of trade requires an understanding of what 
the restricting party is entitled for its protection. In this case, the judge reasoned that 
Petrofina’s restriction was solely designed to protect its competitive position. He 
considered that Petrofina was not entitled to protect such a position through an 
agreement with Martin, when it was in breach of the latter’s right to trade in the most 
advantageous way.40 Secondly, that Petrofina had not shown that it had any 
proprietary interest in the fuel station whose value needed to be protected by the 
restriction since the legal charge had been repaid. Thirdly, that if Petrofina were 
entitled to protect their competitive position by way of an agreement that imposes 
such a restriction, the particular restriction in this case was more than was necessary. 
The reason was that in requiring Martin or his successors in title to carry on with the 
terms of this agreement and until 600,000 gallons of Petrofina’s fuels were sold, 
                                                                                                                                            
April 1963, and thereafter until determined by either party giving three months' previous notice in 
writing to the other provided that the buyer shall not be entitled to terminate this agreement unless and 
until he shall have taken and paid for a total of six hundred thousand gallons of the seller's motor fuel. 
As from the date this agreement comes into effect as a whole any existing agreement of a similar nature 
between the parties relating to the said premises is cancelled without prejudice to any sums due 
thereunder.” 
40 Buckley J was guided by Lord Atkinson’s elaboration on this issue (see [1919] AC at p 574) as 
follows: “The public is interested in every one of its members having freedom of action to carry on his 
trade or business, and deal with the property invested in that trade, within the law, as it seems good to 
him. The deprivation of the subject of that liberty of action in any given instance is, prima facie, an 
injury to the public interest, and, if it is to be excused or justified, must be excused or justified on the 
ground that it affords no more than adequate protection to those interests of the private parties 
concerned which they have a right to have protected. Competition per se is not one of the things which, 
however lucrative, a trader is entitled to be protected against.” 
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Petrofina impeded Martin’s freedom of choice on whether and for how long he could 
continue to operate the filling station on the site.  
 
It was a common ground that the break-even point for fuel sales at this station was 
around 50,000 gallons per year, but the effect of clause 10 of the agreement was that 
the agreement would remain binding on Martin for more than twelve years, unless his 
average annual sales remained at that level. Consequently, if Martin were to fail to 
achieve this volume of sales the agreement would remain binding on him, no matter 
how great were his losses. The previous operators of the station were operating at a 
loss, having sold 34,000 gallons in 1961, 31,000 gallons in 1962, and 29,500 gallons 
as at 31 March 1963. Martin’s experience in the first few weeks of operations were 
not encouraging for him to suppose that he could achieve the expected volume of 
sales without selling cheaper fuels from other sources, despite keeping the station 
open for 13 hours a day. Petrofina disagreed with this judgement and appealed the 
case. 
 
The Court of Appeal argued that a solus agreement in totality was an agreement in 
restraint of trade, unless the agreement relates to a lease or mortgage. Therefore, 
although a solus agreement in gross is not generally bad, it would be considered as 
invalid unless the restraint was reasonable as between the parties to the agreement and 
also not against the public interest.41 The Court of Appeal held that the circumstances 
in the case were quite different from the case of Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s 
Garage (Stourport) Ltd
42 to which the appellant’s counsel referred. The appeal court 
judges held that Petrofina failed to demonstrate to the court that the solus agreement 
                                                 
41 See Petrofina (Gt Britain) v Martin and Another (1966) 1All ER 126. 
42 See Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd, (1965) 2 All ER 933. 
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imposed a restraint that was reasonable under the circumstances for the following 
reasons: firstly, the agreement provided for Martins to transfer the obligations of the 
agreement to the next purchaser of the fuel station, should a sale of the station occur. 
The judges thought that this might render the fuel station unsaleable. Secondly, the 
duration of solus-tie of twelve years or more was considered to be too long. Thirdly, 
the restrictions on lubricants were considered to be enormous.  
 
The Court of Appeal judges, Lord Denning MR and Diplock LJ relied on these three 
reasons, whereas Harman LJ relied mainly on the first reason. However, they all 
adjudged that the solus agreement in this case was in unreasonable restraint of trade 
and should not be enforced. They were all in agreement that the doctrine of restraint 
of trade applies to contracts restricting the way in which a trader operates his trade. 
Lord Denning MR argued that some kind of ties may be enforceable in law depending 
on the nature of the agreements. Some examples are cases where a public house is 
‘tied’, as between lessor and lessee, or mortgagor and mortgagee.43 
 
4.5.2.2 ESSO PETROLEUM CO LTD v HARPER’S GARAGE (STOURPORT) 
LTD [1965] 2 All ER 933 
 
The issues raised by this case concern the validity of clauses that purport to tie two 
fuel stations belonging to the defendants (Harper’s Garage Ltd) to the exclusive 
supply of fuels from the plaintiffs (Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd). This case proved to have 
far-reaching practical relevance to the legal treatment of solus-tie agreements used in 
the fuel retail business in the UK.44 
  
                                                 
43 See Petrofina (Gt Britain) v Martin and Another (1966) 1All ER 126 at 127 
44 See Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd, (1965) 2 All ER 933, (1966) 1 All 
ER 725, and (1967) 1 All ER 699. 
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Esso entered into an agreement with the defendants on 27 June 1963 for the supply of 
motor fuels to one of the defendant’s fuel station at Mustow Green, Worcestershire. 
The solus agreement relating to the Mustow Green garage was for a term of four years 
and five months because this was the unexpired period of a previous ten year solus 
agreement on the garage prior to its acquisition by Harpers Ltd. Basically, the solus 
agreement contained a ‘tying covenant’ (a provision for exclusive purchase of Esso 
motor fuels for all requirements of the garage at the wholesale schedule prices); ‘a 
price maintenance clause’ (which provided that Harpers would retail fuels at Esso’s 
recommended retail prices, which clause had since become unenforceable due to the 
Resale Prices Act 1964 whose provisions were later consolidated in the Resale Prices 
Act 197645); ‘the continuity covenant’ (which was an obligation that Harpers Ltd 
would transfer the terms of the solus agreement to a new buyer of the fuel station 
should he decide to sell it); ‘the compulsory trading covenant’ (which is an obligation 
to keep the garage open at all reasonable hours); and an obligation to give preference 
to the sale of Esso motor fuels. 
 
A separate agreement had earlier been made on 5 July 1962 for the supply of Esso 
motor fuels to the defendant’s second fuel station named the Corner Garage at 
Stourport. In the case of the Corner Garage, Esso provided a loan of £7,000 to the 
defendant, which was secured by a mortgage on the fuel station dated 6 October 1962. 
The mortgage was to be repaid by instalments over a period of twenty-one years, 
including the interest on the principle sum. The mortgage was not to be redeemed 
before the expiration of the twenty-one year term. Both agreements contained 
provisions to the effect that Esso would be the exclusive supplier of motor fuels, and 
                                                 
45See Resale Prices Act 1976. Available online at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1976/pdf/ukpga_19760053_en.pdf, last visited on 25 September 2009. 
This Act was repealed in 2000. 
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that all purchases would be made at Esso’s wholesale schedule price on the date of 
delivery. Both agreements also stipulated that Harpers Ltd should only resell fuels to 
vehicles according to Esso’s stipulated retail schedule prices, and the terms and 
conditions for resale on the day of resale.46 The critical provisions of the agreements 
were contained in clauses 2, 3, and 4.47 
 
It is pertinent to note that Esso introduced solus agreements into the UK fuel retail 
market in 1950. Initially, the solus-ties were for five years only, but progressively 
Esso began to negotiate ties for longer periods (up to twenty-one years). This 
initiative was soon followed by other major oil companies. At the outset, Esso’s solus 
agreements with fuel retailers did not contain a resale price maintenance (RPM) 
clause. However, Esso was forced to abandon the RPM clause when lower price fuels 
began to find its way to the UK fuels market from 1961 onwards. This event was the 
result of new oil discoveries and the availability of more supplies of fuels than was 
anticipated. Subsequently, RPM began to affect Esso dealers who in some areas could 
                                                 
46 However, this resale price maintenance clause was not enforced in practice by Esso. Esso introduced 
the resale price maintenance (RPM) clause in 1958 in order to ensure stability of retail prices, and 
based on the strong pressure from the Motor Agents Association on behalf of the dealers generally. 
47 See Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd (1965) 2 All ER 933 at 937.  ”2. Esso 
agrees to sell to the dealer and the dealer agrees to buy from Esso at Esso's wholesale schedule price to 
dealers ruling on the date of delivery the dealer's total requirements of motor fuels for resale at the 
above service station. ”3. Esso agrees: (i) To allow the dealer on all motor fuels purchased by the 
dealer under this agreement a rebate of one penny and one farthing per gallon calculated quarterly in 
arrear up to February 28, May 31, August 31 and November 30 in each year, and paid as soon as 
possible, thereafter. (ii) To extend to the dealer the advantages of the Esso Dealer Co-operation Plan. 
”4. The dealer agrees: (i) To give Esso at least two clear working days' notice of the dealer's 
requirements of motor fuels and to take delivery in the largest possible loads to be agreed with Esso. 
(ii) To permit Esso to lock and seal the tanks into which deliveries of the motor fuels are made. (iii) To 
make payment to Esso for the motor fuels in accordance with Esso's terms of settlement. (iv) Not to 
resell motor fuels for use in vehicles holding private licences under the Road Traffic Acts except in 
accordance with Esso's retail schedule prices and terms and conditions for resale ruling on the day of 
such resales. The dealer shall not operate any discount, dividend or gift scheme (whether in the form of 
cash or otherwise) in connection with such resales. (v) To operate the service station in accordance 
with the Esso Dealer Co-operation Plan set out overleaf. (vi) Before completing any sale or transfer of 
the service station premises or business or making any other arrangement under which any person 
commences to carry on business there in succession to the dealer to notify Esso in writing and procure 
such person to enter into an agreement with Esso and the dealer whereby such person is substituted for 
the dealer for all future purposes of this agreement including this sub-clause.” 
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not maintain their volume of sales without a price reduction. Accordingly, in a letter 
dated 3 December 1963 Esso informed the dealers about the decision to abandon the 
RPM clause.48 
 
On 4 December 1963 Mr Harper wrote to Esso expressing displeasure at the removal 
of the RPM clause.49 Subsequently, Harpers Ltd began to sell another brand of petrol 
(VIP petrol) at the Mustow Green garage with effect from 12 December 1963. On 18 
February 1964, Esso issued a writ in the first action claiming an injunction restraining 
the defendants from purchasing fuels from other suppliers for resale at the filling 
station until the expiry of the supply agreement. Harpers Ltd continued to sell Esso’s 
motor fuels at the Corner garage until August 1964 when they changed over to VIP 
motor fuels. Harpers Ltd also gave a formal notice to Esso to redeem the mortgage on 
the Corner Garage, which Esso refused to accept. Consequently, Esso issued the writ 
in the second action on 28 August 1964 based on the covenant in clause 5 of the 
Second Schedule of the mortgage as well as the solus agreement.50  
                                                 
48See id., 941. “Dear Sirs, In the belief that it was to the general benefit of the retail petroleum trade of 
this country, we adopted a policy of retail price maintenance of motor fuels and recent sales agreements 
signed by dealers have included a price maintenance clause. “Such a policy, however, has not been 
generally accepted by the trade, and as it appears to be inequitable for us to insist on it being 
implemented we have now informed the Motor Agents Association that we are deleting such clause 
from our future sales agreements and advising all our stockists that, where this clause appears in 
existing agreements, we shall not insist on its implementation.” 
49 Excerpts of the letter read as follows: “…… resulting from your company’s notice of removal of the 
price maintenance clause from dealer contracts, we now deem those contracts null and void. It is 
clearly implied in the contracts that they apply to the marketing of a price protected product and would 
not have been entered into if that had not been the case. If Esso cannot then provide us with petrol at a 
price consistent with the maintenance of, or an increase on our present inadequate profit margin, we 
must look for alternative suppliers. The practice of selling surplus petrol at much cheaper rates into 
direct competition with your contracted dealers, has largely contributed to the present threat of chaos. It 
is regrettable that official prices were not adjusted from time to time, or alternatively a cheaper brand 
introduced for sale at existing Esso stations to absorb this surplus”. 
50 Clause 5 of the Second Schedule provides that: “during the continuance of this mortgage the 
purchase exclusively from the lenders all motor fuels which the company may require for consumption 
or sale on the premises hereby mortgaged (and on any premises owned, occupied or controlled by the 
company which may be adjoining or otherwise physically connected with the premises hereby 
mortgaged) as long as the lenders shall be ready to supply the same at their usual list price and not to 
buy, receive, or sell or knowingly permit to be bought, received or sold on such premises or any of 
them any motor fuels other than such as shall be purchased from the lenders”. 
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The trial judge (Mocatta J) held that the obligations imposed by the solus agreements 
and mortgage on Harpers Ltd to purchase only motor fuels from Esso was binding and 
would be enforced by injunction. The judge reasoned that the solus agreements and 
the mortgage did not contain an obligation on Esso to publish their current retail 
schedule prices, or their dealers to observe those prices. Therefore, by writing the 
letter of 3 December 1963 to their dealers, Esso was deemed not to have committed a 
breach of the solus agreements or mortgage with Harpers Ltd, and so the defendants 
were not entitled to regard the solus agreements as repudiated.  
 
Secondly, the judge applied a doctrine of the common law to this case whereby a 
covenant in unreasonable restraint of trade was deemed to be against the public 
interest or public policy and therefore void. However, his interpretation was that the 
doctrine applies to the trading use that could be made on a particular plot of land and 
that it is inapplicable to a covenant that imposes a trading restraint on an individual or 
a company. Therefore, according to this interpretation the doctrine did not void the 
obligations imposed by the solus agreements and the mortgage. Thirdly, the judge 
thought that the injunctions claimed by the plaintiff are ‘truly negative in character’, 
because in effect they were aimed at restraining the defendants from purchasing fuels 
from other sources even when those sources sold cheaper fuels. However, he thought 
that the injunctions should not be refused on account of its negative character. 
 
Harpers Ltd appealed the decision where the matter was judged by Lord Denning MR, 
Harman and Diplock LJJ.51 Collectively, they over-ruled the previous judgement of 
the case for the following reasons: firstly, they argued that the solus agreement in 
                                                 
51 See Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd, Court of Appeal (1966) 1 All ER 
725. 
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regard to the Mustow Green garage imposed a significant restraint on trade that was 
more than necessary for the protection of Esso’s trading interests. Having regard to 
Esso’s power to fix both the wholesale and retail prices, it was considered that the 
period of four years and five months was too long. The duration of the contract 
combined with the continuity covenants might result in a squeeze on the dealers’ 
margins. Lord Denning considered a three year term for the Mustow Green garage as 
reasonable. Therefore, the solus-tie was considered to be unenforceable.  
 
Secondly, the doctrine of restraint of trade also applied to covenants in a mortgage 
(per Diplock LJ). Hamman and Diplock LJJ considered that the terms of the mortgage 
were oppressive and in excess of what was reasonably necessary to protect Esso’s 
interest in the land as security for his loan. The solus provisions, in conjunction with 
the provision for a penal rate of interest in certain events and a provision for the 
extension of the security if Harpers incurred further debt meant that the mortgage 
terms were onerous. Moreover, the mortgage could not be redeemed in less than 
twenty-one years. Diplock opined that a tying covenant for a fixed period of two years 
or so or for an indefinite period terminable on two years notice may be adequate for 
the protection of a fuel suppliers’ interest in ensuring continuity of outlet for fuel 
supplies. This tie was also considered unenforceable.  
 
Thirdly, the judges reasoned that the price maintenance clause in the solus agreement 
for the Mustow Green garage was severable, but the other covenants (the tying, 
continuity, and compulsory trading covenants) were not severable. Therefore, the 
appeal court set aside the injunction granted by the trial judge on the ground that the 
ties in the agreements were in restraint of trade and so unenforceable.  
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Esso appealed to the House of Lords. The case was heard by a full House of Lords 
comprising of Lord Reid, Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest, Lord Hodson, Lord Pearce 
and Lord Wilberforce. Although the individual Lords were generally in agreement 
regarding the issues to be determined in this case, they arrived at their respective 
judgements by different reasoning. Thus, the judgement of the case by the Lords are 
summarised below.52 
 
The first issue in the appeal was a determination of whether these agreements could 
be regarded in law as agreements in restraint of trade. Lord Reid noted that the law 
relating to restraint of trade had an ancient origin, and lay within a narrow margin. He 
noted two original categories of activities that were regarded as being in restraint of 
trade. Firstly, where an apprentice or a craftsman agrees not to compete with his 
master after leaving his service, and secondly, where a trader who sold his business 
agrees not to compete thereafter with the purchaser of his business. However, it is not 
an easy task to determine to what extent the principles developed from these original 
categories have been or should be extended to similar cases. 
 
In seeking clarification on the issue, he referred to the most general statement made 
by Lord Parker of Waddington53, as follows: “Monopolies and contracts in restraint of 
trade have this in common – that they both, if enforced, involve a derogation from the 
common law right in virtue of which any member of the community may exercise any trade or 
business he pleases, and in such manner as he thinks best in his own interest ……. Contracts 
in restraint of trade were subject to somewhat different considerations. There is little doubt 
                                                 
52 See Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd, House of Lords (1967) 1 All ER 
699. 
53 See A-G of Commonwealth of Australia v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd, (1911-13) All ER Rep 1120 at 
1123 
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that the common law in the earlier stages of its growth treated all such contracts as contracts 
of imperfect obligation, if not void for all purposes; they were said to be against public policy 
in the sense that it was deemed impolitic to enforce them …..”  
 
Lord Reid also drew from Lord Macnaughton’s statement in the Nordenfelt case54 as 
follows, “the public has an interest in every person carrying on his trade freely; so has 
the individual. All interference with individual liberty of action in trading, and all 
restraints of trade of themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to public 
policy, and therefore void”.  However, Lord Reid noted that Lord Parker and Lord 
Macnaughten at that point in time were only familiar with the two original categories 
of cases, since solus agreements and mortgages within the solus scheme had not 
developed in those years. He opined that restraint of trade should imply a contract 
whereby a man gives up some freedom of action which otherwise he would have had. 
For example, a man buying or leasing a piece of land had no previous right to be 
there, or trade there, and if he takes up the land subject to a negative restraining 
covenant, he has not given up a right or freedom that he previously had. He reasoned 
that ‘tied house’ cases should be explained based on this logic. 
 
Applying this logic to this case, Lord Reid argued that the Mustow Green supply 
agreement fell within the scope of the doctrine of restraint of trade as developed in the 
English law. The reason is that Harpers Ltd was entitled to use this land in any lawful 
way as they chose before they made this agreement, and by making this agreement 
they agreed to restrict their right to sell fuels supplied by others, except Esso. 
Therefore, by engaging in this agreement, they gave up a right or freedom which they 
enjoyed prior to this agreement. Therefore, Harpers had agreed negatively not to sell 
                                                 
54 See Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co Ltd, (1891-94) All ER Rep at 18.  
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fuels supplied by others except Esso, and have also agreed positively to keep the 
garage open at all reasonable hours during the period of the tie. The appellant’s 
counsel had argued that these terms were merely aimed at regulating the respondents 
trading (i.e. promoting) than restricting his trade. However, Lord Reid thought that 
regulating a company’s existing trade may be an even greater restraint than 
prohibiting then from engaging in a new trade. Moreover, a contract which obliges a 
company to take one’s whole supply from one source may be more restraining than a 
contract where a company sells its entire output to one buyer. He concluded that in his 
view this agreement or similar agreements were bound to be in restraint of trade. 
However, since there may be positive benefits to both parties in engaging in such 
agreements, then the provisions of the agreement in each case has to be examined by 
judges to ensure that they are reasonable and justifiable. 
 
Lord Reid emphasised that it is now a generally accepted fact in law that a provision 
in a contract considered to be in restraint of trade must be judged to be reasonable to 
become enforceable, as stated by Lord Macnaughten in the Nordenfelt case. He thus 
argued that, “restraints of trade and interference with individual liberty of action, may be 
justified by the special circumstances of a particular case. It is a sufficient justification, and 
indeed, it is the only justification, if the restriction is reasonable – reasonable, that is, in 
reference to the interests of the parties concerned and reasonable in reference to the interests 
of the public, so framed and so guarded as to afford adequate protection to the party in whose 
favour it is imposed, while at the same time it is in no way injurious to the public”.
55 
 
                                                 
55 See id., p. 18. 
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On this basis, there are three issues to be resolved in every case. Firstly, a 
determination as to whether the restraint is more than what is necessary to afford 
protection to the party in whose favour it was granted. Secondly, a determination as to 
whether it could be justified as being in the interests of the party that was restrained. 
Thirdly, a determination as to whether it is contrary to the public interest. 
 
In considering what was in the restraining party’s interest, Lord Reid reasoned that 
what was against such interests may be against the public interest as well. However, 
in determining whether the terms of the contract superseded what was necessary for 
the protection of Esso’s interests would depend largely on the state of the fuels retail 
business at the time. For this purpose, there was a need to rely on evidence or 
common knowledge on the subject area. Therefore, he decided to supplement the 
reported cases on solus agreements with the Report of the Monopolies Commission of 
July 1965 (Report on the Supply of Petrol to Retailers in the United Kingdom, HC 
264).56 This information was relevant in discerning the benefits of the solus 
agreements to the garage owners and the fuel suppliers. The garage owner’s benefit is 
that he obtains a rebate on the wholesale price of the fuels he buys and receives other 
benefits, especially financial assistance. Conversely, the fuel supplier is assured a 
steady outlet for his refined or imported fuels over a period, and fuel distribution is 
made easier and economical. Esso argued that they could not have made an 
investment of about £200 million in refineries and other plants at the time, if they 
could not foresee steady and assured outlets for their products. This justifies their use 
of solus-ties to achieve this objective. However, there was no evidence as to the 
                                                 
56 See MMC Report; supra note 1. 
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additional benefit derivable from a five year term as opposed to a two year tie or even 
a twenty year tie. 
 
The Court of Appeal held that the ties involved with the agreement with Harpers Ltd 
were for unreasonably long periods. Lord Reid thought that considering that over 90% 
of existing filling stations were tied at the time, and that there may be some difficulty 
and time lag in opening a new filling station, it might well take a longer time to access 
alternative outlets. Therefore, the argument by the judges at the appeal court to the 
effect that the appellants could have found other suitable outlets in the area within two 
to three years may not have been borne out of hard evidence. He observed that Esso is 
not particular about any one outlet, but rather more concerned with maintaining a 
stable system of fuel distribution that is efficient and economical. He reasoned that, 
based on the facts before him, ties of less than five years are likely to be insufficient at 
the point in time. Therefore, the duration of the Mustow Green agreement does not 
seem to be unreasonable. Considering the circumstances, he reasoned that the 
appellants were compelled by circumstances to act in such a manner as to obtain 
renewals of the majority of their numerous ties, some of which will terminate almost 
every week. This is based on the fact that Esso, at the time, supplied about seven 
thousand (about one-fifth) of the thirty-five thousand fuel stations in the UK based on 
solus-ties. Therefore, Lord Reid allowed the appeal regarding the Mustow Green 
agreement to stand.  
 
Lord Morris arrived at the same conclusion regarding the Mustow Green agreement, 
albeit through a slightly different reasoning. In arriving at this conclusion, he clarified 
the position of the law in regard to the conflict between freedom of trade and freedom 
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of contract by drawing from Sir George Jessell MR57, Scrutton LJ58, Lord Shaw of 
Dunfermline59, Lord Denning MR60, and Diplock LJ61. Lord Morris reasoned that the 
very basis of the Mustow Green contract was restrictive because it was designed to 
ensure that Harpers Ltd would not sell any other motor fuels from other suppliers, 
except those belonging to Esso. Therefore, the agreement restricted the manner in 
which Harpers Ltd would operate their business. However, in a case where a person 
voluntarily takes up a lease of land with a restrictive covenant attached, it would not 
seem reasonable to apply the doctrine of restraint of trade. This draws the distinction 
between a case where a person seeks to claim a greater freedom than that which he 
currently possesses or has arranged to acquire, and a case where a person fetters his 
future by sacrificing with a freedom which he possesses.  
 
                                                 
57 See the case of Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson, (1875) LR 19 Eq 462 at 465. Sir 
George Jessell MR stated as follows: “it must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily 
those rules, which say that a given contract is void as being against public policy, because if there is 
one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of full age and competent 
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into 
freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by courts of justice. Therefore, you 
have this paramount public policy to consider – that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of 
contract”. 
58 See the case of English Hop Growers Ltd v Dering, (1928) All ER Rep at 400. Scrutton made a 
similar statement, to the one above, as follows: “I myself have always regarded it as in the public 
interest that parties who, being in an equal position of bargaining to make contracts should be 
compelled to perform them, and not to escape from their liabilities by saying that they had agreed to 
something which was unreasonable”. 
59 See the case of Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby, (1916-17) All ER Rep at 314. In regard to these 
competing principles of law (i.e. freedom of contract and freedom of trade), Lord Shaw stated as 
follows: “the delicacy of the operation of law in setting the bounds of either freedom has been long 
familiar. In these cases, as I have pointed out, there are two freedoms to be considered, one the freedom 
of trade and the other the freedom of contract: and to that I will now again venture to add that it is a 
mistake to think that public interest is only concerned with one. It is considered with both”. 
60 See Petrofina (Gt. Britain) Ltd v Martin, (1966) 1 All ER at 131. In trying to define what is meant by 
a contract in restraint of trade, Lord Denning MR stated that, “….. every member of the community is 
entitled to carry on any trade or business he chooses and in such manner as he thinks most desirable in 
his own interests, so long as he does nothing unlawful; with the consequences that any contract which 
interferes with the free exercise of his trade or business by restricting him in the work he may do for 
others, or the arrangements which he may make with others, is a contract in restraint of trade. It is 
invalid unless it is reasonable as between the parties and not injurious to the public interest”. 
61 See id., 138. Diplock in the above case also confirmed this point of view by stating that, “a contract 
in restraint of trade is one in which a party (the covenantor) agrees with another party (the covenentee) 
to restrict his liberty in the future to carry on trade with other persons not parties to the contract in such 
manner as he chooses……”. 
  
182 
However, the agreements made by Harpers Ltd were of a different kind, because they 
owned their garages and Esso had no interest in them or in the land where they were 
situated. Clearly, the agreements made in reference to the two garages were 
agreements in restraint of trade and will have to pass the test of reasonableness to be 
enforceable. Esso alleged that the agreements were reasonable, and so they had to 
demonstrate to the House of Lords that the restraints contained in those agreements 
afforded them just the adequate protection of their rights to outlets for their products, 
effective and economical distribution of their products, and a return on the huge 
investments in refineries and plants. At the time, solus agreements which lasted 
relatively fewer years could be regarded as reasonable. In the case of the Mustow 
Green garage, the duration was for four years and five months, which represented the 
unexpired period under a previous agreement with another company. Lord Morris 
concluded that the Mustow Green agreement was reasonable as between the parties. 
 
Regarding the Mustow Green garage, Lord Hodson concurred with the judgement 
given by the other Lords. He argued that the oil companies were entitled to the 
protection of continuity of outlets, which is the objective justification for the tying 
covenant and complemented by the compulsory trading and continuity covenants. 
However, in reaching a conclusion he relied on a number of reported cases of like 
nature, particularly from Commonwealth Courts like Canada and South Africa (as 
Lord Pearce did), where five years had been considered as the ideal term for solus 
agreements. He also relied on the recommendations of the Monopolies Commission 
1965 (as Lord Reid and Lord Pearce did), which stipulated that solus agreements 
should not usually exceed five years. Therefore, since the duration of the Mustow 
Green agreement was less than five years, he considered it to be reasonable. 
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Lord Wilberforce argued that, on balance, the agreements in this case fell within the 
category of agreements in restraint of trade which requires reasonable justification. 
The reason was that the agreements directly restrain the exercise of Harper’s trade. 
The next question was whether these agreements fell within some category that could 
be excluded from the doctrine of restraint of trade. However, in character, this was 
essentially a trade agreement between traders, and not a mere transaction in property 
or between owners of property. If it were the latter, it could be judged as a normal 
commercial transaction of an acceptable kind. Moreover, the agreements involved 
other restrictive components: there was a tie for a fixed period with no provision for 
earlier determination by notice, and there was a fetter on the terms on which the 
garage could be sold. In the case of the Corner garage, there was an extra fetter on the 
terms for the mortgage redemption. These restrictions taken together, takes these 
agreements into the category of those that would require reasonable and objective 
justification, and thus would have to be subjected to the test of reasonableness. 
Therefore, Lord Wilberforce agreed with the other Lords that the Mustow Green 
agreement does pass the test of reasonableness considering the interests of the parties. 
 
The Corner garage agreement at Stourport, presented more difficulties because it 
involved in addition to the standard solus agreement a mortgage of the garage for a 
loan which is irredeemable before twenty-one years. All the Lords agreed that the 
Corner garage agreement failed the test of reasonableness, but they applied slightly 
different arguments in arriving at their judgements. Lord Reid thought that a tie for 
twenty-one years “stretches far beyond any period for which developments are 
reasonably foreseeable”. Conversely, he also opined that it would be unfair to Esso if 
Harpers Ltd, having used Esso’s financial assistance to build up their business, 
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became entitled to be free in a relatively short time to seek better terms from a 
competing supplier. However, in this case, there could not be discerned a greater 
advantage to the garage owner from a twenty-one year tie than he obtains from a five 
year tie. Moreover, there was no evidence to show that a shorter duration of tie would 
be inadequate for Esso. Therefore, Lord Reid dismissed the appeal as regards the 
Corner garage agreement. In making his judgement, he stated that his opinion 
regarding the length of solus ties permissible in a solus agreement should not be 
regarded as a general rule. He also referred to the case of Petrofina (Gt Britain) Ltd v 
Martin,
62 which in his opinion should also not be regarded as laying down a general 
rule.  
 
The case of the Corner garage involved a solus agreement, a loan agreement and a 
mortgage, and Lord Morris thought that all could be linked together as incidents of 
one transaction. He contended that the intention of Esso was likely to be that in 
providing for redemption of the mortgage for the same period of time as the solus-tie 
(i.e. twenty-one years), it should act to support or reinforce the solus agreement. The 
appellants argued that the doctrine of restraint of trade did not apply to covenants 
contained in land mortgages. However, Lord Morris took the contrary view. He 
argued that in relation to the duration of twenty-one years, Esso failed to demonstrate 
that that period of time was reasonable in the interest of the parties. Consequently, he 
concurred with the decision of the Court of Appeal that in the circumstances Harpers 
should be allowed to redeem the balance of the loan. 
 
                                                 
62 See Lord Denning MR & Diplock LJ in the case of Petrofina (Gt Britain) Ltd v Martin, Court of 
Appeal (1966) 1 All ER 126. 
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In the case of the Corner garage, Lord Hodson considered that the duration of twenty-
one years was so long that it must be justified positively, or be regarded as 
unreasonable. He opined that covenants in restraint of trade must be tested with the 
same criterion of reasonableness, whether they are contained in mortgages or not. 
Therefore, he saw no reason why the doctrine of restraint of trade should not be 
applicable to mortgages. He agreed with the decision of the Court of Appeal that the 
tying covenant and the compulsory trading covenant are closely linked with the 
provision that the mortgage will be irredeemable for twenty-one years.  
 
In judging the issue of the mortgage contract in the Corner garage agreement, Lord 
Pearce thought that the prolonged fetter on the right to redeem seemed to have been 
inserted for the purpose of prolonging the solus tie and is connected. The implication 
was that the existence of the mortgage did not help the appellant’s argument regarding 
the issue of reasonableness of the tie. Consequently, he dismissed the appeal in 
respect of the Corner garage on the basis that the tie (made more onerous by the terms 
of the mortgage for the same number of years) for a duration of twenty-one years was 
not reasonable in the circumstances. 
 
Lord Wilberforce agreed with the other Lords that the Corner garage did not pass the 
test of reasonableness because of its unduly long duration. He also noted that the fact 
that a transaction is a mortgage does not protect the contents of the arrangements from 
examination. He reasoned that if the purpose and nature of the lending goes beyond 
its security value, and extends to other independent purposes, then the terms of the 
mortgage may and should be independently scrutinized.63 In this case, he opined that 
                                                 
63 See Lord Wilberforce, Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage, (1967) 1 All ER 699, at 736. 
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the mortgage in conjunction with the solus agreement was designed by Esso to tie the 
Corner garage to its fuel products for as long as possible, if not indefinitely. Since the 
mortgage and solus agreements tie in together by virtue of same duration of term, and 
so were designed to work together, therefore an adverse conclusion to the restriction 
imposed by the solus agreement must equally apply to the mortgage. Consequently, 
Lord Wilberforce dismissed the appeal relating to the Corner garage. 
 
4.5.2.3 SHELL UK LTD V LOSTOCK GARAGE LTD 
This case deals with a determination of what constitutes an implied condition of a 
solus agreement and the effects of price discrimination on a licensee.64 Lostock (a 
small garage) was tied to Shell by a solus agreement. The terms were similar to most 
solus agreements whereby the garage was required to sell only fuels supplied by 
Shell, and to keep the garage open at all reasonable times. Originally, the agreement 
was for a period of twenty years, commencing from April 1955 to March 1975. 
However, owing to the regulation of fuel retail activities by the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission UK in 1966, the agreement was altered with effect from 1966 to 
allow Lostock the entitlement to terminate the agreement by giving twelve months’ 
notice at any time after 1971. 
 
During the fuel price war of 1975, Lostock was unable to reduce its retail prices as 
Shell continued to charge at the old price. Shell introduced a price support scheme (as 
did other oil majors) to enable its filling stations meet the competitive pressures 
brought about by intense price competition. However, two neighbouring but larger 
garages benefited from this price support, and owing to its small size Lostock was not 
                                                 
64 See Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd, Court of Appeal, (1997) 1 All ER 481. 
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in receipt of price support. Consequently, the two neighbouring garages were able to 
undercut Lostock, and the latter began to operate at a loss. 
 
In 1975, Lostock erroneously believed that the tie with Shell had ended in 1971 and 
failed to serve a twelve months’ termination notice to Shell before obtaining fuel 
supplies from another supplier. Shell threatened the supplier with proceedings for 
inducing Lostock to breach its solus agreement, and the supplier stopped supplying 
Lostock. In response, Lostock resumed taking supplies from Shell and subsequently 
served a twelve months’ notice of termination to determine the agreement in March 
1977. Shell brought an action against Lostock, claiming damages for a breach of the 
solus agreement by taking supplies from another supplier. Shell also claimed an 
injunction restraining Lostock from obtaining future supplies from other suppliers 
while the solus agreement was still in force. 
 
Lostock claimed a declaration that the agreement was void and unenforceable, and as 
being in unreasonable restraint of trade. Lostock also contended that the agreement 
was subject to an implied condition that Shell would not discriminate against their 
garage in favour of neighbouring and competing garages in such a way as to render 
their fuel sales uneconomic. Therefore, Lostock insisted that Shell was in breach of 
that implied term by rendering price support to neighbouring garages and excluding 
them. Consequently, Lostock sought an injunction restraining Shell from enforcing 
the agreement. 
 
The trial judge (Kerr J) held that Shell could not enforce the tie so long as its price 
support policy had caused hardship for Lostock. However, the judge refused to grant 
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the declaration and injunction sought by Lostock, but awarded damages for their 
actual loss. Lostock, being dissatisfied with the judgement, appealed the case and 
Shell counter-appealed for the injunction sought. 
The Court of Appeal (comprising of Lord Denning MR, Ormrod LJ, and Bridge LJ) 
held as follows: 
(a) There should not be implied to the agreement a provision that Shell should not 
abnormally discriminate against Lostock, because such an implication is not 
necessary to validate the agreement. Moreover, such a provision could not be 
formulated with any degree of precision (Bridge LJ dissenting). Therefore, it followed 
that Shell was not in breach of the agreement by operating the price support policy, 
and Lostock’s appeal on the basis that the agreement was void because Shell 
discriminated against the garage was dismissed. Lord Denning noted that in Esso 
Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd,65 Mocatta J also refused to 
make such an implication and there was no appeal from his decision.  
 
However, in making his decision, Bridge LJ referred to Judge Kerr J’s findings on the 
effect of the discrimination on Lostock.66 Bridge contended that under those 
circumstances, it would be an absurdity for Lostock to be bound by the agreement. He 
posited that the necessary foundation for the application of the classic doctrine on 
                                                 
65 See Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd, (1965) 2 All ER 933, at 941-945. 
66 See Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd, (1997) 1 All ER 481, at 495. Kerr J was quoted as follows: 
“I am satisfied on the evidence that, so long as the scheme lasts, [Shell] would be compelling [Lostock] 
to trade at a loss so far as their sales of petrol are concerned if the covenants in the agreement are 
enforceable against them. [Lostock] must continue to keep their premises open for the sale of petrol at 
all reasonable times. But so long as Barber's and the Plumley garage are supported and [Lostock] are 
not, as is the present position, I am satisfied that [Lostock] must operate at a loss if the agreement is 
enforced. The advent of the VIP garage, together with the operations of the ICI and Esso garages, 
would probably in any event have put [Lostock] under great pressure and perhaps have forced them 
into a loss-making situation. This would be a situation which they would have had to accept. But the 
grant of the [Shell's] price support scheme to Barber's and Plumley's undoubtedly made their position 
much worse, and for the time being economically untenable so far as their sales of petrol are 
concerned.” 
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which terms are implied in contracts was present in this case. Accordingly, that 
doctrine requires that terms or provisions should be implied in contracts to remove 
contractual absurdities which reasonable parties to it could not have intended. 
However, Bridge LJ agreed with Lord Denning MR that this case presents an extreme 
difficulty in defining the appropriate degree of discrimination which any implied term 
should preclude. Therefore, the criteria that Shell must not discriminate unfairly, 
abnormally, or unreasonably in respect of its price support policy does not indicate 
where the line should be drawn with any precision. It was for this reason that Lord 
Denning, and Ormrod LJ decided to dismiss the appeal brought by Lostock relating to 
price discrimination. Bridge LJ, however, reasoned that in spite of the lack of 
precision in the criterion that should be embodied in the implied term, the court 
should not shrink from the task of deciding which side of the line the case falls. He 
refused to accept that the difficulty in defining with precision what provision is to be 
implied is an insurmountable barrier to the implication of any term limiting Shell’s 
freedom to discriminate. He further argued that his test of the degree of discrimination 
prohibited by any implied term was whether such was enough to render Lostock’s 
fuel sales business impracticable or uneconomic. Therefore, he thought that Lostock’s 
appeal should be allowed, although his was a minority judgement. 
 
(b) Shell’s cross-appeal against the dismissal of their claim for an injunction 
restraining Lostock from breaking the solus-tie provision was dismissed on the 
following grounds:  
(i) Lord Denning argued that it is now a settled matter that a solus agreement is a 
contract in restraint of trade, and referred to Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s 
Garage (Stourport) Ltd. Therefore, this case falls within a special class of cases 
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whereby the courts have to investigate the terms of the contract to determine whether 
or not they are fair and reasonable. If they are judged to be unfair or unreasonable, the 
court is entitled to refuse to enforce them. In most cases, the courts tend to consider 
the reasonableness of the terms at the time the contract was made. However, in this 
case Lord Denning ruled (the other appeal judges consenting) that the court should 
not enforce a contract in restraint of trade where after the contract had been entered 
into it was found to be operating unfairly and unreasonably, in circumstances that 
could not have been previously anticipated. Therefore, the court should dismiss 
Shell’s counter appeal, and decline to enforce the solus-tie provisions, as long as Shell 
was operating their price support scheme to the detriment of Lockstock. When the 
agreement was altered in 1966, it had seemed reasonable and fair to retain the solus-
tie provision. However, when Shell introduced their price support scheme, which 
excluded Lostock, it had become unfair and unreasonable to insist on the enforcement 
of the tie. 
 
(ii) Lord Denning MR and Ormrod LJ ruled (and Bridge LJ consenting) that it would 
be unjust and inequitable to grant Shell an injunction restraining Lostock from 
breaking the solus-tie provision whilst Shell were operating the price support policy 
and excluding Lostock from it. This scheme inflicted financial hardship on Lostock 
during the time it was in operation, and so Shell were not entitled to enforce the tie 
provision. 
 
(iii) Bridge LJ decided (and the majority of the  judges dissented) that Shell were in 
breach of an implied contractual provision not to discriminate against Lostock in a 
manner as to render it commercially unprofitable for them to continue to trade on the 
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express contractual terms. He argued that the breach should result to a repudiation of 
the agreement by Shell. 
 
(iv) Lord Denning MR and Ormrod LJ (Bridge LJ dissenting) ruled that since the 
price support scheme had been terminated, the tie remained enforceable until the solus 
agreement terminated after Lostock’s twelve months notice to Shell (i.e. in March 
1977). They argued that in the circumstances, Lostock was not entitled to claim an 
injunction against Shell until the expiry of the notice. 
 
4.5.2.4 ESSO PETROLEUM CO LTD V ADDISON and OTHERS 
This case involved Esso (the plaintiffs) and 120 Esso licensees (defendants), 
comprising of companies and individuals who retailed motor fuels at fuel stations 
which operated under licences from Esso.67 The legal proceedings arose between Esso 
and the licensees over the construction of Esso’s standard form of license agreement 
and some aspects of the operation of their fuel stations. There were three categories of 
these disputes: those arising out of the operation of a national sales promotion called 
Esso Collection; those arising from certain changes to the financial provisions of the 
licences introduced by Esso between 1 January 1966 and 1 April 1998; and those 
regarding the supply of motor fuel at higher than ambient temperatures (i.e. hot fuel). 
The facts of the case, provisions of the licence agreements, and the basis for court 
rulings are summarised as follows. 
 
                                                 
67 See Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Addison and others, (2003) EWHC 1730 (Comm). Similar charges 
were brought against Esso Petroleum Co Ltd in the following cases: Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v David 
and others, (2003) EWHC 1730 (Comm); Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Milton, (1997) 2 All ER 593; and 
Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mahoney, (2000) All ER (D) 993. 
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The first issue required a determination as to whether Esso licensees were obliged to 
participate in and to bear the total cost of Esso promotional schemes. The Esso ‘Tiger 
Token’ promotional scheme operated nationally in the UK from 1986 to February 
1996. The scheme involved issuing tokens to motorists which they could redeem for 
gifts. Esso expected the individual filling stations to bear the total cost of 
administering the scheme, as part of their trading expenses. The licensees were also 
expected to bear part of the cost of providing the promotional gifts. To offset part of 
the cost of providing the gifts, individual retailers were credited each month with an 
allowance determined by the volume of fuels ordered the previous month. Based on 
the nature of the scheme, it was inevitable that the cost of providing the gifts would be 
deferred somewhat, because of the time lag between when motorists collect tokens 
and the actual time that they redeem these tokens for gifts.  
 
Consequently, at the end of the promotional scheme many licensees had owed 
substantial amounts to Esso which the latter sought to recover. This resulted in group 
litigation by Esso licensees to the effect that Esso was supposed to bear the cost of 
administering the scheme. Therefore, it was left to the courts to determine whether on 
the true construction of the relevant license agreements and the way the scheme 
operated, the claimant (Esso) was entitled to recover from the fuel retailers the cost of 
the promotional gifts supplied to them for the purpose of the scheme. 
 
Three forms of licence agreement were current during the period of the promotional 
scheme. These forms of agreement were broadly similar in form and in substance, but 
were different in some respects. Premier A licence agreement was the form of 
agreement in 1986. This was replaced by the Partnership Licence Agreement (PLA) 
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in 1989. The PLA was later modified in 1992. Both forms of the PLA were expressed 
to run for a fixed duration of three years, whereas the Premier A licence agreement 
was expressed to run as agreed on an individual basis with the licensees. Part II, 
clause 12 of the Premier A form of licence covers incentive schemes and stipulated 
that, “the licensee should join in promotion and sales incentive schemes for Esso 
products as Esso may reasonably request from time to time.”68 The Seventh Schedule, 
clause 8 of the PLA (1989) also stipulated that, “the licensee will at the licensee’s 
own expenses (unless otherwise provided for) comply with the conditions set out in 
the Seventh Schedule hereto.”69 Clause 24 under the Seventh Schedule covers 
promotional activities and incentive schemes, and states that, “the licensee will join in 
all sales, promotional and incentive activities and schemes as Esso may from time to 
time require.”70 The PLA (1992) followed closely the same pattern as the 1989 PLA. 
 
On the basis of the true construction of the licence agreements, the court ruled that the 
licensees were obliged to join in the promotion at their own expense based on clause 8 
of the 1989 PLA. Therefore, any licensee that joined in the promotional scheme and 
operated it with full knowledge of its terms had inevitably entered into a scheme 
contract with Esso whereby he became liable for the cost of gifts supplied to his outlet 
for that purpose. For those licensees who claim that they were given an assurance that 
they would not incur any costs in the course of operating the promotional scheme, the 
court ruled that its precise terms and effects would have to be determined in separate 
proceedings. 
 
                                                 
68 See id., point 17 
69 See id., point 18. 
70 See id., point 18.  
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The second issue dealt with whether Esso was entitled to make adjustments to 
retailers’ margins, fees, and allowances; and whether such adjustments were 
reasonable or arbitrary. During the latter part of 1994 and early 1995, Esso reviewed 
its fuel retail operations in order to detect the cause of its declining market share. The 
review exercise revealed that supermarkets were driving down prices at the pumps 
which resulted in Esso’s outlets being uncompetitive. Consequently, Esso embarked 
on a Business Process Redesign (BPR). Following the review of marketing operations 
of the fuel stations, Esso decided to adjust margins, fees and allowances. These 
adjustments gave rise to the dispute with the licensees whom complained that Esso 
reduced licensees’ margins and allowances, and increased fees to an extent where it 
was commercially unfeasible for them to operate their businesses. They contended 
that in adjusting these, Esso had exceeded its entitlements under the licence 
agreements. 
 
However, clause 6 of the Fifth Schedule to the PLA provided for margin/allowance 
review.71 Having determined that Esso was entitled to make adjustments in margins, 
fees and allowances, the court also needed to determine whether these adjustments 
were made arbitrarily or whether there was a reasonable driving force behind it.  
Following the outcome of Esso’s review of their fuel retail operations in 1994/1995, 
Esso decided in 1996 to jettison the Esso Collection Promotion Scheme because the 
company thought that it was better to compete directly on price, as a way of attracting 
and retaining customers, than through gift promotions. Consequently, Esso introduced 
                                                 
71 Clause 6 provided as follows: “prior to the 1st of November in every year, Esso will review the 
Licence Margin and the sum payable in respect of the Monthly Operating Cost Allowance. Following 
such review, Esso will notify the licensee of the result of its review and if in Esso’s opinion changes 
are required to the licence margin or cost allowance such changes will take effect on the 1st of 
December following the review. Esso reserves the right, if necessary, to make adjustments to the 
licence margin and/or the cost allowance at any other time upon notification to the licensee.” 
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a new strategy (the Pricewatch Scheme) whereby Esso ensured that it matched the 
retail prices set by competing fuel stations in a given area. The retailers were meant to 
bear part of the burden of operating this new scheme themselves because they were 
expected to frequently monitor the prices being charged by competing sites in their 
areas and report back to Esso. This monitoring activity added to the retailers’ costs, 
but overall Esso bore the major part of the costs of the scheme. Esso regarded the 
operation of this scheme as necessary to retain its presence as a major player in the 
motor fuel retail market. The introduction of this scheme, based on the BPR, may 
have necessitated the frequent adjustments in margins, shop fees, and operating cost 
allowance (three times in 1996, and subsequently in 1997 and 1998). 
 
On the basis of the above facts, the trial judge ruled that clause 6 of the fifth schedule 
of the PLA entitled Esso to adjust the margin, shop and marketing fees and operating 
cost allowance at its discretion, although it was not entitled to make such adjustments 
“arbitrarily, capriciously or irrationally.”72 Esso was not also entitled to make such 
adjustments as would render the businesses of the defendants uneconomic. 
Considering the need for Esso to make necessary adjustments to its operations in 
order to meet the supermarket competition in fuel retailing, the trial court was 
satisfied that all the adjustments before it were not made arbitrarily, dishonestly or 
irrationally. In the same judgement, the trial judge (Moore-Bick J) ruled that if those 
necessary adjustments which Esso was compelled to make had affected adversely the 
business of any of the licensees’, the matter would have to be determined in separate 
proceedings. 
 
                                                 
72 See id., point 149. 
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The third aspect of the dispute relates to what is known as ‘hot fuel’ or ‘wet stock 
losses’. Petrol (and to a lesser extent diesel) has a high co-efficient of expansion and 
as a result the observed volume of any given delivery is significantly affected by its 
temperature. The observed volume of these fuels at the time of loading tends to be 
more than the recorded volume after cooling has taken place in the storage tanks. The 
difference in volume is regarded as wet stock losses to the retailers. Similarly, 
motorists who obtain fuels shortly after a given delivery in a filling station would 
have received a relatively hotter fuel, and are also likely to incur wet stock losses after 
the fuel has cooled in the fuel tanks. 
 
Licensees were obliged to obtain all their requirements of motor fuels from Esso as 
stated in the solus agreements. All fuel station operators were also required to keep 
records of the quantity of fuels on their premises (known as ‘wet stock’). Many 
licensees began to notice that they were incurring wet stock losses which they could 
not account for. Subsequently, they observed that these losses must have been caused 
by the contraction of fuel after cooling in the storage tanks. Consequently, they 
complained to Esso that they have received less fuel than they ordered and paid for 
because the fuel delivered to them was ‘hot’ when loaded into the tanker. 
 
The petroleum industry had recognised the need for a standard temperature 
accounting for products passing through the refining and distribution system. The 
licensees who claim to have received deliveries of hot fuel contended that Esso was 
under an obligation to adopt the standard temperature accounting and was in breach of 
contract for not doing so. The court recognised the fact that petrol (and to a lesser 
degree diesel) are highly volatile substances. In the case of petrol, a change in 
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temperature of 4 degrees centigrade produces a change in volume of about 0.5%, and 
0.3% with diesel. Therefore, if the temperature is significantly higher than ambient 
temperature at the time of loading into the road tanker, there can be a significant 
reduction in volume at the time of cooling. Expert evidence before the court, revealed 
that although the standard temperature accounting has been used in the oil industry for 
over fifty years (as at the time of the case), it was not generally applied within the UK 
for the sale of petrol or diesel, either by fuel suppliers to retailers or retailers to 
motorists. However, the court was more directly concerned with identifying the terms 
on which Esso sold motor fuels to the licensees and to determine whether or not it 
failed to comply with its obligations. 
 
Based on the facts, the court ruled that the agreements for the supply of fuel by Esso 
to its licensees provided for the sale and delivery of a stated volume measured at the 
temperature at the distribution terminal at the time of loading into the delivery 
vehicle. Therefore, Esso was not in breach of contract for delivering fuel at 
temperatures higher than ambient temperature at the time of loading into road tankers. 
Clause 6 of the licence agreement and clause 1 of the Fifth Schedule provided that the 
licensee was bound to buy all fuel requirements from Esso on Esso’s current terms 
and conditions. Clause 5 stipulated that, “the seller’s measurements of quantity will be 
accepted by the buyer”.73 Clause 8 provided that “all packages contain full measures 
when delivered by the seller but owing to the volatile nature of petroleum the seller 
cannot be held responsible for any shortages after the packages have left the seller’s 
premises.”74 
 
                                                 
73 See id., point 154. 
74 See id., point 154. 
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The judge also noted the opinion of experts that it would be technically possible in the 
future to introduce equipment required to enable standard temperature accounting to 
be carried through the entire distribution chain (i.e. from the refinery to the pump). 
However, this will require the co-operation of the entire industry to implement and 
would take some time to actualise. However, standard temperature measurement at 
the pump was yet to be introduced at the time of the case, and has not yet been 
introduced in the UK. The judge argued that until this technology is introduced, there 
must be a point in the distribution chain where the transition from standard 
temperature accounting to accounting in observed volumes occurs. The current 
practice provides for that transition to occur at the loading gantry on the sale of fuels 
by the supplier to the retailer. Moreover, the judge reasoned that petrol pumps in the 
UK dispense fuels based on observed litres and not standard litres. For this reason, it 
is not feasible to account for motor fuels on a standard-litre basis throughout the fuel 
retail distribution system. The experts agreed that considering the circumstances, the 
adoption of standard temperature accounting for the sale of fuel to retailers would 
operate to the advantage of some and to the disadvantage of many. Even if Esso were 
to supply its licensees in standard volumes measured at the loading gantry, there 
would still be a differential between the standard volume supplied and the observed 
volume received into the retailer’s tank due to evaporation. 
 
Esso’s licensees appealed against the decisions of the trial judge. Firstly, they 
challenged the judge’s construction of the standard forms of the contract and argued 
that the judge should have adopted a more restrictive interpretation of Esso’s rights to 
adjust margins, fees and allowances. Secondly, they contended that the judge should 
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have found that Esso acted “arbitrarily, capriciously, dishonestly or irrationally.” 
Thirdly, they challenged the judge’s ruling on the issue of wet stock losses. 
 
The appeal judges (Ward, Tuckey, and Neuberger LJJ) affirmed the decisions of the 
trial judge on the issues raised by the appeal as follows:75 Firstly, based on the facts of 
the case, the trial judge was entitled to construe Esso’s standard form of agreement in 
the way he did. They held that the judge made a clear finding of fact that Esso had not 
made the adjustments in margins, fees, and allowances based on improper motives. 
Rather, these were based on rational responses to commercial situations. 
 
Secondly, regarding the issue of hot fuel, the appeal judges held that if a contract for 
the sale of goods by volume did not provide expressly a measurement system for 
those goods, the natural implication would be to adopt a measurement system that 
accords with established good practice in the trade or industry concerned. In this case, 
the trial judge found that each contract with the licensee was for the purchase and sale 
of a volume of fuel measured in accordance with the prevailing and established 
industry practice. This measurement was carried out at the point of delivery into road 
tankers at the temperature at which fuels reached the loading gantry in the normal 
course of operations. They concluded that the trial judge made the right decision on 
the issue. 
 
                                                 
75 See Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Addison and others, (2004) EWCA Civ 1470. 
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4.5.3 Summary of Current Legal Principles in Play in this Area of  
         Law 
The cases of Petrofina (Gt Britain) v Martin and Another and Esso Petroleum Co Ltd 
v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd defined the nature of solus agreements and how 
these special class of cases should be treated by the courts. On one hand, solus 
agreements were generally considered to be in the interest of the licensors, the 
licensees, and the general public. Solus agreements afford the licensor adequate 
protection to outlets for their fuels and ensure a return on their substantial investments 
in refineries and plants. These agreements ensure a steady supply of fuels and other 
supplementary support measures (i.e. loans for refurbishing retail sites, loans for fuel 
equipment, etc) to the licensees, while also facilitating economical distribution of 
fuels in the public interest. On the other hand, these agreements were basically 
regarded as falling within the doctrine of restraint of trade. However, based on the 
usefulness of solus agreements they are enforceable by the courts provided that they 
pass the test of reasonableness. 
 
An important legal principle that emerged in the case of Petrofina (Gt Britain) v 
Martin and Another is that solus agreements could not be used by a licensor to protect 
its competitive position, particularly when such restrictions on a licensee is more than 
what is necessary for such protection. This is important considering the vigorous 
nature of competition in fuels wholesaling and retailing. 
 
Price discrimination is also a regular feature of the fuels retail trade, and also a 
contentious one among the licensees because price competition is vital in the trade 
and determines to a large extent the volume of fuels sold by retailers. The case of 
Shell UK v Lostock garage indicates that the issue of price discrimination as an 
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implied term in a solus agreement presents significant difficulties in defining the 
appropriate degree of discrimination which an implied term should embody or 
preclude. The lack of precision in the criterion that should be embodied or precluded 
from an implied term makes it difficult for the courts to allow any case or appeal that 
falls under price discrimination. 
 
Retailers’ margins, fees and allowances are crucial determinants of the profitability of 
fuel outlets. The judgement of the case of Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Addison and 
Others in the Court of Appeal reveals that reasonable commercial decisions by 
licensors such as promotional schemes and adjustments in retailers’ margins, fees, and 
allowances are allowable in courts provided that the contracts contains relevant 
provisions relating to these decisions. 
 
The issue of wetstock losses also has implications for retailers’ profitability. 
However, the appeal court judgement in the case of Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Addison 
and Others indicate that for similar cases the current industry temperature accounting 
standards for fuel retail operations should remain in force until standard temperature 
measurement at the pumps is introduced in the UK. 
 
4.5.4 Australian Fuel Retail Franchise Regulations 
The Australian solo marketing scheme is the equivalent of the UK solus trading 
scheme, and so shares similar issues and difficulties in the contractual relationship 
between the oil majors and the retailers (franchisees and independent retail operators). 
The refining wholesalers in both jurisdictions faces two major risks which they must 
cushion: the potential volatility of demand which arises from the tendency of 
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consumers to change brands in response to price differences; and the high capacity 
utilization needed to make refining economic. Inevitably, they are forced to respond 
to these risks (through vertical agreements) by tying retail outlets to contractual 
arrangements for exclusive supply/ resale of their refined products.76  
 
Oil majors in Australia only need to own one of the capital assets needed to operate a 
fuel retail site (the outlet, pumps or storage facility) to insist on exclusive supply ties. 
The only exception occurs where a retailer provides his own capital, pumps and 
storage (as in the case of independent retailers) in which case he can sell unbranded 
products and choose between suppliers. These categories of retailers are few in the 
major capital cities as shown in table 4.6.77  
 
Table 4.6 Non-oil Major Sites in Major Capital Cities; Mar 1996 
 Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Adelaide Perth Total 
No. of non-oil 
major sites  
233 305 197 56 80 871 
Total no. of all 
sites 
1,011 1,036 657 310 413 3,427 
% of non-oil 
major sites of 
total sites 
23.0 29.4 30.0 18.1 19.4 25.4 
 
Source: ACCC, Inquiry into Petroleum Products Declaration P33. 
 
Table 4.6 also reveals that the oil majors utilize franchise agreements extensively. 
The majority of non-oil major sites are usually single businesses without the 
economies of scale derived from chain linkages, and are mainly located in rural areas. 
In cases where retailers have franchise agreements with the oil majors, the product 
ties are further consolidated through guarantees on borrowing, tied lease of land, 
                                                 
76 See IC report; supra note 15, at 32. 
77 See id., 33. 
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buildings and equipment and these are included in such arrangements or documented 
through separate agreements. 
 
4.5.5 Quasi-Fuel Franchise Regulation of 1975 
Considering the inevitability of vertical arrangements in the petroleum industry and 
some of the detrimental effects it could have on competition, the Trade Practices 
Commission (TPC) decided in 1975 to stipulate a number of conditions for exclusive 
dealings which the oil majors were mandated to reflect in all agreements with its 
franchisees and independents. These conditions were similar to the Undertakings 
signed by the oil majors in the UK in 1966 and are as follows.78 Firstly, no ties should 
be placed on dealer-owned sites for fuels, lubricants and other products. Secondly, no 
ties should be placed on lubricants under any circumstance. Thirdly, resellers were 
required to hold sufficient stocks to meet demand for branded fuels. Fourthly, 
resellers were expected to have reasonable access to equipment in order to sell 
another supplier’s fuels. 
 
However, the evidence shows that no retailer was able to secure the last condition for 
the following reasons: franchisees’/lessees’ fear of retaliation from the supplying oil 
major; costs of separating brands; the ownership of storage tanks and pumps by the oil 
majors; and the Laidely agreement which prevented cross fuelling between brands. 
Indeed, the oil majors mounted a successful common law prosecution for ‘passing 
off’79 (i.e. a retailer selling from a pump a brand other than that advertised on the 
                                                 
78 See id., 42-43. 
79For details, see id., 119. 
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pump) which effectively prohibited such actions by retailers. On this basis, all oil 
majors reintroduced full ties into their franchise agreements in 1988.80 
 
It has been observed in Australia that small businesses prefer franchise agreements 
because it reduces the capital investment required to establish goodwill which in turn 
minimizes the risk of business failure. Such agreements usually include an exclusive 
territory, effective IT- driven management systems, and the supply of an established 
brand belonging to the oil major or their distributors.81 However, in practice the 
ability of a franchisee to take advantage of an exclusive territory and goodwill is 
limited by the relative undifferentiated nature of petroleum products. Equally, the 
conditions that restrict supply to one brand would mean that franchisees have little 
control over supply. The indications are that franchisees also have no control over 
prices.  
 
The evidence shows that the franchisee under the conditions of lack of independence 
does not always achieve the objective of reducing the risk of business failure. These 
risks would include the level of price volatility; the amount of SPS provided by the 
supplier; and any sudden increases in rents, leases or other marketing fees. The nature 
of franchise agreements (like any other exclusive supply arrangements in the industry) 
permits the transfer of countervailing power from the fuel retailer to the supplying oil 
majors, which allows the latter to achieve more predictable demand for their product 
through indirect vertical integration. In other words, the franchisees have the 
appearance of a ‘glorified employee’ of the oil majors.  
 
                                                 
80 See id., 43. 
81 See id., 35. 
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4.5.6 The Petroleum Retail Marketing Franchise Act 1980 
The foregoing situation probably led to the enactment of the Franchise Act which set 
out in details the preferred relationship which the oil majors should have with their 
franchisees’ with some semblance of relative equity in the contractual relationships.82 
However, prior to the enactment of the Franchise Act a number of government 
enquiries were set up because of the perceived imbalances in negotiating power 
between the franchisor and the franchisees. Hence, the Act was meant to redress such 
imbalances by setting minimum terms and conditions for all franchise agreements and 
delivering greater security of tenure to the franchisees’ and the ability to accrue 
goodwill. 
 
The Act covers all agreements on outlets retailing over 360,000 litres of fuels per 
annum and applies also to multi-site franchisees but not restricted to oil majors’ 
franchisees. The following are the minimum conditions imposed by the legislation83: 
“the right to assign and appropriate goodwill; tenure of three years with two further 
three-year terms at the option of the franchisee (i.e. in effect a 9-year term); 
franchisors should not impose unreasonable terms on the franchisees, including 
increasing rents or withdrawing rebates arbitrarily; prohibition of price discrimination 
between like-branded franchisees, except where the price discrimination can be 
justified by differences in the costs of supply or the need to meet competition; 
disclosure of all relevant information by the franchisor to the franchisee at least three 
days prior to the latter entering into an agreement with the former (to enable the 
franchisee make an informed decision)”. 
                                                 
82 Commonwealth Numbered Acts, Petroleum Retail Marketing Franchise Act No. 139 (1980). 
Available online at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/prmfa1980359/ last visited on 29 
September 2009. 
83 See IC Report on Petroleum Products; supra note 15, at 158-159. 
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4.5.7 Case Law on the Petroleum Retail Franchise Act 1980 
Some identified cases arising from the Franchise Act are set out below to give a 
perspective on how the courts interpreted crucial provisions of the Act. The cases also 
tested whether the court interpretations facilitated the objectives of the Franchise Act 
or not.  
 
Table 4.7 Cases Based on the Franchise Act 
Provisions of the Act Cases 
Termination of Franchise 
Agreements (s16) 
Anjac Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil Australia Pty Ltd, (1985) 69 ALR 733; 
Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Brian Brindle, (1985) 62 ALR 89; Richards 
v Golden Fleece Petroleum Pty Ltd, (1983) 49 ALR 337; Magic 
Australia Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil, (1988) 84 ALR 483; Caltex Oil 
(Australia) Pty Ltd v Best, (1990) 97 ALR 217; Chronopoulos v Caltex 
Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd, (1982) 45 ALR 481. 
Renewal of Franchise 
Agreements (s17) 
Ampol Petroleum Ltd v Calaby Pty Ltd, (1991) 110 ALR 343; Anjac 
Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil; Esso Australia Ltd v RI & MI Abela Pty Ltd, 
(1989) 91 ALR 476; Beckford Nominees Pty v Shell Co of Australia 
(1986) 73 ALR 373; Sagitarrian Enterprises Pty Ltd v Ampol 
Petroleum Ltd, (1986) 69 ALR 551; Sid Marz Services v Caltex Oil 
Australia Pty Ltd, (1988) ATPR (Digest) 46; Dinyarrak Investments 
Pty Ltd v Amoco Australia Ltd, (1982) 45 ALR 214; Serhan v Ampol 
Petroleum Ltd, [(985) 58 ALR 347; J & M O’Brien Enterprises Pty Ltd 
v Shell Co of Australia (1982) 45 ALR 81. 
Assignment of Rights and 
Interests (s11) 
Bayata Pty Ltd and Another v Ampol Petroleum Ltd, (1982) 45 ALR 
349; Chenoa Pty Ltd v Shell Co of Australia, (1988) 81 ALR 1; Ampol 
Petroleum Ltd v Calaby Pty Ltd; Esso Australia Ltd v RT & MI Abela 
Pty Ltd. 
Application of Act to 
Agreements Prior 
To Commencement of the Act 
(s6) 
Centenary Investment v Total Australia Ltd, (1982) ATPR 40-314; J & 
M O’Brien v Shell Co of Australia; Esso Australia Ltd v RT & MI 
Abela Pty Ltd; Chronopoulos v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd, (1982) 
45 ALR 481. 
Protection against Price 
Discrimination (s20) 
BP v Trade Practices Commission, (1986) 66 ALR 148; Mobil Oil 
Australia Ltd v Brain Brindle; Chonopoulos v Caltex Oil (Australia) 
Pty Ltd. 
Contracting out of the Statute Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v Best; Richards v Golden Fleece 
Petroleum Pty Ltd; Beckford Nominees Pty Ltd v Shell Co of Australia; 
Ampol Petroleum Ltd v Calaby Pty Ltd; Esso v RI & MI Abela Pty Ltd. 
 
Rental Increases (s13) Chronopoulos v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd. 
Interim Franchise Agreements 
(s3 & s14) 
Dinyarrak Investments Pty Ltd v Amoco (Australia) Ltd. 
Source: This Research 
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The key provisions of the Franchise Act dealt with termination of agreements, 
renewal of agreements, assignment of rights and interests in a retail site, application 
of the Act to agreements prior to the commencement of the Act, protection against 
price discrimination, protection against imposition of impossible or unreasonable 
obligations, contracting out of the statute, and interim agreements. The identified 
cases are listed under these various categories as shown in table 4.7. The cases chosen 
for reporting in this thesis are those that collectively best represent the court 
interpretations and rulings regarding the cases brought under the Act, and also those 
that cover more than one provision of the Act. 
 
4.5.7.1 MOBIL OIL AUSTRALIA LTD V BRIAN BRINDLE 
This case dealt with termination of agreements and what the correct basis should be 
under the Franchise Act 1980, as well as issues arising from wholesale price 
discrimination. The original case was brought before the Federal Court of Australia, 
and was decided by the trial judge (Wilcox J).84  
 
Mr Brian Brindle (the respondent) operated a Mobil (the applicant) fuel station within 
the country district of Wollongong for more than 21 years. At the time of the case, he 
occupied two sites (one for about eight years and the other for about six years). The 
parties executed four agreements to govern their relationship. Firstly, there was a 
lease of a fuel station at Towradgi for a term of three years. Secondly, there was a 
Reseller Contract between the parties (meant to operate in conjunction with the lease). 
The terms of the contract obliged Mr Brindle to sell no less than two million litres of 
refined fuels per annum at the Towradgi fuel station. However, Brindle was not 
required to purchase, in any particular year, a quantity exceeding 50% of the fuel sold 
                                                 
84 See Mobil Oil Australia v Brian Brindle, (1984) 56 ALR 541. 
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at the filling station.85 Thirdly, there was a Meter Wholesale Contract, which was 
interdependent with the Reseller Contract, which consisted of a system of supply 
whereby Mobil provided fuel to a filling station on a consignment basis. Under the 
system, fuel was delivered to the storage tanks of the fuel station at such times, and in 
such quantities as Mobil wished. The fuel remained the property of Mobil until it was 
sold at the pump to a customer through a bowser. The dealer was liable to pay to 
Mobil the wholesale list price for what had been sold. The contract provided for 
Mobil to enter the premises at any time to carry out an audit of sales. Either party was 
free to suspend this contract, upon breach of the contract by the other party. Fourthly, 
there was an Equipment Loan Contract (which ran concurrently with the lease 
agreement) that provided for the lessee to use items of plant owned by Mobil at the 
fuel station. 
 
The nature of competition within the Wollongong district (a rural location), and the 
price discrimination as practised by Mobil (but not peculiar to Mobil alone) began to 
have a negative impact on Brindle’s business. The evidence of the respondent and 
three experienced fuel station operators within the district revealed that price was the 
major factor influencing sales of retail motor fuel in the district. Within the district, 
there were other categories of competitors. There were sites known as freeholders (i.e. 
fuel stations operated on land owned by the proprietors of the station), and 
commission agency sites. Fuel supply arrangements between the oil majors and these 
categories of retailers differ from that of their dealers or franchisees (who operate on 
the basis of a lease agreement). The freeholders are supplied fuel at a substantially 
                                                 
85 The implication of the Meter Wholesale Contract was that, regardless of the 50% proviso in the 
Reseller Contract, a dealer operating under this contract has to take 100% of his fuel supplies from 
Mobil. The reason is that the contract prohibits the storage of fuel purchased in the open market (i.e. 
foreign or secondary fuel) in the storage tanks containing Mobil’s fuel held on consignment basis. 
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lower price than the lessee dealers. There were two of such sites near Mr Brindle’s 
fuel station. The commission agency sites were owned and operated by the oil majors 
and managed by commission agents. The fuel supply arrangement in this case was 
that the oil majors owned the fuel stored at the site and retailed it to customers 
through the commission agents, who were remunerated through sales commission. 
Therefore, the oil majors were able to adjust the retail prices at such sites to meet 
competition. There were also two such commission agency sites near Mr Brindle’s 
fuel station. 
 
Under the Reseller Contract, Mobil had the sole right to determine the wholesale price 
of the fuels supplied, which was usually adjusted to return a retail margin of 3.0-3.5 
cents per litre to the dealer. Brindle complained (which was supported by other 
dealers) that this margin was inadequate even in normal times to meet retail costs and 
to provide a decent return on investment. The situation tends to be aggravated during 
times of strong price competition, when the dealers could consider shaving off some 
of their margins in order to match competitors’ prices. However, Mobil (like the other 
oil majors) had a policy of Selective Price Support (SPS) for such periods of strong 
competition. Brindle complained that there was often a delay in the application of 
SPS. During the intervening period, the dealer had to reduce or eliminate retail 
margins to retain customers. In trying to find a lasting solution to problems arising 
from price competition, Brindle decided to purchase an oil tanker to achieve cheaper 
supplies. 
 
The lease on the fuel station located in Towradgi was due to terminate in March 1984, 
and the respondent failed to renegotiate favourable terms, as well as the price which it 
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paid to the applicant for fuel supplies. Subsequently, the respondent defaulted on the 
payment for a delivery of fuel made on 29 November 1983. On 23 December 1983, 
Mobil served upon the respondent a notice of termination based on the Franchise Act 
1980. The notice of termination covered all four agreements between the parties, 
followed by an application and an order on 29 December 1983 requesting the 
respondent to surrender the fuel station to Mobil.86 The respondent sought to 
renegotiate the agreement in the interim, and following unsuccessful attempts he filed 
a cross-claim on 4 June 1984, seeking a declaration to nullify the notice of 
termination. 
 
The Federal Court of Australia held that it was not just and equitable for Mobil to 
refuse to renew the franchise agreements for the following reasons. Firstly, the non-
renewal would lead to disastrous consequences for the respondent. Secondly, the 
circumstances surrounding the default in payment were understandable, considering 
the effects of wholesale price discrimination among the various categories of sites 
supplied by Mobil within the district where the respondent operated.87 Therefore, the 
court ordered that the lease should be renewed at a true rental value provided that, (a) 
the respondent repaid his debts, and (b) that the respondent was not obliged to 
purchase fuels at a wholesale price higher than his competitors within the district. 
 
In delivering the judgement, the court considered that the lease between Mobil and Mr 
Brindle falls within the definition of the term “franchise agreement” as stated in the 
Franchise Act 1980.88 The Franchise Act defines it to include, (a) “an agreement 
                                                 
86 For details of the action against Mr Brindle, see id., 550. 
87 The Judge referred to similar cases as follows: Richards v Golden Fleece Petroleum Pty Ltd, (1983) 
49 ALR 337; and J & M O’Brien Enterprises Pty Ltd v Shell Co of Australia, (1982) 45 ALR 81. 
88 See The Petroleum Retail Marketing Franchise Act 1980; supra note 82.  
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containing provisions by virtue of which a corporation (the franchisor) grants to another 
party to the agreement (the franchisee) the right to occupy or use premises in connection with 
the retail sale of motor fuel by that person at those premises, (b) “an agreement under which 
a franchisor is entitled or required to supply motor fuel to a franchisee for retail sale by that 
person at particular premises or under which a franchisee agrees to acquire motor fuel from 
a franchisor for retail sale by the franchisee at particular premises”.89 The court reasoned 
that the Reseller Contract between Mobil and Mr Brindle fell within this definition. 
 
Moreover, the court also took into consideration the true spirit of the Act. The main 
policy behind the legislation was to give greater security of tenure to franchisees than 
they would have under their contractual arrangements with the oil majors without the 
Act. This underlying policy was referred to by Fox, J in Chronopoulos v Caltex Oil 
(Australia) Pty Ltd;90 Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, in 
Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v Best;91 Toohey, J in Richards v Golden Fleece 
Petroleum Pty Ltd
92 and by Fox, J in J & M O’ Brien Enterprises Pty td v Shell Co of 
                                                 
89 See Section 3 of the Franchise Act. 
90 See Chronopoulos v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd, (1982) 45 ALR 481 at 484. Fox, J emphasizes 
that, “the principal purposes of the Franchise Act are to give security of tenure to retail operators of 
service stations, and a protection against price discrimination by corporations supplying motor fuel to 
them”. 
91 See Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v Best, (1990) 97 ALR 217 at 224. “The statutory purpose of 
giving greater security to franchisees marketing motor fuel by retail would be frustrated and the scheme 
of regulation would be undone if the Act were to be read as permitting a provision such as cl 17.4 to be 
included in a franchise agreement. In the case of a statute, the object of which is to protect the interests 
of a class of persons who are at a disadvantage in negotiating a contract on fair terms with a class of 
corporations having superior bargaining power, the courts must reject an interpretation which would 
allow the statutory purpose to be circumvented. This is particularly so when the attempted 
circumvention takes the form of the adoption of a provision in the contract which would enable the 
party possessing superior bargaining power, by its unilateral action, to alter the parties’ rights and 
obligations under the contract in such a way as to deprive the contract of the statutory protection.”  
92 See Richards v Golden Fleece Petroleum Pty Ltd, (1983) 49 ALR 337 at 347-348. “The legislation 
seeks to put franchisees in the position of independent operators, protecting them against termination of 
their agreements and giving them rights of renewal of those agreements. Franchisors and franchisees do 
not stand in the relationship of master and servant, principle and agent, or in any fiduciary capacity that 
imposes rights and obligations apart from those which the parties have contracted, controlled as they 
are by the legislation”. 
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Australia (1983).93 Section 10 of the Act dealt specifically with the supply of motor 
fuel. The franchisor was under obligation, pursuant to this Act, to supply fuel to the 
franchisees during the term of their agreement in reasonable quantity as may be 
required at the premises. However, special provisions were made in the Act for cases 
where supply was not possible due to shortages of supplies, industrial dispute, or 
other circumstances beyond the franchisor’s control, i.e. s10 (4) (b).94  
 
Under the circumstances, the critical issue that arose under s17 (1) (c) was whether 
the court was satisfied that the non-renewal of the agreements was ‘just and 
equitable’.95 Section 17 (12) entitles the court to order a re-determination of the 
provisions of the agreement to be renewed, if it was not satisfied that the non-renewal 
of the agreements was ‘just and equitable’. The court ruled that in this case the 
decision by Mobil not to renew the agreement was not ‘just and equitable’. 
 
In the case between Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Brian Brindle, Mobil appealed the 
decision of the court forcing the corporation to renew the agreement with Mr 
Brindle.96 However, the appeal court upheld the decision of the Federal Court on the 
basis that the Franchise Act was meant to “give greater security of tenure to retail 
                                                 
93 See J & M O’ Brien Enterprises Pty Ltd v Shell Co of Australia, (1982) 45 ALR 81 at 82. “The broad 
intention of the principal provisions of the Act is to give greater security of tenure to companies and 
individuals marketing motor fuels by retail.” Those provisions are the duration of agreements (Section 
13), their renewal and termination (Sections 16 & 17), and the assignment of rights and interests 
(Section 11). These provisions were cemented by Section 7 (1) of the Act, which stipulates that “a 
provision in any agreement is void to the extent that it purports to exclude, limit or modify, or is 
otherwise inconsistent with, the operation of a provision of this Act or any right or remedy based on or 
arising out of a provision of this Act”. 
94 In such circumstances, the franchisor is bound to use its best judgement and discretion – “to supply 
motor fuels to its franchisees in such manner as is fair and equitable as between each of its franchisees 
and as between its franchisees and any other persons to whom it supplies motor fuels, having regard to 
the respective needs of its franchisees, of those other persons and of the public”, i.e. s10 (5). 
95 See Section 17 of the Franchise Act. Available online at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/prmfa1980359/s17.html, last visited on 20 July 2009. 
96 See Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Brian Brindle, (1985) 62 ALR 89. 
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operators of service stations and protect them from price discrimination from 
suppliers”.97 Secondly, the power of the court in determining the amount payable by 
the franchisee under an agreement to be renewed is not restricted only to the payment 
of rentals. Section 17 (12) of the Act provides that the court may determine “any other 
provisions of the agreement as to be renewed”. This provision includes price 
discrimination (s20), and entitlements by the court to determine a term relevant to the 
price of motor fuel within such an agreement. 
 
4.5.7.2 RICHARDS V GOLDEN FLEECE PETROLEUM PTY LTD 
This case relates to termination of agreement on the basis of an allegation of ‘wilful 
adulteration’ of products supplied to a franchisee. The applicants (Mr and Mrs 
Richards) secured a lease from the respondents (Golden Fleece) of a fuel station in 
Dianella. The lease and a reseller supply agreements were for a term of three years.98 
Golden Fleece claimed that the Richards obtained fuel from another supplier, stored 
the ‘foreign’ product into storage facilities provided by Golden Fleece which already 
contained the company’s products, and then proceeded to sell the mixture of the fuel 
from both sources. Golden Fleece accused the Richards of ‘wilful’ adulteration of 
motor fuel supplied to them under the franchise agreement. Secondly, Golden Fleece 
contended that the Richards wilfully ‘passed off’ the fuel from another supplier as 
fuel supplied to them by Golden Fleece, and that this action was carried out without 
their consent. 
 
                                                 
97 See the judgement of the appeal court judges (Fox, Pincus, and Burchett JJ), at 90. Also see BP 
Australia Ltd v Trade Practices Commission, (1986) 66 ALR 148. Section 20 of the Franchise Act 
permits a franchisor to engage in price discrimination in order to meet or match a price or benefit 
offered by a competitor. 
98 See Richards v Golden Fleece Petroleum Pty Ltd, (1983) 49 ALR 337. 
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Each of these allegations (if proved beyond reasonable doubt), is a valid ground for 
termination of a franchise agreement under s 16 (2) of the Franchise Act.99 Similarly, 
each allegation constituted a breach of the lease and reseller supply agreement, albeit 
the relevant covenants were not in identical terms to the Act. The Richards denied the 
allegations and insisted that they did not breach the provisions of s16 (2). They relied 
upon s16 (6) whereby “in any proceedings under s16 (4), the court shall not declare a 
notice to have been terminated, or to terminate a franchise agreement unless – (a) a 
ground specified in the notice is established by the franchisor to the satisfaction of the 
court; and (b) the court is satisfied that the termination of the agreement and any 
related agreement or agreements is just and equitable, having regard to all the 
circumstances”. 
 
However, following an order for the recovery of specific documents from the 
Richards, Mr Richard deposed that they had ordered fuel from North Suburban on 
three occasions, identified as 03 August, 21 October 1982 and 04 February 1983. A 
representative of North Suburban who was subpoenaed by the respondent to provide 
evidence, however, revealed that the Richards had ordered and received fuel on seven 
occasions. The Richards acknowledged ordering and receiving fuel on the extra days 
when faced with this revelation, but denied having placed order for fuels on 02 March 
1983 as alleged by the respondents. A representative of North Suburban produced 
evidence from his records that on 28 Feb 1983, they received an order from the 
applicants for super petrol. However, the representative of North Suburban could not 
show evidence regarding who placed the order or how it was placed. The suspicion 
was that it could have been done by telephone. Moreover, no employee under the 
                                                 
99 See Section 16 of the Franchise Act. Available online at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/prmfa1980359/s16.html, last visited on 20 July 2009. 
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Richards had the authority to order fuel. Nevertheless, the court was not satisfied with 
Mr Richards’ account of his activities on 02 March 1983. If the onus lay on the 
Richards to prove that they did not place the order, the court could have inferred that 
they may have failed to discharge that onus. However, in this case the onus lay on 
Golden Fleece to prove that the Richards placed the order. 
 
The notices of termination for the lease and reseller supply contract were not based on 
the fact of delivery, but on allegations of adulteration and ‘wilful passing off’. The 
respondents failed to establish a proof that the applicants ordered the fuel or that fuel 
was delivered with their consent, or that the applicants wilfully adulterated fuel 
supplied to them by the respondents on the basis of paragraph (e) of s16 (2). But the 
failure of the respondents to prove these did not dispose of the ground for termination 
based upon paragraph (f) of s16 (2). 
 
Section 16 (2) (e), stipulated that a franchisor can terminate a franchise agreement 
with a franchisee if “the franchisee misrepresents the octane rating of, or wilfully 
adulterates, motor fuel supplied to him under the franchise agreement”. S16 (2) (f), 
stated that a franchise agreement could be terminated by a franchisor if “without the 
consent of the franchisor, the franchisee wilfully passes off motor fuel supplied to him 
by a person other than the franchisor or a related corporation as being motor fuel 
supplied to him by the franchisor or a related corporation”. 
 
As far as s16 (2) (f) is concerned, the real issue facing the court was to determine 
whether the Richards ‘wilfully’ passed off the fuel supplied by North Suburban, on 
the morning of 02 March 1983, as fuel supplied by Golden Fleece. In the 
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circumstances of this case, it was clear that the Richards knew about the fuel delivery 
to their petrol station on 02 March and that the fuel was not supplied by Golden 
Fleece. But, the fact that they went ahead to sell the fuel under the logo of Golden 
Fleece would mean that they intentionally, deliberately, and with full knowledge of 
what they were doing, ‘passed off’ Shell’s petrol as that of Golden Fleece. Therefore, 
the court was satisfied that the applicants’ conduct fell within paragraph (f) of s16 (2), 
and that the notices given on this basis were proper. 
 
However, the applicant invoked s16 (4), which stated that, “where a franchisor serves 
notice on the franchisee under sub-section (3) terminating the agreement, the 
franchisee may apply to a court for an order declaring the notice to have had, or to 
have, no effect”. Section 16 (4) had implications for s16 (6). S16 (6) operated as a 
positive prohibition against the court declaring a notice to have terminated, or to 
terminate, a franchise agreement unless the court was satisfied that there was a 
reasonable ground for the notice of termination and that the termination was “just and 
equitable”,100 having considered all the circumstances and effect on the franchisees. 
 
In making a decision, the judge had to consider two matters that were relevant to what 
could be regarded as “just” and “equitable” in the context of the Franchise Act. 
Firstly, the legislation was meant to put the franchisees in the position of independent 
operators by protecting them against undue termination of their agreements with 
franchisors and providing them with rights of renewal of those agreements. On the 
basis of the legislation, the relationship between the franchisors and the franchisees 
was not a master and servant, or principle and agent type that imposes rights and 
                                                 
100 See Richards v Golden Fleece Petroleum Pty Ltd, (1983) 49 ALR 337 at 346. Toohey, J contended 
that, “it is apparent that Section 16 of the Franchise Act is designed to protect a franchisee against 
termination of the franchise agreement”. 
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obligations, apart from those which the parties have contracted themselves.101 Those 
rights and obligations that were mutually contracted must also be in line with the 
Franchise Act, and controlled by it.102 Secondly, the only loss that Golden Fleece had 
suffered in this event was the loss of potential revenue that would have accrued to it 
had they (and not North Suburban) supplied the fuel. Thirdly, there was no evidence 
that consumers had suffered any detriment as a result of the applicant’s conduct, albeit 
some consumers had been misled. Fourthly, the foremost consideration of the judge in 
terms of what was ‘just and equitable’ was the implications of the termination of the 
contracts for the applicants. The termination would mean that they would lose the 
entire benefit of the business they built up. Moreover, the Richards secured loans in 
order to purchase plant and equipment by mortgaging their own house. If they no 
longer operated the fuel station, it was unlikely that they would be able to meet those 
obligations. 
 
The judge considered that Golden Fleece failed to satisfy him that the termination of 
the contracts would be ‘just and equitable’. He held that the consequences of the 
termination on the applicants would be too grave as to outweigh all other 
considerations, and was satisfied that the termination would not be ‘just and 
equitable’. Therefore, he declared the notices of 15 March 1983 given by Golden to 
the Richards to have had no effect. However, the judge ruled that the Richards should 
repay to Golden Fleece the costs of the application and cross-claim because Mr 
                                                 
101 See id., 348. 
102 See id., 349. Toohey maintained that Section 16 should not be construed in such a manner as to 
restrict its remedial operation or purpose. In this case, Toohey states, that, ……I agree with counsel for 
the respondent that s16 of the Commonwealth Act deals with the termination of a franchise agreement 
so exhaustively as to leave no room for the operation of s81 of the Property Law Act” The latter is an 
Act of the State of Western Australia which imposes a pre-condition to be satisfied before forfeiture or 
re-entry under a lease. In order words, Toohey’s interpretation of s16 and Fox’s interpretation of s7 (1) 
would mean that a contracting out of the franchise Act was disallowed. 
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Richards’ conduct of 02 March 1983, coupled with previous deliveries from North 
Suburban without the consent of Golden Fleece meant that the Richards brought upon 
themselves the giving of the notices and should bear the costs of the court hearing. 
 
4.5.7.3 CHRONOPOULOS V CALTEX OIL 
This case deals with the right of a franchisor to increase rental charges unilaterally 
and the application of the Franchise Act retrospectively. Caltex Oil (the respondent) 
leased out a fuel station to the McDonalds on 2 May 1980 for a three year term. The 
fuel station was registered under the Real Property Act 1900 (New South Wales), at a 
time when the Franchise Act 1980 was not in existence. 
 
The lease included a lease agreement and a reseller supply contract. Clause 10 of the 
reseller supply contract stipulated that, “the buyer shall not assign this agreement or 
any of its rights or obligations hereunder or attempt or purport so to do without the 
prior written consent of Caltex”.103 However, on 17 November 1980, the McDonalds 
(proprietors of Chronopoulos) sent a letter to Caltex notifying them of plans to re-
assign its interest in the fuel station.104  Caltex replied on 28 November 1980, and in 
the letter gave conditions under which Chronopoulos should proceed with the 
reassignment plans.105 The implication of section (c) in Caltex letter is that this clause 
would negate the use of lube bays for minor service work being currently permitted 
under the existing fuel station permit. Having met these conditions, on 28 December 
                                                 
103 See Chronopoulos v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd, (1982) 45 ALR 481 at 484. 
104 See id., at 484. The letter reads as follows: “I have been offered $35,000 plus (1) take over all stock, 
plant and equipment; and (2) take over leases on cash register and water pressure machine, to assign 
my lease to Messrs George & Danny Chronopoulos. Your approval is requested as soon as possible”. 
105 See id., at 484. Caltex letter reads as follows: (a) not to match the offer made by Messrs 
Chronopoulos, (b) to process the request from the McDonalds on the condition that Chronopoulos 
fulfils Caltex requirements on their financial capacity to operate the service station, (c) to request the 
McDonalds to inform Chronopoulos of Caltex plans to convert the service station into a convenience 
(‘C’) store”. ‘C’ means convenience store. 
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Caltex reassigned the Deed of Lease it had with the McDonalds to Chronopoulous. 
On 02 September 1981, Caltex informed the applicants (Chronopoulous) by “notice of 
rent review”,106 that they are required to pay rental for the premises in the sum of 
$21,999 per annum from 01 October 1981, as different from the previous rental of 
$13, 428 as contained in Clause 1 of the original agreement.  
 
The original lease to the McDonalds was entered into before the Franchise Act 1980 
came into force on 19 September. Section 6 (2), and s6 (6) of the Act regulated the 
extent to which the Act could be applied retrospectively.107 The claim for increased 
rent gave rise to this case, and the court had to determine the validity or otherwise of 
an increase in rent by Caltex. Clause 1 of the lease agreement conferred on the lessor 
(Caltex) the discretion to raise or lower the rent. The lessee (Chronopoulous) argued 
that part of clause 1 under which the discretion to alter rent was given was void in 
common law, or alternatively is an ineffective part of the covenant. The judge 
                                                 
106 See id., 483-484. Clause 1 of the lease agreement also contains the provision for rent review, as 
follows: The Lessee shall pay to the Lessor rental of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred & Twenty-Eight 
Dollars ($13,428.00) per annum payable by equal monthly instalments in advance on the first day of 
each month during the term, the first such payment (or, the apportioned part thereof) to be made on the 
First Day of May 1980 PROVIDED HOWEVER that the Lessor shall have the right to review upon or after 
each anniversary of the commencement date the amount of the annual rental payable hereunder and 
shall be entitled to increase or decrease the annual rental to such amount as the Lessor shall, in its 
discretion, think fit and, subject to the following further proviso, commencing on the first day of the 
month after notification of the new rental is served on the Lessee, the Lessee shall pay to the Lessor, by 
equal monthly instalments thereof as aforesaid, the annual rental notified by the Lessor which shall be 
the rental reserved hereunder until further reviewed as provided in this clause PROVIDED THAT such 
notification shall be served on the Lessee at least twenty-one (21) days prior to the said first day of the 
month on which the new rental commences and the Lessee shall have the right to give to the Lessor at 
any time, prior to such commencement three (3) months’ written notice of termination of this Lease 
and in the event of the Lessee giving such notice to the Lessor, the rental payable by the Lessee 
hereunder until the termination of this Lease at the expiration of the said three (3) months’ notice shall 
be the rental payable immediately prior to the review.  
107See Section 6 of the Franchise Act. Available online at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/prmfa1980359/s6.html, last visited on 20 July 2009 
Section 6 (2) states that, “subject to section 1, the provisions of sections 10, 17 and 20, sub-section 22 
(1), (2) and (5), sections 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27 and, to the extent necessary for the application of those 
provisions by virtue of this sub-section, this Part, extend to a franchise agreement in effect immediately 
before the commencement of this Act”. Section 6 (6) stipulates that, “subject to sub-section (2), (3) and 
(4), this Act does not apply in relation to a franchise agreement that was entered into before the 
commencement of this Act”. 
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reasoned that the fact of discretion to alter rent does not mean that the clause is void, 
or unenforceable as argued by the lessee. 
 
The rest of the submissions relied on the application of the Franchise Act. The 
respondent submitted that only certain sections of the Act were applicable (i.e. section 
6 (6)), because the lease agreement was entered into before the commencement of the 
Act. Conversely, the applicants relied on the general policy of the Act, which is based 
on securing tenure for the franchisees. Thus, they argued that a situation where the 
lessor is allowed to raise the rent as it wished, thereby leaving the lessees only the 
option to terminate the lease by giving three months notice is not consistent with the 
policy guiding the Franchise Act. However, the judge reasoned that the Act provided 
for termination of agreements in certain situations s16 (2) (a-k),108 and therefore 
security of tenure was not absolute. Rather, the crux of the matter in relation to the 
policy of the Act was to determine whether the Act was clearly opposed to rental 
increases not agreed by the lessees. However, the Act did not proscribe changes in 
rental charges as clarified in Section 7.109 Thus, the relevant part of clause 1 in the 
lease agreement did not offend against s7. 
 
The applicants also referred to s13 (8),110 which prescribes the terms of leases granted 
after the commencement of the Act, and also of renewal of leases (including those in 
effect immediately before that date). They argued that the power to increase rent can 
                                                 
108 See Section 16 of the Franchise Act. Available online at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/prmfa1980359/s16.html, last visited on 20 July 2009. 
109 See Section 7 of the Franchise Act. Available online at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/prmfa1980359/s7.html, last visited on 20 July 2009. S 7 
(1) provides that, “this Act applies, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary and, in particular, 
but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, a provision in any agreement is void to the extent 
that it purports to exclude, limit or modify, or is otherwise inconsistent with, the operation of a 
provision of this Act or any right or remedy based on or arising out of a provision of this Act”. 
110 See Section 13 (8) of the Franchise Act. Available online at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/prmfa1980359/s13.html, last visited on 20 July 2009. 
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be used, indirectly, to force lessees out of business. However, the court held that this 
case is based on the right and power of a franchisor to review rental charges 
unilaterally. 
 
Section 17 does not have a direct bearing on the case, as it deals with lengthening of 
the tenure of franchisee, by requiring renewal, unless a notice of non-renewal is given 
by the franchisor and grounds are stated in line with those set out in s16. However, 
when and if the question of renewal did come about, the court (if appealed to) might 
exercise the power to review the rental situation in accordance with s17 (1) (6) and 
s17 (12).111 However, the judge dismissed the application based on the entitlement to 
periodic review of rental charges conferred on the franchisor by the Franchise Act. 
 
4.5.7.4 ANJAC PTY LTD V CALTEX OIL  
This case relates to the conditions under which a refusal to renew franchise 
agreements were acceptable under the Franchise Act.112 The respondent and 
franchisor (Caltex Oil) gave notice of termination of a franchise agreement it made 
with the applicant and franchisee (Anjac Ltd), pursuant to Section 17 of the Franchise 
Act. The applicant contested the validity of the notice on the ground that Caltex did 
not provide details of its basis for refusal to renew the agreement. 
 
The applicant and the respondent entered into a deed of lease and a supply agreement 
for petroleum products on 10 September 1982. The terms of the contract were to 
expire on 31 July 1985 (i.e. duration of three years). However, s17 (5) of the Act 
stipulated that Caltex was not entitled to refuse or fail to renew the franchise 
                                                 
111 See Section 17 of the Franchise Act. Available online at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/prmfa1980359/s17.html, last visited on 20 July 2009. 
112 See Anjac Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd, (1985) 69 ALR 733. 
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agreement, unless it had served Anjac Ltd a notice in writing of its decision to refuse 
to renew the agreement, and that the basis for non-renewal complied with the 
requirements of s17 (5).  
 
The bases for non-renewal or refusal to renew a franchise agreement are specified in 
s17 (1) of the Act.113 However, s17 (2) (a) and (b) stated the conditions under which a 
franchisor was entitled to sell its interest in the marketing premises other than to the 
franchisee. Section 17 (2) (a) stipulated that one of those conditions was that, “before 
entering into the agreement, the franchisor has offered the interest for sale to the 
franchisee on terms that were no less favourable to the franchisee than the terms of 
the agreement with that person”. The core message of this sub-section is that the 
franchisee should be given the first option to buy, if the franchisor chooses to sell its 
interest in the marketing premises. In this case, Caltex stated that its grounds for 
refusal to renew the franchise agreement were based on s17 (1) (c) (i). Subsequently, 
Caltex instructed its agents (L J Hooker Ltd) to sell the premises either to Indopal Pty 
Ltd for $1.4 million or if this failed to carry out a public auction of the premises. 
 
The crux of the case was for the court to determine whether Caltex’s notice of 31 May 
1985 adhered with the terms of s17 (5). However, the meaning of s17 (5) was likely to 
vary from case to case depending on the grounds of s17 (1) that the notice relied on. 
In the notice served on Anjac, the ground for Caltex’s decision was identifiable and 
related to s17 (1) (c) (i). The point of argument in relation to the notice was that 
                                                 
113 See Section 17 of the Act. One of such grounds is contained in s17 (1) (c) (ii) as follows: “a 
franchisor shall not fail or refuse to renew the franchise agreement except on one or more of the 
following grounds:…..- “the franchisor has, in good faith and in the normal course of business entered 
into an agreement, or negotiations for an agreement, (other than an agreement containing a provision 
having the effect of prohibiting the use of the marketing premises for the retail sale of motor fuel) to 
sell its interest in the marketing premises to a person other than an associate of the franchisor”. 
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Caltex did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that the proposal to dispose of the 
interest in the marketing premises was “in good faith and in the normal course of 
business”.  
 
In court, Caltex lawyers tried to demonstrate that Caltex was acting in good faith and 
in the normal course of business by showing that the returns from the sale of 
petroleum products were uneconomic and that the land value had become so high that 
it was more profitable for Caltex to dispose of the fuel station. Unfortunately, these 
reasons were not stated in the notice given to Anjac Ltd under s17 (5) in the form that 
would satisfy the requirements of that provision.  
 
Another reason why Caltex lost the case related to the explicit documentation of the 
full particulars of the proposal to dispose of the premises. Caltex stated in the notice 
that the agreement for sale of the premises would be in the standard form of the 
contract for sale, but the terms of the “standard contract for sale”114 were not fully 
disclosed in the notice as well as the summary of the effect of the contract. The 
exclusion of the full particulars of the contract for sale had meant that Caltex was not 
sufficiently compliant with s17 (5). The judge concluded that in terms of s17 (7) (a) 
he was not satisfied that Caltex had served Anjac a notice in accordance with s17 
(5).115 Consequently, Caltex was ordered to renew the franchise agreement and to pay 
the applicants costs for the legal action. 
 
 
 
                                                 
114 See Anjac Ltd v Caltex Oil, (1985) 69 ALR 733 at 735. 
115 The trial judge referred to the judgement made by McGregor in the case of  Serhan v Ampol 
Petroleum Ltd, (1985) 58 ALR 347 at 360. 
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4.5.8 Summary of Current Legal Principles Based on Court  
         Interpretations of the Franchise Act in Australia 
The special nature of solo agreements based on the restraints they impose on the 
franchisees necessitated the enactment of the Franchise Act in the first place. There 
are legal principles that emerge from the court treatment of cases relating to 
franchising arrangements in the fuel retail sector in Australia. Firstly, s16 (2) (a-k) of 
the Franchise Act prescribed the grounds under which a franchise agreement may be 
terminated by a franchisor. These grounds imply that security of tenure is not 
absolute. Section 17 (1) also specified the bases for non-renewal of a franchise 
agreement.  
 
However, the judgement of the cases of Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Brian Brindle, 
Richards v Golden Fleece Petroleum Pty Ltd, and Anjac Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil 
Australia reveals that the courts held the statutory purpose of the Franchise Act as 
sacred. This purpose was to confer security of tenure to franchisees and to protect 
them against price discrimination from their franchisors. Thus, the statute recognised 
the imbalance in bargaining power between the franchisors and the franchisees. 
Therefore, most cases brought to the court under the Franchise Act that dealt with 
termination or non-renewal of agreements was judged on the basis of this true spirit of 
the Franchise Act. The grounds on which the franchise agreements were terminated 
were made to pass the ‘just and equitable test’, which included a consideration of all 
the circumstances and the effect of the termination or non-renewal on the franchisees. 
This test is not fundamentally different from the ‘test of reasonableness’ which solus 
agreements must pass through, in the case of licence agreements in the UK. 
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Secondly, the case of Chronopoulos v Caltex Oil Australia shows that the franchisor 
is entitled to periodic adjustment in rental charges to their franchisees as warranted by 
commercial conditions. This is consistent with the provisions of s7 of the Franchise 
Act. However, s17 (1) (6) and (12) empowered the court (if appealed to) to review the 
rental situation if the increase in rental charges appeared to be unreasonable. This 
legal principle also emerged from the case of Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Addison and 
Others, in the UK. 
 
4.5.9 Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Franchise Act 
Based on the cases detailed so far, it is clear that the judges adhered to the purpose 
and true spirit of the Franchise Act, which was to ensure greater security of tenure for 
the franchisees by regulating the duration, renewal and termination of such 
agreements and assignment of rights and interests under these agreements. To a large 
extent, the Act was also meant to protect the franchisees from price discrimination 
from their suppliers. 
 
The major oil suppliers felt disadvantaged by the operations of the Franchise Act and 
court rulings based on the provisions of the Act. Consequently, they devised means of 
circumventing what they regard as an unnecessary intervention by the government in 
the fuel retail market. This was achieved by exploiting the loopholes in the Franchise 
Act such as, (a) lack of a specific section dealing with whether franchising 
arrangements should be based on a single- site or multi-site model. (b) The Franchise 
Act did not limit the oil majors’ ability to increase the number of commission agent 
sites. (c) The Act did not forbid the oil majors from becoming shareholders with their 
distributors. (d) The Act entitled them to make reasonable adjustments in rents, leases 
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and marketing fees as the market situation demanded. This entitlement to adjustments 
could be open to abuses as some of the oil majors probably used this opportunity to 
indirectly set retail margins for the franchisees or ‘clawback’ any margin benefit when 
fuel prices increase.  
 
As a result, there was a marked shift in the nature of the franchising arrangements. 
Initially, franchise arrangements were negotiated with an individual retailer on a 
single site basis, but during the 1990s the oil majors started to negotiate franchise 
agreements covering a number of sites (multi-site franchises) ranging from five to 
over 30 sites.116 According to Shell (which had 14 multiple franchise systems 
operating in Australia), the eventual number of multiple site systems would depend on 
market conditions and site availability. Shell’s sites participating in these systems 
were drawn from its primary network of 630 sites and the firm expected to have over 
300 sites operating within this format by the end of 1996.117 Mobil’s intention was not 
to use multi-site franchise systems to the extent that Shell had. BP in consultation 
with its dealers launched initially a trial small- scale, multi-site franchise operations in 
1994 which it expanded afterwards. Conversely, Ampol /Caltex were precluded from 
multi-site franchising because of the ‘undertakings’118 they signed with the 
government during the merger process. 
 
The adoption of multi-franchising systems has caused serious concerns amongst 
existing franchisees as they see it as a ploy by the oil majors to extend their control 
over margins and threaten their existence. It could be argued that the capital 
requirements needed to enter into such agreements were much higher than for a single 
                                                 
116 See ACCC Report on Petroleum Products Declaration; supra note 14, at 37. 
117 See id., 38. 
118 For more details on the Undertakings, see id., 26-27. 
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site franchise thereby raising the barriers to entry and making transfer from one 
supplier to another unlikely for most small- scale operators unless capital assistance is 
available from the franchisor. Owing to the fact that participants in the multi –site 
franchise arrangements were chosen on the basis of application, unsuccessful 
applicants claimed that the system undermined their long- term viability. Although 
price effects were not been observed from the presence of multi-site franchises, most 
franchisees feared that this arrangement may in the future enhance the oil majors’ 
total control over retail prices and allow more location-specific retail price 
discounting, particularly targeting independent operators.119 Based on the foregoing, 
one might argue that the objectives of the Franchise Act were circumvented by the 
major oil suppliers over a period of time by reclaiming their control over the fuel 
retail trade through means that could not reasonably be covered by the Act. 
 
However, the ACCC acknowledged that such arrangements represented a means for 
reducing costs by spreading overheads. The Commission contended that any firm 
risking its capital had a legitimate right to determine how and with whom it wished to 
share the risks and therefore could judge the relative merits of franchise applications. 
It also noted that franchise agreements may not be renewed in some cases and that a 
franchisee exiting in such a declining market (and with its supplier as its only likely 
buyer) would likely have little bargaining power. While acknowledging the 
inevitability of structural adjustments and novel approaches (e.g. multi-franchising) 
that tend to minimise costs within the fuel retail sector, the ACCC was not in favour 
                                                 
119 See id., 39. 
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of regulatory rigidities that discouraged the oil majors from making necessary new 
investments in the sector.120  
 
The evidence regarding the effectiveness of the Act pointed to the speedy pace of 
rationalisation121 and the attendant high rate of exit of franchisees usually before the 
completion of the guaranteed nine-year term. Such franchisees were paid off for the 
remainder of the term and most of the franchisees raised issues regarding the 
adequacy of this payment.122  Moreover, the inherent tendency of the industry to seek 
increased efficiency through improvements in economies of scale and scope has often 
hampered the viability of franchisees that are unable to restructure or improve their 
sites. Conversely, it might be argued that given the frequent innovations that occur in 
the industry, a shorter tenure could have increased the associated risks for franchisees 
and perhaps reduced whatever pay-off they received from their franchisors. 
 
Some franchisees pointed to unexpected variability in fuel pricing; and rents on site 
and capital equipment as factors that have reduced margins below expected levels.123 
The rents and marketing fees charged by the franchisors often included a risk 
premium based on the added value derived by the franchisees from the greater 
security of tenure. The reason is that the Franchise Act increases the franchisor’s cost 
since a longer tenure for the franchisees increased their investment risk.124 Regarding 
the issue of variable rents, it could be argued  that rents should reflect the opportunity 
                                                 
120 See id., 39. 
121 See id., 16. There were about 20,000 fuel retail sites in Australia in 1970. Subsequent rationalisation 
has reduced the number of retail sites to 9,000 as at 1995. The ACCC has projected that this number is 
likely to reduce to around 5,000 – 6,000 by 2010. 
122 See id., 40. 
123 See id., 40. 
124 See IC Report on Petroleum Products; supra note 15, at 162. 
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cost of a site, but in the fuel retail business the conversion of sites to other uses could 
be quite costly thereby reducing its value for alternative uses.  
 
The IC pointed out that the Franchise Act had undermined economic efficiency and 
the pace of restructuring in the fuel retail sector, by allowing some unviable sites to 
remain in business longer than necessary. The Commission posited that a more 
flexible term (between 3-5 years) which was normal in other industries could have 
facilitated efficient industry restructuring.125 The IC also noted that although both the 
Trade Practices Act (TPA) and the Franchise Act prohibited price discrimination, but 
they differ in interpretation. Price discrimination is a breach of the TPA if only it 
leads to a substantial lessening of competition. However, based on the Franchise Act a 
franchisor was not allowed to charge different prices to their franchisees regardless of 
whether it had significant effect on competition or not.126 It could be argued that price 
discrimination in this strict sense may be unfair to a fuel wholesaler considering the 
peculiarities of the trade. The exclusivity of the franchise supply arrangements and 
differentials in buying power creates an opportunity for a franchisor to charge 
different prices to different franchisees.  
 
The Hilmer report indicated the benefits of generic legislation as opposed to the costs 
of industry-specific legislation such as the Franchise Act. The report argued that 
industry-specific regulatory efforts tend to result in a unique business environment 
that could be protected from full competitive forces to the detriment of consumers and 
the general public. Consequently, the report argued in favour of national policies that 
progressed reforms on a broader front and that led to the reduction in the costs of 
                                                 
125 See IC Report (1994); supra note 15, at 162-163. 
126 See id., 164. 
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developing and implementing a number of industry-specific regulatory 
arrangements.127  
 
4.5.10 Emergence of the Oilcode and the Repeal of the Sites &  
         Franchise Acts 
The Australian Government’s review of the industry in 1994, 1996, and 2001 revealed 
that the cost structures were changing and that the Sites and Franchise Acts were no 
longer working as designed, and decided to repeal the 1980 Acts and replacing them 
with a mandatory Oilcode128, under s. 51AD of the Trade Practices Act 1974.129 
However, the Franchise Act was hailed as a reasonable piece of legislation and the 
government also decided that a modified form of the Act will constitute the 
foundation of the Oilcode. The government thought that the Sites and Franchise Acts 
had not halted the rationalisation of fuel sites from 1980 to 2006. It became clear that 
the structure of the downstream petroleum market had changed so much that 
discriminatory legislation like the Franchise Act should undergo reforms.130 The 
Oilcode is intended to revise tenure provisions and applies to a range of agreements, 
including commission agencies which were not covered by the Franchise Act.131  
 
                                                 
127 Hilmer, F. G., National Competition Policy (Report by the Independent Committee of Inquiry into 
National Competition Policy) 13-14, (1993). 
128 See the Trade Practices (Industry Codes – Oilcode) Regulations 2006. Available online at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/LegislativeInstrument1.nsf/0/8A20D590A169F3C2C
A2572290015FA28/$file/9844778A061011EV.pdf, last visited on 29 September 2009. 
129 See 51 AD of the Trade Practices Act 1974. Available online at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/tpa1974149/s51ad.html, last visited on 22 July 2009. 
130 Australian Senate, Economics Legislation Committee: Provision of the Petroleum Retail Legislation 
Repeal Bill 2006. Available online at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/Committee/economics_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-
07/petroleum/report/report.pdf, last visited on 25 September 2009. 
131 The prescribed mandatory industry code of conduct (the Oilcode) came into effect on 1 March 2007. 
Available online at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/783104, last visited on 29 
September 2009. 
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The Oilcode utilizes the provisions taken from the Franchise Act as its building 
blocks and aims to provide a fair and reasonable conduct between oil majors, 
distributors and retailers; a national approach to terminal gate pricing; and the 
resolution of disputes between the parties.132  
 
The objectives of the Oilcode are threefold: to assist industry participants to make 
informed decisions when entering, renewing or transferring a fuel reselling agreement 
through the disclosure of specific information; to improve transparency in wholesale 
fuel pricing and provide better access to declared petroleum products at a terminal 
gate price (TGP); and to improve the operating environment for all industry 
participants by providing access to a cost-effective and timely dispute resolution 
scheme as an alternative to litigation. The provisions under these objectives are 
briefly outlined below. 
 
Under the Oilcode, a fuel reselling agreement between suppliers and retailers contains 
the following provisions: (a) the supplier grants the retailer the right to conduct a fuel 
reselling business and is able to exert substantial control over the business.  
(b) The retailer is required to pay, or agree to pay, a fee before commencing business. 
(c) The reselling business will be associated with a trademark, commercial symbol or 
advertising that is owned, used, licensed or specified by the supplier.  
(d) The amount of fuel that will be sold under the agreement is expected to be at least 
30,000 litres per month.  
                                                 
132 ACCC Report (2006), Submission to the Senate Economics Legislative Inquiry into the Price of 
Petrol in Australia. Available online at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/764980/fromItemId/653960, last visited on 25 
September 2009. 
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(e) The agreement will have a minimum duration of five years except in certain cases, 
for example where the upfront initial investment is less than $20,000.  
(f) The supplier will provide a disclosure document to a prospective retailer at least 14 
days before the agreement is entered into. This will include the provision of leasing 
documentation to the retailer, and the disclosure of materially relevant facts such as 
the finalisation of certain court proceedings and bankruptcy matters as the supplier 
becomes aware of them.  
(g) A supplier will not prevent a retailer from associating with other retailers for 
lawful purposes.  
(h) The supplier will make allowances for a cooling-off period of at least seven days 
after entering into the agreement before the retailers could pay any money under the 
agreement.  
(i) The supplier will follow certain procedures before the expiry of the agreement or if 
the parties agree to terminate the agreement early; or where a variation, renegotiation 
or transfer of the fuel reselling agreement is sought; or in situations where it becomes 
necessary to terminate the agreement because of a breach by the retailer. 
 
The Oilcode also provides for a nationally consistent approach to terminal gate 
pricing arrangements between wholesale fuel suppliers and their retailers.133 The 
definition of TGP as used in both Western Australia and Victoria (where the practice 
was introduced in 2001) is a fuel price based on import parity, plus cost to terminal 
gantry, plus excise and the Goods & Services Tax (GST).134 
TGP = Import parity- based price + Cost to terminal + Excise duty + GST. 
                                                 
133 For clarification purposes, a wholesale supplier under the Oilcode is somebody who sells declared 
petroleum products such as petrol and diesel from a wholesale facility such as an oil refinery, a 
shipping facility, or a facility connected by a pipeline to a shipping facility. A customer is somebody 
engaged in the business of buying declared petroleum products from a wholesale supplier. 
134 See id., 6. GST is the equivalent of VAT in the UK. 
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Another issue addressed by the Oilcode regards a more preventive approach to dispute 
resolution. The dispute resolution scheme includes the appointment of a Dispute 
Resolution Adviser (DRA), and covers disputes arising where a wholesale supplier 
fails to supply a declared petroleum product to a customer; or disputes arising 
between parties to a fuel reselling agreement; or from any provision of the Oilcode 
regarding TGP or fuel reselling agreements. However, the Oilcode provides separate 
procedures for dealing with special cases, such as disputes arising from supply of 
products at a TGP and those connected with failure to supply. The reason is that the 
Oilcode takes into consideration the potential for commercial damage that may result 
as a consequence of failure to supply declared petroleum products. Such disputes are 
addressed directly by the DRA.The discussions on further development of the Oilcode 
is on-going and the parties have worked on the development of four new 
supplementary Codes covering prior disclosure and the expiry/voluntary surrender of 
agreements for retailers and distributors.  
 
4.6 Findings on licence/franchise regulations 
Firstly, there is a common ground in both jurisdictions that solus agreements (UK) or 
solo agreements (Australia) are classified as contracts in restraint of trade. The 
common difficulties arising from agreements between the major oil suppliers and 
their licensees or franchisees are the issues of exclusive selling and price 
discrimination. All the legal cases covered in this chapter relate to one or the other.  
 
In its simplest form, an agreement between a fuel wholesaler and a retailer cover 
issues relating to the solus tie, the term, the purchase price, payment arrangements, 
the minimum notice required to deliver products, transfer of ownership, failure to 
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supply (including force majeure), and termination. Some of the agreements provide 
for the offer of sale of the wholesaler’s lubricants, product advertisements, and the use 
of wholesaler’s brand name. The agreement may also include arrangements for some 
forms of financial support, e.g. loans granted to the dealer for site development, etc. 
In some cases, the contractual arrangements are separated into two or more: the solus 
agreement, fuel supply agreement, loan or mortgage agreement, shop agreement, etc. 
 
Considering a wide range of consumer goods, it could be said that the principle of 
setting up retail distribution outlets each dedicated wholly or mainly to selling one 
brand of a commodity is not only wasteful but operates against the public interest. 
The general expectation in a market system is that the motorist should have a wide 
range of brands and grades to choose from in any particular fuel station. However, the 
retailing of fuels presents special challenges and problems because each grade of each 
brand must be stored in a separate tank and dispensed through its own separate pump 
on a forecourt that gives access to vehicles. Therefore, it is unusual for any given fuel 
retail site to stock all brands and grades belonging to all suppliers as it would 
probably require as many as 28 pumps and tanks for adequate coverage of brands. It 
could be argued that if the oil suppliers had chosen a mixed site system as opposed to 
the exclusive system, the outlets offering a wide range of choice would be too few.135  
 
The counter-argument that flows from this is that the exclusive system could lead to 
over-proliferation of fuel retail outlets on the theoretical basis that the supplying 
companies would tend to follow one another in creating exclusive stations on specific 
roads or within small districts where demand was only sufficient for fewer outlets. 
                                                 
135 See MMC Report (1965); supra note 1 at 137. 
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However, it is unlikely that fuel suppliers would willingly create conditions whereby 
the equipment, personnel and the premises they have invested in would be under-
utilised.136 This has not been the case because of the high rate of site rationalisation in 
the two jurisdictions. 
 
Discriminatory discounts usually have the effect of excluding from the trade those 
dealers who are not in receipt of them, thereby making it impossible for the excluded 
dealers to secure products at competitive prices. Suppliers contend that excellent 
distributors or bulk buyers would likely not be able to maintain certain standards of 
service if they were not offered incentives. Thus, such distributors or buyers may be 
forced under the pressures of unrestricted competition to reduce standards of service 
and performance which would not serve the public interest.137 Where this protection 
takes the nature of an agreed discount or margin, the suppliers regard such preferential 
treatment as a just reward for the services rendered by the dealer or large volume 
buyer.138  
 
Theoretically, the most crucial requirement for effective price discrimination to occur 
is that resale between consumers would be minimal. As this is the case with retailing 
in general, price discrimination is always likely to occur. The most significant 
negative effect of price discrimination is that it may be used to stifle or even foreclose 
weaker market segments. Many independent fuel retailers complain that price 
discrimination, either in the form of preferential discounting or differential rebates put 
                                                 
136 See id., 140-141. 
137 Competition Commission (CC), Collective Discrimination: A Report on Exclusive Dealing, 
Collective Boycotts, Aggregated Rebates and other Discriminatory Trade Practices 26 (1955). 
Available online at http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1950_1959/010collective.htm, last visited on 16 August 2009. 
138 See id., 27. 
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them at a disadvantage relative to supermarkets and other larger retailers. Moreover, 
they argue that to ensure fairness, differences in prices should reflect differences in 
cost.  However, by receiving extra discounts and other benefits from its suppliers a 
large retailer could offset the resource cost of his inefficiencies and still survive the 
competition for market shares. Such large retailers may be considered to have 
extracted a hidden subsidy for his inefficient operations and depending on the size of 
this subsidy may drive away from the market more efficient operators who probably 
were not large buyers.139 However, the evidence shows that the strong competition 
between retailers ensures that the benefits of such preferential discounts (as reflected 
in lower buying prices) are being significantly passed on to the consumers. Thus, 
retail prices tend to be lower through the buying power of the large retailers and 
supermarkets than in the absence of price discrimination.140 Conversely, price 
discrimination could lead to higher total sales as a result of more customers being 
served than would be likely under uniform pricing.141 
 
However, the use of Selective Price Support (SPS) in the fuel retail trade presents 
peculiar difficulties. The varying level of wholesale price support applied by the oil 
majors to selected fuel resellers could affect the retail pricing regime. In both 
jurisdictions, the oil majors provide SPS to their licensees / franchisees to help them 
maintain their market share in response to price discounting by other retailers in 
certain localities. By providing SPS, franchisees are guaranteed a margin on fuel sold. 
However, it also enables the oil majors to exercise control over which retail sites 
                                                 
139 Competition Commission Report, Discount to Retailers 66-67 (1981). Available online at 
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1981/135discounts_retailers.htm, last 
visited on 16 August 2009. 
140 See id., 68. 
141 Office of Fair Trading (OFT), Research Paper 13: Competition in Retailing 96-99 (1997). Available 
online at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft195.pdf , last visited on 29 August 
2009. 
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would meet lower prices offered by its competitors. Other retail players 
(independents, branded or unbranded) who are not in receipt of this support or who 
obtain their supplies from non-refiner sources become exposed to extreme pressures 
at such times. It could be argued that through SPS mechanisms and the use of 
commission agents, the oil majors are able to lead price cycles which benefit the 
motorists by way of lower prices. The SPS policy could have a significant impact on 
city-country (or urban-rural) price variations. SPS has limited application in rural 
areas because of the presence of low volume sites, higher cost of supply, and lesser 
competition relative to urban locations. Wholesale price support is only considered in 
cases where the country or rural dealers are either willing or forced to lower retail 
margins. Therefore, sustained use of SPS could lead to high fuel price differentials 
between rural and urban locations. 
 
Secondly, the regulations of the licence/franchise arrangements in both jurisdictions 
(UK in 1966, and Australia in 1975) are similar on the basis of the objectives for the 
regulation. The objectives for the regulations were to redress the imbalance of power 
in contractual relationships between the franchisor (usually the oil majors) and the 
franchisees (the dealers and independent retailers); and to increase the security of 
tenure for the licensees / franchisees. The governance of the regulations in this case 
involved two levels: the markets and contracts. However, the market and contract 
levels of governance are characterised by imbalance of power and uncertainty for the 
licensees / franchisee, particularly in the fuel retail sector. Evidence from this 
investigation suggests that private, self-regulation through the workings of markets 
and contracts results in a relationship whereby there is an imbalance of power in 
favour of the licensor / franchisor and uncertainty for the licensee / franchisee. The 
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reason is that the market interaction between the licensor / franchisor and the licensee 
/ franchisee establishes these conditions, which are reinforced by the contract through 
the interaction of the standard format of the agreements (generated by the licensor / 
franchisor) and the weaker bargaining power of the licensees / franchisees. This 
situation has been responsible for the numerous litigation cases associated with the 
fuel retail trade. This condition establishes a case for legislative intervention when 
necessary. However, the Australian experience with the Franchise Act exposes the 
difficulties involved in regulating a trade where the producer of the goods is also the 
wholesaler, and participates in the retail business as well. 
 
There are differences in the regulation of agreements between the oil majors and the 
resellers in the two jurisdictions. Firstly, the UK regulatory approach tends to be more 
holistic when compared to the Australian initial approach in 1975. The UK licence 
regulation covered provisions such as the length of the term of agreements, supply of 
fuel equipment to retailers by the oil majors, restrictions in relation to the retailers’ 
sale of his premises, and the degree of control exercised by the fuel suppliers over the 
retailers non-core businesses, e.g. lubricants, tyres, batteries, etc. On the other hand, 
the Australian franchise regulation in 1975 provided for the removal of ties placed on 
dealer-owned sites for fuels, lubricants and other non-petroleum goods. It also 
contained other provisions regarding adequacy of supply of products to retailers, and 
reasonable access to fuel equipment from their suppliers. 
 
However, the major differences between the regulations in both jurisdictions relates to 
the legislative enactment of the Franchise Act by the Australian Government in 1980, 
and how that affected the treatment of related court cases. The result was that the 
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Franchise Act introduced a third level of governance, i.e. markets, contracts, and 
statute. The latter brought about rigidities both in the workings of the markets and the 
contracts. For instance, prior to the 1966 regulation of solus agreements in the UK and 
the enactment of the Franchise Act 1980 in Australia the courts relied primarily on 
general principles and doctrines of law, i.e. law of contracts, property law, etc. 
Afterwards, the courts in the UK continued to rely on these general principles of law, 
but guided by the provisions of the 1966 fuel retail regulatory framework. In the case 
of Australia, most of the trial judges maintained that the Franchise Act disallows 
attempts at contracting out of the statute. In making their decisions, the judges relied 
mainly on the true spirit and purpose of the Act, which was to protect franchisees 
from price discrimination and to provide security of tenure. Therefore, doctrines 
flowing from the law of contract and property law were not to be readily carried over 
into a consideration of the operation of the franchise statute. 
 
However, direct government intervention through the auspices of the Oilcode (which 
replaced the Franchise Act) depends primarily on self-regulatory tools, such as prior 
disclosure which tend to be ineffective in addressing the objectives of a franchise 
regulation. For instance, the use of disclosure as a regulatory tool is inadequate 
because it is self-regulatory in nature.142 The use of self-regulatory measures assumes 
that the contracting parties could willingly support each others role in the regulatory 
process. However, a franchisee is not a full participant at any stage in the governance 
of the franchise relationship and therefore not suitably equipped to perform its role in 
the regulation of the contractual relationship.  
 
                                                 
142 Spencer, E. C; Balance of Power, Certainty and Discretion in the Franchise Relationship: An 
Analysis of Contractual Terms, a Paper Presented at the 22nd Annual International Society of 
Franchising Conference (ISoF), Saint-Malo, Brittany, France, 2008. 
  
240 
Regarding the Australian fuel franchise regulations, neither self-regulatory 
mechanisms nor legislative intervention are able to achieve the stated goals of 
redressing the imbalance of power in the contractual relationship between the 
franchisor and the franchisee or reducing uncertainty in franchise relationships. This 
analysis lends credence to the argument that the fuel retail sector should be free from 
legislative intervention (i.e. deregulated), except in cases where markets are failing as 
might be expected in some rural and remote areas. In the latter case, government 
intervention could be in the form of fuel price reduction for rural motorists or cost-
cutting measures for rural fuel retailers. Alternatively, the regulation of franchise 
agreements is more likely to be effective if all contracting parties are equipped to 
fulfil their roles at all stages of the governance of the relationship. The above 
arguments probably necessitated the move by the Australian Government to repeal the 
Franchise Act and to deregulate the fuel retail sector under the guidance of the 
mandatory Oilcode. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
The investigation about how the sites and licence / franchise regulations could resolve 
the fuel pricing problems in rural / remote locations, and thus contribute to rural 
development by encouraging the growth of rural independent fuel retailers revealed 
that these regulatory support mechanisms have limited effectiveness. 
 
The ‘undertakings’ obtained from the oil majors in 1966 (and subsequent amendments 
in 1968 & 1976) reflects a genuine effort by the UK Government and regulatory 
authorities to correct some aspects of the contractual imbalances (between the oil 
suppliers and their retailers) and some aspects of the solus trading system that could 
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operate against the public interest. Although, the ‘undertakings’ were meant to 
strengthen the solus system, but the 1976 (amended) version which has remained in 
force (till date) is yet to undergo further amendments to reflect the changing fuel retail 
market structure. The sites regulation was in place for two years and encouraged new 
entrants. However, it did not stem the decline in the number of independent fuel 
retailers, but rather encouraged the expansion of supermarket fuel retail outlets. 
Supermarkets, like the oil majors thrive on economies of scale and consider most rural 
locations as uneconomic places to invest. Consequently, the expansion of 
supermarkets outlets led to lower pump prices in urban locations. Motorists in rural 
areas closest to the cities have been known to travel long distances to patronise the 
supermarket fuel outlets, with consequences for the few retail outlets in their local 
areas.  
 
The UK fuel retail licence regulations are useful in terms of ensuring a smoother fuel 
supply and distribution system, by improving the contractual relationship between the 
fuel suppliers and the retailers across the entire sector. The legal cases examined also 
reinforced the provisions of the licence regulations, by making sure that all solus 
agreements met the test of reasonableness as should be required for contracts that are 
deemed to be in restraint of trade. 
 
Conversely, the Australian Government considered the ‘undertakings’ from the oil 
majors in 1975 to be inadequate to check the industry concentration arising from 
vertical integration of the major oil companies’ operations. Consequently, the Sites & 
Franchise Acts were enacted to restrict the ability of the oil majors to own and operate 
a high number of outlets, to determine franchise terms and fuel prices unilaterally, as 
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well as facilitate the development and entrenchment of the independent fuel retail 
sector. In the short term, these Acts encouraged new entrants, particularly the 
independent retailers and supermarkets who were not affected by the Sites Act. 
However, in the long run these Acts were unable to prevent further decline of the 
smaller independent retailers who usually operate in the rural /remote locations. On 
the other hand, the supermarkets have grown their market share significantly by 
discounting fuels to promote their grocery business as is the case in the two 
jurisdictions. Therefore, the Australian experience of fuel retail site regulation 
indicates that it is ineffective in the long run to impose site restrictions on the major 
fuel suppliers. However, for specific purposes such impositions may occur for a short 
period of time. In this case, the purpose was to give independent wholesalers and 
retailers an opportunity to develop with a view to lessening the market concentration 
and reducing the market power of the oil majors.  
 
Similarly, attempts at correcting contractual imbalances through legislation are 
usually fraught with difficulties. On a positive note, some aspects of the Franchise Act 
were useful in terms of regulating the duration, assignment of rights and interests, and 
termination of solo agreements. The regulation thus ensured more efficient and 
smoother fuel supplies to both urban and rural locations. However, licence / franchise 
regulations do not directly translate to lesser fuel prices for rural areas or a reduced 
rural-urban fuel price differentials. Nevertheless, it might be argued that these pricing 
problems could be exacerbated in the absence of more economically efficient and 
smoother fuel supplies.  
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The court cases examined revealed that the judges made their judgements strictly on 
the basis of the contents and the purpose of the Franchise Act. However, historical 
antecedents of the fuel retail sector show that the oil majors developed this sector and 
have been in the ascendancy from the outset. Therefore, it is difficult to whittle down 
their bargaining powers significantly through restrictive legislation, such as the 
Franchise Act. The experience of Australia in this context reveals that the oil majors 
find ways to circumvent such legislation. For instance, in Australia the majors 
thwarted such attempts by using vertical arrangements such as multi-site franchising, 
insistence on 100% ties with their retailers or franchisees, and equity participation in 
distributorships. Multi-site franchising schemes enabled them to exert considerable 
control over retail prices, particularly when the need for price discounting arises. 
Their control over prices plus multi- franchising could mean that they are able to carry 
out location-specific price discounting when necessary.  
 
The introduction of the Oilcode served some useful purposes, particularly the terminal 
gate pricing which has furnished more transparency on fuel pricing and the provision 
of a dispute resolution mechanism. However, the Oilcode relies in some respects on 
prior disclosure which assumes that all industry operators are likely to work together 
for the common good. This is often not the case. More worrisome is the fact that the 
Oilcode does not address the increasing dominance of the supermarket / oil major 
alliances. This alliance currently accounts for over 50% of the market, and their 
ability to use their grocery business to cross-subsidize their fuel retail operations is 
capable of driving many large and small competitors in several locations from the fuel 
retail sector. Based on the current situation and future forecasts, there is a significant 
possibility that the structure of the fuel retail sector will mimic that of the retail 
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grocery market (i.e. a duopoly). Duopoly, in the absence of any countervailing forces, 
may likely translate to lesser price competition and ultimately higher retail prices for 
fuels for urban locations, and even higher prices for rural areas. 
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Chapter 5 
FUEL PRICE AND TAX REGULATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates how fuel wholesale and retail price regulations could resolve 
the research problems and thus contribute to a rural development policy. However, 
preliminary investigation reveals that fuel tax and VAT (or Goods and Services Tax, 
GST, in the case of Australia) constitute together more than 50% of fuel retail prices, 
and so are important components of pump prices that could be regulated in the two 
jurisdictions. This chapter also examines in detail the interface between fuel price 
regulations and fuel tax objectives, including environmental considerations. 
Holistically, this chapter looks at the intersection between fuel price regulation, fuel 
tax policy, transport policy and environmental policy, in the context of a rural 
development policy. 
 
More specifically, this chapter investigates the purpose of fuel tax and how it drives 
transport policies in both jurisdictions, as well as the distributional effects of 
relatively higher fuel taxes (or higher pump prices) on sub-groups of the population. 
Public transport has been regarded as the alternative to private transport for rural and 
remote areas. Hence, this chapter also examines the potential for developing effective 
public transport solutions and infrastructure in these areas. The role of central 
government, local councils, parishes, and local investors in developing rural transport 
solutions are also explored The role of central governments in developing rural 
transport solutions, in the two jurisdictions, are discussed in the light of a deregulated 
transport sector. Other rural transport policy options are discussed, including the 
potential for fuel duty concessions and remissions.  
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5.2 United Kingdom 
5.2.1 Components of fuel retail price 
The components of fuel prices consist of costs of crude oil and its transportation to the 
refinery, refinery costs, fuel duty plus VAT, and wholesale/retail margins (see Table 
5.1).  
Table 5.1  UK unleaded petrol pump price composition - January average 
 2007 (Average major brand price) 
Component Price per litre 
(ppl) 
% 
Pump Price 87.80 100 
Duty & VAT 61.40 70 
Petrol Cost (costs of crude 
oil, refining costs, and 
wholesale margin) 
18.85 22 
Gross Retail Margin 7.50 8 
 
Source:  UK Petrol Industry Association Ltd (UKPia) 
 
5.2.2 Wholesale price regulation 
Wholesale petroleum prices in the UK are based on the prevailing international price 
of the particular fuel and adjusted to account for transport costs. The Rotterdam 
market represents the bulk trade in petroleum products in North West Europe (UK 
inclusive), and consequently petroleum product prices are tied to this market. 
Therefore, movements in the prices of products in Rotterdam influence the wholesale 
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pricing arrangement in the industry, and the wholesale price is also linked to the retail 
price of fuels.1 
 
Crude oil accounts for a small proportion (about 12%) of the pump price of petrol in 
the UK, although it represents a significant proportion of a refinery’s costs. The fact 
that crude oil and refined products are internationally traded goods means that it is not 
feasible to regulate the wholesale price of fuels. However, it is possible to regulate 
wholesale margins, which are determined by the major oil suppliers (usually the oil 
majors).2 The evidence reveals that the UK has no experience yet of wholesale price 
regulation because the fuel retail market is deregulated in this respect. The Office of 
Fair Trading (OFT) maintains that the market is operating competitively and so direct 
government intervention in fuel pricing is unwarranted.3 However, the OFT continues 
to monitor and supervise the fuel retail trade and fuel prices to detect early warning 
signs of anti-competitive pricing, if any. 
 
5.2.3 Retail price regulation 
Fuel duty and VAT account for a significant proportion of the retail price of fuels (see 
Table 5.2). The level of fuel taxes has obvious implications for the cost of living both 
for fuel consumers and non-fuel consumers, and more so in rural and remote 
locations. Thus, we should examine the UK Government’s policy with regard to the 
regulation of fuel taxes. 
 
 
                                                 
1 A Report by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT 230): Competition in the Supply of Petrol in the UK, p. 
45 (1998). Available online at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/transport/oft229.pdf, last 
visited on 24 October 2009. 
2 The Australian experience shows that it is problematic to regulate wholesale prices, wholesale and 
retail margins. For more details, see pp. 50-3 of this chapter. 
3 See OFT 230; supra note 1, at pp. 3-4. 
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Table 5.2  Average UK fuel prices and taxes for unleaded petrol, diesel, 
and LPG, 2000-08 
Year 
(Average) 
Petrol 
(pence) 
Petrol 
(duty) 
Petrol 
(tax 
as % 
of 
price) 
Diesel 
(pence) 
Diesel 
(duty) 
Diesel 
(tax 
as % 
of 
price) 
LPG 
(pence) 
LPG 
(duty) 
 
LPG 
(tax 
as % 
of 
price) 
2000 80.72 48.55 75.09 82.24 51.55 77.61 N/A N/A N/A 
2001 75.12 47.15 77.77 77.74 54.20 84.08 38.18 10.00 40.93 
2002 73.68 46.07 77.47 75.57 48.04 79.44 37.47 4.50 26.91 
2003 76.28 46.14 75.40 78.04 46.14 74.04 38.76 4.50 26.50 
2004 80.81 50.19 77.07 82.51 47.10 72.07 38.53 4.50 26.57 
2005 87.55 47.10 68.82 91.39 47.10 66.53 40.05 4.50 26.14 
2006 91.64 47.10 66.39 95.35 47.10 64.33 45.03 4.50 24.85 
2007 95.40 48.85 66.21 97.88 48.85 64.90 47.23 6.64 28.89 
2008 107.46 50.52 62.08 118.22 50.52 57.74 56.17 8.43 29.81 
 
Note: Duty and VAT (17.5%) included in the price. 
Source:  Data gathered from UK Retail Marketing Survey: A Special Supplement to 
Petroleum Review, published by the Energy Institute (2002-09 editions). 
 
5.2.4 The purpose of fuel tax in the UK 
There are two reasons for fuel tax in the UK: to generate revenue and to reduce the 
rate of car usage for environmental reasons. Fuel taxation is an important part of the 
UK Government’s revenue. The estimate of the contribution of fuel duties to total 
revenue for 2004-05 was £23.5 billion, or 5.2% of the total revenue.4 The bigger 
contributors relative to fuel duties are income tax, national insurance, VAT and 
corporation tax.5 According to the Treasury Department estimates, an increase in duty 
on petrol and diesel by around 7.3 pence per litre will generate about the same 
revenue (i.e. £3 billion) as a one penny increase in the basic rate of income tax.6 This 
                                                 
4 Leicester, A., Fuel Taxation, p 8, Institute for Fiscal Studies Briefing Note, No. 55 (2005). Available 
online at http://www.ifs.org.uk/bns/bn55.pdf, last visited on 12 September 2009. 
5 For more details on sources of UK Government revenue, see Adam et al., Taxation in the UK, p 7, 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies, prepared for the Commission on Reforming the Tax System for the 21st 
Century (2008). Available online at http://www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesreview/reports/uktax.pdf, last visited 
on 15 September 2009. 
6 See Leicester; supra note 4, at pp. 8-9. 
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estimate underlines the huge potential of fuel duties as a source of government 
revenue. 
 
The second reason for fuel taxation relates to the effects of road transport on the 
environment. Individual decisions about car ownership and usage involve private and 
social costs. Some of the private costs include the vehicle purchase price, road tax, 
vehicle maintenance (MOT), insurance and fuel expenses. The use of road transport 
by each individual also imposes social costs (externalities) such as noise and air 
pollution, congestion, road infrastructure damage, accident risk imposed on other road 
users.7 Road fuel combustion leads to the emission of a variety of air pollutants. Some 
of these gases contribute to global environmental problems. For example carbon 
dioxide and other gases contribute to global warming, and sulphur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxides can cause acid rain. Generally, these emissions can create localised 
poor air quality. For example, emissions of black smoke and particulates can 
contribute significantly to respiratory disorders. Nitrogen oxides and volatile organic 
compounds can react to create photochemical smog.8 The social costs of many 
pollutants depend on when and where they are emitted, because their effects can be 
influenced by the population density of an area and traffic levels. 
 
These social costs are often not accounted for in the pricing of fuels. The role of 
government policy in this regard is to ensure that these negative externalities are 
internalised in the price of fuels. Fitting vehicles with ‘clean’ technology can help to 
                                                 
7 Smith, Z., The Petrol Tax Debate, p4, Institute of Fiscal Studies Briefing Note, No. 8 (2000). 
Available online at http://www.ifs.org.uk/bns/bn8.pdf, last visited on 12 September, 2009. 
8 For more details on the pollutant emissions from road transport, see The Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution: 18
th
 Report on Transport and the Environment, APPENDIX A. Available 
online at http://www.rcep.org.uk/reports/18-transport/1994-18transport.pdf, last visited on 15 
September 2009. 
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reduce these emissions. Different types of fuels emit different levels and kinds of 
emissions (see Table 5.3). For example, diesel is associated with higher emissions of 
nitrogen oxides and particulates than petrol. The emissions of carbon dioxide, 
nitrogen oxides, and volatile organic substances can be reduced by fitting a three-way 
catalytic converter.9  
 
Table 5.3 Environmental Performance Comparison of LPG Relative to Petrol and  
                Diesel 
 
Pollutant/Emission 
Type 
Harmful 
Effects 
Environmental 
Effects 
Emissions 
from LPG 
compared 
petrol 
engines 
Emissions 
from LPG 
compared to 
diesel 
engines 
Nitrogen Oxides Irritation of the 
respiratory 
organs 
(poisonous) 
Acid rain 30% less 60-90% less 
Hydrocarbons Some of these 
are 
carcinogenic 
Greenhouse 
effect/summer 
smog 
30% less 95% less 
Carbon Monoxide Extremely 
poisonous 
Some 
greenhouse 
effect 
30% less 95% less 
Carbon dioxide Non-toxic Significant 
greenhouse 
effect 
12% less n/a 
Particulates Potentially 
carcinogenic 
Winter smog n/a 100% less 
 
Source: Combined Gas Systems (UK) 
 
 
                                                 
9 Blow, L & Crawford I., The Distributional Effects of Taxes on Private Motoring, pp15-16, Institute 
for Fiscal Studies (1997). Available online at http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/comm65.pdf, last visited on 
15 September 2009. See also Crawford, I., The Distributional Effects of the Proposed London 
Congestion Charging Scheme, The Institute for Fiscal Studies, Briefing Note No. 11 (2000). Available 
online at http://www.ifs.org.uk/bns/bn11.pdf, last visited on 15 September 2009. 
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However, the assessment and measurement of the total external costs associated with 
road transport can be problematic because this involves difficult estimates of the 
potential effects of greenhouse gases, the annoyance cost of noise, the value of life 
saved, etc. Nevertheless, it can also be a useful exercise to attempt to quantify these 
social costs, no matter how difficult.10 For instance, in 1993 Pearce et al. estimated 
that the annual aggregate external costs of road transport in 1991 was between £22.9 
billion and £25.7 billion, depending on the valuation of a saved life. They broke the 
numbers down as follows: £13.5 billion (congestion costs), £1.3 billion (road 
damage), £2.8 billion (pollution costs, excluding noise pollution), £0.6 billion (noise 
pollution), and between £4.7 billion and £7.5 billion (accident costs).11 Newbery 
carried out a similar empirical evaluation by drawing in part from Pearce et al., and 
employing the techniques suggested by the Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution (18th report). He estimates external costs of road transport for 1993 to be 
between £29.3 billion and £36.9 billion per annum, depending on the valuation of a 
life and the assumed effects of particulates on mortality and morbidity.12 
 
Theoretically, there are a number of methods for dealing with socially detrimental 
activities. This can be achieved through a regulatory framework (i.e. by setting 
allowable traffic volumes or emission levels); or through market mechanisms such as 
taxes and charges; or by specifying fuels production technology (e.g. pollution 
abatement equipment, etc).13 However, economists prefer the market mechanism (i.e. 
use of price instruments) as the ideal policy tool for addressing externalities. The 
                                                 
10 For details on techniques for putting money value on environmental damage, see the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution (18
th
 Report); supra note 8, at APPENDIX C (Box C). . 
11 Pearce et al., Blueprint 3: Measuring Sustainable Development (1993) 
12 Newbery, D. M., Royal Commission Report on Transport and the Environment: Economic Effects of 
Recommendations 1258-72, Economic Journal 105 (1995). 
13 See Blow & Crawford; supra note 9, at p. 17. 
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desirable methods are usually those that aim to correct the externalities as directly as 
possible because such methods produce faster results. Thus, a tax or a quantity control 
on emissions is likely to be superior to alternatives such as limiting traffic levels or 
specifying technology.14 The reason is that limiting traffic does not encourage the use 
of less polluting technology, and it is unlikely to achieve a significant reduction in 
pollution. Similarly, specifying the use of certain equipment has the same abatement 
effect, and the same equipment cost will apply to all motorists regardless of the 
mileage they cover. For motorists who do relatively smaller mileage, the reduction in 
pollution may not be significant enough to justify the cost of fitting the equipment.  
 
Although tax is ideally the best policy choice for regulating externalities, there is a 
pitfall to its usage. To charge taxes and enforce quantity controls requires the 
measurement of the emission levels of each motorist, which is problematic. Thus, the 
downside to the imposition of environmental taxes is that the level of pollution 
reduction is difficult to measure.15 The extent of this pitfall will depend on the costs of 
mistakes made in setting the level of pollution abatement. In certain situations, 
quantity controls (i.e. setting an emission level) may be preferable to charging a tax. 
For example, if the costs of pollution are very high it may be necessary to reduce 
emission levels below a certain fatal threshold. 
                                                 
14 HM Treasury, Tax and the Environment: Using Economic Instruments 23-28 (2002). Available 
online at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/adtaxenviron02-332kb.pdf, last visited on 12 September 
2009.  See Sterner, T et al., Gasoline Tax Policy: Carbon Emissions and the Global Environment pp. 
109-119, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy XXVI-2 (1992).  See Crawford, I & Smith, S., 
Fiscal Instruments for Air Pollution/Abatement in Road Transport pp. 33-51, Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy XXIX-1 (1995). See McKay, S et al. Fiscal Instruments in Environmental 
Policy, pp1-5. Institute for Fiscal Studies, Fiscal Studies, Vol. 11 (4), 1990. Also see Kosonen, K & 
Nicodeme, G., The Role of Fiscal Instruments in Environmental Policy 1-2, CESifo Working Paper No. 
2719 (2009). Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/gen_info/economic_analysis/tax_p
apers/taxation_paper_19.pdf, last visited on 14 September 2009. 
15Pearson M, & Smith S., Taxation and Environmental Policy: Some Initial Evidence 5-7, Institute for 
Fiscal Studies Commentary (1990). Available online at http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/comm19.pdf, last 
visited on 12 September 2009. Also see OECD Publication Efficient Transport for Europe: Policies for 
Internalisation of External Costs, European Conference of Ministers of Transport (1998). 
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However, taxes can have superior benefits over regulation because each unit of 
pollution is charged for. This can result in a sustained incentive for motorists to 
reduce levels rather than simply complying with the minimum standard set by 
regulation. With the latter, there is no incentive to exceed the minimum standard but 
taxes provide the motorist with additional incentive because each unit reduction in 
pollution produces a tax saving. Determining the appropriate tax levels is also 
difficult, because the optimal level of pollution reduction depends on costs and 
benefits which are uncertain themselves.  
 
Determining appropriate tax levels is made more complex by the existence of other 
externalities and other pre-existing taxes used by government to generate revenues. 
Taxes directed at one externality may interact with other tax provisions.16 For 
example, fuel tax could be used to reduce fuel consumption. This could lead to the 
production of more fuel-efficient cars, which will produce a different effect on 
mileage, and encourage more road usage as a consequence. This could in turn lead to 
more road congestion than otherwise would have been. Environmental taxes can also 
interact with taxes aimed at raising revenues. This interaction can erode the tax base 
of such revenue-raising taxes by causing a reduction in the consumption of the good 
or the level of activity on which they are set. Nevertheless, these same considerations 
equally apply to alternative policies such as quantity controls. Consequently, it has 
been argued that for environmental taxes to achieve their objectives, the 
environmental benefits and the revenues generated as a result of a fuel duty increase 
must outweigh the costs to consumers or producers of the fuels. 
 
                                                 
16 See id., pp. 18-20. 
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Direct measurement of emissions may not be possible in practice. Where this is 
possible, it would require substantial administrative costs or expensive metering 
technology.17 Therefore, theoretical analysis of different policy options to abate 
pollution tend to ignore administrative and measurement costs which are relevant in 
practice. For example, it is not feasible to measure each motorist’s car exhaust 
emissions by time and place, but it is possible to tax fuels because they are related to 
the externality. This rule is applicable to carbon dioxide emissions from vehicles, 
because there is a linear relationship between this emission and fuel consumption. 
There is also a positive correlation between the global warming effects of carbon 
dioxide emissions. Therefore, a fuel tax would approximate a direct charge on this 
externality.  
 
However, it is not always possible to find a practical tax base that is generally 
applicable to all emissions because the cost of other exhausts emissions (e.g. black 
smoke, particulates, etc) can vary by location and weather conditions.18 Consequently, 
fuel taxes are not a particularly accurate way to charge for these environmental costs. 
Thus, it may be useful to apply a range of taxes and subsidies to approximate the 
direct charge on the externality, but the correct combination is also not always 
obvious.19  
 
In some cases, taxes may be effective in achieving emissions reduction. For example, 
the introduction of a tax differential in favour of unleaded over leaded petrol resulted 
in a substantial increase in the share of unleaded petrol in total petrol sales. Other 
                                                 
17 See Smith; supra note 7, at p. 4. 
18 See Blow & Crawford; supra note 9, at pp. 20-22. 
19 Smith, Z & Simpson, H., Taxation of Fuel and the Environment, Chapter 5, in the IFS Commentaries 
on the Green Budget (2001). Available online at http://www.ifs.org.uk/budgets/gb2001/chap5.pdf, last 
visited on 12 September 2009. For details on the economics of fuel tax design, see pp. 52-7. 
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factors, such as the introduction of catalytic converters, which can only work with 
unleaded petrol and the fact that both types of fuel are close substitutes may have 
contributed to its increased share. In other cases, regulation may be necessary where it 
is difficult to find a tax base that is well linked to the externality. For example, in 
regulating emission standards, new cars can be fitted with catalytic converters, which 
may result in the decline of emissions of nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide and 
volatile organic substances. 
 
Nevertheless, the UK Government believes that one way of reducing the amount of 
damage caused by road transport is to discourage excessive car usage. The 
government achieves this by levying tax, in excess of VAT, on road fuels, to ensure 
that the price that consumers pay reflects these social costs. However, the evidence 
reveals that the purpose of fuel tax as an instrument for altering consumer behaviour 
is not always successful because the demand for fuels is price-inelastic (at least in the 
short term).  
 
Empirical evidence suggests that a 1% increase in the real cost per mile of driving 
will reduce miles travelled by less than 0.5% (in the short term).20 This suggests that 
the consumers’ response to an increase in fuel cost per mile is not proportionate. It is 
this lack of a proportionate response by motorists to fuel price increases that makes a 
fuel tax an attractive source of government revenue. The Institute for Fiscal Studies 
argued in their analysis of the 1999 ‘green’ budget that there seems to be a 
contradiction in government policy on fuel duties. They contended that, in the long 
run, this policy cannot be a good source of revenue and at the same time act as a 
                                                 
20 See Smith; supra note 7, at p. 4. 
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measure for curtailing car usage.21 Nevertheless, sustained high duty rate does affect 
the behaviour of motorists in the long run because some have switched to using LPG 
or buying more fuel efficient cars, which tend to reduce the harmful effects of fuel 
consumption on the environment. 
 
5.2.5 Excise duty and UK transport policy 
The government in its 1998 budget speech laid down the future transport policy for 
the UK.22 Until 1993, the use of road fuel taxes as fiscal instruments for dealing with 
the social costs of road transport have been primarily for revenue generation purposes, 
and secondarily to address external costs associated with road transport.23  
 
However, since 1993, road fuel duties have been partly designed to correct 
environmental problems associated with road transport. In recognition of the need to 
correct these externalities, the then Chancellor (Norman Lamont) announced in the 
March 1993 budget a 10% increase in road fuel duties (partly to compensate for the 
revenue loss from the abolition of car tax in November 1992). He further announced 
an annual real increase in fuel duties of at least 3% to be applied in subsequent 
budgets (the fuel duty escalator).24 Additionally, VAT was imposed on domestic 
supplies of fuel and power in order to return greenhouse gas emissions in the UK to 
1990 levels by the year 2000, in line with the agreement at the UN Convention on 
Climate Change at Rio.  
                                                 
21 Institute for Fiscal Studies, The IFS Green Budget 90, Commentary No. 76 (1999). 
22 Bolton, P et al., Road Fuel Prices and Taxation, House of Commons Library: Research Paper 00/52 
(2001). Available online at http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2001/rp01-052.pdf, last 
visited on 18 September 2009. 
23 See Blow & Crawford; supra note 9, at p. 22. 
24 For details on the introduction of the road fuel tax escalator, see Bolton et al.; supra note 22, at pp. 
19-22. 
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In the 1994 budget, the duty level on road fuel gas (LPG) was frozen to make it a 
viable alternative to petrol and diesel. In 1995, the duty on LPG was reduced by 15% 
to bring the price in line with those of petrol and diesel.25 In the 1996 budget, the level 
of duty on LPG was further reduced by 25% to encourage faster switching to the 
alternative fuel. Moreover, in the 2004 budget, the Chancellor gave a three-year 
certainty for the duty treatment of alternative fuels. Firstly, the budget provided 20p 
per litre duty differential in favour of bioethanol and biodiesel. This was guaranteed 
until at least 2007. Secondly, the budget reduced the duty differential in favour of 
LPG by the equivalent of 1p per litre for each of the next three years to 2007. Thirdly, 
the budget froze the duty differential in favour of natural gas at its current level 
(equivalent to 41p. per litre) to 2007.26 
 
In the 1994 budget, the then Chancellor (Kenneth Clarke) announced that all fuel 
duties would be increased by at least 5% in real terms in future budgets. In the 1995 
budget, the government increased the relative duty on super-unleaded petrol, due to 
concerns over the high level of carcinogenic aromatic hydrocarbons in this fuel. The 
5% fuel duty target was re-affirmed by the Chancellor in the 1996 budget. 
 
The Chancellor of the in-coming Labour Government (Gordon Brown) announced in 
his 1997 budget an increase in annual fuel duties of at least 6%.27 The government 
stated in its budget that “environmental taxation must meet the general tests of good 
taxation. It must be well designed to meet objectives without undesirable side-effects; 
                                                 
25 See Blow & Crawford; supra note 9, at p. 23. 
26 HM Treasury, UK Budget Speech; Press Notice 03: Protecting and Enhancing the Environment 
(2004). Available online at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_notice_03.htm, last visited on 12 
September 2009. 
27 HM Customs & Excise CE 3 (Press Release), Increases in Fuel Duties to Help the Environment 
(1997). Available online at http://archive.treasury.gov.uk/budget/1997/ce3.html, last visited on 12 
September 2009.  
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it must keep deadweight compliance costs to a minimum; distributional impact must 
be acceptable; and care must be had to implications for international competitiveness. 
Where environmental taxes meet these tests, the government will use them”.28 To this 
end, the government stated that fuel duties have enabled the UK to meet its Kyoto 
target on greenhouse gas emissions reduction. The government estimated that 
increased fuel duties between 1996 and 1999 may result in carbon savings of between 
1.0 and 2.5 million tonnes by 2010.29  
 
What was not clear was whether the government’s claims were based on valid means 
of measuring success at meeting these objectives. For instance, it was unclear whether 
the government had or intended to measure the impact or effectiveness of the ‘fuel 
duty escalator’ with such criteria as a reduction in the volume of fuel consumed, or 
the mileage travelled for a constant volume. The evidence from the Financial 
Secretary’s statement shows that government assumed that the amount of fuel 
consumed was less than it would have been but for the higher duty levels. The lack of 
a measuring device makes it easier for the general public to infer that the important 
element in fuel taxation is more in terms of revenue generation than environmental 
concerns. Nevertheless, the common opinion among the five major oil companies is 
that the demand for motor fuel is relatively price-inelastic. Shell went on to comment 
that although the tax applied to pump prices has risen significantly over the years, 
they were yet to experience a corresponding change in fuel demand in the UK.30 
These observations help to reinforce public opinion. 
 
                                                 
28 HM Treasury Press Notice, Tax Measures to Help the Environment (1997). Available online at 
http://archive.treasury.gov.uk/budget/1997/hmt4.html, last visited on 23 October 2009. 
29 House of Commons, Trade and Industry Committee (5th Report); Impact on Trade and Industry of 
Motor Fuel Taxation xv (Session 2001-02). 
30 See id., xxvii. 
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In addition to the ‘fuel duty escalator’, the UK Government introduced differential 
road fuel duties to encourage the use of fuels that were considered to be 
environmentally friendly.31 For instance, the government introduced a duty 
differential in 1997 in favour of unleaded over leaded petrol. This differential 
widened in subsequent years until the use of leaded petrol was officially abolished in 
2000. There was also a duty differential in favour of diesel over petrol, because 
standard diesel engines produce significantly lower emissions of certain pollutants, 
e.g. carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons, than petrol engines. The 
invention of catalytic converters has removed this advantage, because fitting a three-
way converter to a petrol engine can reduce nitrogen oxide and hydrocarbon 
emissions below that of diesel engines. 
 
The 6% fuel duty escalator has ceased to apply to future budgets from 1999, but the 
government maintained that decisions about road fuel duties would be taken on a 
budget-by-budget basis.32 The Chancellor announced in the 2000 budget that duty 
rates would from then on increase in line with inflation. The government further 
stated that any real increases in road fuel duties in the future would be lower, and that 
the revenues would be ring-fenced and used for the modernisation of roads and public 
transport (hypothecation).33 According to the Chancellor, appropriate levels of fuel 
duties in the future are expected to take into account the government’s economic and 
social objectives and UK’s environmental commitments. 
                                                 
31 See Blow & Crawford; supra note 9, at 23. Also see OECD Publication, Vehicle Emission 
Reductions 103, European Conference of Ministers of Transport (2001). 
32 See Bolton et al.; supra note 22, at 23. 
33 Institute for Fiscal Studies, The IFS Green Budget Analysis pp. 109-10, Commentary No. 80 (2000). 
Hypothecation means the allocation of resources from future duty increases to specific ends. Under 
genuine hypothecation, any reduction in consumption would lead to lower spending on transport in the 
long run. The IFS has argued that the link between taxation of road fuel to spending on transport is 
tenuous. Similarly, they argue that there is a contradiction in this policy because in the long run it 
cannot be a good source of revenue and at the same time act as a measure for curtailing car usage. 
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However, compared to most European countries, the UK has one of the highest post-
tax fuel prices. This is because the fuel duty and the VAT interact to raise the overall 
tax component of fuel prices (see Table 5.4). 
 
Table 5.4  EU Price Comparisons (2007) 
Country Unleaded  
Petrol 
(Excl.Duty/ 
VAT) 
Diesel 
(Excl. 
Duty/VAT) 
Unleaded 
Petrol 
(Duty/VAT) 
Diesel 
(Duty/VAT) 
Unleaded 
Petrol 
(incl. 
Duty/VAT 
Diesel 
(Incl. 
Duty/VAT 
UK 25.73 28.88 61.33 61.86 87.04 90.74 
Netherlands 29.44 31.47 60.42 36.11 89.86 67.58 
Denmark 28.17 30.25 52.53 38.34 80.70 68.59 
Italy 29.57 33.12 51.47 39.98 81.04 73.10 
France 27.68 31.17 53.90 40.38 81.58 71.55 
Germany 25.46 28.92 57.26 43.17 82.72 72.09 
Belgium 29.84 33.54 54.50 33.77 84.34 67.31 
Luxembourg 29.13 31.33 40.13 27.16 69.26 58.49 
Spain 28.25 30.94 36.30 29.24 64.55 60.18 
Ireland 26.61 30.85 41.64 36.46 68.25 67.31 
Sweden 24.83 29.19 52.11 41.08 76.94 70.27 
Source:  UK Petrol Industry Association Ltd (UKPia) 
 
 
In 1998, the EU concluded an agreement with the European car manufacturing group 
to reduce the average carbon dioxide emissions from the new car fleet. To support this 
agreement, the UK Government created incentives for individual motorists to demand 
more fuel-efficient vehicles. 
 
The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, in its 1994 report on transport 
and the environment, recommended that “fuel duty be increased year by year so as to 
double the price of fuels, relative to the prices of other goods, by 2005”.34 The report 
also recommended that the government should press for the revision of the EC 
Directive on fuel prices so as to ensure a sustained year-by-year increase in fuel prices 
                                                 
34See the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution; supra note 8, at p. 240.  Recommendation 
28, however, is a product of a strict environmental research and did not take into account the economic 
multiplier effects of a doubling of fuel prices on the prices of other transported goods. 
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across the Community.35 In responding to this report, Newbery estimated that the total 
external costs of road transport far outweighed the revenue raised from fuel and road 
taxes. He concluded that a large increase in fuel duties could be justified. However, he 
posited that fuel taxes were a blunt instrument for dealing with many of these social 
costs. It has been argued previously that the main social cost that fuel taxes can 
effectively address is the global warming effect of carbon dioxide emissions. Thus, 
the Royal Commission aimed its proposals at addressing this. 
 
Realistically, the effects of global warming are difficult to estimate, the revenue from 
fuel taxes are far in excess of Newbery’s estimates, and the implied carbon tax from 
the Royal Commission’s proposal are far greater than the EU’s suggested rate for a 
carbon tax.36 When a product is taxed for both revenue generation and environmental 
purposes, it implies that theoretically the tax could be broken down into the revenue-
raising component and its externality-correcting component. Thus, it may be 
erroneous to compare total revenue generated from fuel taxes and the global warming 
costs, because road fuels are also taxed partly for revenue generation purposes.  
 
5.2.6 International comparisons 
In comparison to other EU countries, current UK levels of fuel taxation are the 
highest37 (see Table 5.4). The Road Hauliers Association (RHA) estimated that the 
European average price for a thousand litres of diesel is £540, as against £810 in the 
                                                 
35 See id., 240. Recommendation 29 makes reference to the EC Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 
October 2003, which set minimum levels of taxation applicable to motor fuels. 
36 See Blow & Crawford; supra note 9, at p. 26. 
37 See Trade and Industry Committee (5th Report); supra note 29, at p. 38. Memorandum submitted by 
the Road Haulage Association (RHA) to the Trade and Industry Committee. 
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UK.38 Conversely, the Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP) stated that 
although UK fuel duties were the highest in Europe, the differential in prices was 
much less when compared to levels of national GDP (see table 5.5). On this basis, 
they quantified that UK taxation levels as a percentage of GDP (40%) compares 
favourably with most EU countries.39 For instance, Sweden has 58%, France 50%, 
and Germany 44%40.  
Table 5.5  Relating duty rates to per capita GDP 
Petrol GDP per capita 
(divided by 100) 
Diesel GDP per Capita 
(divided by 100) 
Luxembourg 5.4 Luxembourg 6.7 
Denmark 3.1 Denmark 4.1 
Austria 2.9 Austria 3.8 
Ireland 2.9 Belgium 3.8 
Germany 2.7 Germany 3.7 
Belgium 2.6 Netherlands 3.3 
Spain 2.4 France 3.3 
France 2.3 Ireland 3.0 
Italy 2.3 Italy 3.0 
Netherlands 2.3 Finland 3.2 
Finland 2.2 Spain 2.9 
Sweden 2.2 Sweden 2.8 
Greece 2.1 Greece 2.8 
Portugal 1.9 Portugal 2.7 
UK 2.0 UK 2.0 
Source:  Trade and Industry Committee (5th Report): Impact on Trade & Industry of 
Motor Fuel Taxation, p. 138. 
The IEEP also stated that the UK has relatively lower employment and lower 
corporation taxes; administrative costs were relatively lower; and have comparatively 
fewer tunnels and toll bridges. However, the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) 
                                                 
38 See id., xiii. 
39 See id., p. 138. Memorandum submitted by the Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP) 
to the Trade and Industry Committee. 
40 See id., p. xiv. 
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opined that small businesses were usually unincorporated and therefore did not 
benefit from low rates of corporation tax.41  
 
From the foregoing, it could be argued that UK levels of fuel taxation are the highest 
in the EU, regardless of whether these are balanced by lower corporation tax, 
motoring infrastructure costs, or social welfare benefit costs. It could also be inferred 
that small companies that are heavily reliant on road transport will be hit the hardest 
by high fuel taxation levels. In rural areas, rises in fuel taxation could have a 
devastating impact. Rural motorists have had to pay the same high taxes despite being 
responsible for little of the current levels of air pollution. Small fuel retailers in rural 
areas obtain supplies at wholesale prices which are sometimes more than the price at 
which major supermarkets retail fuel to consumers.42  
 
As a result, associations like the Petroleum Retailers Association (PRA) and the FSB 
have proposed that fuel wholesalers should be made to sign an agreement never to 
exceed a maximum wholesale price for fuel sales in order to protect local independent 
fuel retailers and rural motorists.43 From the Australian experience of wholesale price 
regulation, this is not a credible long-term option. However, so long as the demand for 
fuel remains relatively inelastic, the government may not consider fuel taxation as the 
real problem that rural fuel retailers are facing in terms of attracting custom and 
increasing volume throughput. 
 
                                                 
41 See id., p. 153. Memorandum submitted by the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) to the Trade 
and Industry Committee. 
42 See id., p. 154. Memo submitted by the FSB to the Trade and Industry Committee. 
43 See id., p. 154. 
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More rural fuel outlets have closed mainly because of the economic effects of a highly 
competitive industry, but also because of the high cost of capital needed to finance the 
purchase of fuel with 70-80% of fuel tax contained within the price. Low margins, 
small volume throughput, competition from supermarkets, etc. are the main 
challenges faced by the independent fuel retailers, especially those in rural areas. For 
the rural motorist, it would seem that the government is yet to address fully the 
absence of an alternative form of transport to the car. 
 
Nevertheless, compared to other OECD countries, the UK also has among the highest 
petrol taxes and the highest diesel taxes, whereas Australia has one of the lowest 
petrol and diesel prices – on both a pre-tax and post-tax basis (see Figure 5.a).44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 International petrol and diesel price comparisons. Available online at 
http://www.aip.com.au/pricing/internationalprices.htm , last visited on 15 October 2009. 
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Figure 5.a  International fuel price and tax comparisons in OECD Countries, 2009 
Petrol prices and taxes in OECD countries 
March quarter 2009  
Diesel prices and taxes in OECD countries 
March quarter 2009  
  
Source:  Australian Petroleum Statistics, Department of Resources, Energy & Tourism. 
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5.2.7 Distributional effects of increase in fuel duty on sub-groups of  
           the population 
Periodic objections to high fuel taxes are usually based on the effect that the tax will 
likely have on certain groups of the population, particularly those within the low 
income band and those living in rural areas. A number of empirical studies have been 
conducted to determine the distributional effects of fuel tax increases on different sub-
groups within the population.  
Smith examines these effects based on income and population densities. The study 
analyses the effect of a 6% real increase in fuel tax by comparing the cost of 
achieving a given level of economic welfare before the tax increase, with the cost of 
achieving the same level of economic welfare after the tax increase.45 The study used 
the cost-of-living index to measure how much extra income was needed to return to 
the original welfare level. 
The analysis reveals that the effect of fuel duty rises on the cost of living for 
households across different income groups and population densities in the UK is felt 
most by households in the middle-income bracket, followed by poor car-owning 
households and rural dwellers.46 This finding does not imply that a fuel tax policy 
used to protect the environment is inappropriate. Overall, the UK tax and benefit 
system is progressive, and creates an argument for compensation for sub-groupings of 
the population that bear the higher burden. For example, the adverse effect of fuel tax 
increase on the cost of living for rural inhabitants could be compensated by improving 
rural public transport. 
 
                                                 
45 Skinner, I & Fergusson, M., Transport Taxation and Equity, pp17-28 (1998). Institute of Public 
Policy Research, London. Also see Smith; supra note 7, at p. 5. 
46 See Smith; supra note 7, at pp. 5 and 8. 
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Leicester’s study assesses the extent to which recent price increases can be attributed 
to government policy; whether there is a case for fuel duties to be altered based on 
pump price changes; and the effects of fuel duty changes on different sub-groups of 
the population.47 He finds that the poorest household are not disproportionately 
affected by high fuel prices; instead those households in the upper half of the income 
bracket face the largest increase in their cost of living. That is not to say that the 
impact on the poorest households is not substantial, but this category consume very 
little fuel. Nevertheless, he finds that among the households that own cars, the poorer 
households are worse hit.48 This category would include some rural inhabitants who 
are heavily reliant on private transport. 
 
Blow and Crawford’s study reveals that an increase in fuel taxes has a direct effect on 
the cost per mile of travel, and may also have an indirect effect by inducing changes 
in fuel efficiency.49 Thus, the direct effect is to increase the cost of vehicle usage and 
consequently cause a reduction in individuals’ mileage. The indirect effect tends to 
work in the opposite direction by increasing fuel efficiency through the manufacture 
and purchase of more fuel-efficient vehicles and the scrapping of older, less-fuel 
efficient vehicles. Thus, the effect of fuel taxes on mileage may be different from their 
effect on fuel consumption 
 
The longer-term effects of an increase in fuel taxes may also be to reduce the level of 
vehicle ownership. The level of this response would depend on the availability of 
other modes of travel such as public transport. Therefore, responses are likely to vary 
                                                 
47 See Leicester; supra note 4, at p. 1.This briefing note updates and revises Smith’s study titled, “The 
Petrol Tax Debate”. 
48 See id., p. 14. 
49 See Blow & Crawford; supra note 9, at p. 24. 
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according to individual circumstances. For example, rural inhabitants may have 
minimal or no access to reliable public transport. In the short term, there is little 
alternative to the use of private cars for travel purposes. However, in the longer term 
people can alter their circumstances by migrating away from rural areas in order to 
reduce the distance between home/workplace and amenities. Conversely, government 
can alter the circumstances of rural inhabitants by increasing access to public 
transport. 
 
Their study also shows that the welfare effects of taxes on road fuels and car usage do 
alter the set of relative prices faced by consumers and will differ across types of 
households and across the income distribution. The evidence also suggests that a 30% 
increase in fuel prices will reduce mileages by about 12%.50 The overall distribution 
of welfare effects of such a reform based on the empirical evidence is that poorer 
households are relatively less affected since most of them don’t own cars. Amongst 
households that own cars, the welfare effects are greatest for poorer households, 
particularly in rural areas. 
 
Research by the Automobile Association (AA) indicates that the effects of the cost of 
fuel was felt most by people who live in rural areas, those on lower income, and 
younger people.51 A similar study commissioned by the AA and the UK Petroleum 
Industry Association (UKPia) also found that households in medium- and low- 
density areas account for about 31% of all households that own cars, and these groups 
are more severely affected by fuel price increases than households in high density 
                                                 
50 See Blow & Crawford; supra note 9, at 51. 
51 For more details, see The Great British Motorist (AA) 2000. 
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areas.52 This finding is consistent with similar conclusions reached by Blow and 
Crawford, Skinner and Fergusson. These other studies find that rural households are 
disproportionately affected by fuel price increases. 
 
Table 5.6  Indicators on car ownership and usage, by area type (1995/97) 
Indicators Rural London Metropolitan Large Urban Great Britain 
(Average) 
Percentage of 
Households with 
a Car 
83 61 59 69 69 
Annual Car  
Mileage 
10,200 7,800 9,000 9,200 9,600 
Public transport as a 
Percentage of all 
Journeys 
4 20 14 9 9 
 
Source:  Road Fuel Prices and Taxation, House of Commons Library, Research Paper 
00/69 (2000) p. 31. 
 
Table 5.6 represents information from the National Travel Survey and reflects a 
significant level of rural dependence on car transport. This issue has been of concern 
to rural communities and the Scottish Government. According to the Rural Scotland 
Price Survey conducted by Mackay Consultants for Highlands & Islands Enterprise in 
1999/2000, the price of unleaded petrol in the Highlands and Islands was 9.5% higher 
than in Aberdeen, and diesel was 11.3% higher.53 However, these differences reflect 
factors other than fuel duty, such as the cost of delivering fuel to those locations, local 
monopolies or oligopolies, etc. 
 
One of the principles behind levying excise duties is that they can be charged across 
the board by all who purchase the good or service. However, with fuel duties it is 
                                                 
52 Glaister, S & Graham, D., AA Motoring Policy: The Effects of Fuel Prices on Motorists 11 (2000). 
Available online at 
http://www.iam.org.uk/OneStopCMS/Core/CrawlerResourceServer.aspx?resource=87d12e8eea0246a4
8635b8d4a2fda12b&mode=link&guid=a20d8e9570844535afb60a9b90ebe590, last visited on 12 
September 2009.  
53 See Bolton et al.; supra note 22, at p. 43. 
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likely that this principle will produce distributional effects, considering the greater 
reliance by rural dwellers on private transportation. The application of fuel tax 
exemptions or relief’s tailored to specific locations might subsidise an individual’s 
decision to live in a given place, possibly without regard to the circumstances in 
which they make the choice to live there. It has to be argued that compensation for 
living in these areas, as well as support for businesses located there, could better be 
addressed through the benefit system,54 or by the provision of regional aid.55 
 
5.2.8 Transport in rural areas in the UK 
Rural transport provision depends on the ability to overcome accessibility issues. In 
this context, accessibility means the ease with which people can obtain the services 
and facilities that they desire. Thus, accessibility is seen as the instrument for 
achieving social justice, greater social inclusion, and sustainability of rural 
communities.56 Figure 5.b shows the vicious cycles of public transport demand in 
rural areas, particularly those adjacent to urban areas. In one of such cycles, increased 
car ownership enables rural inhabitants to access urban facilities where goods and 
services are relatively cheaper. There is also more choice in urban locations and some 
rural dwellers who work in urban cities can do their shopping close to their place of 
work.  
 
                                                 
54 HM Treasury, Tax Ready Reckoner and Tax Reliefs Table 2 (2007). Available online at 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr_csr07_taxreadyreckoner.pdf, last visited on 12 September 2009. 
Also see House of Commons Library, The Burden of Taxation, Research Paper 03/74 (2000). Available 
online at http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2003/rp03-074.pdf, last visited on 12 
September 2009. 
55 See Bolton et al.; supra note 22, at p. 45. 
56 Brake, J & Nelson, J. D., A Case Study of Flexible Solutions to Transport Demand in a Deregulated 
Environment 263, Journal of Transport Geography 15 (2007). See Bannister, D., The Reality of the 
Rural Transport Problem pp38-41, Discussion Paper 1, Rees Jeffreys Road Fund ‘Transport and 
Society’ Papers (1989). Also see McDonagh, J., Transport Policy Instruments and Transport-Related 
Social Exclusion in Rural Republic of Ireland 356, Journal of Transport Geography 14 (2006). 
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Consequently, this can reduce significantly the demand for goods and services in rural 
locations and force a decline in rural facilities. This can in turn increase the benefits of 
owning a car and create a further increase in car ownership. In another vicious cycle, 
this triggers a reduced demand for public transport. Consequently, bus operators 
suffer reduced revenues or incur losses and may respond by increasing fares or 
reducing the frequency of service. These responses are seen by potential public 
transport users as inadequate and poor quality public transport service. As a result, 
there is an increase in the benefit of car ownership which gives rise to greater car 
ownership. The problem can be compounded by the recent demographic changes 
whereby there has been an increasing influx of high income earners from urban areas 
and wealthy retirees into rural areas. 
 
One way of counteracting the vicious cycle is for the local authority to subsidise bus 
companies operating in rural areas.57 However, if subsidy funds dry up, the bus 
operators are likely to respond by reducing service frequency and/or increasing fares, 
or withdrawing services altogether. Each time a cycle of decline is completed, the 
most vulnerable members of the communities (low income earners, elderly, disabled, 
young persons) bear the greater brunt of less access to employment, goods, and 
services. 
 
The Transport Act of 197858 placed the burden of provision of socially desirable 
transport services onto local authorities. As a result, few policies have been 
specifically directed by the government towards rural transport issues. However, 
                                                 
57 See Brake & Nelson; supra note 56, at p. 264. 
58 See UK Transport Act 1978. Available online at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/RevisedStatutes/Acts/ukpga/1978/cukpga_19780055_en_1, last visited on 20 
September 2009. 
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under the 1985 Transport Act,59 registered public transport services in the UK were 
deregulated and this event marked a new era for transport provision in rural areas. 
However, prior to the enactment of this Act the UK Government reasoned that local 
councils together with the operations of a free market system could ensure adequate 
provision of rural transport needs. Subsequently, the former network of public 
transport services in rural areas were replaced by skeletal commercial services and 
local authority supported services.  
 
Figure 5.b  Vicious cycle of demand for public transport in rural areas 
 
 
Source:  Transport Operations Research Group: A Case Study of Flexible Solutions 
to Transport Demand in a Deregulated Environment, p. 264. 
 
 
To facilitate the provision of these services, the government proposed to increase 
funding to the Rural Development Council for: community transport schemes; 
provision of four years of transitional funding when changes to licensing regulations 
                                                 
59 See UK Transport Act 1985. Available online at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/RevisedStatutes/Acts/ukpga/1985/cukpga_19850067_en_1, last visited on 20 
September 2009. 
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meant that local councils could not specify which services the bus operators would 
offer; and removal of cross-subsidy of less profitable routes by profitable routes.60 
However, statistics from the Department of Transport (DoT) in 1996 (i.e. about 
twelve years later) indicated that rural areas lack bus services (see Table 5.7).  
 
Table 5.7  Frequency of bus services by population density in Great  
 Britain (percentages of households), 1996 
 
Frequency of Service Built-Up 
Areas 
Towns over 
25k 
Towns 3-
25k 
Rural 
Areas 
15 mins or less 53 38 12 7 
About every 30 mins 31 35 32 18 
About every 60 mins 5 10 25 21 
Less frequent daily 
service 
- 2 10 29 
No daily service - - 2 8 
 
Source:  Root et al., The Costs of Rural Travel (1996) p. 26. 
 
The UK Government’s view is that this could be improved or alternative modes of 
transport have to be considered. This situation accounts for why rural dwellers are 
heavily reliant on private vehicles. The study conducted by Root et al demonstrates 
that a higher percentage of rural households use cars than urban households (81% 
compared to 65%). Similarly, a higher percentage of rural households (37%) have two 
or more cars than urban households (21%).61 Gray, in his estimation of rural reliance 
on car journeys, found that around 24% of rural car journeys are completely 
dependent on the car, and 35% of rural car journeys are heavily reliant on the car. 
However, he contends that there may be a significant potential for a modal shift, with 
                                                 
60 Root et al., Sustainable Mobility and Accessibility in Rural Transport: The Costs of Rural Travel p. 
25 (1996). Available online at http://www.eci.ox.ac.uk/research/energy/downloads/smartreport.pdf, last 
visited on 20 September 2009. 
61 See id., p. 26. 
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20% of the journeys being either reliant/discretionary or discretionary usage of the 
car.62 
 
Table 5.8 indicates that rural households spend 18% more on energy (i.e. fuels and 
power) and less on environmentally friendlier forms of transport (i.e. buses and 
trains). Consequently, rural households are expected to contribute more per household 
to carbon emissions than non-rural households. These costs when considered together 
with other higher costs of living place an additional constraint on rural inhabitants’ 
budget. The adverse effects of transport are generally felt more acutely in remote rural 
areas than in towns or the neighbouring countryside. Also, total motor costs are higher 
in rural than in urban areas. This finding is in line with Gray’s findings on the cost of 
rural motoring.63 However, low population densities make it difficult to provide 
adequate substitutes, such as conventional public transport services. 
 
Nevertheless, many schemes have been devised to improve access to essential public 
transport services in rural areas. Some are based on government initiatives and some 
based on endogenous self-help efforts with the cooperation of local councils. The 
latter include community buses, taxi buses, post buses, social car schemes, and in less 
remote locations, dial-a-ride services. Some of the social car schemes would include 
education (school buses), social and other care service transport, and non-emergency 
patient transport services. Such innovative transport schemes are mostly dependent on 
                                                 
62 Gray, D., Rural Transport: An Overview of Key Issues p. 25, prepared for the Commission for 
Integrated Transport (2001). Available online at 
http://cfit.independent.gov.uk/pubs/2001/rural/rural/key/pdf/rural.pdf, last visited on 20 September 
2009. Car dependent are journeys which could not be made without a car. Journeys that rely heavily on 
access to a car; i.e. trips which would be extremely inconvenient to make by another mode. Car reliant 
journeys for which less convenient, rapid or flexible alternatives to the car do exist. Car reliant/ 
discretionary journeys which are usually made by car but which could be made by another mode 
without too much inconvenience. Discretionary journeys which could quite easily be undertaken by a 
mode other than the car 
63 See id., pp. 29-30. 
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voluntary help, and on financial assistance from the Rural Development Commission, 
local authorities, etc.64 
 
Table 5.8  Household expenditure on transport (£/week) by population  
 density in the UK, 1995 
Item 
 
Household 
Expenditure 
 
Greater  
London 
 
316.25 
Other  
Metropolitan 
Areas 
255.27 
High 
Population  
Density 
282.32 
Medium 
Population  
Density 
293.61 
Low 
Population 
Density 
289.19 
Fuel/Power 12.05 12.90 12.22 13.17 13.85 
Total Motor Costs 30.94 31.60 36.45 38.05 40.6 
New Car/Van 
Purchase 
2.43 2.93 6.22 3.61 5.67 
Petrol 7.74 8.05 9.78 10.61 11.44 
Diesel 0.38 0.41 0.53 0.61 1.13 
Insurance & Tax 5.87 5.45 6.16 6.42 6.62 
Repairs, etc 3.88 2.78 3.10 3.27 4.10 
Second-hand 
Car/Van 
7.91 9.22 7.24 10.27 8.74 
Rail & Tube 
Fares (excl. 
season tickets) 
2.31 0.49 1.17 1.38 0.76 
Bus & Coach 
Fares (excl. 
season tickets) 
1.53 1.95 1.30 1.20 0.82 
Motor Costs as a 
% of Total 
Expenditure 
9.8 12.4 12.90 13.0 14.0 
Rail & Bus Fares 
as a % of Motor 
Expenditure 
12 8 7 7 4 
 
Notes: Population density (persons per household), High: > 7-9; Medium: 2.2-7.9; 
and Low: < 2.2. Table only lists selected aspects of motor costs. 
Source:  Source: Root et al., The Costs of Rural Travel (1996) p. 28. 
 
Government policies towards rural public transport have been scanty, primarily 
because of the deregulation of transport services. However, there are a few 
                                                 
64 Nutley, S. D., Unconventional Modes of Transport in Rural Britain: Progress to 1985 pp. 73-86, 
Journal of Rural Studies, Vol. 4 (1), 1988. Also, see the Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution; supra note 8, at p. 181. 
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examples.65 Under the Bus Service Operators Grant (BSOG), the registration of a bus 
service entitles the operator to a fuel duty rebate from central government. The 
government set up a Rural Transport Partnership Fund in its 1998 White Paper on 
Integrated Transport. The partnership comprises local authorities, private sector, 
community, and voluntary transport sectors. The pool of funds is allocated to projects 
that generate long-term improvements to public transport services, and those that help 
reduce social exclusion of rural people.  
 
Table 5.9  Projected rural transport funding, UK 
Rural Public Transport Funding 1995-98 
(£) 
1998-2001 
(£) 
2001-04 
(£) 
Rural Bus Subsidy Grant - 90 132 
Rural Bus Challenge - 48 60 
Countryside Agency 4.8 17 47 
Total 4.8 155 239 
Source:  Gray, D., Rural Transport, p. 34. 
 
In 1998, the Rural Bus Subsidy Grant was introduced in order to improve rural bus 
services, including their administration and marketing. The interaction of this grant 
with free bus travel for elderly people (over 60s) throughout Scotland caused an 
increase in bus usage generally. The Rural Bus Subsidy Grant funds rural 
transportation with an annual budget of around £32.5 million and is administered by 
county councils and unitary authorities. In England and Wales, the Rural Bus 
Challenge (RBC) Fund was introduced in 1998 with the objective of creating cost-
effective innovative rural public transport and was administered by the Department 
                                                 
65 See Brake & Nelson; supra note 56, at p. 263. 
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for Transport. This fund was phased out in 2004. There is also the Parish Transport 
Fund administered by the Countryside Agency. The Scottish Government also set up 
the Scottish Rural Community Transport Initiative. 
 
Table 5.9 shows the projected rural transport funding under these schemes from 1995 
to 2004. There are also a few other fuel subsidy schemes in the UK.66 Agriculture is 
subsidised. However, the subsidy applies to tractors, generators, combines, and grain 
dryers, but not to vehicles used for transportation of produce and livestock to market. 
The Fishing Fleet Diesel Fuel Subsidy applies to marine diesel used by fishermen, and 
attracts zero tax and duty. There is also a 75% Fuel Duty Rebate for buses that use 
Ultra Low Sulphur Diesel (ULSD). The Energy Saving Trust Scheme provides grant 
for conversion of cars and vans to liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and compressed 
natural gas (CNG) (i.e. cleaner fuels).  
 
However, a number of schemes have been proposed or recommended by some 
associations and interest groups. These include:67 The Essential User Rebate Scheme 
(EUR) for hauliers; a reduction in VAT levels for motorists and/or businesses located 
in rural areas; excise duty rebate for all classes of transport in rural areas; Vehicle 
Excise Duty reduction on a graduated scale based on carbon dioxide emissions; Rural 
Services Fund; Rural Transport Grant; Rural Travel Bonus; Tax-Free Travel 
Vouchers; and Rural Council Tax Rebate. Most of these proposals have not been 
granted, because of the technical difficulties involved with their design, 
implementation and monitoring. 
 
                                                 
66 See Trade and Industry Committee Report (5th); supra note 29, at pp. xxiv, 93, 151, and 152. 
67 See id, pp. 40-41, 58, 70, 150-2, and 156. 
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Non-transport solutions have also been sought. Firstly, some town planners have 
thought about concentrating rural populations into larger settlements or key villages 
that might support the provision of essential services. Secondly, the development of 
telecommunications may enable the provision of some services remotely, thereby 
reducing the need to travel.68 This may also create additional rural employment (e.g. 
telecottages). These measures might somewhat reduce the extent of car travel in rural 
areas. In suitable rural locations, these measures could be combined with other 
environmentally friendly transport modes (e.g. cycling and walking) by creating better 
conditions for these. However, the most difficult problem arises in the less isolated 
rural areas, especially those closest to large conurbations (i.e. suburban locations). In 
this case, road improvements, population dispersal and changes in land use combine 
to generate large flows of traffic with attendant high levels of pollution. There are also 
pressures for the construction of new infrastructure. 
 
The 18th report on Transport and the Environment (The Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution) noted that increases in fuel prices will not in themselves 
bring about a switch to public transport on the scale that would be desirable on 
environmental grounds. It also noted that public contributions, by way of subsidies, to 
the cost of providing public transport can be justified on both social and 
environmental grounds.69 The report also identified that trains, buses, and trams are 
significantly more energy efficient on average compared to cars and lorries, and that 
                                                 
68 Farrington, et al., Sustainable Transport Policy and People Living in Rural Areas: A Policy Paper, 
pp. 11-21, Prepared for the Scottish Consumer Council, Glasgow (1996). See Wilson, R. H., Rural 
Telecommunications: A Strategy for Community Development pp. 289-300, Policy Studies Journal 20-2 
(1992).  See Kay, D. L et al., Role of Services in Regional Economic Growth, pp. 419-442, Journal of 
Growth and Change 38-3 (2007). Available online at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-
bin/fulltext/118493001/PDFSTART, last visited on 20 September 2009. For more details on 
alternatives to car travel, see the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution; supra note 8, at pp. 
181-190. 
69 See id., p. 246. 
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buses and coaches make more efficient use of existing road facilities. The report 
concluded that a sustainable transport policy for the future must have the objective of 
increasing the proportion of personal travel and freight transport by using 
environmentally less damaging transport modes.70 
 
There are suggestions that public transport should be subsidised on a consistent basis 
or that subsidies where present should be increased to discourage people from using 
their cars or acquiring one and instead use buses and trains.71 The argument behind 
these suggestions is that if public transport is closely linked to lower social costs than 
private transport, then lowering the costs of public transport is an alternative to raising 
the costs of private car usage. However, the social cost of transport varies with 
location, time, and traffic conditions, and so it could be expected that the differential 
costs between public and private transport would similarly vary.  
 
Thus, designing ideal subsidies for rural locations is a complicated exercise. This is 
more so, if subsidies translate to an under-reflection of the social costs of road 
transport. In this case, subsidising public transport could attract new users, including 
people who have moved away from other forms of transport. Consequently, such a 
policy will produce an undesirable side-effect to a policy aimed initially at reducing 
the impact of transport decisions on society. Rail and most bus services in the UK are 
now privatised and government may be reluctant to subsidise directly many fares 
under a free market system. Government subsidies would largely depend on how 
prices are regulated and also on the public’s acceptance of large subsidies to 
privatised industries. 
                                                 
70 See id., p. 245.  
71 See Blow & Crawford; supra note 9, at p. 29. 
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Empirical evidence suggests that cross-price elasticity of demand between transport 
modes is low, thus subsidies to public transport may not be too effective in 
discouraging people from car ownership and usage.72 Some commentators (e.g. 
Newbery) suggest that quality improvements in public transportation may be a better 
way of encouraging a switch from private to public transport. An example is 
providing more road space to buses and less to private cars. Another argument that 
affects the policy of subsidising public transport is that the application of subsidies 
requires public funds. These are generated through taxes, and so such a policy may 
result in distortions to other sectors of the economy. 
5.2.9 Other policy options 
 
Of all the components of fuel price, the wholesalers’ and retailers’ margins have the 
greatest influence on the differential between rural and urban fuel prices. VAT tends 
to magnify this differential because it is charged on the full selling price (excise duty 
included). For instance, a differential of 7.2 ppl between the Highlands and Islands 
and urban Scotland would be 6.1 ppl without VAT.73  
 
The wholesale and retail gross margins are much higher in rural areas due to three 
factors. The first relates to transport costs. Fuel suppliers have to deliver fuels over 
long distances (on poor road networks) to a sparse network of fuel stations. Evidence 
from the OFT report (1998) shows that the extra cost of delivery to North West 
Scotland is 2p per litre more than elsewhere.74 The second pertains to retailers’ 
overheads, which tend to be higher because of the smaller turnover than that of other 
                                                 
72 See id., p. 29. 
73 The Scottish Parliament (The Information Centre), Rural Petrol Prices 4, Research Note 99-52 
(1999). Available online at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/pdf_res_notes/rn99-
52.pdf, last visited on 12 September 2009. 
74 See OFT Report 230; supra note 1, at p. 71. 
  
281 
fuel stations in urban locations. The third factor is accounted for by the impact of 
competition and supermarket fuel discounting. Fuel discounting in urban areas 
implies that margins tend to be lower relative to rural areas. Some rural areas adjacent 
to urban locations are affected by this competition and attract lower margins 
compared to some other rural locations. For example, the fuel market in North West 
Scotland is regarded as separate from the rest of the UK and insulated from the strong 
competition that ensued with the introduction of Esso’s Pricewatch and supermarkets’ 
entry and expansion into fuel retailing.75 
 
The current focus is on pursuing policies that enable fuel stations to remain open by 
reducing their operating costs. This, rather than reducing the prices they charge, could 
enable them to survive. For example, the UK Government secured derogation from 
the EU Petrol Vapour Recovery Directive for small stations in rural areas (north of the 
central belt). Implementation of the directive in the affected rural areas would have 
entailed a capital cost of around £3,000 per station.  
 
A current Health and Safety Executive directive requires fuel retailers to carry out 
more regular testing of storage tanks, particularly when the tanks are 20-, 25-, and 30-
years old, with twice a year tests afterwards.76 The estimated cost for each test was 
put at around £500 per tank.77 Meeting the cost of compliance with this regulation is 
hardest for those retailers with low margins and low-volume throughput, and these are 
usually independent fuel retailers in rural areas. Most retailers in these local 
communities have cited environmental pressures as one of the major causes of their 
                                                 
75 See id., p. 69. 
76 House of Commons (Trade and Industry Committee 6th Report), Petrol Retailing xix (Session 1995-
1996). 
77 H. Fox; Social & Economic Impact: Petroleum Prices & Distribution in the Highlands and Islands 
para. 1.2.11 (1996). 
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closure. The Rural Development Commission has expressed concerns in recent years 
regarding the cost of meeting regulatory standards in rural areas. Although 
exemptions and derogations have reduced the environmental burden on some 
qualified fuel retailers, however the discretion available to the enforcing authorities is 
limited and their approach differs from locality to locality. 
 
It might also be argued that the requirement for full closure of sites with tanks filled 
with concrete could deter entry or exit by imposing huge costs on a company that 
must exit the market. Conversely, new entry might occur with the re-opening of such 
closed sites. However, due to this requirement, re-opening of these sites may be as 
difficult as constructing new ones.78 The Scottish Government operates the rural 
transport fund, and a percentage of this fund is used to help rural fuel stations with 
tank replacement and groundwater issues. Local authorities have discretionary powers 
to provide rate relief of up to 100% to fuel stations under the wider rate relief for 
village shops and post offices scheme.79 
 
Other possibilities have been suggested. The first one is duty derogation. This 
involves applying lower rates of duty to rural areas. The UK Government could apply 
for a similar derogation for specific policy considerations which would require 
unanimous EC Council agreement (article 8.4 of EC Council Directive 92/81).80 This 
has been permitted in the Azores and on certain Greek Islands (article 9 of EC 
                                                 
78 OFT Report 230; supra note 1, at p. 22. 
79 House of Commons Library, Rural Rate Relief 26, Research Paper 01/47 (2001). Available online at 
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2001/rp01-047.pdf, last visited on 15 September, 
2009. 
80 The details on this EC Directive are available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:51999PC0632:EN:HTML, last visited on 25 
October 2009. For more information on duty derogation, see The Scottish Parliament (The Information 
Centre), European Petrol Retailing pp. 1-3, Research Note 01/38 (2000). Available online at 
http://polfest.org/business/research/pdf_res_notes/rn00-38.pdf, last visited on 12 September 2009. 
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Council Directive 92/82).81 However, there would be technical difficulties in 
delineating the boundaries of the areas that could benefit from such derogation. This 
might arise because it is difficult to monitor the influx of motorists from adjacent 
areas to those that benefit from derogation. 
 
The second is essential user rebates. To counteract the technical difficulties involved 
with duty derogation or reduction the suggestion is that a more effective way might be 
to target essential users in particular areas as eligible for discounted fuels at rural fuel 
stations.82 A number of issues would have to be considered in this case, such as 
definitions of how peripheral a location need be to qualify for the rebates, of the 
income band that qualifies for essential user rebate, and what constitutes an essential 
user. 
 
The third possibility is reducing dependence on the car. Motorists in rural locations 
face the same fuel price or duty increases as those in urban areas, but the realities of 
rural life and the lack of public transport alternatives constrain their ability to reduce 
car usage in response to price increases. Nevertheless, government can reduce the 
need to travel among rural communities by supporting rural shops and services, and 
innovative modes of transport through the Rural Transport Fund.83 For example, the 
Scottish Rural Transport Fund managed by the Scottish Government supports the 
                                                 
81 The details on this EC Directive are available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=31992
L0082&model=guichett, last visited on 25 October 2009. 
82 See Scottish Parliament Research Note 99-52; supra note 73, at 7-8. The UK Road Haulage 
Association, in a memorandum submitted to the Trade and Industry Committee, also made a case for 
the application of Essential User Rebate Scheme to domestic hauliers. For more details, see Trade and 
Industry (5th report); supra note 29, at 40-41. 
83 The Scottish Parliament (The Information Centre), Rural Transport Initiatives 2-6, Research Note 
01/48 (2001). Available online at 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/pdf_res_notes/rn01-48.pdf, last visited on 12 
September 2009. 
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Rural Public Passenger Transport Grant, the Rural Community Transport Initiative, 
and the Rural Petrol Stations Grants. The downside to this policy is that it is likely to 
take a long time to implement measures that reduce car dependency, due to the lack of 
viable interim alternatives. 
5.2.10 EU taxation of energy products and environmental policy 
Some environmental regulatory measures in regard to road transport are in force in 
the UK, mainly through the adoption of EC directives on emission standards for 
vehicles which were introduced in 1989 and 1991.84 The directives set the emission 
standards for vehicles and based on these, all new cars from January 1993 must meet 
the emission standards through the fitting of a catalytic converter. 
 
To promote EU environmental objectives and in keeping with the Kyoto protocol, the 
EU devised a community system of minimum rates for the taxation of energy 
products and electricity.85 This is aimed at encouraging more efficient use of energy, 
mainly to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in order to protect the 
environment. A second objective is to improve the internal market mechanisms and 
thereby reduce competition distortions between mineral oils and other energy 
products. However, this taxation system is applicable only to products used as motor 
or heating fuels and to electricity. To facilitate environmental protection, the EU 
authorises member states to grant tax advantages to businesses that take specific 
measures to reduce their GHG emissions. 
The Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructured the taxation rates 
for various energy products. Table 5.10 shows the minimum levels of taxation 
                                                 
84 See Blow & Crawford; supra note 9, at p. 26. 
85 EC Directive 2003/96/EC; Community Framework for the Taxation of Energy Products and 
Electricity. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:283:0051:0070:EN:PDF, visited on 15 
October 2009. 
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applicable to motor fuels. The Directive allows member states to differentiate between 
energy products used for transportation and those used for industrial or commercial 
purposes.  
Table 5.10  EU minimum levels of taxation applicable to motor fuel 
Products 
(Euro) 
Current Minimum 
Excise Rates 
Minimum Excise 
Rates From 
01.01.2004 
Minimum Excise 
Rates From 
01.01.2010 
Petrol (/1000 l.) 337 421 421 
Unleaded petrol 
(/1000 l.) 
287 359 359 
Diesel (/1000 l.) 245 302 330 
Kerosene (/1000 l.) 245 302 330 
LPG (/1000 l.) 100 125 125 
Natural gas 100 (/1 000 kg) 2.6 (/gigajoule) 2.6 (/gigajoule) 
(The volumes are measured at a temperature of 15°C). 
Source:  EU Community Framework for the Taxation of Energy Products and 
Electricity 
 
Table 5.11 shows the minimum levels of taxation applicable to fuels for industrial 
and commercial uses. The minimum levels of taxation are lower than those used for 
transport purpose. Fuels are considered as raw materials for industrial and commercial 
purposes, and these include agriculture; horticulture; forestry; stationary motors; 
vehicles intended for use off the public roadway; civil engineering and public works; 
plants and machinery used in construction. Table 5.12 also shows the minimum levels 
of taxation applicable to heating fuels and electricity, which are even lower when 
compared to those applied to industrial and commercial use.  
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Table 5.11  EU minimum levels of taxation applicable to fuels for  
 industrial or commercial use  
Products 
Current Minimum Excise 
Rates 
Minimum excise Rates 
From 1.1.2004 
Diesel (/1000 l.) 18 21 
Kerosene (/1000 l.) 18 21 
LPG (/1000 kg.) 36 41 
Natural gas 36 (/1 000 kg) 0.3 (/gigajoule) 
(The volumes are measured at a temperature of 15°C). 
Source:  EU Community Framework for the Taxation of Energy Products and 
Electricity. 
 
However, the Directive provided for differentiated rates of taxation based on a 
number of conditions: “when the differentiated rates are directly linked to product 
quality; when the differentiated rates depend on quantitative consumption levels for 
electricity and energy products used for heating purposes; or the following uses: local 
public passenger transport (including taxis), waste collection, armed forces and public 
administration, disabled people, ambulances; between business and non-business use, 
for the energy products and electricity”.86 
 
 
Moreover, the Directive in certain cases provided for exemptions; total or partial 
exemptions; or reduction in the level of taxation depending on the local circumstances 
in a member state. The following activities are completely exempt from taxation: 
“energy products and electricity used to produce electricity and electricity used to 
maintain the ability to produce electricity. However, member states may, for reasons 
                                                 
86 See Article 5 of the EC Directive 2003/96/EC. 
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of environmental policy, subject these products to taxation, i.e. energy products 
supplied for use as fuel for the purpose of air navigation other than in private pleasure 
flying; energy products supplied for use as fuel for the purposes of navigation within 
Community waters, including fishing, other than private pleasure craft, and electricity 
produced on board a craft”.87 
 
Table 5.12  EU minimum levels of taxation applicable to heating fuels  
 and electricity  
 
Products 
Current Minimum 
Excise Rates 
Minimum Excise 
Rates From 
1.1.2004 (Business 
Use) 
Minimum Excise 
Rates From 
1.1.2004 (Non-
business Use) 
Diesel (/1000 l.) 18 21 21 
Heavy fuel oil 
(/1000 kg.) 
13 15 15 
Kerosene (/1000 l.) 0 0 0 
LPG (/1000 kg.) 0 0 0 
Natural gas 
(/gigajoule) 
- 0.15 0.3 
Coal and coke 
(/gigajoule) 
- 0.15 0.3 
Electricity (/MWh) - 0.5 1.0 
(The volumes are measured at a temperature of 15°C). 
Source:  EU Community Framework for the Taxation of Energy Products and 
Electricity 
 
 
The following activities qualify for either total/partial exemption or a reduction in 
their taxation levels: “energy products used under fiscal control in the field of pilot 
                                                 
87 See Article 11 of the EC Directive 2003/96/EC. 
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projects for the technological development of more environmentally-friendly products 
or in relation to fuels from renewable sources; biofuels; forms of energy which are of 
solar, wind, tidal or geothermal origin, or from biomass or waste; energy products and 
electricity used for the carriage of goods and passengers by rail, metro, tram and 
trolley bus; energy products supplied for use as fuel for navigation on inland 
waterways (including fishing) other than in private pleasure craft, and electricity 
produced on board a craft; natural gas and LPG used as propellants”.88 
 
The differentiated rates of taxation, total or partial exemptions, and reductions in 
taxation also align with the EU consumer policy strategy.89This strategy is expected to 
shift the focus of regulation in favour of citizen-focused outcomes, which could be 
achieved by addressing market failures that harm consumer welfare and enhancing 
socio-economic inclusion and cohesion through guaranteeing access to essential 
services and products at affordable prices.90 In this way, the EU consumer policy 
coupled with these exemptions could be instrumental in guaranteeing core European 
values of fairness, openness, solidarity, sustainability, and transparency. 
  
In addition to these differentiated rates of taxation, derogations, and reductions in 
taxation, there are available grants from the Cohesion Fund for the establishment and 
development of trans-European networks for transport, telecommunications and 
energy. The objective of the fund is to promote the harmonious development of the 
Community and the internal market. The report recommended that the European 
                                                 
88 See Article 14 of the EC Directive 2003/96/EC. 
89 EU Consumer Policy Strategy (2007-2013); Empowering Consumers, Enhancing Their Welfare, 
Effectively Protecting Them. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/overview/cons_policy/doc/EN_99.pdf , last visited on 18 September 
2009. Also see Department of Trade & Industry (DTI) Consultative Document: Extending Competitive 
Markets: Empowered Consumers, Successful Business pp. 14-28 (2004). 
90 See EU Consumer Policy Strategy; supra note 89, at p. 3.  
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Commission should give support only to those developments which are consistent 
with sustainable development and respect for the environment. The report advocated 
the pursuit of measures that increase the cost of transport to reflect the environmental 
and social costs at the Community level, in order to protect the competitive position 
of member states. 
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5.3 Australia 
5.3.1 Components of fuel retail prices 
The components of fuel pump prices consist of crude oil costs (including 
transportation to the refinery); refinery costs (including distribution costs and 
wholesale margin); fuel duty plus VAT (including State franchise fee); and the retail 
margin. Table 5.13 shows the breakdown of retail petrol price in Australia as at 1999. 
Similar to the UK, crude oil accounts for about 26% of the pump price whereas the 
total duty (including GST and State fee) accounts for about 60%. Table 5.14 
represents a five-city annual average of the components of Australian retail petrol 
price from 2003-07, and indicates that the average fuel tax has declined from 51.4% 
in 2003-04 to 40.5% in 2006-07. 
 
Table 5.13 Australian retail petrol price components, 1999 
Components of Petrol  
Retail Price 
Percentage 
100 
Refinery Feedstock 26 
Refinery Charges 1 
Distribution 9 
Fuel Excise plus GST 47 
State Franchise Fee 12 
Gross Retail Margin 5 
Source:  Petroleum refining and marketing in Australia – Changes Ahead, Australian 
Parliamentary Library (1999). 
 
5.3.2 Wholesale and retail price regulation 
 The wholesale and retail pricing of fuels in Australia is dictated by international 
factors: the price of crude oil, the international market for refined fuels, and the US/ 
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AUS exchange rate. The dynamics for fuel pricing is much the same as in other 
OECD countries.91 The difference between the pump price of fuels in one jurisdiction 
and another lies in the level of taxes and excise duties. About 70% of oil consumed by 
Australian refineries is imported. Australian crude producers are free to export crude 
oil and petroleum products into international markets as well as sell these within 
Australia, depending on where they get better prices.  
 
Table 5.14 Components of Australian retail petrol prices (five-city annual 
average), 2003-04 to 2006-07 
Components of  
Retail Price92  
2003-04 
Average 
Price  
90.30 cpl 
2004-05 
Average 
Price 
100.6 cpl 
2005-06 
Average 
Price 
121.1 cpl 
2006-07 
Average 
Price 
121.6 cpl 
Crude Oil 29.6 41.6 56.6 56.1 
Gasoline Crack 
(Refining Costs) 
6.1 3.0 4.2 3.7 
Wholesale Margin 
(excl. GST) 
4.3 5.3 7.4 8.1 
Excise + Wholesale 
and Retail GST 
(TAXES) 
46.4 
(51.4%) 
47.3 
(47.0%) 
49.2 
(40.6%) 
49.2 
(40.5%) 
Retail Margin 
(excl. GST) 
3.9 3.4 3.8 4.4 
Source:  Report of the ACCC Inquiry into the Price of Unleaded Petrol (2007) p. 129 
 
International prices for fuels are determined by the forces of supply and demand and 
not production costs, in line with other internationally traded commodities.93 The 
                                                 
91 See Report of ACCC Inquiry into the Price of Unleaded Petrol: Petrol Prices & Australian 
Consumers 127 (2007). Available online at   
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/806216, last visited on 29 September 2009. Also 
see Australia: Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Petrol Prices in Australia 5-18 (2006). 
Available online at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/SENATE/COMMITTEE/economics_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-
07/petrol_price/report/report.pdf, last visited on 29 September 2009. 
92 Excise is a flat value levied by the government on petrol leaving a refinery. The GST, which is the 
UK equivalent of VAT, is levied on the final price of petrol at a flat rate of 10%. The margins represent 
the additional price added by both the wholesaler/distributor and the retailers to cover the costs of 
distribution and retailing and provision for profits. 
93 See id., pp. 54-56. Also see Watson, C., Petrol Prices: Fair or Not? pp. 11-12, Institute of Public 
Affairs (IPA) Review Article (1999). Available online at http://www.ipa.org.au/library/review51-
3%20Petrol%20Prices%20Fair%20or%20Not.pdf, last visited on 12 September 
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Singapore refinery price (Singapore Mogas 95 Unleaded) is the international refined 
petrol benchmark for the Asia–Pacific region.94 
 
Although crude oil accounts for a small percentage of the pump price, it can affect the 
prices of fuels quite significantly. Since the years 2003-08, the prices of fuels have 
increased markedly because of the increase in world crude oil prices arising from 
increased demand from China, political uncertainty in the Middle East, high gasoline 
demand from North America, thirty year low of oil stocks in the OECD countries, and 
supply uncertainty in Iraq, Nigeria, Russia, and Venezuela.95 Most recently, pump 
prices have risen following supply concerns in Russia, Iraq, and Nigeria, and 
increased levels of the US and UK terror alert. Consequently, retail fuel prices do 
reflect these factors in addition to wholesale and retail margins, transportation and 
storage costs within Australia, franchise fees and bulk breaking costs. Fuel prices are 
also affected by intense competition for market share, especially in metropolitan 
cities, which often leads to discount cycles. 
 
The price of fuels paid by consumers therefore reflects market forces. Prices are set 
by fuel retailers in accordance with their estimation of the demand and competition in 
their localities. Price differentials exist because fuel prices in regional centres and 
country areas reflect the size of, and competition within, the local fuel market. 
 
                                                 
94 Australian Institute Petroleum Publication, Facts about Petrol Prices 1 (2007). Available online at 
http://www.aip.com.au/pricing/pdf/Facts%20About%20Petrol%20Prices.pdf, last visited on 14 
September 2009. 
95 See Australian Government (Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism), Petrol – Frequently 
Asked Questions 4 (2009).  Available online at 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/transport_fuels/Petrol%20Fact%20Sheet%20May%20200,
9.pdf, last visited on 12 September 2009. 
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Based on the foregoing, it is not feasible to regulate the price of crude oil or refinery 
and distribution costs. However, it might be possible to regulate wholesale and retail 
margins, and fuel duty. The latter constitutes more than half of the pump price of fuels 
and so is the most important component of fuel prices in Australia. 
 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) investigated the 
possibilities of regulating both wholesale and retail prices in their search for ways to 
reduce fuel price variability and rural-urban price differentials. The Australian 
Government has indirect powers to regulate prices at the wholesale, retail and 
terminal levels. Although at the Commonwealth level the Australian Government has 
no specific powers to control prices, under s.51 of the constitution it has power to 
‘regulate prices charged by trading, financial, or foreign corporations’.96 Some of the 
States have legislation to regulate fuel prices while some have regulated retail prices 
in the past. Some are planning to introduce retail price caps in certain regional areas, 
e.g. Western Australia. Government price regulation could take the form of setting 
price caps (maximum prices chargeable), minimum prices and specific daily prices, 
thereby controlling price movements.  
 
Through price regulation, price cycles could be limited (where minimum or maximum 
prices are set) or eliminated where specific prices are set. The Australian Price 
Surveillance Act (PSA) 1983 provided for the surveillance of the prices of certain 
goods or services, including petroleum products. However, the ACCC could not set 
prices under the PSA. Therefore, national price regulation can only take place if the 
                                                 
96ACCC Report on Reducing Fuel Price Variability 76 (2001). Available online at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/321896 , last visited on 5 August 2009. The ACCC 
regulated the wholesale prices of oil refiners up to 1 August 1998, after which wholesale prices were 
deregulated, although they could be re-regulated in the future. 
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Commonwealth Government, States and Territories resolve and liaise closely on its 
implementation. 
 
Apart from the arguments that regulation of pump prices would eliminate or limit 
price cycles, the ACCC observed that retailers also favour this option because it could 
give them more certainty to prices and would receive fewer criticisms from their 
customers.  
 
Nevertheless, there are arguments against retail price regulation. Firstly, it could lead 
to higher average prices, if firms have market power and the regulators provide for 
retail margins that may be higher than could be determined in a competitive setting. 
Secondly, it would be difficult for regulators to determine retail margins considering 
the different cost structures across the retail sector, the range and nature of services 
provided, and the relative turnover from fuel and non-fuel items. Therefore, if the 
price cap is set too high, discounting with attendant price cycles can still occur. It may 
also permit inefficient operators to remain in business. If it is set too low, it may result 
in operators being driven out of business, thereby reducing the degree of competition 
in the industry with possible supply implications. Thirdly, this option may also limit 
or eliminate the ability of retailers to compete on price to attract customers, but rather 
on factors such as quality of service. Fourthly, regulating fuel retail prices would run 
contrary to the global trend towards deregulation and globalisation.97 
 
The PSA price places a cap on wholesale prices to prevent oil majors from charging 
higher prices, particularly in country areas. Ministerial Directions were also put in 
                                                 
97 See id., p. 77. 
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place to ensure that some of the costs of supplying country consumers were not 
reflected in the maximum wholesale price applicable to some districts.98 One major 
limitation to imposing an effective wholesale price regulation is the possibility that 
the oil majors may circumvent it by selling fuels through distributors, particularly in 
country areas. Despite this possibility, the Industry Commission (IC) argues that there 
could be some merit in wholesale price regulation, particularly in some country areas 
where little competition takes place.99 Wholesale price regulation tends to be less 
restrictive than pump price regulation, and placing a cap on wholesale prices could act 
as a ceiling on retail prices, thereby leading to lesser price cycles. This form of 
regulation is usually justified where competition is less intense and wholesale prices 
too high. 
 
On the down side, almost all the arguments against retail price regulation would apply 
to wholesale price regulation. In addition, past experiences in Australia show that 
retail price cycles existed despite wholesale price regulation, and restrictions on 
wholesale prices may not translate into lower retail prices, depending on which party 
appropriates the gains. 
 
Based on the arguments for and against both retail and wholesale price regulation, the 
ACCC concluded in 2001 that these may also lead to results that are inconsistent with 
the public interest. There are practical difficulties involved in determining an 
                                                 
98 Industry Commission Report No 40, Petroleum Products 83 (1994). Available online at   
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/6970/40petrol.pdf , last visited on 22 September 
2009. 
99 See id., p. 78. 
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appropriate price cap or level, as substantiated by the experience of the Western 
Australian Government regarding their operation of a maximum wholesale price.100 
 
Therefore, the ACCC opined that price regulation should be considered as anti-
competitive and should only be considered where there is a proof of market failure. 
Industry analysts argue that intervention in this case (if the aim is to generate long-
term positive effects) could take the form of an integrated industry development 
approach involving creation of change in the local markets or the encouragement of 
new entry. The Commission also recommended the continued close monitoring of 
fuel pricing arrangements in Western Australia.101 This view is supported by some 
commentators (Cousins and Fels), who argue that where industries are highly 
concentrated and barriers to entry high there may be a significant role for ongoing 
price surveillance as this exercise will help boost consumer information and 
confidence. 
 
5.3.3 Fuel tax regulation 
Government taxes represent almost 60% of the pump price,102 whereas Australia’s tax 
revenues from crude oil and LPG have reduced significantly. Thus, petroleum taxes 
have switched from the wellheads in the oilfields (i.e. government tax take from crude 
oil) to the petrol pump or point of sale (i.e. government tax take from refined 
products). The basis for this switch revolves around successive governments’ resolve 
to encourage exploration and development of Australia’s petroleum resources. 
                                                 
100 See IC report No 40; supra note 98, at p. 81. 
101 See id., p. 81. Also see Cousins, D & Fels, A., The Re-Emergence of Price Surveillance 308, UNSW 
Law Journal 32-1 (2009). 
102 Roarty M; Petroleum Refining & Marketing in Australia – Changes Ahead 7, Parliament of 
Australia: Current Issues Brief 11 1999-2000. Available online at http:// 
www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cib11.htm, last visited on 29 September 2009. 
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Likewise successive governments have continued to raise taxes at the pump by 
relying heavily on the relative unresponsiveness of fuel demand to changes in prices. 
 
5.3.3(a) The objectives of fuel tax in Australia 
Petroleum products excise has increasingly become an important source of revenue 
for the Australian Government. In 2001-02, this revenue was estimated to be $12.2 
billion and accounted for 7.5% of total government revenue.103Thus, fuel excise is 
Australia’s largest source of government indirect tax revenue and the third largest 
source of tax revenue after income and company taxes. 
 
Table 5.15  Global policy developments in fuel taxation 
 
Time Policy Development Fuel Tax Objective Fuel Tax Instrument 
Since 
Early 
1900s 
Cost imposed on road 
infrastructure from 
transport fuel users 
Funding road 
infrastructure costs 
Taxation of petroleum 
products used in 
transport 
1900s Economic 
Development 
General revenue raising Taxation of petroleum 
products used in 
transport 
1970s Response to crude oil 
price shocks of mid- to 
late-1970s 
Energy security or fuel 
diversity, via 
encouragement of 
substitute products 
Low or zero fuel tax 
rates on petroleum 
substitute products 
1980s Increased awareness of 
the effects of fuel use 
on the environment and 
human health 
Reducing the costs of 
some fuel use 
Low or zero fuel tax 
rates on petroleum 
substitute products 
Early 
2000s 
Effects of change on 
regional and rural 
communities, 
especially primary 
production 
Regional development 
and industry assistance 
Low or zero fuel tax 
rates on petroleum 
substitute products 
produced from 
agricultural products 
Source:  Report of the Inquiry into Fuel Taxation (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2002) p. 9 
 
                                                 
103 Commonwealth of Australia; Report on Fuel Tax Inquiry 85 (2002). Available online at 
http://fueltaxinquiry.treasury.gov.au/content/report/default.asp , last visited on 5 October 2009. 
Rebates, subsidies and grants for fuels were around $2.9 billion. Therefore, the net revenue to the 
government was $9.3 billion. 
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Australia, like most other OECD countries, responds to global policy developments in 
fuel taxation. Table 5.15 indicates the global policy developments in fuel taxation. 
Similar to the case of the UK, the primary focus of fuel taxation in Australia since the 
early to middle part of the twentieth century is for revenue generation. However, since 
the second half of the twentieth century, new objectives have been introduced.  
 
However, three groups of objectives have been attributed to contemporary fuel 
taxation arrangements in Australia: raising revenue to fund government expenditure; 
addressing the social costs related to fuel use, such as costs related to damage to the 
road infrastructure by road users and environmental costs (effects of air pollution, 
road congestion, noise effects from vehicle use, costs of road accidents, effects of 
global warming from emission of greenhouse gases); and broader industry and social 
objectives.104 
 
The nature of environmental costs and their relationship to fuel use can vary 
significantly. Some examples are that the cost of pollutants affecting air quality would 
vary with the location of the fuel and the type of vehicle used; traffic congestion 
would depend on location, time, and weather conditions; the costs of road damage 
would depend on the type of road, the type of vehicle, and the amount of fuel used; 
motor vehicle accidents is not directly related to the consumption of fuel, but would 
depend on vehicle maintenance, driver competence, and general road and weather 
conditions; and noise effects are indirectly related to fuel use and would vary 
depending on location and type of vehicle. The externality that is directly related to 
fuel consumption is carbon emissions, and this could be tied to the effects of global 
                                                 
104 See id., pp. 12-18. Also see Beer, T & Grant, T., Life Cycle Analysis of Emissions from Fuel 
Ethanol and Blends in Australian Heavy and Light Vehicles pp. 833-837. Journal of Cleaner 
Production 15 (2007).  
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warming.105 The foregoing would suggest that it is problematic to determine 
accurately the cost of the externality, and internalising it by imposing a fuel tax on all 
users often results in public suspicion as to the real objectives of fuel tax. 
Nevertheless, if these external costs to road transport are not addressed there could be 
a mis-allocation of resources within the economy. For instance, there may be an 
imbalance between private and public transport, rail or road transport, or distortions 
may arise due to lack of commitment to restrict carbon emissions. 
 
External costs, as noted in the case of the UK, can be internalised by using economic 
instruments, such as taxes (excise duty), subsidies and grants, user-charges, 
remediation levies, tradeable permits, and performance bonds. This can also be 
achieved through regulatory instruments such as equipment specifications and 
mandatory standards. In some cases, moral suasive measures can also be applied, such 
as public enlightenment campaigns aimed at changing behaviour and attitudes.106 The 
UK uses a combination of pricing and regulatory instruments to internalise the 
external costs of road transport. On the other hand, Australia has relied predominantly 
on regulatory instruments for internalising externalities, but increasing consideration 
is being given to pricing mechanisms. Some examples are grants for conversion of 
motor vehicles to LPG in Western Australia, and stamp duty concessions for ‘cleaner’ 
vehicles in New South Wales. 
 
The use of regulatory measures and economic instruments has their advantages. 
Regulating emission standards has the advantages of certainty and ease of 
                                                 
105 See Report on Fuel Tax Inquiry; supra note 103, at pp. 12-13. Also see Freebairn, J., Options for 
Reforming Australia’s Indirect Taxes 167-8, Agenda, Vol. 4 (2) 1997. Available online at 
http://epress.anu.edu.au/agenda/004/02/4-2-A-4.pdf, last visited on 20 September 2009. 
106 See Report on Fuel Tax Inquiry; supra note 103, at pp. 63-64. 
  
300 
administration in achieving the desired emission standards. On the down side, it is 
often difficult to target precisely the regulated standards. For example, if the target is 
urban air pollution, imposing emission standards would also result in significant costs 
for motorists in regional and rural areas where the pollution problem is relatively 
much less. However, the relevant policymakers in Australia recognise that market-
based measures are preferable to regulatory instruments, all things being equal.107 The 
advantages of economic instruments in this regard are: firstly, these can be applied to 
all fuel consumers in direct proportion to their external costs; secondly, economic 
instruments enable fuel consumers to respond in a variety of ways to reduce their 
external costs; and thirdly, these instruments provide an incentive for sustained 
changes in behaviour. 
 
Johansson, in comparing the effectiveness of regulation versus economic instruments 
in addressing externalities arising from road transport argues that different 
externalities could be dealt with using different instruments.108 Examples are: 
congestion and greenhouse gas emissions could be dealt with by employing economic 
instruments; air pollution could be addressed with a combination of regulation and 
economic instruments; and external costs of vehicle accidents and noise pollution 
could be effectively addressed through the regulatory route. 
 
                                                 
107Industry Commission, The Role of Economic Instruments in Managing the Environment, Research 
Paper pp. 25-34 (1997). Available online at 
http://www.pc.gov.au/ic/research/information/ecoinstr/ecoinstr.pdf, last visited on 24 August 2009. 
Also, see IC Report (1994); supra note 98, at p. 207.  
108 Johansson-Stenman, O., Regulating Road Transport Externalities: Pricing versus Command and 
Control, in The Market and the Environment – The Effectiveness of Market-Based Policy Instruments 
for Environmental Reform 134-57 (1999). Also see Carlsson, F., Incentive-Based Environmental 
Regulation of Domestic Civil Aviation in Sweden pp. 75-82, Transport Policy 6 (1999). 
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Non-fuel economic instruments could also be used to address the external costs of 
road transport, e.g. fixed charges. The presence of a fixed charge can influence the 
decision to consume fuel. However, their application is limited because they do not 
capture the variable nature of some of these costs.109 For example, once paid, a fixed 
charge will not reduce the mileage of the motorist or the load he carries, or the type of 
vehicle he uses. 
 
5.3.3(b) Modern fuel tax objectives 
The modern fuel tax objectives actively encourage the production and use of 
petroleum product substitutes by levying low or zero tax rates on these substitutes. A 
number of rationale for this have been suggested such as, improving air quality; 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions; reducing the reliance on imported petroleum 
products; supporting development in regional and rural areas through the production 
of these substitutes using agricultural products e.g. ethanol produced from sugar or 
wheat; and supporting industries e.g. manufacturers of equipment needed to facilitate 
the use of the substitutes (for instance, LPG conversion kits).110 
 
 
The implication of these new objectives is that it might be difficult to justify further 
tax concessions on petroleum products in most market economies. However, the 
evidence shows that despite the tax concessions on these substitutes since the middle 
of 1970s, petroleum products have remained the major source of energy for transport 
purposes and may remain so for the next couple of decades. The convenience, 
efficiency and accessibility of petroleum products for transportation purposes have 
encouraged governments to rely heavily on taxing them for revenue generation 
                                                 
109 See IC Report (1994); supra note 98, at p. 265. 
110 See Fuel Tax Inquiry; supra note 103, at pp. 10-11. 
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purposes. Fuel tax then interacts with the broad-based consumption taxes such as GST 
to substantially increase the tax component of fuel prices.  
 
It is also universally agreed that the performance of a tax system in meeting the 
primary objective of revenue generation for government expenditure should be 
assessed based on efficiency and equity criteria.111 Similar to the case of the UK, the 
Australian Government contends that a framework for assessing petroleum product 
taxes should have regard to the generally accepted objectives and the set of desirable 
characteristics of an efficient tax system.  
 
The difference in energy use determines the tax treatment that different types of 
energy sources receive. For instance, previously coal, wood, and oil were major 
sources of energy for heating but have now been replaced by gas and electricity. The 
latter energy sources are generally subjected to very low or zero fuel taxes in most 
OECD countries. Similarly, petroleum product substitutes (e.g. ethanol, LPG, CNG) 
attract little or no tax because these sources of energy are less energy efficient and 
less convenient in terms of availability and storage. However, these sources of energy 
are also environmentally friendly. For example, in Australia ethanol is not taxed and 
both natural gas and other biofuels are not within the excise regime.112  
 
Some of the recommendations by the Australian Fuel Taxation Inquiry Committee 
relates to the Australian inconsistent application of fuel taxation among fuels. The 
Committee believes that fuel taxation should not be discriminatory between fuels, but 
rather government should aim to minimise the application of fuel taxation to 
                                                 
111 Commonwealth of Australia, Industries Assistance Commission (IAC); Report on Certain 
Petroleum Products-Taxation Measures 78; Report No. 397 (1986). 
112 See Fuel Tax Inquiry; supra note 103, at p. 10. 
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intermediate inputs into production (i.e. business inputs).113 The Committee thus 
recommended that fuels should be taxed according to their energy content, such that 
all fuels will have the same tax burden, i.e. fuels with higher energy content will 
attract a higher tax rate and vice versa. This approach should help to reduce 
distortions in resource allocation arising from differential fuel taxation, and provide a 
clearer framework for both current and future fuels. This is in line with the concept of 
neutrality with regard to closely related economic decisions as referred to in many 
debates on tax policy.114 Nevertheless, deviations from neutrality (in the form of 
higher or lower rates of tax) may be explicitly justified when considering economic 
activities, where the responses of producers and consumers to the signals provided by 
the market result in outcomes that are against the best interests of the entire 
community.  
 
However, the principle of equity emphasises the notion of fairness among tax payers. 
The official opinion in Australia is that the burden of tax should be borne according to 
the ‘ability-to-pay’ principle. The application of the ‘ability-to-pay’ principle raises 
two concepts of equity: “horizontal equity, which means that people in similar 
economic circumstances should be treated similarly; and vertical equity, which means 
that people in different situations should be treated differently, with those who are 
better off bearing a greater share of the tax burden”.115 
 
                                                 
113 See IAC Report No. 397; supra note 111, at p. 18.  
114 See id., p. 79. 
115 Australian Government Publishing Service; Reform of the Australian Tax System 14, Draft White 
Paper (1985). 
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5.3.4 Excise duty and Australian transport policy 
The institutional framework for transport policy and administration is well developed 
in Australia.116 However, we are concerned in this chapter with issues relating to how 
road fuel taxes drive the Australian transport policy. 
 
Fuel duty was initially introduced in 1929 when domestic refineries were constructed 
and locally produced refined products entered the market. Then the government 
introduced an excise on petrol at the rate of 0.18 cents per litre (cpl) which was 
hypothecated to road funding.117 The most significant expansions of fuel excise 
occurred in 1957 when excise duty on diesel and aviation turbine kerosene was 
introduced, to ensure that the operators of diesel vehicles contributed to the 
maintenance of roads and that the operators of commercial airline fleets contributed to 
the heavy costs of providing airport and air-route facilities.  
 
In 1959 the legislators passed the Commonwealth Aid Roads Bill118 which formally 
terminated the hypothecation arrangements for road funding. The government 
proffered the following reasons for bringing to an end the formal hypothecation 
arrangements.119 Firstly, the tax burden was not only borne by the motorists because a 
significant amount of the fuel tax was paid by commercial transport operators who 
subsequently passed on the cost to consumers of their goods and services. Secondly, 
the government believed that it was not a proper practice to allocate the proceeds of 
                                                 
116 For more details, see Scrafton, D & Starkie, D., Transport Policy and Administration in Australia: 
Issues and Frameworks pp. 82-83, Transport Reviews, Vol. 5 (2), 1985.  
117 Fuel Taxation Inquiry (Background Papers), History of Fuel Taxation in Australia 2 (2001). 
Available online at http://fueltaxinquiry.treasury.gov.au/content/backgnd/002.asp, last visited on 5 
October 2009. 
118 For more information on the Commonwealth Aid Roads Bill 1959, see Bureau of Transport 
Economics:  the History of Commonwealth Government Legislation Relating to Roads and Road 
Transport 9, Part 3 (1900-72). Available online at 
http://www.bitre.gov.au/publications/47/Files/OP008.pdf, last visited on 25 September 2009. 
119 James, D., Revenue Before Rhetoric: A Critique of Fuel Taxation in Australia 2, Parliamentary 
Research Service, Current Issues Brief No. 50 (1994-95). 
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any one tax to a particular expenditure. Instead, government thought that taxes should 
contribute to an overall pool to be used for any desirable expenditure purpose. 
Thirdly, the significant annual fluctuations in fuel tax receipts lead to irregular 
funding for roads, thus making forward planning difficult for road authorities. 
 
The enactment of the Aid Roads Bill effectively severed the formal link between fuel 
taxes and road funding until in 1982 when the government enacted the Australian 
Bicentennial Road Development Trust Fund Act 1982 (ABRD Act), which established 
a roads programme to be funded by a surcharge of 1 cpl on fuel tax levied on petrol 
and diesel.120 This surcharge was subsequently increased to 2 cpl a year later. The 
ABRD surcharge was replaced by the Australian Land Transport Development Act 
1988, which is still in force and provides for a variable percentage of tax on petrol and 
diesel to be paid into a trust fund for expenditure on road funding. 
 
Until the 1980s, the main rationale for fuel taxes has been to provide a general source 
of government revenue. However, tax concessions have been a part of the fuel 
taxation structure for fuel used other than as a transport fuel or for uses of petroleum 
products other than as fuel. These concessions are usually in the form of remissions, 
refunds of excise duty, or lower excise rates.121 The Australian Government perceived 
these concessions as mechanisms for providing tax relief to legitimate users of fuels 
for uses other than as a transport fuel. 
                                                 
120 The Australian Bicentennial Road Development Trust Fund Act 1982. Available online at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/abrdtfa1982511/, last visited on 25 September 2009. 
121 Excise remission refers to a situation where payable excise duty is either forgone or waived. A 
refund and rebate are similar mechanisms whereby duty that has been paid is returned to the payer 
under peculiar circumstances. However, a rebate within the excise system is normally paid to a 
different party whereas a refund is usually paid to the entity that has the legal obligation to remit the 
excise. 
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The provision of these concessions commenced in 1957, with the provision of an 
exemption certificate scheme aimed at exempting all off-road users of diesel fuel from 
payment of diesel tax.122 This scheme remained in operation after the formal 
discontinuation of hypothecation of petrol and diesel tax to road funding. However, 
this scheme was discontinued in 1982 due to alleged abuse of the scheme whereby on-
road users were obtaining diesel that had been purchased duty free through the 
scheme. This scheme was replaced by the more transparent Diesel Fuel Rebate 
Scheme (DFRS). The scheme provided tax rebate on diesel fuel for certain activities, 
mainly in the agricultural and mining industries in order to maintain Australian 
competitiveness in these key export industries.123 The scheme also contained a limited 
number of community and social welfare objectives. Based on this new scheme, all 
users of diesel fuel were required to purchase duty paid fuel. Eligible users were 
allowed to claim a rebate equivalent to the diesel tax for specific off-road usage.124 
 
Government levied excise on LPG for vehicular movements between 1974 and 1979 
through the Liquefied Gas (Road Vehicle Use) Tax Collection Act 1974.125 This was 
done to ensure that LPG users contributed to road maintenance, and the rates varied 
between 2 cpl in 1974 to 2.125 cpl in 1979. However, this tax was abolished in 1979, 
                                                 
122 See History of Fuel Taxation in Australia; supra note 117, at p. 9. Subsequently, the Petroleum 
Products Freight Subsidy Scheme was introduced in 1965 to reduce the price of petroleum products in 
remote areas of Australia via a reduction of the freight component of the purchase price of fuels. 
123 For details, see Australian Taxation Office, Diesel Fuel Rebate Scheme. Available online at 
http://www.ato.gov.au/docs/2002FRGS03.rtf, last visited on 25 September 2009. For details of the 
amended DFRS Bill (1999), see the online link at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/caeafrsb1999469.txt/cgi-
bin/download.cgi/download/au/legis/cth/bill_em/caeafrsb1999469.txt, last visited on 25 September 
2009. 
124 Webb, R., Fuel Price Subsidy Schemes 1, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Research Note 
No. 24 (2000-01). Available online at http://www.aph.gov.au/LIBRARY/pubs/RN/2000-
01/01rn24.pdf, last visited on 25 September 2009. Eligible users include primary producers, mining 
(excluding quarrying), diesel fuel used in hospitals, nursing, and old-aged persons’ homes, diesel used 
for lighting, heating, hot water, cooking for domestic purposes, and air-conditioning. 
125 The Liquefied Gas (Road Vehicle Use) Tax Collection Act 1974. Available online at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/Act1.nsf/framelodgmentattachments/BF0757D478C9
0203CA256F7100774BC1, last visited on 22 September 2009. 
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when the government made a commitment to a five-year guarantee on excise-free 
status for alternative fuels (LPG and CNG). Government also announced that any 
changes to this status would be notified to the users at least one year in advance. 
Ethanol was added to the list of alternative fuels in 1980 and so attracted a duty-free 
status. These new measures were meant to encourage the diversification of Australia’s 
domestic fuel supply, following the second world oil price shock of 1979. 
 
The 1983 budget introduced two major changes to the fuel excise system: the 
introduction of an excise duty on kerosene, fuel oil, and heating oil; and the 
introduction of a six-monthly indexation of fuel tax rates. The tax rates applied for 
these products (i.e. 1.872 cpl) were significantly lower than the rates for petrol and 
diesel (9.027 cpl), which effectively created a parallel system to the DFRS for the 
provision of excise relief for certain users of fuel.126 However, the condition for this 
concessional rate of duty on kerosene, fuel oil, and heating oils is that they should not 
be used in an internal combustion engine. The indexation arrangements introduced by 
the government were meant to remove problems associated with past discretionary 
increases in fuel tax, by maintaining the real value of tax collections, thereby 
providing a higher degree of stability for industry and consumers. Indexation 
arrangements remained until 2001, when the government discontinued the policy as 
part of a decision to review fuel taxation. 
 
The 1990s witnessed a flurry of discretionary and sometimes arbitrary increases in 
fuel duty for revenue generation purposes. For example, in the 1993 budget, the 
government announced a 5 cpl increase in diesel fuel excise and a 3 cpl increase in 
                                                 
126 See History of Fuel Taxation in Australia; supra note 117, at p. 11. 
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fuel duty on heating oil, kerosene, and fuel oil. The government also levied taxes on 
fuels used as intermediate inputs in production.127 In its recommendation to the 
government, the IC in 1994 urged that the diesel fuel rebate for domestic users should 
be scrapped, and that the wider issue of fuel duty charged on intermediate inputs 
should be addressed. However, the government went on to abolish the diesel fuel 
rebate for domestic users, and stayed action on the issue of excise on intermediate 
inputs. In the 1995 budget, the government increased the duty on light fuel oil to the 
same level as that of diesel based on the rationale that some users (e.g. railways) were 
substituting the lower fuel oil for diesel.128 
 
The fuel taxation policy of the 1990s was criticised as not having met the test of 
equity and neutrality in tax design. For example, primary production and some mining 
operations were taxed lightly on their consumption of diesel fuel, whereas such 
concessions were denied most railways, most coastal shipping, road transport users, 
quarrying, tourist resorts, etc. James argued that the abolition of the excise on petrol, 
diesel, and fuel oils used as intermediate inputs could have cost the government at 
least $4.8 billion in forgone revenue. However, he contended that this forgone 
revenue could have been recouped through taxes on externalities or road user charges. 
More revenue could also be generated by increasing taxes on fuel used in final 
consumption and/or through an expansion of existing tax bases (e.g. extension of sales 
tax to services). He further argued that the impact of such consumption taxes on the 
                                                 
127 See James; supra note 119, at p. ii. Also see Webb, R., Some issues in Fuel Taxation 3, 
Parliamentary Library (Information and Research Services), Current Issues Brief No. 2 (2001-02). 
Available online at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/Pubs/cib/2001-02/02cib02.pdf, last visited on 18 
September 2009. Also see Benge, M., Taxes on Business Inputs and the Effects of a Goods and 
Services Tax pp. 399-406, Agenda, Vol. 5 (4), 1998. Available online at 
http://epress.anu.edu.au/agenda/005/04/5-4-A-1.pdf, last visited on 18 September 2009. 
128 See History of Fuel Taxation in Australia; supra note 117, at p. 113. 
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consumer could be offset by the lower cost of consumer goods brought about by the 
lower cost of fuel inputs to producers.  
 
These arguments are backed by economic theory, which indicates that the imposition 
of any tax on intermediate inputs (such as fuel) to the production process will raise the 
price of the final goods. This will amount to a misallocation of resources because such 
a tax will tend to divert resources away from those industries that intensively use fuels 
for production, and into other industries. Consequently, such a policy will unduly 
reduce the production and supply of goods by the manufacturing sector and set up a 
negative multiplier effect. The restricted supply of goods will in turn affect the prices 
of goods relative to other goods and services, thereby distorting both consumption and 
production decisions. These distortions are not in line with the principle of tax 
neutrality, which requires a well designed tax system to have at least a positive impact 
on production and consumption decisions, as well as on efficiency in resource 
allocation.129 Ultimately, such a taxation policy is likely to yield a sub-optimal level 
of social welfare. 
 
However, it was not until the 1990s that the Australian Government introduced 
environmental measures as one of the objectives that a fuel tax system should pursue. 
Consequently, in 1994 a fuel tax differential was introduced on leaded petrol, coal tar 
and coke oven distillates as a first measure. This was followed in 1999 with 
government’s announcement of the Measures for a Better Environment130 package. 
These measures included an early introduction of ULSD, the Greenhouse Gas 
                                                 
129 See IAC Report No. 397; supra note 111, at Appendix K (The Inefficiencies of Intermediate Input 
Taxation). 
130 See the Provisions under Measures for a Better Environment Package at 
http://www.iea.org/Textbase/pm/?mode=cc&id=466&action=detail, last visited on 25 September 2009. 
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Abatement Programme, Alternative Fuels Conversion Programme, Renewable 
Remote Power Generation Programme, and Service Station Remediation. The Fuel 
Tax Inquiry report provides details on these measures, which are summarised below. 
 
The government committed to a further reduction in the sulphur content of diesel, 
from 500 ppm in 2003 to 50 ppm in 2006, through an early introduction of the ULSD 
before it became mandatory in 2006. The objectives were to improve air quality and 
to provide benefits in certain locations, e.g. in underground mining operations, etc.131 
To achieve these objectives, the government provided an excise differential between 
regular diesel and ULSD to encourage new refinery capital investment over the period 
from 2000 to 2005, and to provide an incentive for diesel consumers to switch 
demand to ULSD. The excise differential consisted of an extra 1 cpl on regular diesel 
from January 2003, and 2 cpl for 2004 and 2005. 
 
The objective of the Greenhouse Gas Abatement Programme (GGAP) is to support 
projects that will result in net reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, particularly in 
the period 2008-12. Funding has been provided at $100 million per annum. Two 
projects have received funding to promote the use of ethanol as a transport fuel. BP 
received $8.8 million to replace petrol production at its Bulwer Island refinery with a 
fuel grade petrol/ethanol brand. Also, Mossman Central Mill Company in Queensland 
received $34 million to produce ethanol fuel. The GGAP is achieving reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions at a relatively low cost ($6 per tonne of carbon dioxide 
                                                 
131 See Fuel Tax Inquiry; supra note 103, at pp. 185-191. See Environment Australia, Setting National 
Fuel Quality Standards 40 & 59, Paper 1 (2000). Also see Trebeck, D., Fuel Taxation: Emerging 
Issues 4 (2003). Available online at 
http://www.aciltasman.com.au/images/pdf/Fuel%20Taxation%20Emerging%20Issues%2010-04-
03.pdf, last visited on 16 September 2009. 
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saved per annum) by targeting large-scale projects.132 The use of non-taxation 
measures to address greenhouse gas emissions is increasingly becoming the preferred 
strategy as opposed to the levy of more fuel taxes. 
 
The objectives of the Alternative Fuels Conversion Programme were to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and to improve air quality by encouraging heavy 
commercial vehicles and public transport buses to operate on LPG or CNG instead of 
diesel. The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), 
in the year 2000, carried out a study which compared the air quality performance of 
these fuels on vehicles.133 They found that LPG and CNG had significantly better air 
quality performance compared to low sulphur diesel fuels. The government allocated 
funding for this programme to the tune of $75 million from 2000-04. The programme 
funds up to 50% of the cost to convert existing heavy vehicles fuelled by diesel to 
LPG or CNG, and up to 50% of the extra cost of purchasing a new LPG or CNG bus 
or other commercial vehicles weighing over 3.5 tonnes. This programme led to a 
reduction of emissions of particulates by 72–99%. Reduction in emissions over the 
life of a converted vehicle was estimated at $70 per tonne, which is significantly 
higher than the cost of reductions achieved with the GGAP.134 However, there are 
also savings from avoidance of healthcare costs from improved air quality. This is 
also an example of a targeted environmental improvement measure outside of the fuel 
tax system. 
 
                                                 
132 See Fuel Tax Inquiry; supra note 103, at p. 202. 
133 Anyon et al., Comparison of Transport Fuels: Life-cycle Emissions Analysis of Alternative Fuels for 
Heavy Vehicles, CSIRO (2001). Available online at 
http://www.environment.gov.au/settlements/transport/comparison/index.html, last visited on 16 
September 2009. Also see International Energy Agency, Automotive Fuels for the Future: The Search 
for Alternatives 76 (1999). 
134 See Fuel Tax Inquiry; supra note 103, at p. 204. 
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The Renewable Remote Power Generation Programme (RRPGP) supports an increase 
in the use of renewable energy generation (i.e. wind turbines, micro-hydro, wave, 
tidal, etc) in rural and remote parts of Australia that currently rely on diesel for 
electricity generation. The objectives of the programme included a reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions, increased use of renewable energy technologies in remote 
areas of Australia, improved electricity supply for remote users, improved energy 
infrastructure for indigenous communities, and to assist the large-scale development 
of renewable energy technologies, with export possibilities in mind.135 Government 
investment in this programme was around $264 and was planned for a period of four 
years. The Australian Greenhouse Office projects that this programme will reduce 
diesel consumption for remote electricity generation by more than 50 million litres per 
annum. This saving in diesel consumption is insignificant considering that the average 
annual sale of diesel in Australia is roughly 13 billion litres, and around 700 million 
litres of diesel is used annually for power generation.136  
 
Nevertheless, the objective of the programme is not to completely replace diesel but 
to reduce dependence on it. On the down side, not all remote locations benefited from 
this programme because some areas are geographically unsuited for wind, water, tidal 
or solar power generation. This programme also conflicted with the Petroleum 
Products Freight Subsidy Scheme (PPFSS) which was designed to reduce the cost of 
fuels in remote areas by covering the cost of freight above a certain limit. $1.2 million 
dollars subsidy was paid to transport 14 million litres of diesel to remote locations, 
and some of this diesel has been used for generators. To resolve the conflict, the fuel 
tax inquiry committee recommended to the government that this programme be 
                                                 
135 See id., p. 206. 
136 See id., p. 208. 
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replaced with a more transparent provision of fuel credits for excise paid on diesel 
used for commercial electricity generation. However, this recommendation impacted 
adversely on this programme by removing the incentive to switch to renewable 
sources of energy in remote areas. 
 
It has been suggested that a percentage of the revenue collected through fuel taxes 
should be used for monitoring service station sites and to clean up contaminated sites 
caused by leaking underground fuel storage tanks. This is in recognition of the fact 
that the rate of service station rationalisation has been high, and consequently the 
number of stations has declined from about 20,000 in 1970 to 8,300 in 2000.137 Thus, 
some of the closed sites required remediation of soil contaminated by leaking 
underground fuel tanks. Concerns for remediation liability could also impede the 
smooth transfer of ownership or the re-use of these sites for valuable ends. The 
liability issue could be a source of hardship for site owners in rural areas because the 
value of sale for alternative uses may be lower than the cost of necessary remediation 
work. Consequently, some owners have abandoned their sites.  
 
Currently, policies on remediation of service stations are undertaken by State, 
Territory, and local governments. However, the government recognises that the issue 
of liability in regard to the environmental impact of sites closure is important. 
However, it does not support the use of fuel taxation revenue for specific 
environmental or industry restructuring objectives because it is likely to have 
secondary effects on other sectors of the economy. The government considers that 
                                                 
137 The Victorian Automobile Chamber of Commerce is one of the organisations that suggested the 
establishment of a clean-up fund for underground fuel storage tanks, in its submission to the Fuel Tax 
Inquiry (see p. 4 of the submission). The submission is available online at 
http://fueltaxinquiry.treasury.gov.au/content/Submissions/Industry/downloads/VACC_239.pdf, last 
visited on 2 October 2009. 
  
314 
under the terms of the 1997 State Roles and Responsibilities, the Local, State and 
Territory Governments should continue to deal with the issue of sites remediation.138 
 
Apart from the Measures for a Better Environment, the government also announced 
further parliamentary amendments to its original tax reform proposal of 1998 (A New 
Tax System
139 package). The package included the retention of an amended version of 
the DFRS and the introduction of three new schemes, which are the Diesel and 
Alternative Fuels Grants Scheme (DAFGS), the Fuel Sales Grants Scheme (FSGS) 
and the Product Stewardship (Oil) Scheme. Under the New Tax System, the DFRS 
was extended to rail and marine transport, and was also extended to cover all similar 
fuels in keeping with the tax neutrality principle. Rebate rates were equalised for all 
eligible activities in line with the equity concept, and were extended to a full rebate of 
fuel duty.  
 
The DAFGS replaced the proposed diesel fuel credit for transport operators under the 
new system. The objective was to reduce transport costs for businesses in regional and 
rural Australia, and to address the environmental concerns regarding emissions from 
diesel consumption within urban areas. The FSGS was introduced in order to bridge 
the rural–urban price differentials that had widened with the introduction of the GST. 
The objective of the Product Stewardship Scheme was to encourage the reuse of 
waste oils by taxing lubricants and providing a benefit to oil recyclers for the 
treatment of waste oil products. 
 
                                                 
138 See Fuel Tax Inquiry; supra note 103, at p. 211. 
139 For details, see Tax Reform: Not a New Tax, a New Tax System (The Howard Government’s Plan 
for a New Tax System). Available online at 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/159/PDF/overview.pdf, last visited on 2 October 2009. 
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5.3.5 International comparisons 
Figure 5.1
140 is based on official statistics from the Department of Industry, Tourism 
& Resources (Australian Petroleum Statistics) and the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) for March 2009, and reveals that Australia has among the lowest petrol and 
diesel prices of all OECD countries. 
 
This indication is consistent with previous data available from the IEA, showing that 
the retail price of petrol in Australia in the December quarter 2008 was the fourth 
lowest among OECD countries, at A$1.24 per litre. For the same period, average 
prices in the UK were A$2.25 per litre, Japan A$2.14, Germany A$2.36, and the 
United States A$0.95 per litre.141 
 
The figures available from the same source on diesel show that the retail price of 
diesel for non-commercial use in Australia was the fifth lowest among OECD 
countries in the March quarter 2005, at A$1.06 per litre. In the UK the price was 
A$2.06 per litre, Japan A$1.12 per litre and Germany A$1.65 per litre. However, the 
US, Mexico, Canada, and New Zealand had lower diesel prices than Australia.142 
Commercial users of diesel in Australia pay significantly less than the retail price 
because the government provides subsidies for diesel use. Petrol and diesel are also 
subject to Australian GST.143  
 
                                                 
140 See p21 of this Chapter. 
141 See Petrol-Frequently asked Questions; supra note 95, at p. 5. 
142 Australian Government (Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources), Diesel- Frequently 
Asked Questions 2 (2005). Available online at http://www.jforrest.com/pdf/Diesel_Fact_Sheet.pdf, last 
visited on 12 September 2009. 
143 Australian Taxation Office, http:// www.ato.gov.au, last visited on 29/10/2004. However, all the 
GST revenues collected by the government, including those levied because of increased petrol and 
diesel prices, are passed to the States and Territories. 
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5.3.6 Transport in rural areas in Australia 
The use of public transport for rural travel in Australia is as problematic as in the UK. 
Consequently, rural dwellers are heavily dependent on private transportation. 
However, it has been argued that public transport is more energy efficient than car 
transport, and so would help reduce dependence on fuels as well as carbon emissions. 
Public transport could also reduce health costs arising from road accidents as well as 
transport disadvantage suffered by those without cars. 
 
Concerns have been raised about the poor state of public transport in rural and 
regional areas. Some of the submissions to the Senate Standing Committee on Rural 
and Regional Affairs and Transport in 2007 confirm these concerns.144 Some of the 
examples are summarised below. The International Association of Public Transport 
has suggested that schools, shopping and recreation centres be brought closer together 
to mitigate the need for private transport. The Western Sydney Regional Organisation 
of Councils has advocated for the development of high-quality integrated services to 
enhance public transport patronage. The organisation also suggested a substantial 
increase in public transport funding. The Western Australian Government (WAG) has 
carried out some public transport measures aimed at improving accessible public 
transport, integrating transport and land-use planning, and enhancing existing public 
transport infrastructure. In 2001, the WAG invested $60 million to improve cycling 
infrastructure in the State.  
 
                                                 
144 Australia: Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport, Australia’s 
Future Oil Supply and Alternative Transport Fuels (Final Report) 69 (2007). Available online at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/rrat_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-
07/oil_supply/report/report.pdf, last visited on 12 September 2009. 
  
317 
Evidence reveals that the level of investment in rural and regional public transport 
services is insignificant compared to that of urban areas.145 Most local governments 
have limited funding capacity to make the necessary investment, and most State 
Governments have not shown as much commitment to rural areas as they have to 
urban areas. Local town transport services, where they exist, are as infrequent as the 
inter-suburban services. Inter-town services connecting smaller towns to regional 
centres are even more infrequent, thereby discouraging potential and occasional users. 
In areas where poor basic public transport services exist, their usefulness is often 
marred by deficiencies in coordination and organisation. 
 
The Senate Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport stated recently, 
in its 2009 report that the key challenge for government is to provide more effective 
public transport services without necessarily incurring a huge cost in public 
subsidy.146 This would also include provisions for centralised information and 
marketing of these services. The Committee recommended that improvements in 
access to public transport could be met by improving route bus service levels, 
increasing and diversifying the use of existing school bus services during non-school 
hours, and increasing the use of community transport services. The Committee noted 
that community transport is a growth sector, servicing a large number of community 
needs. This mode of transport could be better targeted to special needs than is possible 
with public transport. For example, this mode of transport could service the social 
needs of people with disabilities. Community transport services could also be based 
                                                 
145 The Australian Senate: Rural and Regional and Transport References Committee, Investment of 
Commonwealth and State Funds in Public Passenger Transport Infrastructure and Services 47 (2009). 
Available online at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/SENATE/committee/rrat_ctte/public_transport/report/report.pdf, last visited on 
12 September 2009. 
146 See id., pp. 48-9. 
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on daily, weekly or on door-to-door service, and the services could be provided by 
National and State Governments, local councils, or charitable groups (e.g. Rotary 
Clubs). Community transport is currently funded by local councils, or by the 
Commonwealth/State Home and Community Care Program (HACC), or by States 
(separate from the HACC). The Australian Government contributes to the HACC 
program, and the transport component of the HACC contributes to community 
transport. However, the burden of providing adequate public rural transport, and also 
transport services for special needs groups, is increasingly borne by local councils. 
The report suggested that the interface between regular public transport and 
community transport could be coordinated and organised in a cost-effective way.  
 
The Committee recommended that the Commonwealth Government should take 
necessary steps to improve the effectiveness of present community transport services; 
enhance future transport needs of groups targeted by community transport; strike a 
proper balance between community transport and regular public transport; and 
encourage the division of responsibilities, actions, and funding to meet these needs. 
The Committee concluded that there is a need to plan for long-term change that would 
set the trend towards a reduction in car dependence in rural and regional areas, by 
creating incentives for change in behaviour and providing the means for that change 
to occur. It was noted that modes of transport such as walking, cycling, and public 
transport will continue to be unsuitable for certain travel needs. However, the 
government needs to create the conditions to enable people to use them where 
suitable.147 The public transport share of the transport mix is small, and so only a 
small change in behaviour by motorists may be needed to achieve a significant 
                                                 
147 See id., p. 51. 
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increase in the use of public transport. The higher the number of people using public 
transport, the stronger would be the viability of better services. However, Kilkenny 
argues that new economic geography models show that overall reductions in transport 
costs may work against the economic development of low density rural locations. Her 
empirical study infers that rural development would depend on increasing amenities 
and diversity among rural communities.148 
 
5.3.7 Distributional effects of high fuel prices on communities  
Dodson and Sipe examines the impact of high fuel prices on communities, and 
explain the precarious position of outer suburban communities to future rises in fuel 
prices.149 They find that those Australians most likely to be adversely affected by high 
fuel prices are those most reliant on car transport and who lack access to suitable 
alternatives. These are the people who live on the fringes of urban areas, and those in 
regional and remote communities, and also socio-economically disadvantaged outer 
suburban areas. They argue that the long-term solution for fuel-vulnerable 
communities may be to build local and small-scale road infrastructure, and to create 
high quality public transport services linked to local centres, with good walking and 
cycling routes. 
 
In a separate research effort, Dodson and Sipe demonstrate the interrelationship 
between the vulnerability of Australian communities to higher fuel prices, car 
                                                 
148 Kilkenny, M., Transport Costs, the New Economic Geography, and Rural Development, pp. 259-
280. Journal of Growth and Change 29 (1998). Available online at 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119106834/PDFSTART, last visited on 12 
September 2009. 
149 Dodson, J & Sipe, N., Oil Vulnerability in the Australian City 24-25 (2005). Available online at 
http://www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/10072/14542/1/32861.pdf, last visited on 12 September 
2009. 
  
320 
transport dependence, and housing debt.150 Their findings have useful implications for 
land-use planning with a focus on creating communities that are less dependent on car 
transport and an increased role for the use of bicycles where possible. Some 
commentators have suggested tax cuts as a credible measure for easing the impact of 
fuel prices on suburban households because this measure directly lowers the 
consumer price of fuels.151 They argue that these could be targeted at households with 
the highest levels of car dependence. However, the government’s preferred method is 
to apply cuts to personal income tax rates. The government’s previous experience at 
targeting a sector or specific communities with reductions in fuel tax resulted in 
compliance and monitoring problems. Thus, the 2006 budget provided for $36.7 
billion in personal tax cuts over four years based on changes to tax rates and 
thresholds. 
 
The Australian Senate Economic References Committee, in their 2004 report on the 
distributive effects of the taxation system, expressed concerns that households in rural 
and remote communities face a unique set of challenges compared to those faced by 
households in major cities.152 The report recommended that the tax/welfare system 
designed to support households must reflect these different challenges 
 
However, the Australian Government had provided schemes in the past to alleviate 
the cost of rural transport. The schemes were based on reducing the prices of 
                                                 
150 Dodson, J & Sipe, N., Shocking the Suburbs: Urban Location, Housing Debt and Oil Vulnerability 
in the Australian City pp. 42-5 (2006). Available online at 
http://www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/10072/12665/1/41353.pdf, last visited on 12 September 
2009. 
151 See McRann, T., Cut Petrol Price Dear PM, Here’s Some Good Advice 8, Herald-Sun Melbourne 
(2006). See also Fielding, S., Pollies Don’t Pay the Fuel Bill 18, Herald-Sun Melbourne (2006). 
152 Australia: Senate Economic References Committee, The Structure and Distributive Effects of the 
Australian Taxation System 22 (2004). Available online at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/Committee/economics_ctte/completed_inquiries/2002-
04/tax_effects/report/report.pdf, last visited on 14 September 2009. 
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petroleum products, or curtailing rural–urban price differential, or subsidising the 
price of diesel for businesses operating in rural areas. 
 
(a)Petroleum products freight subsidy scheme, 1965 -2006 
This was introduced in 1965 with the aim of reducing the prices of petroleum 
products in regional and rural areas. The scheme was amended in 1983 to specifically 
target remote communities. It operated by reimbursing fuel distributors the excess fuel 
freight cost above a certain threshold (the ‘Customer Pays Margin’).153 The subsidies 
were paid to the fuel distributors on the basis that they signed an undertaking to pass 
on the benefit to their customers. Most of the eligible locations consist of remote 
indigenous communities in Queensland, Northern Territory, and Western Australia. 
Others include Lord Howe Island in New South Wales and Amata in South 
Australia.154  
 
The value of subsidy depends on the remoteness of the location. Although the freight 
subsidy did not offset other costs involved in fuel supply to remote communities (e.g. 
retail margins), it does ensure that fuel distribution to remote areas is cheaper than it 
could otherwise have been. On the down side, the scheme was a disincentive for the 
adoption of less expensive modes of fuel transport for remote communities. The 
administrative costs were found to be disproportionately higher than the cost of the 
subsidy. Moreover, rural communities face a range of higher living costs and it may 
not be justified that one cost out of many should be singled out for a specific subsidy 
scheme. If the objective was to reduce the general high cost of living, the government 
                                                 
153 See Fuel Tax Inquiry; supra note 103, at pp. 164-6. The Scheme was temporarily abolished in 1974, 
because the government thought that the scheme was a disincentive for the adoption of more efficient 
and less expensive modes of transport to remote communities. The scheme was reintroduced in 1978, 
shortly before the government removed fuel duty for LPG used for road transport in 1979. 
154 See annexed map of Australia. 
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could use the more transparent benefit or income tax system to achieve the same 
purpose. 
 
(b)The diesel fuel rebate scheme (DFRS), 1982-2006 
Some of the economic activities that benefited from the DFRS take place in rural 
areas, such as mining, agriculture, forestry, and fishing.155 This scheme subsidised 
diesel used for business purposes and ensured that the final products from these 
activities were competitively priced. However, the high compliance costs on the part 
of the beneficiaries and the high cost of administration by the taxation office 
represented a significant burden to the government. 
 
(c)Fuel sales grants scheme, 2000-2006 
This scheme was introduced in July 2000 to reduce the price differential between 
urban and rural locations and to cushion the impact of the GST on the prices of 
refined products in rural and remote communities. To that effect, the scheme provided 
fuel retailers with grants of one cpl in rural zones and two cpl in remote zones. An 
additional grant of one cpl was provided for locations where the fuel price was 
consistently over $1.21.156 The disadvantage of this scheme laid in the difficulty of 
boundary delineation for the purpose of its administration. There were reported cases 
where fuel stations on the fringes of metropolitan areas received the grant, and so had 
a price advantage over competitors in close proximity. Also the bulk end users, like 
the mining companies located in rural and remote areas, were entitled to the FSGS 
grant even though they also received GST input tax credit on their fuel purchases. 
                                                 
155 Webb, R., Fuel Price Subsidy Schemes 1, Parliamentary Library, Research Note No. 24 (2000-01). 
Available online at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/Pubs/rn/2000-01/01RN24.htm, last visited on 15 
September 2009. Also see Webb, Some issues in Fuel Taxation; supra note 127, at p. 4. 
156 See Webb; supra note 127, at p. 1. Also see Fuel Tax Inquiry; supra note 103, at pp. 161-3. 
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5.4 Summary and Discussion of Findings 
The components of fuel retail prices are similar in both jurisdictions, but differ in two 
respects. Firstly, all fuel duties are levied and collected by the UK Government, 
whereas the Australia Government and individual States and Territories charge fuel 
taxes. Secondly, the UK Government charge relatively higher fuel duties, which are 
reflected in the relative pump prices in both jurisdictions. 
 
Wholesale fuel prices in the two jurisdictions are determined by crude oil prices and 
international fuel prices. Consequently, the only component of the wholesale price 
that could be regulated is the wholesale margin. There is no evidence that wholesale 
margins have been regulated in the UK. However, the Australian experience of 
wholesale price regulation reveals the difficulties associated with setting optimal price 
caps. If the price cap is set too high, it may trigger a round of price discounting and 
result in price cycles. If it is set too low, a high number of operators may exit the 
business, with attendant supply and competition implications. 
 
Fuel retail prices also have not been regulated in the UK. The OFT monitors 
periodically and reports on the state of the fuel retail sector. However, the Australian 
experience of fuel retail price regulation shows that price regulation may leave the 
fuel retail market in a worse state than it could have been under normal competitive 
conditions. The arguments against fuel wholesale price regulation are equally 
applicable to fuel retail price regulation.  
 
The component of fuel retail price that accounts for more than 50% of prices, in the 
two jurisdictions, is the fuel duty plus VAT (UK) or fuel duty plus GST (Australia). 
Thus, realistically the duty and VAT (or GST) are the two components of the fuel 
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retail price that could be regulated by the governments. An examination of the 
purpose of fuel tax, in both jurisdictions, reveals that the primary objective is to 
generate revenue for the governments. However, since the 1990s these governments 
have increasingly relied on fuel taxation to achieve environmental objectives by 
addressing external costs associated with road transport. This secondary objective is 
aimed at discouraging private car transport. These objectives of a fuel tax create an 
incentive for governments in the two jurisdictions to increase, rather than reduce, fuel 
duty. 
 
An investigation of the distributional effects of increases in fuel duty or higher pump 
prices of fuels on sub-groups of the population indicates that the effects are felt most 
by middle-income households, poor car-owning households, and rural inhabitants 
(perhaps with the exclusion of high-income earners, and rich retirees who migrate to 
rural areas). A similar investigation of the impact of high fuel prices on communities 
in Australia reveals that the effects are likely to be felt most by households who are 
most reliant on car transport and who lack access to suitable alternatives. The people 
that are likely to be affected are those living on the fringes of urban areas and those in 
regional and remote communities. 
 
To counteract these adverse effects, it has been argued in the two jurisdictions that 
increasing the use and efficiency of public transport is the intuitive solution. The 
reasons are that public transport could reduce dependence on private transport, 
contribute to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, reduce health costs associated 
with pollution and road accidents, and also reduce social isolation amongst those with 
transport disadvantage. Further investigation into the adequacy of public transport 
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infrastructure and provision in rural areas indicates that the local councils bear a 
disproportionate burden of this task. Therefore, more still needs to be done by central 
governments in both jurisdictions to break the vicious cycle of car dependence in rural 
areas. 
 
EU environmental objectives and a commitment to the Kyoto protocol combine to 
make it difficult for the UK Government to grant fuel tax concessions to the 
disadvantaged sub-population affected by high fuel tax or high fuel pump prices. To 
achieve these objectives, the EU has devised a system of minimum rates for taxation 
of energy products (as contained in Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 
2003). However, the Council Directive provided for differentiated rates of taxation, 
from which local public passenger transport, including taxis could benefit. The 
directive also created exemptions; total or partial exemptions; or reductions in the 
level of taxation depending on local situations in each Member state. Fishing could 
benefit from exemptions. Projects for the technological development of 
environmentally-friendly products, or in relation to fuels and energy from renewable 
sources e.g. bio fuels, solar, wind, tidal forms of energy qualify for total or partial 
exemptions. Products used for carrying goods and passengers by rail, metro, tram, or 
trolley buses, as well as natural gas and LPG used as propellants, all qualify for a 
reduction in tax levels. 
 
Nevertheless, there have been a number of government initiatives in the UK aimed at 
improving public transportation. Examples are the introduction of the Rural Bus 
Subsidy Grant, Rural Bus Challenge, and Parish Transport Fund. There are also a 
number of rural transport initiatives introduced by the Scottish Government. 
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Arguments have been made regarding the need for government to create better 
conditions for the promotion of other transport modes, such as walking and cycling. 
Some non-transport solutions have also been suggested, e.g. adequate provision of 
telecommunications to reduce the need to travel. Other policy measures have been put 
forward, such as duty derogation for rural areas, essential user rebate, and support for 
rural shops and services to reduce car use. However, some of these measures are 
fraught with difficulties in their effective design and targeting. In the case of duty 
derogation and essential user rebate, there are technical difficulties in defining and 
monitoring the boundaries of the target areas. 
 
Thus, it is challenging to design appropriate subsidy schemes for some rural locations. 
Nevertheless, a number of these have been tried in Australia and in some cases the 
results have been inconsistent with the objectives, e.g. the PPFSS, DFRS, FSGS, etc. 
Consequently, they had to be amended sometimes to reduce the problem of 
compliance and to lighten the burden of administration. Most have now been scrapped 
since 2006, primarily because of the government’s environmental policy and a resolve 
to deregulate the fuel retail sector. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to examine the potential contributions of fuel wholesale and retail 
price regulations to a rural development policy. This involved an investigation of  a 
number of issues such as, (a) the purpose of fuel tax and how it drives a transport 
policy; (b) the interface between fuel price regulations and fuel tax objectives; (c) the 
distributional effects of higher fuel taxes or higher pump prices on sub-groups of the 
population; (d) the potential for developing effective public transport solutions and 
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infrastructure in rural areas; (e) the role of central government, local councils, and 
local investors in developing rural transport solutions; and (f) the potential for 
government subsidies such as fuel duty concessions and remissions. These objectives 
were met and a discussion of the findings has been presented in the preceding section 
of this chapter (i.e. section 5.4). 
 
However, based on the findings this thesis argues that the regulation and 
administration of fuel tax could contribute to rural development, if a certain 
percentage of the proceeds are dedicated to improving rural public transport, 
including a number of innovative approaches to rural transport, such as transport for 
special groups – school buses, ambulances, etc. This remains a difficult proposition in 
countries where the public transport sector is deregulated, e.g. in the UK. In such 
cases, private investors and voluntary agencies are usually the key exogenous actors 
in rural public transport provision.  
 
Nevertheless, the UK Government could increase funding for local governments to 
ensure that the benefits of public transport are realised on a universal basis. Fuel tax 
proceeds could also be used to extend business tax credits for those operating in rural 
and remote locations. This would not only increase their competitiveness, but could 
help create and retain jobs in these areas. Funds could also be dedicated to rural fuel 
station remediation, especially those that are closing. This might prevent 
environmental disasters, and also ensure that the premises could be easily re-opened 
or used for alternative purposes. For a longer term solution to the problems of high 
rural fuel prices and rural-urban fuel price differentials, the UK Government could 
possibly consider the EU provisions for total or partial exemptions from fuel taxes for 
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projects that develop environmentally friendly fuels or those that produce fuels and 
energy from renewable sources 
 
In the case of Australia, the government has tried various fuel subsidy schemes with 
the aim of dealing with the problems of high rural fuel prices and high rural-urban 
price differentials. However, the results have been inconsistent and the Australian 
Government have now abandoned most of these fuel concessions and remissions 
since they conflict with government’s current environmental and fuel retail 
deregulation policies. However, similar to the EU directive (2003/96/EC) which 
provided for total or partial or differentiated rates of fuel taxation, the Australian 
Government could also provide fuel concessions that encourage the production of 
environmentally friendly fuels and energy sources. These concessions as part of State 
aid instruments for promoting rural development are examined fully in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6 
STATE AID INSTRUMENTS: APPLICABILITY TO 
RURAL/REMOTE LOCATIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter investigated the contribution of fuel price and tax regulations to 
rural development. The chapter found that environmental considerations affect 
decisions regarding fuel concessions and remissions. However, a percentage of the 
fuel tax proceeds could be hypothecated to improvements in rural public transport. 
 
This chapter investigates the second hypothesis of this study, by comparing the state 
aid instruments in the UK and Australia. This comparison is important in the sense 
that few rural and regional subsidies are introduced in the UK by statutes, whereas 
most of the Australian state aid instruments for rural and regional development are 
introduced by statutes. Moreover, most of the subsidies for regional development in 
the UK are principally based on European state aid rules and guidelines because they 
have to comply with European law due to the UK accession to the EU.  
 
In carrying out the comparison, this chapter examines the subsidy provisions in the 
UK and the various provisions of the European state aid policy in order to identify the 
existence or not of aids that are compatible with rural development objective. 
Similarly, state aid instruments in Australia designed for the purpose of rural 
development, particularly fuel concessions, are assessed in terms of their long-term 
applicability to rural areas. This assessment is based on their compatibility with 
environmental objectives, and the character of the subsidies and the markets where 
they are applied. 
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The findings of this investigation contribute to an understanding of whether rural 
development policy could be pursued solely through an endogenous approach as 
different from a mixture of endogenous and exogenous approaches. 
6.2 United Kingdom 
6.2.1 Structure of subsidy provisions in the UK  
Subsidies are granted by a range of central and devolved government departments and 
agencies in the UK. Regional agencies and local authorities are important providers of 
subsidy and business support aimed at meeting social, environmental, and other 
objectives.1 However, these various arms of government develop their subsidies 
independently, but using common guidelines for policy appraisal as directed by HM 
Treasury.  
 
In Scotland, enterprise agencies play a major role in granting subsidies. Invest 
Northern Ireland acts as the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment’s 
delivery arm for subsidies in that province. In Wales, the Welsh Development 
Authority handles smaller subsidies, while the Welsh Assembly Government plays a 
direct role in the administration of larger subsidies.2 Local authorities in these 
devolved administrations also have powers to disburse discretionary subsidies to meet 
social, environmental, and other objectives. These departments and agencies all 
operate under the EU general guidelines on the granting of subsidies. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 A Report by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT 750), Public Subsidies p. 6 (2004). Available online at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft750.pdf, last visited on 27 September 2009. 
2 See id., pp. 48-9. 
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6.2.2 UK subsidy design and control 
The design and control of subsidies, currently in 2009, pass through five phases as 
follows: 
(a) Guidance on project appraisal for all government departments and executive 
agencies is contained in the Green Book (which applies to England, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland) and in the Scottish Public Finance Manual for Scotland (SPFM). 
According to the Green Book, the basic rationale for government intervention is either 
to rectify a market failure or to address distributional objectives where necessary.3 All 
such policy considerations are expected to conform to the Rationale, Objectives, 
Appraisal, Monitoring, Evaluation and Feedback (ROAMEF) cycle.4 The SPFM 
follows similar procedures as the Green Book.5  
 
These best practice guidelines are useful in the assessment of proposed new policies, 
projects, or programmes, including the provision of subsidies. The guidance compels 
policymakers to investigate the options that could achieve the same set of objectives, 
and choose the one that would deliver the highest net benefit. The project appraisal 
guidelines recommend that policymakers take account of social, financial, and 
environmental costs in assessing programmes and projects. However, the guidelines 
do not explicitly include the cost of competition distortions in the market(s) affected 
by the policy.6 
 
                                                 
3 HM Treasury, The Green Book: Appraisal and Evaluation in the Central Government pp. 11-12 
(2003) Available online at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/1(4).pdf, last visited on 27 September 
2009. 
4 See id., p3. 
5 The Scottish Government, The Scottish Public Finance Manual: Background and Applicability. 
Available online at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Government/Finance/spfm/Intro, last visited on 
27 September 2009. 
6 See OFT 750; supra note 1, at 47. 
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The OFT contends that the guidance should have included potential competition 
distortion effects in the assessment of costs, to prevent the choice of an approach that 
has significant competition distortions over another with similar costs and benefits but 
with less significant distortions. 
 
(b)Regional bodies in the UK administer a significant number of subsidy schemes 
based on Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) and Selective Finance for Investment 
(SFI) guidelines. These two major subsidy schemes provide grants to firms in 
Assisted Areas (AAs) or under-performing areas of the UK. These two schemes 
accounted for about £196.8m of subsidies provided in 2002.7 However, subsidy 
provisions under these schemes are subject to the European state aid rules on regional 
aid. Regional aid is of considerable interest to the European Commission, and so the 
EU regional aid guidelines confer on member states the greatest level of flexibility in 
the design and provision of such subsidies.8  
 
These schemes are administered at the regional level, but the Department of Trade 
and Industries (DTI) developed national guidelines for their administration.9 
However, these guidelines focus on ensuring the effectiveness of grants at enhancing 
                                                 
7 See id., p. 53. 
8 See Commission Regulation (EC) No 1628/2006 of 24 October 2006 on the Application of Articles 87 
and 88 of the EC Treaty to National Regional Investment Aid, Official Journal of the European Union 
(L302/29).  Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:302:0029:0040:EN:PDF, last visited on 27 
September 2009. Note 3 of this regulation states that, “by addressing the handicaps of the 
disadvantaged regions, national regional aid promotes the economic, social and territorial cohesion of 
Member States and the Community as a whole. National regional investment aid is designed to assist 
the development of the most disadvantaged regions by supporting investment and job creation in a 
sustainable context.” Also see Europa (Press Releases), State Aid: Commission Adopts New Regional 
Aid Guidelines for 2007-2013, 1P/05/1653 (2005). Available online at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1653&format=HTML&aged=0&langu
age=EN&guiLanguage=en, last visited on 27 September 2009. 
9 Please note that DTI was disbanded on 28 June 2007 and was replaced by the Department for 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR). BERR was disbanded on 6 June 2009 and was 
replaced by the current Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). 
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regional growth and providing sustainable skilled jobs in the AAs. The criteria set out 
in these guidelines reflect those of the European state aid rules. Some of these are, 
firstly, that the project’s viability in the AAs is doubtful without the grant. Secondly, 
the jobs created through the grant must meet a certain minimum quality (applicable 
only to SFI). Thirdly, the acceptable cost per job created should not be above a certain 
maximum level. Fourthly, considerations should be given to the extent to which the 
project displaces jobs in competing firms rather than creating new ones. These criteria 
limit the magnitude of regional aids and ensure that the benefit derived from the 
project outweighs the costs. However, similar to the project appraisal guidelines, the 
OFT contend that these guidelines do not cover other characteristics of the subsidy 
that may affect competition. 
 
(c) Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) is compulsory for all legislative proposals 
for regulations that affect businesses, voluntary bodies, and charities. Following a UK 
Government White Paper in 2001, all RIAs must include a competition assessment 
procedure.10 However, this process involves only measures that could be introduced 
through legislation. Thus, the scope for the RIA process is limited, as only few 
                                                 
10 HM Treasury & OFT 829, Guidance on How to Assess the Competition Effects of Subsidies: A 
Report Prepared for the OFT by NERA Economic Consulting, 2006. Available online at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft829.pdf, last visited on 28 September 2009.  
See OFT Report (876con), Completing Competition Assessments in Impact Assessments: Draft 
Guidelines for Policy Makers (2007). Available online at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft876con.pdf, last visited on 28 September 
2009. See OFT Report (355), Guidelines for Competition Assessment: A Guide for Policy Makers 
Completing Regulatory Impact Assessments (2002). See OFT 1113, Governments in Markets: Why 
Competition Matters – a Guide for Policy Makers pp 10-16 (2009). Available online at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/general/OFT1113.pdf, last visited on 28 September 
2009. Also see UK Governments (Dti) response to OFT proposals on how to assess the competition 
effects of subsidies, 2006. Available online at http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file28499.pdf, last visited 
on 28 September 2009. 
  
334 
subsidies are introduced through legislation in the UK. The OFT have also published 
case-studies on how to assess the competition effects of subsidies.11 
 
(d) The Treasury’s Fees and Charges Guide, and the SPFM (Fees and Charges 
Section) discourages public sector bodies from cross-subsidising their commercial 
activities with funds they receive for their public sector activities. The aim is to ensure 
that commercial investments made by public bodies do not distort markets through the 
allocation of common costs between their commercial and non-commercial services.  
(e) The State Aid Policy Unit (SAPU) of the Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills (BIS) provides the formal link between the European Commission and UK 
subsidy providers for all state aids. Therefore, all notifications of state aid are passed 
through the SAPU, but the unit is not responsible for ensuring adherence to the state 
aid rules. The SAPU’s role is to monitor the process and to render advice on state aid 
rules and procedures to all government units that are responsible for providing aid to 
businesses.12 Monitoring could be useful in identifying the competition effects 
associated with existing subsidies. Thus, information gathered through the monitoring 
process could be used to improve subsequent design of subsidies. In some cases, 
monitoring could help identify concerns that have slipped through the project 
appraisal phase. 
 
However, the European Commission is responsible for monitoring and enforcing the 
European state aid rules, whereas the responsibility for adherence to the rules remains 
with the subsidy provider. There are a few cases where the European rules specify 
                                                 
11 OFT 828, Case Studies of Public Subsidies: A Report Prepared for the OFT by NERA Economic 
Consulting, 2006. Available online at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft828.pdf, last visited on 28 September 2009. 
12 See OFT 750; supra note 1, at p. 59. 
  
335 
that a subsidy proposal goes through a competition assessment by its provider. In such 
cases, the SAPU can review it before forwarding it to the EU Commission as part of 
the aid notification process. Therefore, the SAPU only considers the competition 
effects of these subsidies where the state aid rules specifically require it.  
 
The government recognises that subsidies, when properly designed under certain 
guidelines, could be a potent tool for addressing market failures and increasing social 
welfare. However, the OFT contends that such policy appraisal guidelines should 
incorporate competition distorting effects as one of the factors to be considered when 
designing a subsidy. 
 
6.2.3 UK expenditure on subsidies 
The European rules on state aid stipulate that member states should provide annual 
state aid notifications, including how much subsidy were disbursed, the objective the 
aid is pursuing and the instrument for delivering the aid.13  
Table 6.1  UK State aid by primary objective 
 
Sector State Aid (%) 
Transport 27.2 
Research & Development 25.7 
Regional Aid 21.0 
Small & Medium Scale 
Enterprises 
14.5 
Sectoral 6.7 
Employment 2.1 
Training 1.6 
Environment 1.2 
Rescue & Restructure 0.0 
Total 100 
Source:  OFT 750, Public Subsidies (2004) p. 10 
                                                 
13 See Article 88(3) EC. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12002E088:EN:HTML, last visited on 30 
October 2009. 
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Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the distribution of UK state aid by primary objective and by 
aid instrument. The tables indicate that around 75% of the aid (as at 2004) was 
disbursed to the transport, research and development, and regional aid sectors, and 
that this aid was delivered mainly through grants and tax credits.14  
 
Table 6.2  UK State aid by aid instrument 
Aid Instrument State Aid (%) 
Grant 70 
Tax Credit 13 
Advice 8 
Reimbursable Grant 6 
Tax Relief/ Rate Reduction 2 
Equity Capital 1 
Government Loan/Guarantee 0 
Soft Loan 0 
Total 100 
Source:  OFT 750, Public Subsidies (2004) p. 11 
 
HM Treasury estimated the value of subsidies in 2003 at £8.2bn. This figure includes 
transfers through the Common Agricultural Programme (£2.3bn), transfers to public 
bodies (£2.1bn) and subsidies for public transport infrastructure, revenue support, and 
the Strategic Rail Authority (£2.5bn). The remainder (£1.3bn) represents grants made 
to private firms.15 This figure does not include some subsidies that are not classified 
as state aids but as public expenditure, such as tax relief, capital grants, and loan 
guarantees. It also does not include subsidy payments made by local authorities. 
However, the amount of subsidy granted in the UK that meets the European state aid 
criteria in 2002 was £2.8bn, which was far less than the annual figure for subsidies 
granted. 
 
                                                 
14 See OFT 750; supra note 1, at p. 9. 
15 See id., p. 8. 
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However, 2008 figures from the EU state aid scoreboard indicate that UK’s aid 
expenditure has risen sharply because of the impact of the global financial crisis. 
Total state aid granted by the EU member states in 2008 was approximately 279.6 
billion Euros. In absolute terms, the UK had the highest State aid expenditure of all 
member states (72.5 billion Euros), followed by Germany (66.8 billion Euros), Ireland 
(37.5 billion Euros) and Belgium (19.4 billion Euros).16 Aid to the financial sector for 
‘rescue and restructure’ objectives accounted for most of this expenditure. 
 
6.2.4 UK membership of the European Union
17
 
The events of the World War II and Winston Churchill’s suggestion in his speech at 
Zurich University in 1946 for the formation of a kind of United States of Europe set 
the scene for the creation of the European Union. Subsequently, in 1949 the 
governments of the UK, France, and Benelux decided to create a Council of Europe.18 
Eight years later (1957), the Treaties of Rome established the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community. The following year 
(1958), the EEC held its first session of the European Parliamentary Assembly in 
France. The initial emphasis by the parliament was based on trade cooperation among 
European countries. Thus, in 1959 seven countries (UK, Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and Portugal, joined together to form the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA). In 1961, the UK applied formally to join the European 
                                                 
16 Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2009) 1638; State Aid Scoreboard (Autumn 2009 
Update): Facts and Figures on State Aid in the EU Member States, pp7-8. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/annex_2009_autumn_en.pdf, last visited on 
27 October 2009. 
17 This section is a brief account included only to establish the position of the UK within the EU. 
18 Europa: EU AT A GLANCE: The History of the European Union. Available online at 
http://europa.eu/abc/history/1945-1959/index_en.htm, last visited on 27 October 2009. Also see 
European Union Integration: Key Timeline History. Available online at http://www.age-of-the-
sage.org/history/european_union_integration.html, last visited on 29 October 2009. 
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Community (EC) but it was not until 1973 that the UK, along with Ireland and 
Denmark, joined the EC officially.  
 
During the latter part of 1974, the EC’s heads of government decided to constitute 
themselves into the European Council and agreed to hold meetings three times a year. 
The Council also agreed on the modalities for elections into the European Parliament, 
and to set up the European Regional Development Fund, and an economic and 
monetary union. 
 
However, Britain’s membership of the EU was opposed by a cross-section of the 
populace and political interests (these groups are often referred to as Eurosceptics).19 
Some argued that the relationship between the UK and the EU could be limited to 
trade only and should not extend to common currency and regional politics. Others 
feared that the UK/EU relationship could lead to significant changes in British 
constitutional rules and the framework of the government; distribution of formal 
authority and resources; regulatory rules, guidelines and codes; business processes; 
and the cultural aspects of institutions.20This led to the call for a referendum on 
Britain’s involvement with the EC project. The 1975 referendum shows that around 
67.2% of the citizens were in support of the UK remaining a member of the 
Community. The European Council established the European Monetary System and 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1978. In response to growing anxiety about 
the EC project as regards the monetary and political agenda, the UK, of all the 
                                                 
19 The Conservative Party houses a considerable number of Eurosceptics. 
20 Ricardo Gomez et al., European Union Policy Making in the UK: A Brief History, pp1-2. European 
Policy Research Unit, Devolution and European Union Policy Making Series, Manchester Papers in 
Politics, Paper No. 5 (2003). Available online at 
http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/disciplines/politics/publications/workingpapers/documents
/manchester_working_papers/MPP072003.pdf, last visited on 29 October 2009. 
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Community member states, was alone in deciding not to be a part of the ERM. 
However, the Maastricht Treaty21 of 1992 created the Euro and the three-pillar 
structure of the modern EU.22 The signing of the Amsterdam Treaty23 in 1997 marked 
the beginning of the common foreign and security policy, conferred more powers on 
the European Parliament, and defined the rights of individuals within the Union. The 
Lisbon Treaty24 further confers more powers on the EU’s parliament, and created the 
positions of a European President, a European Foreign Minister, and a diplomatic 
service. 
 
The single European market entered into force in 1993 and was acceded by all 
member states. However, the idea of lifting border control was put forward by the EC 
(the Schengen Agreement),25 and the UK and Ireland dissented due to fears of illegal 
immigration and terrorism. Subsequently, the Schengen Agreement came into force 
between Germany, France, Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. In 
2001, the Treaty of Nice was signed to reform the institutional structure of the EU to 
provide for eastward enlargement. The enlargement took place in 2004 as ten new 
countries joined the EU: Hungary, Poland, Cyprus, Estonia, the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia, Lithuania, Malta, the Slovak Republic, and Latvia. Prior to the enlargement, 
                                                 
21 Europa: Treaty of Maastricht on European Union. Available online at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_economic_f
ramework/treaties_maastricht_en.htm, last visited on 29 October 2009. 
22 The three pillars consist of the European Community, the Justice and Home Affairs, and the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
23 EU: The Treaty of Amsterdam - Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing 
the European Communities and Certain Related Acts. Available online at 
http://www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamtreaty.pdf, last visited on 29 October 2009. 
24 EU: Treaty of Lisbon – Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (2007). Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML, last visited on 29 October 2009. 
25 EU: The Schengen Agreement – The Schengen Area and Cooperation. Available online at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_
immigration/l33020_en.htm, last visited on 29 October 2009. 
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in 2002 the common European currency (the Euro) entered into circulation in twelve 
participating member states,26 excluding the UK. 
 
The UK’s membership of the EU has been fraught with resentment by a section of the 
British people based on accumulation of power at Brussels, of further enlargement, 
and its implications for immigration. Some Eurosceptics believe that the idea of 
European integration is largely driven by elites and not by the popular will of the 
people. However, the current economic recession has seen the powers of the European 
Council weakened as member state governments took unilateral actions to save their 
banks, car companies, and to secure jobs as much as possible This has led to record-
level budget deficits in most member countries and has thus weakened the tight 
budgetary discipline set by the EC. The former EU Internal Market/Competition 
Commissioner Mario Monti has called for a new deal on how to integrate social 
policies in the Eurozone without endangering single market rules.27 Therefore, the EC 
will have to re-assert its right to set competition policy in a new era of significantly 
enhanced state intervention and ownership. 
 
Based on the foregoing, it could be argued that Britain has not always agreed with all 
EU policies, particularly on its monetary policies. However, for the purpose of this 
chapter, it may suffice to say that Britain’s support for a single European market 
commits it to the EU state aid policies.28 
                                                 
26 The participating countries are Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, and Austria. 
27 Hollinger, P., Europe Warned on Tax in Single Market Drive, article published in the Financial 
Times (October 2009). Available online at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e6f9a68e-c19d-11de-b86b-
00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss&nclick_check=1, last visited on 05 November 2009 
28 Commissioner Monti M, Britain and the Single Market: A longer-Term View, Speech at Reception 
Europe 21, London (1999). Available online at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/99/76&format=HTML&aged=1&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en, last visited on 30 September 2009. 
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6.2.5 EU guidelines on state aid or subsidies 
The fundamental rationale behind the EU guidelines on state aid is that the provision 
of state aid can distort competition in three main ways: by causing firms to set output 
and pricing levels inefficiently; by keeping inefficient firms in the market, 
discouraging entry by efficient firms or encouraging entry by inefficient firms; and by 
distorting investment and R& D decisions.29 
 
The EU guidelines require that any rescue aid or subsidy must be warranted on the 
grounds of serious social difficulties that have no undue spill-over effects on other 
member states and provided that the subsidy is non-discriminatory. The EC Treaty 
generally prohibits state aid, but with exemptions for aids that target objectives which 
are compatible with the common market; for instance aid is allowed to promote 
cultural conservation, remedy of damages caused by natural disasters, and for 
horizontal objectives such as training, R&D, and aid to small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs).30 These are in keeping with the two broad aims of the EU: 
maintenance of freedom, security and justice within internal borders; and an internal 
market where competition is free and undistorted; and sustainable development based 
on balanced economic growth, price stability, a highly competitive social market 
economy, social justice and protection. These aids are in line with EU shared values 
which include human dignity, free markets, respect for human rights, minority rights, 
equality, freedom, the rule of law, etc. The common principles prevailing in EU 
member states also stress pluralism, non-discrimination, justice, tolerance, solidarity, 
etc.  
                                                 
29 OFT 821; European State Aid Control p. 3 (2005). Available online at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft821.pdf , last visited on 12 October 2009. 
30 See OFT report on Public Subsidies; supra note 1, at p. 32. 
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Articles 87–9 of the EC Treaty31 defined the group of subsidies that are regarded as 
state aids and subject to a specific set of guidelines and regulations drawn up at 
European level. The objective of articles 87–9 is to prevent state aids that harm the 
Common European Market. The EC Treaty defined state aid as any government 
intervention that fulfils four criteria: it conveys an economic advantage to some firms 
– i.e. selective; it is a transfer of state resources – either a cost or loss of revenue; it 
distorts or threatens to distort competition; it affects trade between member states – 
the product or service is or could be subject to intra-community trade. 
 
Article 87 (1) – ex Article 92 –captures the reluctance of the EU to encourage state 
aid as follows: “Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member 
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so 
far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market”. 
However, Article 87 (2–3) – ex Article 92 – created exemptions as follows:  
“The following shall be compatible with the common market: (a) aid having a social 
character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such aid is granted without 
discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned; (b) aid to make good the 
damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences; (c) aid granted to the 
economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by the division of 
Germany, in so far as such aid is required in order to compensate for the economic 
disadvantages caused by that division”. 
 
                                                 
31  EC Treaty (S. 3); Aids Granted by States. Available online at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12002E087:EN:HTML, last visited 
on 20 October 2009. See the Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, Official Journal of the EU (C321 E/1). Available online at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/ce321/ce32120061229en00010331.pdf, last visited 
on 20 October 2009. 
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3. “The following may be considered to be compatible with the common market: 
(a) Aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is 
abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment; 
(b) Aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest 
or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State; 
(c) Aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain 
economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent 
contrary to the common interest; 
(d) Aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect 
trading conditions and competition in the Community to an extent that is contrary to the 
common interest; 
(e) Such other categories of aid as may be specified by decision of the Council acting by 
a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.” 
32
 
 
From the foregoing, aid may be permitted under Articles 87–89 if it is designed to:33 
facilitate the development of certain activities or economic areas; promote the 
economic development of underdeveloped areas; promote the execution of an 
important project of common European interest; or remedy a serious disturbance in 
the economy of a member state, or; promote culture and heritage conservation. 
 
The guidelines on state aid now places compatible aid into three categories: 
(a) Regional aid – for regions suffering low growth or high unemployment. 
(b) Sector-specific aid – with specific rules for sensitive sectors, and  
(c) Horizontal objectives – e.g. aid for SMEs, R&D, training, or employment. 
                                                 
32 Fore more discussions on the EEC Rules & Policy of State Aids, see D. L. McLachlan, D. Swann., 
Competition Policy in the European Community: The Rules in Theory and Practice pp. 51-5 (1967). 
33 See Public Subsidies; supra note 1, at p. 34. 
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Based on the four criteria that define state aid, it follows that three types of subsidies 
are not considered as state aid:34 
(a)Subsidies that do not affect intra-community trade;  
(b)Subsidies whose value is below a given threshold and so pass through the ‘de 
minimis’ block exemption. The special rules for small amounts of aid allow 
government bodies to grant up to €200,00035 cumulatively to any individual firm over 
a rolling three-year period without informing the EC; (c)Subsidies that are provided 
on a non-selective basis but have different effects on individual recipients.36 
 
6.2.5.1 Aid for rural development 
The Council Regulation (EC) No. 1257/199937 on support for rural development 
defines a new policy for it and seeks to establish a coherent and sustainable 
framework for the long-term future of rural areas in Europe. Article 51 of this 
regulation declares that Articles 87–8 of the EC Treaty are applicable to aid for rural 
development. This regulation forms the basis for complementing Agenda 2000 reform 
                                                 
34 See id., pp. 32-3. 
35 See Amended EC Commission Regulation No 1998/2006 on De Minimis Aid, Official Journal of the 
EU (L379/5). Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:379:0005:0010:en:PDF, last visited on 16 
October 2009. Also see Europa (Press Releases), State Aid: Commission adopts new De Minimis 
Regulation, Exempting Aid Notification below 200,000 Euros. Available online at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1765, last visited on 16 October 2009. 
36 See Unicredito Italiano SpA v  Agenzia and Ufficio, Case C-148/04, ECJ (15 December 2005). 
Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004J0148:EN:HTML, last visited on 30 
October 2009. Paragraph 1, states that, “Article 87(1) EC prohibits aids which ‘favours certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods’, that is to say, selective aid. Aid may be selective in 
the light of that provision even when it concerns a whole economic sector. That is the case with a tax 
reduction which applies only to the banking sector and, within the banking sector, benefits only 
undertakings which carry out certain operations. Since it does not apply to all economic operators and 
is, in reality, a departure from the ordinary tax scheme, it cannot be considered to be a general measure 
of tax or economic policy. Such a tax reduction must therefore be prohibited under Article 87(1) EC…” 
37 Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999 on Support for Rural Development from the European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and Amending and Repealing Certain 
Regulations, Official Journal of the European Communities (L160/80). Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rur/leg/1257_en.pdf, last visited on 15 October 2009. 
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package38 on agricultural policy, by promoting a competitive and multifunctional 
agricultural sector as part of a comprehensive, integrated strategy for rural 
development in member states. 
 
Article 33 stipulates the aspects of rural development for which support may be 
granted, as follows:39 “support shall be granted for measures, relating to farming activities 
and their conversion and to rural activities, which do not fall within the scope of any other 
measure referred to in this Title. Such measures shall concern: land improvement, 
reparcelling, setting-up of farm relief and farm management services, marketing of quality 
agricultural products, basic services for the rural economy and population, renovation and 
development of villages and protection and conservation of the rural heritage, diversification 
of agricultural activities and activities close to agriculture to provide multiple activities or 
alternative incomes, agricultural water resources management, development and 
improvement of infrastructure connected with the development of agriculture, encouragement 
for tourist and craft activities, protection of the environment in connection with agriculture, 
forestry and landscape conservation as well as with the improvement of animal welfare, 
restoring agricultural production potential damaged by natural disasters and introducing 
appropriate prevention instruments, financial engineering.” 
 
Thus, this policy stresses the development of alternative sources of income as an 
integral aspect of a rural development policy, while recognising that farming plays a 
number of important roles, such as the preservation of rural heritage, the environment 
and traditional landscapes. However, Article 37 of this regulation stipulates that 
support for rural development may be extended to measures that are compartible with 
other community policies.  
                                                 
38 See EU, Agenda 2000 – A CAP for the Future. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/review99/08_09_en.pdf, last visited on 15 October 2009. 
39 See Article 33 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999. 
  
346 
Therefore, the regulation covers both agricultural and non-agricultural activities in its 
support for rural development. Therefore, let us examine the EC policies on key 
aspects of rural development issues, such as agriculture, small- and medium-scale 
enterprises, transport, energy conservation, environmental protection and services of 
general interest. 
 
6.2.5.2 EC policy on state aid for agriculture 
State aid rules in the agricultural sector are based on three objectives: to ensure that 
these rules are (a) compatible with the general principles of competition policy; (b) 
consistent with the Community’s common agricultural and rural development 
policies;40 (c) coherent with the EU’s international obligations, and in this context the 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture.41 
                                                 
40 ARAP v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-82/96, CFI (17 June 1999) ECR II- 
1889. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61996A0082:EN:HTML, last visited on 28 
October 2009. Paragraph 86 states that, “it must be borne in mind at the outset that a common market 
organisation pursues a set of distinct aims, reflecting the various objectives of the common agricultural 
policy, as defined by Article 33(1) EC. It seeks in particular to ensure optimum employment of farmers 
and ensure a fair standard of living for them, to stabilise markets and to assure the availability of 
supplies to consumers at reasonable prices. Moreover, Article 33(2) provides that, in working out the 
common agricultural policy, account is to be taken of the particular nature of agricultural activity, 
which results from the social structure of agriculture and from structural and natural disparities 
between the various agricultural regions, the need to effect the appropriate adjustments by degrees and 
the fact that in the Member States agriculture constitutes a sector closely linked with the economy as a 
whole.” Also see Walter Rau and Others v Commission of the European Communities, Joined Cases 
(C-279/84, C-280/84, C-285/84, C-286/84), ECJ (11 March 1987) ECR I- 1069. Available online at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61984J0279:EN:HTML, last visited 
on 28 October 2009. Paragraph 21 elaborates on the set of distinct aims that the common organisation 
of the agricultural market should pursue as follows. “It must be pointed out that according to the settled 
case-law of the Court … in pursuing the various aims laid down in Article 39 of the Treaty, the 
Community institutions have a permanent duty to reconcile the individual aims. Although that duty to 
reconcile means that no single aim may be pursued in isolation in such a way as to make the 
achievement of the others impossible, the Community institutions may allow one of them temporary 
priority in order to satisfy the demands of the economic or other conditions in view of which their 
decisions are made.” 
41 Europa: Agriculture and Rural Development – State Aid. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/stateaid/index_en.htm, last visited on 28 October 2009. For details on 
the Doha Mandate on Agriculture, see the WTO webpage. Available online at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/chair_texts08_e.htm, last visited on 28 October 2009. 
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Guidelines for state aid to agriculture were established with the adoption of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999 on support for rural development.42 Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 created two funds to finance agricultural expenditure. 
The European Agricultural Fund for Rural development finances the rural 
development programmes of the member states, whereas the European Agricultural 
Guarantee Fund finances direct payments to farmers and measures to regulate 
agricultural markets (e.g. intervention and export refunds).43 Article 41 of this 
regulation specified that the programming period for rural development financed 
programmes would take effect from 1 January 2007. 
 
Regional aid guidelines44 are not applicable to investments in the processing and 
marketing of agricultural products. Similarly, the Commission Regulation (EC) No  
69/200145 on De minimis aid is not applicable to agriculture. Similarly, the 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 70/200146 on aid for small and medium enterprises 
                                                 
42 See Chapter VI of Council Regulation 1257/1999: Agri-environment; and Chapter VII: Improving 
Processing and Marketing of Agricultural Products. 
43 Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 on Financing of the Common Agricultural Policy, Official 
Journal of the European Union (L209/1). Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:209:0001:0025:EN:PDF, last visited on 15 
October 2009 
44 See Guidelines on National Regional Aid for 2007-2013, Official Journal of the EU (C54/13). 
Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:054:0013:0044:EN:PDF, last visited on 16 
October 2009. 
45 See Commission Regulation (EC) No 1998/2006 on the Application of Articles 87 and 88 of the 
Treaty to De Minimis Aid, Official Journal of the EU (L379/5). Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:379:0005:0010:en:PDF, last visited on 16 
October 2009. Article 1(1) (a-c), states that, “this regulation applies to aids granted to undertakings in 
all sectors, with the exception of: (a) aid granted to undertakings active in the fisheries and aquaculture 
sectors, as covered by Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000; (b) aid granted to undertakings active in 
the primary production of agricultural products as listed in Annex I to the Treaty; (c) aid granted to 
undertakings active in the processing and marketing of agricultural products as listed in Annex I to the 
Treaty…….” 
46 See Commission Regulation (EC) No 70/2001 on the Application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC 
Treaty to State Aid to Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Official Journal of the European 
Communities (L10/33). Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:010:0033:0042:EN:PDF, last visited on 16 
October 2009. Article 1(2) (a) stipulates that, “this regulation shall not apply to activities linked to the 
production, processing and marketing of products listed in Annex I of the Treaty”. 
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does not apply to agriculture. However, Commission Regulation (EC) No 68/200147 
on training aid is applicable to the agricultural sector. 
 
Aid for investment in agricultural holdings may only be considered to fall within the 
derogation provided for by Article 87(3) (c) EC48, if such investments improve the 
conditions of agricultural production thereby facilitating the development of the 
sector. Thus, such investments have to meet certain objectives as specified by the 
guidelines for state aid in the agriculture sector as follows: reduction of employment 
costs; increased quality of products; improvement and redeployment of production; 
preservation and improvement of the natural environment, hygiene conditions and 
animal welfare standards; and diversification of farm activities.49 The guidelines 
provided for a maximum rate of aid at 40% gross, and 50% for less-favoured areas. 
 
Investment aid for the processing and marketing of agricultural products may be 
granted to firms that are economically viable and which comply with the minimum 
standards regarding the environment and animal welfare.50 Eligible costs for the 
purpose of grant aid include the acquisition of new machinery and equipment, 
construction, acquisition or improvement of immovable property, and general costs. 
The maximum aid rate is set at 50% for eligible expenses in Objective 1 regions and 
                                                 
47 See Commission Regulation (EC) No 68/2001 on the Application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC 
Treaty to Training Aid (point 3), Official Journal of the European Communities (L10/20). Available 
online at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:010:0020:0029:EN:PDF, 
last visited on 18 October 2009.  (3) “In order to establish a transparent and coherent policy for all 
sectors, it is appropriate that the scope of this regulation be as broad as possible and include the 
agricultural sector, fisheries and aquaculture”. 
48 See Article 87 of the EC Treaty (Ex-Article 92). Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/legislation/treaties/ec/art87_en.html, last visited on 20 October 2009. 
Article 87 (3) (c), stipulates that the following may be considered to be compatible with the common 
market: … (c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic 
areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common 
interest”. 
49 See Agriculture and Rural Development; supra note at 41, at p. 1. 
50 See Article 7 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999. 
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40% in other regions.51 Aid for diversification into other activities related to 
agricultural production, processing and marketing of products may be treated as 
investment in agricultural holdings or investment in agricultural products, depending 
on the size of the investment. Larger scale investments are assessed as aid for 
processing and marketing activities, whereas small-scale investments are regarded by 
the Commission as aid for agricultural holdings. 
 
The Commission previously took a positive view on start-up aid for producer groups, 
with the intention of providing an incentive for bringing farmers together, 
concentrating their supply, and adapting their production methods to market 
requirements. Subsequently, this support had been deemed as unnecessary and has 
been discontinued with effect from the date of this regulation.52 
 
The Commission supports all environmental aid schemes in the agricultural sector 
provided they are compatible with the general objectives of the Community 
environmental objectives. Environmental aid that is compatible with the ‘polluter 
pays’ principle includes those that eliminate pollution at source. The Commission 
supports production methods that protect the environment and encourages the use of 
environmental farming.53The Commission previously supported temporary relief to 
cushion the effects of costs of new mandatory national environmental requirements, 
and also provided relief from certain new energy taxes or levies on environmentally 
                                                 
51 See Article 28 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999. Objective 1 regions are those whose 
development is lagging significantly behind, i.e. whose per capita GDP is less than 75% of the EU 
average. The regions include Azores, Canary Islands, Madeira, etc. For details on the classification of 
the regions into three Objectives for the purpose of administering the Structural Funds, see General 
Provisions on the Structural Funds. Available online at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/regional_policy/provisions_and_instruments/l60014_en.htm, 
last visited on 29 October 2009. 
52 See Note (44) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999. 
53 See id., Article 22. 
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sensitive inputs such as pesticides and herbicides. These may be justified where 
necessary to offset a possible loss of international competitiveness. Regarding clearly 
justified cases, such as aid for the development of biofuels, the Commission supports 
the provision of operational aid to the producers to offset additional costs involved in 
the use of environmentally friendly inputs as compared with conventional production 
methods.54 
 
6.2.5.3 State aid for transport services 
The EC provisions for the Community transport policy apply only to transport by 
road, rail, and inland waterway, and are established by Article 2 of Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1107/7055 and Articles 70–80 EC.56 Article 87 EC also applies 
to this sector. Article 73 EC57 makes special provisions for state aid that meets the 
needs of coordination of transport58 or that requires a reimbursement for the discharge 
of certain obligations related to the concept of public service. Council Regulation 
                                                 
54 See Directive 2003/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 May 2003 on the 
Promotion of the Use of Biofuels or other Renewable Fuels for Transport, Official Journal of the EU 
(L123/42). Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:123:0042:0046:EN:PDF, last visited on 24 
October 2009. Note (7) states that, “increased use of biofuels for transport, without ruling out other 
possible alternative fuels, including automotive LPG and CNG, is one of the tools by which the 
Community can reduce its dependence on imported energy and influence the fuel market for transport 
and hence the security of energy supply in the medium and long term. However, this consideration 
should not detract in any way from the importance of compliance with Community legislation on fuel 
quality, vehicle emissions and air quality”. 
55 See Council Regulation (EEC) No 1107/70 of 4 June 1970 on the granting of aids for transport by 
rail, road and inland waterways. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31970R1107:EN:HTML, last visited on 20 
October 2009. Article 2 stipulates that, “Articles 92 to 94 of the Treaty shall apply to aids granted for 
transport by rail, road and inland waterway.” 
56 Title V, Transport: Articles 70-80. See Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and 
of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/ce321/ce32120061229en00010331.pdf, last visited on 20 
October 2009. 
57 See id., Article 73. This Article stipulates that, “aids shall be compatible with this Treaty if they meet 
the needs of coordination of transport or if they represent reimbursement for the discharge of certain 
obligations inherent in the concept of a public service.” 
58 See Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium, Case C-156/77, ECJ (12 
October 1978) ECR I- 1881, paras 10–11. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61977J0156:EN:HTML, last visited on 28 
October 2009.  
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(EC) No 1191/6959 governs compensation for carrying out obligations inherent in the 
concept of public service operated in the road, rail, and waterway sectors. Thus, the 
Commission is favourably disposed to public service obligations imposed for urban, 
suburban, and regional transport services.60 Moreover, member states may conclude 
public service contracts with transport undertakings to ensure adequate transport 
services, which particularly accommodate social and environmental factors, town and 
countryside planning, or with a view to extending reduced fares to certain categories 
of passengers.61 Compensation for such public services is calculated based on the cost 
of providing them. The Commission may, where applicable, apply Article 86(2) EC,62 
                                                 
59 Council Regulation (EC) No 1191/69 on Action by Member States Concerning the Obligations 
Inherent in the Concept of a Public Service in Transport by Rail, Road and Inland Waterway. Available 
online at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31969R1191:EN:HTML, 
last visited on 25 September 2009. For more detailed discussion on EU policy on public service 
obligations, see Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Services of General 
Interest, COM (2003) 270 final. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2003/com2003_0270en01.pdf, last visited on 25 September 
2009. Also see Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: White Paper on Services of General Interest, COM (2004) 374 final. 
Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0374:FIN:EN:PDF, last visited on 25 
September 2009. 
60 See Municipality of Amelo and Others v NV Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij, Case C-393/92, ECJ (27 April 
1994) ECR I- 1477, paras 46–7. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61992J0393:EN:HTML, last visited on 28 
October 2009. Paragraph 46 states that, “Article 90 (2) of the Treaty provides that undertakings 
entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest may be exempted from the 
application of the competition rules contained in the Treaty in so far as it is necessary to impose 
restrictions on competition, or even to exclude all competition, from other economic operators in order 
to ensure the performance of the particular tasks assigned to them.” Also see Criminal Proceedings 
against Paul Corbeau, C-320/91, ECJ (19 May 1993) ECR I- 2533, paras 12-14. Available online at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61991J0320:EN:HTML, last visited 
on 28 October 2009. Paragraph 14 states as follows: “that latter provision thus permits the Member 
States to confer on undertakings to which they entrust the operation of services of general economic 
interest, exclusive rights which may hinder the application of the rules of the Treaty on competition in 
so far as restrictions on competition, by other economic operators are necessary to ensure the 
performance of the particular tasks assigned to the undertaking possessed of the exclusive rights.” 
61 See Council Regulation (EC) No 1191/69, Article 1. 
62 See EC Treaty; supra note 31, at Article 86(2). Article 86(2) provides that “Undertakings entrusted 
with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-
producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on 
competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law and in 
fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected to such an 
extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Community.” 
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which precludes services of general economic interest from compliance with the 
competition rules. 
 
The Commission currently pursues a policy of shifting the balance of transport modes 
in favour of those with lesser environmental impact so as to achieve a sustainable 
transport system. Consequently, the Commission takes a favourable view of aid which 
enhances the development of combined transport; rail services, including investments 
in rail infrastructure; and inland water transport. Council Regulation (EC) No 
718/1999 on Community fleet capacity to promote inland waterway transport 
encourages member states to promote this mode of transport. Similarly, Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1192/6963 provides for compensation for railway undertakings 
based on extra costs they may have to bear compared to other transport undertakings.  
 
Council Regulation (EC) No 543/9764 specifies the other circumstances that may 
warrant the provision of aid for road, rail, and waterway undertakings. Aid may also 
be granted for the purpose of developing transport systems and technologies which 
are economical for the Community, but not extended to commercial exploitation of 
these systems and technologies. Thus, air and maritime transport modes are not 
                                                 
63 See Council Regulation (EC) No 1192/69 of 26 June 1969 on common rules for the normalisation of 
the accounts of railway undertakings. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31969R1192:EN:HTML, last visited on 26 
October 2009. 
64 Council Regulation (EC) No 543/97 of March 1997 Amending Regulation (EC) No 1107/70 on the 
Granting of Aids for Transport by Rail, Road and Inland Waterway. Available online at 
http://www.legaltext.ee/text/en/T50570.htm, last visited on 26 October 2009. See Article 3 of 
Regulation (EC) No 1107/70, which outlines the special circumstances under which Member States are 
allowed to take co-ordinated transport measures or grant aids in respect of the concept of public service 
obligations. 
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priority areas for the Commission; hence they are subject to the EC competition and 
state aid rules.65 
 
6.2.5.4 State aid for energy supply and conservation 
The Commission is actively interested in the security of energy supplies and energy 
conservation. In its Green Paper on European strategy for security of energy supply,66 
the Commission stated that the diversification of energy sources creates conditions for 
greater security of supplies. To promote this strategy, the Commission supports the 
development of indigenous sources of primary energy, particularly renewable sources 
of energy used in the production of electricity. The Commission allows operating aid 
for the production of renewable energy. Operating aid covers the difference between 
the cost of production and the market price of energy from that particular source.67 
 
The Commission’s support for energy conservation is based on its guidelines on state 
aid for environmental protection.68 For example, the guidelines encourage the 
                                                 
65 See Commission of the European Communities v French Republic, Case C-167/73, ECJ (4 April 
1974) ECR I- 359, paras 29-32. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61973J0167:EN:HTML, last visited on 28 
October 2009. 
66 EC: Green Paper – Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply (2000). 
Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52000DC0769:EN:HTML, last visited on 30 
October 2009. 
67 Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the 
promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the Internal Electricity Market, 
Official Journal of the European Communities (L283/33). Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:283:0033:0040:EN:PDF, last visited on 30 
October 2009. Note (1) stipulates that, “the potential for the exploitation of renewable energy sources 
as a priority measure given that their exploitation contributes to environmental protection and 
sustainable development. In addition this can also create local employment, have a positive impact on 
social cohesion, contribute to security of supply and make it possible to meet Kyoto targets more 
quickly. It is therefore necessary to ensure that this potential is better exploited within the framework of 
the internal electricity market.” 
68 See EC Community Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection, Official Journal of the EU 
(2008/C82/01). Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:082:0001:0033:EN:PDF, last visited on 30 
0ctober 2009. 
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development of processes leading to the production of electricity from energy sources 
such as gas, and authorises such aid systems for a period of 10 years.69 The 
Commission supports aid schemes for generating electricity by using renewable 
sources of energy such as wind, solar, small-scale water stations, and biomass, etc. 
Note 14 of the Council Directive 2001/77/EC (concerning common rules for the 
internal market for electricity) stipulates that the directive aims at guaranteeing the 
proper functioning of support mechanisms for renewable energy sources at the 
national level, such as investment aid, green certificates, direct price support schemes, 
tax refunds, and tax exemptions or reductions. The Commission believes that biofuel 
promotion could enhance both security of supply and climate change policy in a 
sustainable manner. Consequently, the Commission supports aid for the use of certain 
biofuels which deliver both environmental benefit and sustainability, e.g. biofuels 
made from residues, wastes, and cellulose material, etc.70 Operating aid may also be 
extended to firms distributing electricity and heating to the public where the cost of 
producing the electricity or heating exceeds its market price.71 
 
The guidelines also cover state aid granted for the remediation of contaminated sites. 
Article 87(3) (c) of the EC Treaty provides the basis for investment aid to firms 
repairing environmental damage by remediating contaminated sites. The guidelines 
provide that such investment aid is compatible with the Community’s environmental 
objectives only if it results in environmental protection. The environmental damage 
covered by the guidelines includes damage to quality of soil, surface water, or 
groundwater. State aid may not be granted where the polluter is easily identifiable. In 
such cases, the polluter must be made to pay for the remediation work in line with the 
                                                 
69 See id., p. 32. 
70 See id., p. 14. 
71 See id., p. 33. 
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‘polluter pays’ principle.72 However, where the polluter is not easily identifiable, or 
based on special circumstances cannot be made to bear the cost, the person directly 
responsible for the remediation work may be granted aid for that purpose. In such 
cases, aid may be granted up to 100% of eligible costs.73 
 
6.2.5.5 State aid for small- and medium-sized enterprises 
The Commission Regulation (EC) No 70/200174, Article 2(b), defines small- and 
medum-sized enterprises as independent enterprises which have fewer than 250 
employees (50 for small enterprises), and have either an annual turnover of €40 
million (€7m for small enterprises) or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding 
€27m (€5m for small enterprises). Eligible enterprises must conform to the criteria of 
independence for SMEs. They must not be owned by one enterprise or jointly by 
several enterprises (having more than 25% or more of the capital base or the voting 
rights) that fall outside of the definition of an SME. 
 
The Commission recognises the beneficial contribution of SMEs to economic 
development. SMEs are regarded as the major drivers of structural change and 
regeneration as they facilitate a shift of economic resources from declining sectors to 
expanding sectors. However, one of the difficulties SMEs face is in obtaining capital 
and credit, mainly due to the limited guarantees and collateral that they can offer. 
Thus, their limited capital restricts their access to new technology and potential 
markets. The introduction of new regulation usually entails higher costs for SMEs. 
                                                 
72 Polluter, in this context, refers to the person liable under the applicable law in each member state. 
73 Eligible costs, in this case, are the costs of the remediation work less the increase in the value of the 
land. The guideline includes all expenditure incurred by an undertaking in remediating its site as 
eligible costs 
74 See Commission Regulation (EC) No 70/2001; supra note 46, at Article 2(b). The definition of 
Small- and Medium-Scale Enterprises is contained in ANNEX 1 of the Regulation. 
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The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has also recognised the economic potential and 
the handicaps faced by SMEs and contend that they are entitled to special 
consideration from the Commission. However, the ECJ opines that this recognition 
should not translate into indiscriminate approval of all schemes regarding such 
enterprises.75 The provisions of this regulation, without prejudice to other EC 
regulations or directives applicable to specific sectors, do not apply to agriculture or 
to aid for export-related activities.76 
 
The regulation provides for aid to SMEs for investment in both tangible and 
intangible assets inside or outside of the European Community. Investment in tangible 
assets refers to fixed assets, whereas investment in intangible assets means investment 
in transfer of technology through acquisition of licences, patent rights, and technical 
knowledge. Eligible costs of tangible investment are costs relating to land, buildings, 
machinery, and equipment, whereas eligible costs of intangible investment are the 
costs of the acquisition of the technology. Aid for investment in intangible and 
tangible assets must be in the nature of an incentive, and must continuously or 
periodically lead to reduction in costs to the SMEs. The aid must also be necessary to 
achieve the stated objectives which market forces alone would not secure; must be 
proportionate to the difficulties which have to be overcome to secure the socio-
economic benefits that are desirable in the common interest; and the positive effects 
on competition and trade must outweigh the negative effects.77 
                                                 
75 See Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities, Case C-364/90, ECJ (28 April 
1993) ECR I-2097.  Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61990J0364:EN:HTML, last visited on 27 
October 2009. Paragraph 24 states that, “in any event, whilst the specific interests of small and 
medium-sized undertakings warrant greater flexibility on the part of the Commission in assessing the 
compatibility of aid with the Treaty, they do not oblige it to approve systematically all aid schemes 
which benefit such undertakings.” 
76 Commission Regulation (EC) No 70/2001; supra note 46, at Article 1(2). 
77  See id., Preambles. 
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The regulation also stipulates the intensity of investment aid for SMEs. The maximum 
aid intensity for small enterprises is 15%, and 7.5% for medium-sized enterprises.78 
Higher thresholds apply to investments that take place in locations that qualify for 
regional aid, in which case the maximum threshold is determined by the level of 
regional investment aid approved by the Commission for each member state. 
 
6.2.6 EU State aid control 
The European System for state aid control was introduced in order to reduce the risk 
of the EU Commission approving subsidies that distort competition and prohibiting 
those that do not. The state aid control is established by Articles 87–9 EC (ex- 
Articles 92–4) with the principal objective of promoting the common market through 
prevention of much aid that could confer an unfair competitive advantage to the 
recipients relative to their competitors, and hence result in competition and trade 
distortions.79 State aid control is implemented through a process of prior notification 
and approval. The Commission uses a system of controls made up of regulations, 
guidelines, and procedures in order to assess whether a proposed aid is likely to be 
compatible with Article 87(3) EC (ex-Article 92 (3).80 Apart from the formal 
supervision of state aid by the European Commission, there is also the judicial level 
of control whereby the ECJ and the Court of First Instance of the European 
Communities (CFI) enforces the EC state aid law. 
 
 
 
                                                 
78 See id., Article 4(2). 
79 For details on the sources of State aid, see A. Biondi et al., The Law of State Aid in the European 
Union pp. 117-31 (2004). 
80 See European Aid Control; supra note 29, at p. 3. 
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6.2.6.1 State aid supervision by the European Commission 
Article 88 (EC)81 and Council Regulation (EC) No 659/199982 empower the European 
Commission to supervise any plans of member states to provide or alter aid and to 
continuously review all systems of aid existing in those states. The supervisory 
system under EC Regulation No 659/1999 and Article 88EC prescribes four 
categories of control of state aid, as follows: new aid, existing aid, unlawful aid, and 
misuse of aid. However, Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 was adopted pursuant to 
Article 89 EC83 which entitles the EC to make regulations for the application of 
Articles 87 and 88 EC. Therefore, where the previous case law regarding the 
application of Article 88 EC conflicts with this regulation, the latter should take 
precedence.84 
 
Plans to grant new aid85 must be notified to the Commission before it is 
implemented.86 The Commission, on receipt of a notification for the grant of aid, 
                                                 
81 See Article 88 (EC). Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12002E088:EN:HTML, last visited on 29 
October 2009. 
82 See Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the 
application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, Official Journal of the European Communities (L83/1). 
Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1999:083:0001:0009:EN:PDF, last visited on 29 
October 2009. 
83 See Article 89 EC. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/legislation/treaties/ec/art89_en.html, last visited on 29 October 2009. 
84 See Kingdom of Spain v Commission of the European Communities, Case C-480/98, ECJ (12 
October 2009) ECR I- 8717. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61998J0480:EN:HTML, last visited on 29 
October 2009. Also see Republic of Spain v Commission of the European Communities, Case C-99/98, 
ECJ (15 February 2001) ECR I- 1101. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61998J0099:EN:HTML, last visited on 29 
October 2009. 
85 Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, Article 1(c). Article 1(c), defines new aid as follows: “new 
aid shall mean all aid, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid, which is not existing aid, including 
alteration to existing aid.” Article 1(d), defines aid schemes as follows: “aid scheme shall mean any Act 
on the basis of which, without further implementing measures being required, individual aid awards 
may be made to undertakings defined within the Act in a general and abstract manner and any Act on 
the basis of which aid which is not linked to a specific project may be awarded to one or several 
undertakings for an indefinite period of time and /or for an indefinite amount.” Article 1(e), defined 
individual aid as follows: “individual aid shall mean aid that is not awarded on the basis of an aid 
scheme and notifiable awards of aid on the basis of an aid scheme.” 
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conducts a preliminary examination and decides whether the plan constitutes state aid 
within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC87 and also whether the aid is compatible with 
the objectives of the common market.88 If the aid meets both criteria, the Commission 
may instruct the member state to proceed to implement the aid plan. Conversely, state 
aid plans that fail to meet the objectives of the common market would have to 
undergo further formal investigation procedure. Therefore, member states are 
prohibited from putting any notifiable new aid into operation and this prohibition 
remains effective during the period of preliminary assessment and where applicable 
the period of formal investigation procedure.89  
 
                                                                                                                                            
86 See Article 88(3) EC. 
87 See Article 87 (1) EC. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/legislation/treaties/ec/art87_en.html, last visited on 29 October 2009. 
The article stipulates that, “Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member 
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it 
affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market.” 
88 See Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities, Case C-66/02, ECJ (15 December 
2005), para 76-82. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62002J0066:EN:HTML, last visited on 29 
0ctober 2009. Paragraph 77 defines State aid according to the meaning of Article 87(1) EC as follows: 
“according to settled case-law, the definition of aid is more general than that of a subsidy, because it 
includes not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also measures which, in various 
forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which 
thus, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same 
effect.” Similar cases are as follows. See UFEX and Others v Commission, Case T-613/97, CFI (7 June 
2006), para 158. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61997A0613(01):EN:HTML, last visited on 29 
0ctober 2009. See Enirisorse SpA v Sotacarbo SpA, Case C-237/04, ECJ (23 March 2006), paras 3-5. 
Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004J0237:EN:HTML, last visited on 29 
October 2009. Also see Kingdom of Spain v Commission of the European Communities, Case C-
501/00, ECJ (15 July 2004), para 90. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62000J0501:EN:HTML, last visited on 29 
October 2009. 
89 See Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities, Case C-364/90, ECJ (28 April 
1993), para 48. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61990J0364:EN:HTML, last visited on 29 
October 2009. The ECJ held, in this case, that the process of informing the Commission during the 
administrative procedure stage that the contested aid measures were yet to be disbursed does not 
guarantee that the measures would not be applied subsequently (i.e. between the time when the 
Commission was informed and the time when the contested measures were notified.  
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In the case of Lorenz GmbH v the Federal Republic of Germany, the court held that: 
“in stating that the Commission shall be informed of plans to grant new or alter existing aid 
in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, the draftsmen of the Treaty have sought 
to provide this institution with sufficient time for consideration and investigation to form a 
prima facie opinion on the partial or complete conformity with the Treaty of the plans which 
have been notified to it. It is only after being put in a position to form this opinion that the 
Commission is bound, if considers the plan incompatible with the common market, to initiate 
without delay the contentious procedure, provided for in Article 93 (2) by giving notice to the 
Member State to submit its comment.”
90  
 
The Court further held that while it is necessary for the Commission to be allowed 
sufficient time to form a preliminary view on the plans notified to it, it had to define 
its position within a reasonable period to prevent unnecessary delays. Guided by 
Articles 173 and 175 of the Treaty, the court determined that the reasonable period 
would be fixed for two months. Therefore, on the expiry of two months after 
notification of an intention to grant an aid the commission should have made a 
decision, failing which the member state concerned could implement its plan, 
provided it gave prior notice to the Commission.91 
                                                 
90 See Lorenz GmbH V Federal Republic of Germany and Land Rheinland/Pfalz, Case C-120/73, ECJ 
(11 December 1973) ECR I- 1471, para 3. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61973J0120:EN:HTML, last visited on 30 
October 2009. 
91 See Lorenz GmbH V Federal Republic of Germany and Land Rheinland/Pfalz, para 4. The Court 
further held that if at the end of the preliminary examination, the Commission concluded that the aid 
was compatible with the Treaty; it should inform the Member State concerned. However, the 
Commission was not entitled at that stage to adopt a decision based on Article 189 of the Treaty. Such 
a decision was considered to be applicable at the end of the contentious procedure as laid down in 
Article 93(2). 
The Court’s decision in this case formed the basis for the judgement of a number of other cases as 
follows. See Fritz Lohrey v Federal Republic of Germany and the Land Hessen, Case 141/73 (11 
December 1973) ECR I- 1527. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61973J0141:EN:HTML, last visited on 30 
October 2009. See Nordsee GmbH V Federal Republic of Germany and Land Rheinland/Pfalz, Case C-
122/73, ECJ (11 December 1973) ECR I- 1511. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61973J0122:EN:HTML, last visited on 30 
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Existing aid is subject to continuous review by the Commission. As part of the review 
process, the Commission may institute a formal investigation procedure into the 
operation of aid. If the Commission finds that the aid is operating inconsistently with 
the common market, it must instruct that the aid be abolished or altered to bring it in 
line with the objectives of the common market.92 However, the Commission’s 
decisions in such matters are not implemented retrospectively. Thus, any existing aid 
which has been granted prior to the Commission’s decision that it is no longer 
compatible with the common market would not be subject to a recovery order.93 
 
                                                                                                                                            
October 2009. Also see Markmann KG V Federal Republic of Germany, Case C-121/73, ECJ (11 
December 1973) ECR I- 1495. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61973J0121:EN:HTML, last visited on 30 
October 2009. 
92 See Government of Gibraltar v Commission of the European Communities, Joined Cases (T-195/01 
& T-207/01), CFI (30 April 2002) ECR II- 2309, paras 109-111. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62001A0195:EN:HTML, last visited on 28 
October 2009. Also see Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, 
Case C-70/72, ECJ (12 July 1973) ECR I- 813, paras 14-17. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61972J0070:EN:HTML, last visited on 28 
October 2009.  
93 Commission v Hellenic Republic, Case C-415/03, ECJ (12 May 2005) ECR I- 3875. Available online 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62003J0415:EN:HTML, last 
visited on 29 October 2009. Paragraph 35 states that, “according to settled case-law, the only defence 
available to a Member State in opposing an application by the Commission under Article 85 (2) EC for 
a declaration that it has failed to fulfil its Treaty obligations is to plead that it was absolutely impossible 
for it properly to implement the decision ordering recovery.” Also see Kuwait Petroleum (Nederland) 
BV v Commission, Case T-354/99, ECJ (31 May 2006). Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61999A0354:EN:HTML, last visited on 29 
October 2009. Paragraph 67 stipulates that, “it must be noted that the Commission, when it is faced 
with an aid scheme such as that in the present case, is generally not in a position – nor is it required – to 
identify exactly the amount of aid received by individual recipients. Accordingly, the specific 
circumstances of one of the recipients of an aid scheme can be assessed only at the stage of recovery of 
the aid … The obligation on a Member State to calculate the exact amount of aid to be recovered – 
particularly where, as in the present case, given the large number of service stations involved, that 
calculation is dependent on information which that Member State has not provided to the Commission 
– forms part of the more general reciprocal obligation to cooperate in good faith in the implementation 
of Treaty rules concerning State aids imposed on the Commission and Member States.” 
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Aid plans and implementation are generally regarded to be unlawful94 where the aid is 
not notified to the Commission or if the aid is notified but implemented prior to a 
decision being made by the Commission. Such aids may be suspended or recovered.  
 
Article 15 of the Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 provided that the powers of the 
Commission to recover unlawful aid shall be for a limitation period of ten years, 
commencing from the day the unlawful aid was awarded to the beneficiary, either as 
an individual aid or under an aid scheme. Furthermore, Article 15 stipulates that any 
action taken by the Commission or by the member state, acting at the request of the 
Commission, with regard to the unlawful aid shall interrupt the limitation period.95 
 
However, the Commission may consider that aid has been misused96 and order its 
recovery where aid has been duly authorised by the Commission, and the recipient or 
member state used the aid for purposes other than those for which it was approved. In 
such cases, a formal investigation procedure is followed prior to a decision by the 
Commission.97 The ECJ contends that Commission decisions have to be taken by the 
                                                 
94 Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, Article 1(f). Article 1(f) defines unlawful aid as follows: 
“unlawful aid shall mean new aid put into effect in contravention of Article 93 (3) of the EC Treaty.” 
Please note that Article 93 EEC Treaty is now Article 88 EC. 
95 See Scott v Commission of the European Communities, Case C-276/03 P, ECJ (6 October 2005), 
paras 30-38. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62003J0276:EN:HTML, last visited on 29 
October 2009. Based on the ECJ interpretations, the procedure for recovery of unlawful aid is 
essentially between the Commission and the Member State, and not directly with the beneficiary. 
Therefore, the Commission could interrupt the limitation period by an action which has not been 
notified to the beneficiary of aid. See similar cases on procedures for notification as follows. P & O 
European Ferries (Vizcaya) SA and Diputacion Foral de Vizcaya, Joint Cases C-442/03P and C-
471/03P, ECJ (01 June 2006), para 103. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62003J0442:EN:HTML, last visited on 30 
October 2009. Also see Air One v Commission, Case C-395/04, ECJ (10 May 2006), para 36. Available 
online at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004A0395:EN:HTML, 
last visited on 30 October 2009. 
96 Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, Article 1(g).  Article 1(g) defines misuse of aid as follows: 
“misuse of aid shall mean aid used by the beneficiary in contravention of a decision taken pursuant to 
Article 4(3) or Article 7(3) or (4) of this Regulation.” 
97 See Commission Decision (1999/580/ECSC) of 11 November 1998, concerning aid granted by 
Germany to ESF Elbestahlwerk Feralpi, GmbH, Riesa, Saxony, Official Journal of the European 
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whole membership of the Commission acting together, rather than the Commissioner 
for Competition Policy being the sole decision maker.98 
 
6.2.6.2 Reform of state aid systems of control 
The OFT carried out a study in 2005 to propose a set of reforms to assist state aid 
controls by putting forward an effects-based approach for approval of aid. By 
implication, state aid should be assessed based on economic logic and approved 
where the level of distortion to competition that results was justified by the benefits of 
the aid to the common interest.99 An improvement in this system of controls could 
reduce the risk of approving aids that distort competition significantly, and those that 
do not. The OFT also set out the economic framework for examining the impact of 
subsidies on competition. The framework revealed that the extent of distortion to 
competition depended on the characteristics of the subsidy (e.g. size and 
nature/number of recipients) and the market characteristics in which the recipients 
                                                                                                                                            
Communities (L220/28). Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1999:220:0028:0032:EN:PDF, last visited on 30 
October 2009. 
98 See Association des Amidonneries de Cereales de la CEE and others v Commission of the European 
Communities, Case T-442/93, CFI (27 April 1995) ECR II- 1329, para 101-103.  Available online at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61993A0442:EN:HTML, last visited 
on 30 October 2009. Paragraph 102 reads as follows: “in those judgements, the Court also stated that 
the principle of collegiality thus established is based on equality as between the members of the 
Commission in the decision-making process and signifies that decisions must be deliberated on jointly 
and that all members of the college bear collective responsibility at political level for all decisions 
adopted. 
 Also see Association of Sorbitol Producers within the EC (ASPEC) and others v Commission of the 
European Communities, Case T-435/93, CFI (27 April 1995) ECR II- 1281, paras 123- 126. Available 
online at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61993A0435:EN:HTML, 
last visited on 30 October 2009. 
99 See Friederiszick, H W et al. European State Aid Control: an Economic Framework pp. 37-49 
(2006). Available online at http://www.esmt.org/fm/312/European_State_Aid_Control.pdf, last visited 
on 30 October 2009.  See OFT 829, UK Guidance on How to Assess the Competition Effects of 
Subsidies: Contribution by the UNITED KINGDOM, 2006. Available online at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/c2clp_ige7p34_en.pdf, last visited on 28 September 2009. 
See OFT 820, OFT Response to the European Commission’s Action Plan on State Aid Reform, 2005. 
Available online at   
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/oft_response_to_consultations/oft820.pdf, last visited on 30 
October 2009. Also see European Aid Control; supra note 29, at p. 4. 
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operate (e.g. level of market concentration, product differentiation and barriers to 
entry and exit).100 
 
Based on the foregoing, the OFT has rolled out proposals for changes to state aid 
controls as follows.101 Firstly, they recommended that block exemptions should 
continue to be applied for cases where competition effects are likely to be very small 
due to the small size and specific targeting of the aid.  
 
Secondly, they adopted a two phase approach for assessing the compatibility of aid 
under Article 87 (3) EC (see Figures 6.a and 6.b). Phase 1 assessment would 
determine the likely significance of distortion to competition and should be 
incorporated into the Commission’s guidelines. Criteria to be used for the assessment 
should include market failure remedy, eligibility for aid, market share of recipients, 
overall levels of aid required, etc. Phase 2 assessment would be conducted for 
proposed aid that does not pass the phase 1 assessment, and should be based on 
transparent economic logic (cost / benefit analysis), and on case-by-case. Thirdly, the 
National Competition Authorities (NCAs) could render formal advice regarding the 
eligibility of proposed aid in line with the economic criteria of the guidelines. The 
Commission could be guided by this advice, but should not however be committed to 
it. 
 
To carry out a detailed assessment in line with Phase 2 requirements, a number of 
steps need to be followed.102 Firstly, the product and geographic markets would have 
to be defined. Secondly, a number of factors that may prevent or restrict the recipient 
                                                 
100 See Public Subsidies; supra note 1, at pp. 14-30. 
101 See European State Aid Control; supra note 29, at p. 5. 
102 See id., pp. 50-8. 
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from raising prices or compel it to innovate would need to be assessed. Such factors 
include the number of competitors (including their intentions and incentives) and 
degree of product differentiation. Thirdly, barriers to entry and exit need to be 
examined. Finally, the subsidy and market characteristics would need to be assessed. 
These assessment procedures underline the tight control that the Commission exerts 
on aid applications and how difficult it could be to get one approved. 
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Figure 6.a  Approval route for state aid under the current system 
 
 
Source:  OFT 821, European State Aid Control, p. 17 
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Figure 6.b  Questions for phase 1 
 
 
Source: OFT 821, European State Aid Control, p. 6 
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6.2.7 The EU policy on economic and social cohesion  
The objective of economic and social cohesion is to pursue a balanced development 
throughout the EU, by reducing structural disparities between regions and promoting 
equal opportunity for all. The idea of ensuring economic and social cohesion in the 
EU dates back to the Treaty of Rome in 1957, where a remark was made, in the 
preamble, about reducing regional disparities. This idea stems from the premise that 
social integration should be pursued as a parallel process to political and economic 
integration.103 However, like most ideals, it is unlikely that in the near future citizens 
across the EU would experience living in the EU as though it were a single state, or a 
single social area. Therefore, it is likely that the idea of social cohesion, in this 
context, is based on social inclusion of all citizens of the EU within and without their 
own geographical boundaries. Thus, the concept of social and territorial cohesion is 
bound to be contentious and controversial.104  
 
However, the idea was put to effect in the 1970s when Community action was 
initiated towards coordinating the national instruments and providing additional 
financial resources. Initially, it was forecast by the EC that the adoption of a single 
internal market would contribute to bridging the gap between regions. This gap is 
often measured in terms of income levels or per capita GDP.105 Thus, initial efforts at 
                                                 
103 Threlfall, M., European Social Integration: Harmonization, Convergence and Single Social Areas 
p. 2, Journal of European Social Policy, Vol.13, 121 (2003). Available online at, 
http://esp.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/13/2/121.pdf, last visited on 12 October 2009. 
104 Mirwaldt, K., McMaster, I., & Bachtler, J., Reconsidering Cohesion Policy: The Contested Debate 
on Territorial Cohesion pp. 12-14, European Policy Research Paper No 66 (2009). Available online at 
http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/eorpa/Documents/EoRPA_08_Papers/EoRPA_08-5.pdf, last visited on 29 
October 2009. Also see Bachtler, J, & Wishlade, F., Searching for Consensus: The Debate on 
Reforming EU Cohesion Policy pp. 46 & 52, European Policies Research Paper No 55 (2004). 
Available online at 
http://www.aer.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/MainIssues/CohesionRegionalPolicy/Bachtler-future-cohes-
pol.pdf, last visited on 29 October 2009. 
105 Cuadrado-Roura, J.R., et al., Economic and Social Cohesion in the EU: a Critical Approach p. 3, 
being a Paper Presented at the 44th European Congress of the Regional Science Association, Portugal 
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mobilising national financial instruments were tentative. As these measures proved 
inadequate, and with the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986, economic and 
social cohesion became a major objective as well as completing the single market 
target. 
 
In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty incorporated the economic and social cohesion policy 
into the EC Treaty as contained in Article 158 (ex Article 130a) and Article 159 (ex 
Article 130b).106 Article 158 (ex Article 130a) provides that, “In order to promote its 
overall harmonious development, the Community shall develop and pursue its actions leading 
to the strengthening of its economic and social cohesion. In particular, the Community shall 
aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the 
backwardness of the least favoured regions or islands, including rural areas.”107 Article 159 
(ex Article 130b) stipulates that, “Member States shall conduct their economic policies 
and shall coordinate them in such a way as, in addition, to attain the objectives set out in 
Article 158. The formulation and implementation of the Community's policies and actions and 
the implementation of the internal market shall take into account the objectives set out in 
Article 158 and shall contribute to their achievement. The Community shall also support the 
achievement of these objectives by the action it takes through the Structural Funds (European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, Guidance Section; European Social Fund; 
European Regional Development Fund); the European Investment Bank; and the other 
existing financial instruments. The Commission shall submit a report to the European 
                                                                                                                                            
(August 2004). Available online at http://www-sre.wu-wien.ac.at/ersa/ersaconfs/ersa04/PDF/657.pdf, 
last visited on 12 October 2009. 
106 See Articles 158-162 EC Treaty (Part 3 – Community Policies); Economic and Social Cohesion. 
Available online at, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/htm/C_2002325EN.003301.html, 
last visited on 12 October 2009. 
107 See Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck, Case C-172/03, ECJ (3 March 2005) ECR I- 1627. 
Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62003J0172:EN:HTML, last visited on 28 
October 2009. Paragraph 2 stipulates that the fact that a measure has a social purpose does not mean it 
should be excluded from classification as aid within the meaning of Article 87 EC. Article 87 (1) does 
not distinguish between measures of State intervention by reference to their causes or their aims but 
defines them according to their effects. 
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Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions every three years on the progress made towards achieving economic and social 
cohesion and on the manner in which the various means provided for in this Article have 
contributed to it. This report shall, if necessary, be accompanied by appropriate proposals. If 
specific actions prove necessary outside the Funds and without prejudice to the measures 
decided upon within the framework of the other Community policies, such actions may be 
adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions.” 
 
The economic and social cohesion idea is largely implemented through the regional 
policy of the EU, because its overriding objective is to bridge regional economic and 
social divides. Hence, regional policy financial instruments (i.e. Structural Funds and 
Cohesion Funds) were created to narrow the regional gaps.108 Thus, regional policy is 
the EU’s second largest budget item, behind the common agricultural project (CAP). 
For example, €348b has been allocated to this policy for the period 2007–13.109 Since 
the enlargement of the EU to 27 member states in January 2007, the EU population 
has increased by 20% and its economy by around 5%. Average GDP per capita has 
decreased by more than 10% and regional disparities have doubled. However, around 
                                                 
108 See Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999, laying down general provisions on the 
Structural Funds, Official Journal of the European Communities (L161/1). Available online at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1999:161:0001:0042:EN:PDF, last 
visited on 28 October 2009. For details on the management, allocation and implementation of structural 
funds, see Ferry, M. et al., Turning Strategies into Projects: The Implementation of 2007-13 Structural 
Funds Programmes, IQ-Net Thematic Paper No 20 (2), 2007. Available online at 
http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/iqnet/downloads/IQ-Net_Reports(Public)/ThematicPaper20(2)Final.pdf, 
last visited on 28 October 2009. Also see Bachtler, J. et al., EU Funding Programmes 2007-2013: A 
Comparative Analysis of EU Funding and Policy Support Structures, European Policies Research 
Centre (2007). Available online at 
http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/eprc/documents/PDF_files/Scotland%20Europa.pdf, last visited on 28 
October 2009. 
109 See Council Guidelines (2006/C54/08) on National Regional Aid for 2007-13, Official Journal of 
the European Union (C54/13). Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/c_054/c_05420060304en00130044.pdf, last visited on 27 
October 2009. 
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60% of the regions lagging behind (i.e. Objective 1 regions) in terms of development 
are in the 12 member states that joined the EU in 2004.110 This increase in the number 
of member states sparked a debate for the reform of EU cohesion policy. 
Subsequently, the EC initiated new proposals in the third cohesion report, meant to 
change the rationale, focus, and implementation procedures of structural and cohesion 
funds.111 As a result, the direction of regional policy and expenditure is shifting 
towards the Central and East European countries. Nevertheless, structural assistance 
remains crucial in geographical areas facing peculiar structural problems. Examples 
are areas undergoing industrial restructuring, rural areas, areas dependent on fishing, 
areas facing natural and demographic barriers. 
 
The evidence shows that the UK has participated in the EU social and economic 
cohesion programme that are funded through the EU structural funds. For example, 
the UK received a total of 11.3 billion Euros of EU structural funds, plus an additional 
15.9 billion in national match funding for the programming period 2000-2006.112 
However, the structural funds are managed separately by the various devolved 
administrations. Scotland received £2.3 billion or 3.4 billion Euros (at 2006 prices) of 
                                                 
110 Europa - Glossary; Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion. Available online at 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/economic_social_cohesion_en.htm, last visited on 29 October 2009. 
111 EC: Third Cohesion Report, Part 1 – Cohesion, Competitiveness, Employment and Growth – 
Situation and Trends. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/pdf/cohesion3/cohesion3_part1_ec
osoc_en.pdf, last visited on 29 October 2009. Also see Bachtler, J & Wishlade, F., From Building 
Blocks to Negotiating Boxes: The Reform of EU Cohesion Policy pp. 6-7, European Policy Research 
Paper No 57 (2005). Available online at 
http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/eprc/documents/PDF_files/EPRP_57_From_Building_Blocks_to_Negotia
ting_Boxes.pdf, last visited on 29 October 2009. 
112 Europa, Structural Funds in the UK: The United Kingdom Programmes 2000-2006 (Excluding 
PEACE II). Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/newsroom/document/pdf/manchesteruk.pdf, last visited on 4 
November 2009. For more details, see European Social Fund: Community Support Framework for 
Great Britain (Objective 3 2000-2006). Available online at http://www.esf.gov.uk/_docs/esf_-
_csf_2004.pdf, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
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EU structural funds during the period 1994-2006.113 These funds were meant to 
finance mainstream projects such as, development and adjustment of lagging regions; 
development of rural areas; adjustment of agricultural structures; integration and 
adaptation of persons excluded from the labour market. Wales received over £1.5 
billion of EU structural funds during the period 2000-2006, and together with match 
funding from other sources amounted to over £3.8 billion of total project 
investments.114 For the period 2007-2013, the EU has made a budget of about 308 
billion Euros for the structural and cohesion funds. Based on this budget, the UK is 
expected to receive 9.4 billion Euros.115 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
113 Davis, S et al., The Impact of Structural Funds Programmes in Scotland 1994-2006, pp. 3-4. 
European Policies Research Centre, European Policy Research Paper No 60, 2007. Available online at 
http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/eprc/Documents/PDF_files/R60_Impact_of_SF_Programmes_in_Scotlan
d_1994-2006.pdf, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
114 Welsh European Funding Office, European Structural Funds Programmes 2000-2006 in Wales. 
Available online at 
http://wefo.wales.gov.uk/programmes/20002006/;jsessionid=Jy0vLpSSd21LRFhNy2y6WrS9VMsF3B
RY7qwcCKwQ1jhh3mdkcpGS!-1129944059?lang=en, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
115 European Unit: EU Policy – Structural Funding. Available online at 
http://www.europeunit.ac.uk/sites/europe_unit2/eu_policy___structural_funding/index.cfm, last visited 
on 4 November 2009. 
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6.3 Australia  
6.3.1 State aid and subsidies in Australia 
Similar to the UK (EU), the Australian Government and individual states provide aid 
and subsidy grants. The granting of aid to states by the Australian Government 
commenced after 1927 with the enactment of the States Grants Act 1927 (SGA).116 
The Act was meant to distribute the surplus revenue accruing to the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund to all states, based on population numbers of the individual states. This 
Act was amended in 1973 (States Grants Act 1973)117 and repealed by Act No. 122 of 
1976.118 Subsequently, the Australian Government decided to deal with states grants 
on the basis of specific need of industry sectors and states. Some grants were applied 
mainly to education, road infrastructure development, and energy products (including 
petroleum products). 
 
However, unlike the UK (EU) the Australian Government enacted an Act in 1965 
specifically for the grant of subsidies on petroleum products, i.e. the States Grants 
(Petroleum Products) Act 1965.119 The South Australian Government also enacted a 
separate subsidy Act, i.e. Petroleum Products Subsidy Act 1965. Other similar 
legislation followed, such as State Grant (Special Assistance to South Australia) Act 
1960; State Grants (Rural Reconstruction) Act 1971; States Grants (Rural 
Adjustment) Act 1976; Fuel Sales Grants Act 2000; Products Grants & Benefits 
                                                 
116 States Grants Act 1927. Available online at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/sga1927172.txt/cgi-
bin/download.cgi/download/au/legis/cth/consol_act/sga1927172.rtf , last visited on 15 October 2009. 
117 States Grants Act 1973. Available online at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/cgi-
bin/download.pl?/scale/data/histact/4/2436 , last visited on 15 October 2009. 
118 States (Personal Income Tax Sharing) Act 1976, No 122. Available online at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/sitsa1976355/index.html, last visited on 16 October 
2009. S. 3(1) states that, “the following Acts are repealed: States Grants Act 1973, States Grants Act 
1974, States Grants Act 1975.” 
119
The States Grants (Petroleum Products) Act 1965.  Available online at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/ActCompilation1.nsf/0/905B8569CC463623CA2573
0C0000B572/$file/StateGrantPetlProd1965_WD02.pdf , last visited on 15 October 2009. 
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Administration Act 2000; Energy Grants (Credits) Scheme Act 2003; Fuel Tax Bill 
2006, and Fuel Tax (Consequential & Transitional Provisions) Bill 2006.  
 
Table 6.3  Summary of major subsidy types120 and their characteristics 
 
Subsidy / 
Characteristics 
Products 
Freight Subsidy 
Scheme (1965-
2006) 
Diesel Fuel 
Rebate Scheme 
(1982-2006) 
Diesel & 
Alternative Fuels 
Grant Scheme 
(2000-2006) 
Fuel Sales 
Grants 
Scheme 
(2000-2006) 
Energy Grants 
(Credits) 
Scheme 
(2003-2012) 
Targeting of 
subsidy 
Paid to fuel 
distributors for 
supplies to 
rural and 
remote retail 
sites, etc 
Mining 
operations; 
primary 
production; 
electricity 
generation at 
specific 
residential 
premises; rail 
and marine 
transport 
Businesses; 
vehicles with a 
gross vehicle 
mass of 4.5 
tonnes or more; 
eligible users of 
alternative fuels 
(CNG, LPG, 
ethanol, bio-
diesel, etc) 
Paid to fuel 
retailers in 
rural and 
remote areas 
Mining 
operations; 
primary 
production; 
agriculture; 
rail and 
marine 
transport; 
eligible 
vehicles 
Absolute size of 
subsidies 
Low  
  
High  
 
High  
 
Medium  High  
Subsidy size 
relative to cost 
of fuels 
Low High 
  
Medium  
 
Low  
 
High  
 
Level of 
selectivity 
Low  High  Low Low  Low 
Effects of 
subsidy on 
recipient’s cost 
Low High Significant Low Significant 
Frequency of 
subsidy 
Continuous 
until its expiry 
on 30 June 
2006 
Continuous 
until its expiry 
on 30 June 
2006 
Continuous until 
30 June 2006 
Continuous 
until 30 June 
2006 
Continuous 
until 30 June 
2012 
Source:  This research 
 
 
Table 6.3 summarises the major subsidy types and their characteristics based on the 
OFT criteria for analysing subsidies.121 In this section, we will examine (for all 
identified subsidy schemes) the policy objective/s, target, size of the subsidy, 
                                                 
120 These subsidy schemes represent the corresponding Acts as discussed subsequently. 
121 Note that the OFT criteria for characterising subsidies was chosen based on the author’s previous 
choice of the OFT definition of subsidies in Chapter 2. 
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duration, reason/s for government’s decision to continue or discontinue the scheme as 
the case may be. 
 
6.3.2 The States Grants (Petroleum Products) Act (SGPP) 1965  
           (1965-2006) 
This Act was meant to grant financial assistance to the States and the Northern 
Territory in regard to prices of certain petroleum products (petrol, diesel, and aviation 
gasoline or aviation turbine fuel). The states are reimbursed by the Australian 
Government for payments made to distributors of eligible products as registered under 
the scheme in accordance with that put in place by the minister for the purposes of the 
Act. 
 
The distributors are supposed to pass on the benefits to the retailers in order to reduce 
pump prices. For this purpose, the distributors were only permitted to be registered if 
entered into an agreement in writing with the Australian Government and the State, or 
having given an undertaking in writing to the government to the effect that:  
“(a) he or she will sell any eligible petroleum product at a price that gives to the purchaser 
the benefit of any payment received or to be received by the distributor in respect of the sale; 
and (b) he or she will not make a claim for a payment from the State in respect of a sale of 
any eligible petroleum product unless he or she sold the product at a price that gave to the 
purchaser the benefit of the payment that the distributor claims to receive in respect of the 
sale”.122 
 
Some persons or companies were excluded from registering under the scheme at any 
time because they were not regarded as distributors. These included “(a) a case where 
the person is an incorporated company – the person is, or is related to another 
                                                 
122 See id., p. 3 (S. 4)  
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company, that is, the owner or operator of a mini-refinery; or (b) in any other case – 
the person is the owner or operator of a mini-refinery”.123 False declarations 
accompanying claims for payment were “punishable on conviction by a fine not 
exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years, or both”. 
This Act was repealed by the Fuel Tax (Consequential and Transitional Provision) 
Act 2006. 
6.3.3 Petroleum products freight subsidy scheme (PPFSS), 1965-2006 
Consistent with the objectives of the State Grants (Petroleum Products) Act 1965, the 
PPFSS was introduced in 1965 order to reduce the cost of delivering certain fuels to 
rural and remote places in Australia.124 This was achieved by subsidising the freight 
component of the purchase price of the fuels, such as automotive distillate, petrol, 
aviation gasoline, and aviation turbine fuel.  
 
The subsidy was paid to independent fuel distributors and oil companies, who in turn 
were required (through signing an undertaking) to pass on the benefit of the subsidy to 
the fuel consumers. Eligible places under the scheme included rural and remote retail 
sites, safe anchorages, airports, and large volume users in rural and remote locations, 
such as mine sites, etc.125 
 
Under the scheme, consumers were required to bear part of the freight costs 
(‘consumer pays margin). In situations where the average freight cost exceeds the 
consumer pays margin, a subsidy was paid to the fuel distributor that was equal to the 
                                                 
123 See id., p. 4 (S. 4D) 
124 Commonwealth of Australia; Report on Fuel Tax Inquiry pp. 164-6 (2002). Available online at 
http://fueltaxinquiry.treasury.gov.au/content/report/default.asp , last visited on 18 September 2009. 
125 AusIndustry, Fact Sheet: Petroleum Products Freight Subsidy Scheme p. 1 (2003). Available online 
at http://www.ausindustry.gov.au/library/PPFSS_fact_sheet20040129022110.pdf, last visited on 15 
October 2009. 
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excess. The Australian Government budgeted $17 million for the scheme from 1999–
2004. Of this, $3.5 million was spent in 2000-01.126 The scheme was discontinued on 
the 30 June 2006, because current environmental concerns could not justify the 
provision of this type of assistance. Secondly, the administrative costs were 
disproportionately high relative to the smaller total amount of the subsidy distributed.  
6.3.4 Petroleum Products Subsidy Act 1965 (South Australia), 1965- 
           2006 
This Act was designed to subsidise the distribution of certain petroleum products in 
certain country areas in South Australia.127 Eligible petroleum products were motor 
spirit (petrol), automotive distillates, and aviation gasoline or aviation turbine fuel. 
Similar to the States Grants Act, registered distributors of eligible products were 
expected to pass the benefits of the payments made to them to the purchasers of those 
products.  
 
For petroleum product customers in those country areas, this Act was supposed to 
deliver additional lower pump prices over and above the beneficial impact of the 
States Grants Act. The subsidy was specifically provided by the Australian 
Government to the State of South Australia for the purpose of this Act, and the fund 
was warehoused in a trust account at the Treasury and under the authority of the 
Treasurer. False or misleading declarations in regard to this Act were considered to be 
an offence punishable on conviction by a fine of $2,000 or imprisonment for 12 
months. 
                                                 
126 The Commonwealth Budget 2001-2002, Ministerial Statements: Industry Sector-Specific Initiatives 
1 (2001). Available online at http://www.budget.gov.au/2001-02/minst/html/transp-10.htm, last visited 
on 15 October 2009. 
127 Queensland Petroleum Products Subsidy Act 1965 p. 3. Available online at 
http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/SUPERSED/P/PetrolPdSbsdyA65_01_.pdf , last visited 
on 15 October 2009. 
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6.3.5 State Grant (Special Assistance to South Australia) Act 1960 
This refers to a special sum of money (1.27 million pounds) paid to South Australia 
from the Consolidated Revenue Fund to assist the development of the South 
Australian State.128 This was in addition to a similar payment made to the state under 
the States Grants (Special Assistance) Act 1959. The latter Act was repealed by the 
Statute Law Revision Act (No. 216, 1973). 
6.3.6 State Grants (Rural Reconstruction) Act 1971 
The Commonwealth of Australia and a number of States with large expanses of rural 
areas (New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia, 
and Tasmania) entered an agreement on rural reconstruction based on the need to 
provide assistance to persons engaged in rural industries throughout Australia. This 
agreement and the funding that went with it were meant to deliver benefits to those 
rural industries and inhabitants. The rural reconstruction Act 1971 and its successor, 
the Rural Adjustment Act 1976 were part of the efforts of the Australian Labor 
Government to fulfil its electoral promises to rural and remote communities of 
Australia. 
 
The schedule for rural reconstruction constituted a scheme under which assistance 
could be provided to those industries, and was financed from the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund. The schedule covered debt reconstruction, farm build-up, and 
rehabilitation of viable businesses. A sum of 100 million dollars was budgeted for the 
scheme during the period 1971 to 1975.129  
                                                 
128 State Grant (Special Assistance to South Australia) Act 1960 (S. 3). Available online at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/sgatsaa1960498/ , last visited on 15 October 2009. 
129 State Grants (Rural Reconstruction) Act 1971, Part III, Clause 11). Available online at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/sgra1971417/s4.html , last visited on 15 October 
2009. 
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6.3.7 States Grants (Rural Adjustment) Act 1976 
Like the Rural Reconstruction Act, the Rural Adjustment Act was entered into by the 
same states and the Australian Government. The outline for the scheme for rural 
adjustment covered all agricultural, horticultural, and pastoral industries. The main 
objective of the scheme was to restore economic viability to farms and farmers whose 
activities were threatened. These took the form of debt reconstruction; advances for 
recurrent expenditure; plant, livestock and property development (see parts 1–7 of the 
schedule).130 Some of the objectives of the scheme were also to alleviate hardship for 
persons that were forced to exit their business by harsh market conditions, and to 
rehabilitate those considering exiting their business. 
 
6.3.8 Diesel fuel rebate scheme (DFRS), 1982-2006 
The DFRS or the off-road subsidy scheme was designed to provide tax or duty rebate 
paid on diesel and allied fuels for specific off-road uses.131 The primary objective of 
the scheme was to maintain Australia’s competitiveness in key export businesses, 
such as agriculture and mining. The legislative authority for the introduction of the 
DFRS was based on Section 78 of the Excise Act 1901.132 Subsequently, the DFRS 
was amended in 2002, based on the need to balance the requirements of businesses in 
regional and remote Australia with the provision of incentives for the use of cleaner 
fuels in these locations.133 Eligible users included those involved with primary 
                                                 
130 States Grants (Rural Adjustment) Act 1976, Schedule of Scheme (Parts 1–7). Available online at  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/sgaa1976354.txt/cgi-
bin/download.cgi/download/au/legis/cth/consol_act/sgaa1976354.rtf , last visited on 15 October 2009. 
131 Australian Taxation Office; Diesel Fuel Rebate Scheme. Available online at 
http://www.ato.gov.au/docs/2002FRGS03.rtf, last visited on 18 September 2009. 
132 Commonwealth Excise Act 1901. Available online at 
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?docid=PAC/19010009/78, last visited on 18 October 2009. 
133.Australia: Senate Economics Legislation Committee: Report on the Diesel Fuel Rebate Scheme 
Ammendment Bill pp. 6-9 (2002). Available online at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/SENATE/COMMITTEE/economics_ctte/completed_inquiries/2002-
04/diesel_fuel_rebate/report/report.pdf, last visited on 18 September 2009. Also, see Diesel Fuel 
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production; mining operations; rail transport; marine transport; electricity generation 
at specific residential premises, including hospitality businesses, hospitals, nursing 
homes, and other medical or nursing care concerns.  
In terms of the absolute size of the scheme, it was second to the Energy Grants 
(Credits) Scheme Act (EGCS) 2003. Table 6.4 shows the breakdown of the rebates 
by industry or operator for the period 2002–03. The mining industry accounted for 
nearly 50% in monetary terms, but represented only 4% of claims. Conversely, 
agriculture, which received the second largest rebates, had 25% of total rebates in 
monetary terms, but represented 86% of all claims. The total number of claimants in 
2002–03 was as high as 93,000. 
 
Table 6.4 DFRS rebates paid estimates by industry/operation (2002–03) 
 
Industry/ Operation Number of Claims 
Paid 
Total Amount Paid  Average 
Amount Paid 
 No                   % $’000                         % $ 
Mining 7,362              3.6 1,113,605               48.6 151,264 
Agriculture 176,084        85.8 579,570                  25.3 3,291 
Rail 444                 0.2 263,686                  11.5 593,887 
Marine 4,793              2.3 123,682                    5.4 25,805 
Fishing 7,613              3.7 97,988                      4.3 12,871 
Forestry 6,071              3.0 46,108                      2.0 7,595 
Electricity generation 2,407              1.2 14,146                      0.6 5,877 
Hospitals 130                 0.1 1,466                        0.1 11,279 
Aged homes 91                   0.0 296                           0.0 3,257 
Nursing homes 40                   0.0 77                             0.0 1,923 
Other medical 29                   0.0 38                             0.0 1,308 
Like fuel use – all 
industries/activities 
230                 0.1 51,813                      2.3 225,275 
Total 205,294      100.0 2,292,477             100.0 11, 167 
 
Source
134  Australian Taxation Office, p286 (2002) 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Rebate Scheme (Amendment) Bill 2002. Available online at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2001-02/02bd147.htm, last visited on 18 October 2009 
134 Australian Taxation Office (ATO), Diesel Fuel Rebate Scheme, p. 286 (2002).  Available online at 
http://www.ato.gov.au/docs/2002FRGS03.rtf, last visited on 16 October 2006. 
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6.3.9 Diesel and alternative fuels grant scheme (DAFGS), 2000-2006 
Similar to the DFRS, the DAFGS was designed for business users and vehicles with a 
gross vehicle mass of 4.5 tonnes or more. However, it differed from the DFRS 
because it included eligible users of alternative fuels, such as CNG, LPG, recycled 
waste oil, and renewable fuels such as ethanol, biodiesel, canola oil, etc.135 
 
The DAFGS was introduced in 2000 as part of the Australian Government’s 
alternative fuel programmes or measures for a better environment package.136 The 
purpose of the scheme was to provide an opportunity for heavy vehicle users and bus 
operators to convert to cheaper natural gas and LPG. This would enable the latter to 
lower the cost of public transport.137 Under the scheme, the Australian Government 
retained the price differential between diesel and alternative fuels to encourage the 
widespread use of the latter in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to 
improve air quality. As a result, the size of alternative fuel subsidies relative to the 
cost of the fuels was low. The grants were as follows: LPG (11.93 cpl); ethanol (20.81 
cpl); diesel (18.51 cpl); and CNG (12.62 cents per cubic meter).138 
 
The DAFGS constituted a building block for the more robust Energy Grants (Credits) 
Scheme 2003 and the Energy Grants (Cleaner Fuels) Scheme 2004. These were to 
take effect after the expiry of the DAFGS on 01 July 2006. 
                                                 
135 Diesel & Alternative Fuels Grant Scheme Act 1999. Available online at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/daafgsa1999379/, last visited on 16 October 2009. 
136 Australia: Senate Economics Legislation Committee: Diesel and Alternative Fuels Grants Scheme 
(Administration and Compliance) Bill 1999. Available online at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/SENATE/COMMITTEE/economics_ctte/completed_inquiries/1999-
02/diesel/report/report.pdf, last visited on 16 October 2009. Also see Environment Australia, Air Toxics 
and Indoor Air Quality in Australia: State of Knowledge Report (2001). Available online at 
http://www.environment.gov.au/atmosphere/airquality/publications/sok/appb.html, last visited on 16 
October 2009. 
137 Australian Taxation Office, Diesel and Alternative Fuels Grants Scheme, pp. 283-285 (2002). 
Available online at http://www.ato.gov.au/docs/2002FRGS04.rtf, last visited on 16 October 2009. 
138 World Energy Outlook; Diesel & Alternative Fuels Grant Scheme (2000).  Available online at 
http://www.iea.org/Textbase/pm/?mode=weo&id=357&action=detail, last visited on 16 October 2009. 
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6.3.10 Fuel Sales Grants Act (FSGA) 2000, (2000-2006) 
The purpose of this legislation was to provide fuel tax concessions to fuel retailers for 
sales of petrol and diesel to users in regional and remote areas in order to cushion the 
effects of higher fuel prices and to reduce the price differentials between urban and 
rural areas.139 Fuel retailers were made to register for the scheme under the Product 
Grants and Benefits Administration Act 2000.140 All fuel retailers were eligible to 
receive grants under the scheme, provided the sale of fuel was in an eligible location 
and to the end users of the products.141 
 
The FSGA was one of the major fuel grants schemes, and attracted a government 
budget of about $270 million per annum (according to 2005–06 figures).142 Under the 
scheme, fuel consumers in non-metropolitan areas and those in remote locations 
received a rebate of 1 cpl and 2 cpl respectively. Similar to the PPFSS, retailers were 
meant to sign an undertaking that required them to pass on the benefit of the subsidy 
to the purchasers. However, there were concerns about compliance issues arising from 
eligibility for the lower and higher grant rates based on geographic boundaries. These 
anomalies were likely to have an adverse impact on resource allocation and 
competition. The Service Station Association suggested that the government could 
deal directly with the problem of rural–urban price differential by introducing a 
                                                 
139 Fuel Sales Grants Act 2000. Available online at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/fsga2000185/ , last visited on 15 October 2009. Also 
see Fuel Tax Inquiry; supra note 124, at pp. 161-3. 
140 See Products Grants & Benefits Administration Act 2000. Available online at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au//legis/cth/consol_act/pgabaa2000424/, last visited on 15 October 2009. 
141 See FSG Act 2000; supra note 139, at Section 7. 
142 Fuel Tax Bill (Consequential & Transitional Provisions) 2006 p. 1. Available online at 
http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/PIWeb/Repository/Legis/Bills/Linked/29030615.pdf , last visited on 15 
October 2009. 
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mandatory Terminal Gate Pricing that would ensure that the ex-refinery price of 
petroleum products was the same for all fuel stations and bulk users.143  
 
However, the previous Australian Government Acts mentioned in this section were 
administered by the Secretary of the Department but to underscore its importance to 
the government at the time, this Act was administered directly by the Commissioner 
of Taxation.144 
6.3.11 Energy Grants (Credits) Scheme Act (EGCS) 2003 
This Act replaced the Fuel Sales Grants Act 2000 when it expired on 30 June 
2006.145The scheme was designed to replace the DFRS and the DAFGS, but with a 
continuance of the benefits inherent in both schemes.146 The Fuel Tax Inquiry 
recommended that these schemes should be substituted with a Business Fuel Credit 
Scheme,147 which would lower the effective level of fuel taxes for businesses, and a 
Residential Fuel Credit Scheme148 for diesel, heating oil, or LPG for domestic use in 
remote communities without access to the electricity grid or natural gas pipelines.  
 
The main purpose of this scheme was to actively encourage the use of cleaner fuels in 
line with the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999.149 The 
                                                 
143 Service Station Association: Submission to the Fuel Taxation Inquiry p. 2. Available online at 
http://fueltaxinquiry.treasury.gov.au/content/Submissions/Industry/downloads/SSA_227.pdf, last 
visited on 18 October 2009. 
144 See id., S. 5. This was meant to ensure strict compliance and monitoring of the grant scheme. 
145 Energy Grants (Credits) Scheme Act 2003. Available online at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/egsa2003280/ , last visited on 15 October 2009. 
146 Australia: Senate Economics Legislation Committee: Provisions of the Energy Grants (Credits) 
Scheme Bill 2003 and Energy Grants (Credits) Scheme (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2003. 
Available online at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/economics_ctte/completed_inquiries/2002-
04/energy_grants/report/report.pdf, last visited on 18 October 2009. 
147 See Fuel Tax Inquiry; supra note 124, at p. 130. 
148 See id., p. 167. 
149 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. Available online at 
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Act relates to diesel and alternative fuels used for on- or off-road purposes and covers 
various sectors, such as mining operations and activities; primary production; 
agriculture; livestock; horticulture; fishing; forestry, marine, and rail transport.150 
 
Persons or companies “are entitled to on-road credit if they purchased or imported 
into Australia, on-road diesel fuel or on-road alternative fuel for (a) use in a registered 
vehicle that has a gross vehicle mass of 20 tonnes or more; or (b) incidental use in 
relation to such a vehicle”.151 Also, persons or companies are entitled to an off-road 
credit if they purchased or imported into Australia off-road diesel fuel for use in the 
activities prescribed above. 
 
The EGCS scheme is Australia’s largest fuels subsidy scheme, followed by the 
defunct FSGS and the PPFSS schemes. The government budgeted above $3.7b per 
annum for the scheme, based on 2005–06 figures.152 The cost of providing grants for 
low sulphur fuels during the period 2005–07 was estimated at $42m. The estimated 
cost of biodiesel grants alone during the period 2003–07 was $234m.153 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/epabca1999588/ , last visited on 16 October 2009. 
Also see Australia: Senate Economics Legislation Committee: Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill 
2009 and related Bills (Provisions), p. 7 (2009). Available online at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/economics_ctte/cprs_2_09/report/report.pdf, last visited on 
18 October 2009. This is a cap-and-trade emissions trading scheme designed to limit the global 
emissions of greenhouse gases. The government has now raised the maximum emissions reduction 
from 15% to 25% by 2020. 
150 See EGCS Act 2003; supra note 145, at Ss. 11-39. 
151 See id., S. 42. 
152 Fuel Tax Act 2006, p. 1. Available online at 
http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/PIWeb/Repository/Legis/Bills/Linked/29030614.pdf , last visited on 15 
October 2009. 
153 Energy Grants (Cleaner Fuels) Scheme Bill 2003. Available online at   
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/Pubs/BD/2003-04/04bd033.htm, last visited on 16 October 2009. 
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Table 6.5  Offset rates for certain cleaner fuels under the Energy Grants 
(Cleaner Fuels) Scheme Act 2004154 
 
Fuel Type Duration Fuel’s Offset Rate 
Biodiesel Biodiesel start day until the end of 
30 June 2011. 
100% of biodiesel’s 
excise duty rate. 
Renewable diesel Renewable diesel’s start day until 
the end of 30 June 2011. 
100% of biodiesel’s 
excise duty rate. 
Biodiesel, CNG, 
ethanol, LPG, LNG, 
methanol or renewable 
diesel 
Lasts from 01 July 2011 to the end 
of 30 June 2012. 
80% of the fuel’s 
excise duty rate. 
Biodiesel, CNG, 
ethanol, LPG, LNG, 
methanol or renewable 
diesel 
Lasts from 01 July 2012 to the end 
of 30 June 2013. 
60% of the fuel’s 
duty excise duty 
rate. 
 
Biodiesel, CNG, 
ethanol, LPG, LNG, 
methanol or renewable 
diesel 
Lasts from 01 July 2013 to the end 
of 30 June 2014. 
40% of the fuel’s 
excise duty rate. 
Biodiesel, CNG, 
ethanol, LPG, LNG, 
methanol or renewable 
diesel 
Lasts from 01 July 2014 to the end 
of 30 June 2015. 
20% of the fuel’s 
excise duty rate. 
Source:  Australian Taxation Office; Section 8, Part 2 (2004) 
 
The EGCS is expected to expire by 2012 and will be succeeded by the Energy Grants 
(Cleaner Fuels) Scheme Act 2004 which is expected to last until 30 June 2015.155 
Initially, the fuel offset rate for biodiesel will be 100% of the excise duty rate until 30 
June 2011. Subsequently, with effect from 01 July 2011 an offset rate of 80% will 
apply to biodiesel and other alternative fuels, such as CNG, ethanol, LNG, LPG, 
methanol, or renewable diesel.156 The offset rate will be reduced progressively until 
                                                 
154 See Energy Grants (Cleaner Fuels) Scheme Bill 2003; supra note 153, at Section 8, Part II. 
155 Energy Grants (Cleaner Fuels) Scheme Act 2004. Available online at 
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?Docid=PAC/20040041/ATOTOC, last visited on 16 October 
2009. Also see Energy Grants (Cleaner Fuels) Scheme (Consequential Amendments) Act 2004. 
Available online at 
http://fedlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/Act1.nsf/0/1BD7D4B37A7E406CCA2573FD0010DB98/$fi
le/0422004.pdf, last visited on 16 October 2009. 
156
Energy Grants (Cleaner Fuels) Scheme, Entitlements to Cleaner Fuel Grants. Available online at 
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?docid=PAC/20040041/8, last visited on 16 October 2009. The 
thesis has introduced three different types of diesel fuels. Petroleum diesel is produced from crude oil 
refining. Biodiesel is produced through a reaction of vegetable oil or animal fat with an alcohol 
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2015, when the effectiveness of the grants would be reviewed (see Table 6.5). A 
claim under the Products Grants & Benefits Administration Act 2000 for energy 
grants both for on-road and off-road diesel fuel was scheduled to be made before July 
2007. Otherwise such claims would have to be made under the new Fuel Tax Act 
2006 (item 9 of Schedule 3 to the Fuel Tax – Consequential & Transitional Provisions 
– Act 2006).157 
6.3.12 Fuel Tax Act (FTA) 2006   
This Act provides a single system of fuel tax credits which was designed to minimise 
or remove the incidence of several fuel tax schemes applicable to taxable fuels. This 
is also to ensure that fuel tax is applied only to “(a) fuels used in private vehicles and 
for certain other private purposes; and (b) fuel used on-road in light vehicles for 
business purposes”.158 To achieve this objective, fuel tax credit is provided to 
minimise or remove the incidence of fuel tax applied to “(a) fuel used in carrying on 
an enterprise (other than fuel used on-road in light vehicles); and (b) fuel used for 
domestic heating and domestic electricity generation; and (c) fuel packaged for use 
other than in an internal combustion engine”.159 The Act also applies to certain 
compressed and liquefied gaseous fuels, unlike the Fuel Sales Grants Act. 
 
Business taxpayers, non-profit bodies, and non-business taxpayers are entitled to fuel 
tax credits. This is extended to businesses that are registered for Goods and Services 
                                                                                                                                            
(usually methanol) and a catalyst. Renewable diesel fuels are diesel fuel substitutes produced from 
renewable feedstock like biomass, slaughter house waste, tallow, or recycled vegetable oil. Chemically, 
petroleum diesel are hydrocarbons, biodiesel are esters, and renewable feedstocks for producing 
renewable diesel are not neither hydrocarbons nor esters. 
157 See Fuel Tax Bill (Consequential & Transitional Provisions); supra note 142, at S. 40. 
158 See Fuel Tax Act 2006; supra note 152, at p. 3. 
159 See id., p. 8. Also see Australia: Senate Economics Legislation Committee: Provisions of Fuel Tax 
Bill 2006 & Fuel Tax (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2006, pp. 4-6 (2006). Available 
online at http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/economics_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-
07/fuel_1/report/report.pdf, last visited on 15 October 2009. 
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Tax (GST). In this case, fuel tax credits are provided based on two scenarios. Firstly, 
the credits apply “where the businesses acquire, manufacture or import fuel for use in 
carrying on the enterprise (whether the fuel is used as fuel or otherwise)”. Secondly, 
they also apply “where the businesses acquire, manufacture, or import fuel to make a 
taxable supply to a private user for domestic heating or to package the fuel for the 
purpose of making a taxable supply of it for use other than in an internal combustion 
engine.160 For non-business taxpayers, credits are provided for fuel if it is to be used 
in generating electricity for domestic consumption. 
 
Conversely, fuel tax credits are not applicable to fuel used in light vehicles on a public 
road; motor vehicles that do not meet environmental criteria; or fuel to be used in 
aircraft. 
6.3.13 Fuel Tax (Consequential & Transitional Provisions) Act 2006 
This Act specified the amendments to and dates for the repeal of previous Acts 
relating to grants provided for petroleum products. The States Grants (Petroleum 
Products) Act was repealed on 1 July, 2007; the Fuel Sales Grants Act on 1 January, 
2007. The Energy Grants Act will be repealed on 1 July, 2012.161 This Act therefore 
provided for transitional arrangements from the Energy Grants to the new 
consolidated Fuel Tax Act. 
 
6.4 Comparative Analysis of Findings 
Provision of state aid for regional and rural development in the UK and Australia are 
somewhat similar in terms of their objectives, arms of government units that are 
allowed to grant aids, targeting of aids, mode of aid delivery, and legislative 
                                                 
160 See Fuel Tax Act 2006; supra note 152, at p. 9. 
161 See FTA (Consequential & Transitional Provisions); supra note 142, at Schedule 1 (part 3) & 
Schedule 2 (part 2) & Schedule 3 (part 7). 
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instruments for promoting rural development. However, they differ significantly in 
terms of subsidy design, governance systems, and selectivity. 
 
Both governments recognise that subsidies could be useful in addressing market 
failures, improving social welfare, and promoting development in areas that are 
lagging behind in terms of economic development. In the UK, subsidies are granted 
by central government, devolved administrations, government departments, regional 
agencies, and local authorities. Similarly, subsidies are granted by the central 
government, states, territories, and local authorities in Australia. The UK Government 
operates two major subsidy schemes which are targeted at AAs or economically-
underperforming areas. Around 21% of state aid is directed at regional development 
in the UK. Similarly, most of the state aid in Australia was designed for regional and 
rural development. Around 83% of aid in the UK is delivered through grants and tax 
credits. Similarly, most state aid in Australia is delivered through grants and tax 
concessions. 
 
However, government departments and agencies in the UK operate and design 
subsidy schemes with common guidelines as directed by HM treasury (and the SPFM 
in the case of Scotland), and the EU general guidelines for the granting of subsidies. 
Generally, the EC Treaty prohibits state aid because of its distorting effect on 
competition. However, the EU guidelines on state aid provides that aid may be 
granted where there are serious economic, social, geological, or environmental 
problems, provided that the aid does not affect other member states and that it is 
provided in a non-selective way. Thus, aid may be provided to promote the 
development of areas where the per capita income level is low, or where there is 
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serious unemployment. Aid can also be provided to facilitate the development of 
certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, provided the aid does not 
affect trading between member states. Member states are also allowed to provide 
grants of up to €200,000 (i.e. De minimis provision) for these purposes without prior 
notification to the EC.  
 
The provision of state aid in EU member states is governed at two levels: statutory 
regulations and the courts (i.e. the CFI and the ECJ). The statutory regulations are 
implemented through prior notification to and approval by, the EC. The EC uses 
systems of control involving regulations, guidelines, and procedures to ensure that 
approved aid complies with Article 87 (3) EC. At the judicial level of governance, the 
CFI and the ECJ interpret and enforce the EU state aid law, hence the existence of a 
large body of case-law on EU state aid. Moreover, all subsidy proposals in the UK 
must undergo a regulatory impact assessment (RIA), and from the year 2001 the UK 
Government introduced competition impact assessment as one of the criteria for 
completing the RIAs. There is no evidence of a formal system of RIA for subsidy 
design and provision in Australia as these are largely introduced through legislation.  
 
Therefore, the provision of subsidies in the UK is strictly controlled through these 
guidelines. Conversely, provision of subsidies in Australia is governed only by 
statutory legislations. However, the administration aspects are conducted by the 
Secretary of the relevant government departments. Regarding tax concessions, the 
Australian Office of Taxation is directly involved in their administration.  
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The EU rural development policies (as well as the CAP) are applicable to the UK. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999 and Agenda 2000 reform package for rural 
areas form the basis for promoting a comprehensive and multifunctional agricultural 
policy. These measures are further consolidated by the EU policy on economic, 
social, and territorial cohesion. These support instruments recognise that agriculture 
alone cannot guarantee the vitality of rural communities, in terms of jobs and 
economic growth. Thus, both regulatory instruments promote measures that support 
the broader rural economy, thereby contributing to the regeneration of rural areas and 
the promotion of diversification of rural economic activities in member states. To 
promote these diversification objectives, the EC designed sector-specific regulations 
and guidelines on agriculture, transport, energy conservation, SMEs, and the 
provision of services of general interest (e.g. telecommunications, electricity, certain 
forms of transport, like ambulances, school buses, etc.). In respect of guidelines on 
transport, the EC’s policy is geared towards shifting the balance in favour of those 
with less adverse impact on the environment.  
 
Similarly, the Australian Government introduced statutes between 1960 and 1976 
designed for rural assistance, reconstruction, and adjustment. However, these were 
discontinued in favour of more sector-specific targeting of aids and most of these 
were related to petroleum products. Nevertheless, the provision of fuel subsidies in 
Australia began in 1965 with the enactment of the States Grants (Petroleum Products) 
Act. Subsequently, a number of fuel subsidy schemes were introduced on an ‘ad-hoc’ 
basis, but with positive intent. Some of the fuel subsidies were designed to reduce the 
pump price of petroleum products in rural and remote areas, e.g. PPFSS (which was 
introduced as part of the legislation aimed at rural assistance and development). The 
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FSGS was introduced to reduce high rural fuel prices and to mitigate the rural-urban 
fuel price differentials. Some of the subsidies were designed to reduce the cost of 
fuels for rural business activities (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, etc.), e.g. the 
DFRS. Some were introduced to encourage businesses to switch to alternative fuels 
that comply with government’s environmental objectives, e.g. the DAFGS and the 
EGCS.  
 
The introduction of these subsidies could be criticised on two grounds: they did not 
take account of the cost and other possible difficulties in their administration; and 
there was no assessment of their impact on competition. In the first instance, there 
were compliance issues with the PPFSS, FSGS, and DFRS. Sometimes, businesses 
were entitled to two or more of these subsidies. For example there was a period when 
the FSGS coincided with the EGCS and some businesses were eligible to both. In the 
second case, it could be argued that fuel subsidies applied to rural and remote 
locations in a non-selective way might not have a significant impact on competition 
because these areas consist of several local markets (which are often separated by 
large distances) with distinct characteristics. Thus, these local markets do not overlap 
with each other or with urban markets. However, application of fuel subsidies to rural 
areas closest to urban locations is likely to produce a spill-over effect on competition. 
It is not clear whether these subsidies may have created disincentives for research and 
development decisions within the sector. The size of some of these subsidies may not 
have been enough to discourage innovation within the sector. Moreover, the subsidy 
schemes with the largest absolute sizes, i.e.DFRS and the ECGS (see table 6.3) were 
provided as a business input and not for on-road transport.  
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Nevertheless, since 2006 the government has demonstrated the political will to 
deregulate the fuel retailing sector. Thus, it may well be that future subsidies will 
undergo a regulatory impact assessment. Similarly, the Australian Government has 
demonstrated a strong commitment towards meeting the environmental challenges 
expressed in the Kyoto protocol by introducing in 1999 the ‘Better Measures for the 
Environment Package’ and enacting the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999. Subsequently, the government provided for a transitional 
period of six years for the phasing-out of most petroleum product subsidies, and a 
replacement of these with measures that promote the use of environmentally-friendly 
fuel products, e.g. LPG, LNG, ULSD, methanol, biofuels, etc. For instance, ULSD 
subsidy was increased from 1cpl to 2 cpl to encourage the use of cleaner fuels. 
However, socially important subsidies were provided for regional and rural areas, e.g. 
a temporary reduction in petrol excise by 4cpl to help reduce transport cost in these 
locations. The fuel tax inquiry also recommended the provision of a residential fuel 
credit scheme for remote areas that are neither connected to the electricity grid nor the 
natural gas system. 
 
Most recently, all fuel grants in Australia have been replaced with a single system of 
fuel tax credits, and thus led to the enactment of the Fuel Tax Act (FTA) 2006. 
Consequently, the SGPP and FSG were repealed with effect from 2007. The ECGS 
will expire by 2012. The Fuel Tax (Consequential & Transitional Provisions) Act 
2006 provided the guidelines and transitional caveats for the phasing-out of previous 
legislation on fuel grants. The FTA took into consideration government’s 
environmental objectives as well as the need to support businesses, particularly those 
that operate in rural communities. It also specified conditions under which business 
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taxpayers, non-business taxpayers, and non-profit bodies would benefit from fuel tax 
credits. However, credits are not applicable to fuels used in light vehicles on public 
roads; all vehicles that fail to meet environmental criteria; or fuels used for air 
transport. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to examine the relevant state aid provisions in the UK and 
Australia with the aim of identifying the existence or not of state aid instruments that 
are compatible with rural development objectives. In the case of Australia, the 
objective is to assess the long term applicability of fuel concessions to rural areas 
based on their compatibility with government’s environmental objectives and the 
characteristics of the subsidy schemes. 
 
In the UK, the national government and devolved administrations (including local 
authorities) have powers to disburse subsidies to tackle social, economic, 
environmental, and other objectives. There is no evidence that the UK Government 
have granted fuel tax concessions to rural motorists, fuel retailers or businesses, 
except those granted to farmers under the CAP and those granted to the fishing fleet. 
The reason is that the character of the subsidies are shaped by the application of the 
common guidelines for policy appraisal as directed by the HM Treasury, and the EU 
general guidelines on the provision of state aid. Recent guidelines emphasise the need 
to ensure that all subsidy proposals pass through a competition filter test. The aim is 
to detect proposals that are likely to create competition distortion effects. 
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The EU regulations in support of rural development, Council Regulation (EC) No 
1257/1999 and Articles 158-162 of the EC Treaty on Economic and Social Cohesion 
entitle member states to design and fund specific rural projects through the EU 
structural funds. These projects are expected to be notified to the European 
Commission. Apart from these regulations, the EC also provided for the De minimis 
aid which exempts state aids that are below 200,000 Euros from notification. These 
regulations complement the Agenda 2000 reform package on agricultural policy, and 
together these are directed at the objective of promoting an integrated strategy for 
rural development in member states. Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 created 
the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund for financing agricultural activities. This 
fund finances direct payments to farmers and also measures that promote the 
agricultural sector. However, rural development programmes for member states is 
financed through the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development. The EC 
regulations in support of rural development is not restricted to agricultural activities, 
but extends to other aspects of rural development such as the promotion of rural 
transport, SME’s, energy conservation, and environmental protection. 
 
In the case of Australia, there is evidence that during the period 1965-2006 the 
Australian Government subsidised petroleum products for rural motorists and 
business as a means of reducing the cost of rural living. There is also evidence that the 
Australian Government pursued a policy of rural reconstruction and adjustment 
between 1960 and 1976, but discontinued this policy in favour of sector-specific 
requirements. Table 6.3 indicates that subsidy size relative to cost of fuels was high 
for the DFRS and EGCS, and the effect of subsidy on recipients cost was significant 
for the DAFGS and the EGCS. These subsidies could have failed the competition 
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filter test and would not have been granted in the UK. However, most of the rural fuel 
subsidy schemes were discontinued since 2006 because of the inherent conflict 
between the schemes and the government’s environmental objectives. However, the 
funding for these fuel subsidies has been reallocated to infrastructure development. 
Nevertheless, the Australian Government retained the EGCS whose objective is to 
facilitate the use of environmentally friendly fuels by the primary and manufacturing 
industries. The Energy Grants (Cleaner Fuels) Scheme (EGCFS) was also retained to 
promote the use of biodiesel, ethanol, methanol, renewable diesel, LPG, and LNG. 
The EGCS and the EGCFS have been consolidated under the FTA and are due to 
expire by 2012 and 2015 respectively. 
 
The foregoing would suggest that both the UK and Australian Governments are 
currently proactive in providing support for rural and regional development. 
Similarly, both governments currently discourage the use of fuel subsidies as a tool 
for pursuing rural development objectives. Nevertheless, the future thrust of rural and 
regional development in both jurisdictions would likely involve a close network of 
exogenous factors (local businesses, local governments, local associations, etc.) and 
exogenous factors (i.e. central government, regional government, external investors, 
etc.). This is likely to materialise faster in the UK (due to its involvement with the 
EU) than in Australia. This prospect is investigated in more details in the chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7 
TRENDS IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN THE UK AND 
AUSTRALIA 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The research findings from Chapters 4–6 indicate that the regulation of fuel retailing 
activities on its own makes a limited contribution to rural development policy. Based 
on current economic and environmental points of view, it is neither justifiable to 
directly subsidise wholesale prices for fuel retailers in rural areas, nor to provide fuel 
concession to fuel consumers in those areas. It may be appropriate to reduce the cost 
of fuel retailing in rural areas, e.g. through business rate reductions, government 
support for remediation of closed sites, and derogation from environmental costs 
(testing of storage tanks, vapour recovery equipment, etc). However, it is possible to 
provide and subsidise public transport in these areas to reduce the need for private 
transportation. It is also feasible to encourage rural inhabitants to switch to cheaper 
alternative fuels (i.e. LPG, ULSD, biofuels, etc.) by reducing excise duty levied on 
these substitutes in the short term.  
 
These measures may or may not contribute to a reduction in fuel prices in rural areas 
or the rural–urban price differentials, depending on the location and number of fuel 
retail outlets in a given area. Hence, this thesis argues that fuel retailing activities 
could contribute to rural development in the wider context of an integrated rural 
development policy driven by a convergence of endogenous and exogenous inputs. 
The economic activities generated through an integrated approach to rural 
development could increase consumer demand for fuels and help reduce rural fuel 
  
397 
prices with the attendant reduction in rural–urban price differentials, and/or enable 
rural communities to afford the relatively higher prices. 
 
Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to trace the evolution of rural development 
policy in both jurisdictions to examine what forces are driving those developments, 
and to determine whether their current rural development models are consistent with 
an integrated approach, driven by a mixture of endogenous and exogenous factors. 
Thus, this chapter will contribute to an understanding of the rural development 
models currently adopted in both jurisdictions and thus unravel the potential and 
future contributions of fuel retailing activities in rural areas. 
 
7.2 United Kingdom 
7.2.1 Pre-CAP rural development perspectives 
Rural UK is almost entirely the product of the evolution of agricultural processes 
since prehistoric times. The historic link between agriculture and the rural 
environment in the UK could be understood in this historical context. The advent of 
the industrial revolution transformed the landscape and led to the UK becoming the 
world’s first urban nation. The construction of railways, new roads, and improved 
transport infrastructure resulted in the speedy development of towns and eventually a 
significant level of migration of people from rural to urban areas.1  
 
The industrial revolution also had an impact on agriculture and altered the state of 
rural communities. Firstly, urban consumers demanded more and cheaper foodstuffs. 
Secondly, there was an increasing dependence on imported food supplies. However, 
                                                 
1 Countryside Agency, UK Agricultures (Introduction): Food, Farming and the Countryside. Available 
online at http://www.ukagriculture.com/uk_agriculture.cfm, last visited on 2 November 2009. 
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the aftermath of the agricultural depression of the late nineteenth century gave rise to 
further commercialisation of agriculture and a reduction in agri-employment.2 As 
industrial activities continued to increase and diversify, the importance of agriculture 
in the rural economy began to decline. Some rural areas became transformed into 
industrial cities and towns. What remained of the rural settlements became 
synonymous with agricultural production, which products are mainly sold to urban 
consumers. Hoggart et al. describes the prevailing understanding of rurality at the 
time as “essentially defined and maintained by an urban-centred population (and 
arguably exists for that population as well”, and the associated rural tradition “derives 
more overtly from a conception of rural space as an arena for consumption”.3 
 
The end of the Second World War brought about a new agricultural revolution driven 
by agrichemicals, mechanisation, and government subsidy. Over a period of time, 
agricultural production became less land and labour intensive and more capital 
intensive and thus ushered in a period of increasing government support through 
financial incentives.4 Following the food shortages that Europe faced in the aftermath 
of the Second World War, the EU decided to tackle the problem on a continental 
basis, under a subsidised common agricultural policy. 
 
7.2.2 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
The CAP was developed in the 1950s with the policy objective of achieving self-
sufficiency in basic agricultural products by subsidising their production. The policy 
                                                 
2 Turner, M., Output and Prices in UK Agriculture 1867-1914, and the Great Agricultural Depression 
Reconsidered, pp. 38-51, AgHR 40-1 (1985). Available online at http://www.bahs.org.uk/40n1a3.pdf, 
last visited on 2 November 2009. 
3 Hoggart, K. et al., Rural Europe: Identity and Change (1995). 
4 Brassley, P., Output and Technical Change in the Twentieth Century British Agriculture, pp. 60-84, 
AgHR 48-1 (1996). Available online at http://www.bahs.org.uk/48n1a4.pdf, last visited on 2 November 
2009. 
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later began to place emphasis on direct payments to farmers as the best way of 
ensuring that they were provided with a reasonable standard of living and that they 
provided consumers with quality food at reasonable prices while embracing 
environmentally sustainable production techniques. The CAP then accounted for 
nearly 70% of the EU budget.5 Financial assistance was provided for the restructuring 
of farming so that they were adapted to the social and economic situation at the time. 
Other measures were introduced such as assistance for farmers wishing to retire early, 
and for professional training. The role of farmers went beyond ensuring self-
sufficiency in basic foodstuffs to include improvements in the quality of rural 
economies and preserving traditional landscapes and biodiversity. 
 
However, the policy of achieving self-sufficiency in food production and ensuring 
that the EU had a viable agricultural sector began to result in almost permanent 
surpluses of major farm produce. Production limits helped to reduce the surpluses; for 
example milk quotas were introduced in 1983. Consequently, some of the excess 
production was exported with the help of export subsidies; others were stored or 
disposed of within the EU.6 These measures had high budgetary cost implications, and 
the export subsidies distorted the world markets for agricultural products. These 
represented half-measures at curtailing the spiralling cost of the CAP and the 
commodity surpluses. 
 
                                                 
5 EU in the World, Food and Agriculture, The EU Common Agricultural Policy. Available online at 
http://www.deljpn.ec.europa.eu/union/showpage_en_union.afs.agriculture.php, last visited on 2 
November 2009. 
6 EC, Agriculture and Rural Development, The Common Agricultural Policy Explained. Available 
online at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/capexplained/cap_en.pdf, last visited on 2 November 
2009. 
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With the advent of the Rio Earth Summit in 1992,7 the EU became concerned about 
the environmental sustainability of agriculture. Thus, changes had to be made to the 
original policy of CAP to adapt it to current realities. However, the cost of the CAP 
and environmental concerns were not the only drivers of change. As agricultural 
processes became modernised with the help of new technology, and as the EU society 
became more service-driven, the number of people working on the land declined from 
more than 20% when the CAP was introduced to 7%. This development had 
implications for the survival of rural economies. The negotiations leading to the WTO 
Agreements on agriculture which commenced with the Uruguay rounds (1986-94) 
ensured that definite action was taken by the EU to reform the CAP. 
 
7.2.3 Impact of WTO agreements on agriculture on the CAP 
The Uruguay round of world trade negotiations commenced in 1986 and was 
concluded in 1994. The negotiations led to the creation of the World Trade 
Organisation, which was empowered to enforce multilateral trade agreements, 
including an agreement on agriculture. The Uruguay agreement on agriculture8 
established common rules in three areas of agricultural policy for all parties to the 
agreement. These are export subsidies, market access, and domestic support.9  
 
                                                 
7  UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable Development: Earth 
Summit – Agenda 21 (1992). Available online at http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/index.shtml, last 
visited on 2 November 2009. Also, see United Nations General Assembly, Report of the UN’s 
Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
(1992). Available online at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm, last 
visited on 2 November 2009.  
8 World Trade Organisation (WTO), WTO’s Agriculture Agreement (Uruguay Round, 1986-94). 
Available online at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agric_e.htm, last visited on 3 
November 2009. 
9 WTO, Understanding the WTO: The Agriculture Agreement – New Rules and Commitments. 
Available online at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm, last visited on 3 
November 2009. The full text of the Agreement is available online at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag.pdf, last visited on 3 November 2009. 
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The agreement provided a clearer definition of what constitutes an export subsidy,10 
and also led to a 36% reduction in the maximum expenditure on export subsidies and 
a 21% reduction in the maximum quantity of exports that could benefit from such 
subsidies, relative to the base period.11 New export subsidies were prohibited. Barriers 
against agricultural food imports such as quotas, export restraints, and variable levies 
were substituted with a more transparent tariff-only system. Countries were also 
bound to the tariffs; hence no country is allowed to increase tariffs unilaterally.12 
Developed countries were required to cut their tariffs by an average of 36% over six 
years, with a minimum tariff cut in any one line of 15%. However, allowance was 
made for a minimum 5% of domestic consumption to be open to import competition 
to minimise trade protectionism.  
 
The agreement also provided a safeguard which allows temporary duty increases 
above the bound tariff levels during periods of low global prices or a sudden upsurge 
in imports.13 Thus, the increase in duty could be triggered based on low prices of 
commodities or a huge quantity of imports.  
 
Based on the agreement, all domestic support in the form of subsidies to farmers was 
rated according to their effects on production (i.e. green box, amber box, and blue 
box). Subsidies with minimal effect on the quantities of commodities produced are 
not subject to reduction, and so are classified in a ‘green box’. Subsidies such as 
                                                 
10 See id., p. 1. The WTO clarifies that “trade is distorted if prices are higher or lower than normal, and 
if quantities produced, bought, and sold are also higher or lower than normal – i.e. than the levels that 
would usually exist in a competitive market. For example, import barriers and domestic subsidies can 
make crops more expensive on a country’s internal market. The higher prices can encourage over-
production, if the surplus is to be sold on world markets, where prices are lower, then export subsidies 
are needed. As a result, the subsidising countries can be producing and exporting considerably more 
than they normally would.” 
11 See Articles 9-10 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
12 See Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
13 See Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
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market price support were classified in an ‘amber box’. Subsidies under this box are 
subject to a limit (the aggregate measure of support, AMS) which is capped. For 
developed countries this cap has to undergo further reduction by 20% over six years. 
The De minimis exemptions permit a country to exclude support for a particular 
product from its calculation, provided that such support is not greater than 5% of its 
total value of production.14 The exemption also includes non-product specific support 
which is less than 5% of the value of total agricultural production. However, specific 
quantities produced but subject to output controls were classified in the ‘blue box’. 
These are not subject to the AMS and were exempted from reduction in subsidies.  
 
These common rules are still central to the ongoing Doha Round of negotiations15 on 
further reform of agricultural trade policies. Article 20 of the WTO Agreement16 on 
agriculture committed members to continue the reform process designed to reduce 
domestic support and protection, while the Doha Round trade negotiations progress. 
 
These rules did not have adverse implications for the EU agricultural policy, because 
most EU direct payments to farmers were classified in the ‘blue box’. Moreover, the 
new, reduced tariffs did not significantly change the level of protection. However, EU 
agricultural policy had to be reformulated within the constraints of the commitments it 
undertook as part of the agreement on agriculture at the end of the Uruguay round. 
The commitments cover the three areas of export subsidies, market access, and 
domestic support. The cap placed on expenditure on export subsidies has been the 
most constraining WTO provision for the CAP. Thus, the EU is bound by a reduction 
                                                 
14 See Article 6 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
15 See Doha Rounds of Negotiations. Available online at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiations_summary_e.htm, last visited on 3 November 
2009. 
16 See Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  
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both in the value and quantities of export subsidies, particularly in the sugar, dairy, 
and poultry sectors. The Uruguay agreement on agriculture also required the EU to 
replace previous variable levies used to protect the domestic market from low-priced 
imports with fixed tariffs that cannot be exceeded. Moreover, for certain categories of 
commodities, a minimum of 5% of the total consumption must be open to competition 
from imports. The new tariff levels have had a significant effect on the EU because of 
the flexibility built into the agreement whereby a country can allocate higher tariff 
cuts on less sensitive products. With some commodities, e.g. sugar, the EU has used 
the special agricultural safeguard to provide additional protection.  
 
The Uruguay agreement on agriculture was flexible in regard to the classification of 
the various forms of farm support and these supports were based on their impact on 
production. Support mechanisms such as administrative prices, direct payments, and 
input subsidies were classified accordingly. Support systems such as environmental 
payments, social payments, or direct payments not linked to production, were 
considered to have posed less distortion to international trade and were allowed. The 
trade distorting payments are now subject to a strict ceiling.  
 
The direct consequences of the domestic support ceiling for the EU have been limited. 
While the EU’s WTO commitments have not prompted a major re-adjustment to EU 
agricultural policy, they have helped to shape an entire new framework for CAP 
reform because of the constraints on domestic support that is remotely or directly 
linked to production. Also, the constraint imposed by the WTO agreement on export 
subsidies rendered the old system of high intervention prices impracticable because it 
becomes difficult to offload such quantities on world markets. If additional disciplines 
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on domestic support arise from the ongoing Doha Round,17 such as elimination of 
export subsidies and further tariff cuts, there could be further reform of the CAP to 
ensure compliance. 
7.2.4 CAP reform process 
Events at the continental and global levels, coupled with technological developments, 
such as the development of biotechnology, brought the CAP to a turning point. 
Consequently, a year before the commencement of the WTO negotiations on world 
trade (i.e. in July1985) the European Commission carried out a comprehensive review 
on the potential impact of these developments on the agriculture sector and society 
and made recommendations to the European Council and the European Parliament.18 
This document (the Green Paper) reviewed several issues facing the CAP, such as 
international and budgetary constraints, economic and social objectives of the CAP, 
the role of the agricultural sector in the economy, the implications of the advent of 
biotechnology, the need for new uses for agricultural products e.g. the production of 
bio-ethanol, the need to restore a balance to external trade, regulation and control of 
practices harmful to the environment and a promotion of practices friendly to the 
environment, the necessity for income support, etc.  
 
Based on the outcome of the intensive consultations that were carried out by the 
Commission regarding the Green Paper, the Commission recommended guidelines on 
                                                 
17 For details on current negotiations, see Agriculture: WORK IN THE WTO, The Current Negotiations. 
Available online at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negoti_e.htm, last visited on 3 
November 2009. For more updated information, see Doha Development Agenda: DOHA WORK 
PROGRAMME, The July 2008 Package. Available online at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agchairtxt_dec08_a_e.pdf, last visited on 3 November 
2009. 
18 EC: Perspectives for the Common Agricultural Policy (The Green Paper), Communication of the 
Commission to the Council and the Parliament on 15 July 1985, COM (85) 333 final. Available online 
at http://aei.pitt.edu/931/01/perspectives_for_cap_gp_COM_85_333.pdf, last visited on 3 November 
2009. 
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the future for Community agriculture in December 1985.19 In this document, the EC 
highlighted the major priorities that should guide the future operations of the CAP, as 
follows: “(a) to gradually reduce production in the sectors which are in surplus and to 
alleviate the resulting burden on the tax payer; (b) to increase the diversity and 
improve the quality of production by reference to the internal and external markets 
and the desires of consumers; (c) to deal more effectively and systematically with the 
income problems of small family farms; (d) to support agriculture in areas where it is 
essential for land use planning, maintenance of the social balance and protection of 
the environment and the landscape; (e) to make farmers more aware of environmental 
issues; (f) to contribute to the development in the Community of industries which 
process agricultural produce, and thus involve agriculture in the profound 
technological changes which are taking place.”20 The Commission opined that it was 
necessary to achieve these objectives to prevent a gradual process of re-
nationalisation of agricultural policy. To achieve these objectives, the Commission 
pointed out that it would require an understanding that the stated priorities were 
linked to changes in production and in the markets, and so required increased 
flexibility in the use of available instruments under Community regulations.21 
 
The foregoing events led to the publication in 1988 of the EC’s Communication The 
Future of Rural Society,22 which pointed towards the need for a formal rural 
                                                 
19 EC: A Future for Community Agriculture, Commission Guidelines Following the Consultations in 
Connection with the Green Paper, Commission Communication to the Council and Parliament on 18 
December 1985, COM (85) 750 final. Available online at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/930/01/perspective_for_cap_gp_follow_COM_85_750.pdf, last visited on 3 
November 2009. 
20 See id., p. 5. 
21 See id., p. 6. 
22 EC: The Future of Rural Society, Commission Communication Transmitted to the Council and to the 
European Parliament on 29 July 1988, COM (88) 501, Bulletin of the European Communities, 
Supplement 4/88. Available online at http://aei.pitt.edu/5214/01/001713_1.pdf, last visited on 3 
November 2009. 
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development policy for Europe. In this document, the EC expressed doubts about the 
impact of the progressive exposure of the erstwhile protected Community agriculture 
to actual market conditions. Therefore, reform measures were needed to restore order 
to the markets, to diversify and improve the targeting of support for farmers, and to 
facilitate structural adaptation. The Commission suggested a review of all present 
legislation and funding mechanisms that support rural development and the need to 
create strategies and measures that target rural development.23 The EC recommended 
that actions and measures that go beyond agriculture would need to be considered in 
order to stem the problem of rural decline. Thus, a rural development policy would 
include policy for “creating lasting, economically justified jobs, outside the farming 
sector (economic diversification). A rural development policy of this kind must reflect 
very fully local needs and initiatives, particularly in respect of small and medium-
sized firms, and lay heaviest emphasis on maximizing indigenous potential.”24 
  
The Commission’s Green Paper and the subsequent guidelines enshrined in A Future 
for Community Agriculture triggered an increasing level of debate in the UK (in 
the1990s) regarding the future of rural areas. The House of Lords Select Committee 
concluded in 1990 that the EC guidelines formed a proper basis for future rural policy 
development.25 Based on this conclusion, the Countryside Commission rendered 
advice on the formulation of rural strategies which placed emphasis on the need for a 
coordinated local approach as the best way of addressing competing rural demands.26 
                                                 
23 See id., p. 7. More practical guidelines and suggestions are outlined in Part Three of this 
Communication. 
24 See id., p. 8. 
25 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, The Future of Rural Society para 
177, HL Paper 80-1, 1990. 
26 Countryside Commission, English Nature and the Rural Development Commission; Advice on Rural 
Strategies, Countryside Commission (1992). 
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Consequently, the Department of Environment issued a Rural White Paper27 in 1995 
which stressed that the reality of life in the countryside was such that only small-scale 
changes based on differences in local circumstances were likely to succeed.  
 
The 1995 Rural White Paper (UK) was widely criticised for identifying the 
components of an integrated rural policy without specifying the means for integrating 
the sectoral policies and their institutions.28 Neither did the document specify how a 
rural development agenda could take account of the social, economic, and 
environmental pressures for change at the time, but rather focused on self-help as the 
means for delivering a rural vision. However, the 1995 Rural White Paper marked a 
paradigm shift from the traditional agricultural fundamentalism to a more balanced 
view of rural areas.29 
 
7.2.5 Leader initiative 
The EC recommendations in the publication, Future of Rural Society resulted in the 
launch of the Community Leader initiative in 1991, which embodied the endogenous 
rural development approach.30 This initiative became the first Europe-wide experience 
with local development in rural areas. The idea was to enable rural communities to 
pursue their own development objectives, as each community faces different 
                                                 
27 Department of the Environment and Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food; Rural England: a 
Nation Committed to a Living Countryside p. 6, 1995. See Department of the Environment, PPG7 
Revised; Planning Policy Guidance: The Countryside – Environmental Quality and Economic and 
Social Development, pp3-11, 1997. Also, see the Rural Development Commission, Rural Development 
and Statutory Planning, pp32-37, 1993. 
28 Hodge, I., On Penguins and Icebergs: The Rural White Paper and the Assumption of Rural Policy p. 
336, Journal of Rural Studies 12 (1996). Also, see Lowe, P., Blueprint for a Rural Economy, in 
Allanson, P. & Whitby, M., The Rural Economy and the British Countryside p. 193, 1996. 
29 Ravenscroft, N., ROOTS 1997- Rural Planning After the White Paper: New Paradigm or Old 
Rhetoric? p. 31 (1997), Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors Research. Available online at 
http://www.rics.org/site/download_feed.aspx?fileID=2648&fileExtension=PDF, last visited on 4 
November 2009. 
30 EC, Leader Initiative – Local Solutions to Rural Development. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/news/regions/071119_1_en.htm, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
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challenges and problems. Thus, from inception the Leader initiative was designed 
based on the Community-led Rural Development Model, since the initiative was 
meant to promote economic development in communities through a bottom-up 
approach. 
 
Leader I was a kind of pilot project and was designed to pursue a novel small-scale 
approach to rural development in lagging areas (Objective 1), and in areas facing 
structural problems with relatively smaller financial resources (Objective 5b).31 Under 
the Leader Scheme, 217 areas were identified for revitalisation. The local action plan 
within the chosen rural areas was designed and implemented by local partnership, 
with the aid of EU structural funds. The initiative also encouraged communities to 
form regional, national, and international networks to enable them to benefit from 
their collective experience. 
 
However, during this period there was a divergence of approach between the UK and 
European policy programmes. The efforts of the Rural Development Commission 
(UK) were meagre compared to the scale of EU rural development funding under the 
Structural Funds and the Leader Scheme. The policy objectives associated with the 
EU rural development programmes emphasised more integrated operations, the 
development of rural partnerships, and the development of a wider range of rural 
interests. As a result, tensions developed between the UK traditional agriculture-based 
community policy and the emerging paradigm of the territorial and integrated 
approach to rural development.32 The UK Government’s initial reluctance to 
                                                 
31 EUROPA, Agriculture: Short History of Leader, p. 12. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/eval/reports/leaderplus/1_1.pdf, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
32 Ward, N., Actors, Institutions and Attitudes to Rural Development: The UK National Report p. 22. 
Research Report to the WWF and the Statutory Countryside Agencies of Great Britain (2000). 
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incorporate the European rural policy agenda within a national rural policy framework 
heightened the tension and uncertainties. One commentator opined that it seemed that 
the institutional framework for agriculture and rural policy had become a captive of 
old cultural values and was serving as an obstacle to more radical and progressive EU 
policy reform on rural development.33  
 
Nevertheless, the feedback from the Leader I launch encouraged the Commission to 
launch Leader II in 1994 to broaden the experience to 1,000 rural areas within the EU. 
This time, the Commission opted for a decentralised approach in partnership with 
member states. Innovative measures by public and private actors were also stimulated 
at the local level. Joint learning and networking were consolidated through the setting 
up of the Leader II Observatory and the initiative became a part of the programming 
logic of the EU structural funds.34 The Observatory became the anchor point for EU-
wide networking and capacity building. Leader II transcended the local communities 
and was the responsibility of national or regional tiers of government depending on 
member states’ choice. 
 
Several developments led to the launch of Leader + in 2001,35 which extended the 
coverage of the initiative to all rural areas in the EU. The major one was the launch 
of, and the provisions contained in, Agenda 2000 and the Rural Development 
Regulation. The Leader + initiative was designed to promote the implementation of 
                                                 
33 See Sue Richards’ comments in Ward, N., A Department of Rural Affairs: Radical Reform or Red 
Herring p. 15, Centre for Rural Economy Working Paper 54, University of Newcastle (2000). 
34 See id., p. 13. 
35 EC, Commission Notice to Member States of 14 April 2000, Laying down Guidelines for the 
Community Initiative for Rural Development (Leader+), Official Journal of the European Communities 
(C139/5). Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2000:139:0005:0013:EN:PDF, last visited on 4 
November 2009. 
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integrated, territorial, and original strategies for rural sustainable development, with a 
strong focus on partnerships and networks. About €5b investment was projected for 
this initiative during the period 2000–06. About €2b of this projected amount was 
funded by the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) 
Guidance section, and the remainder was expected to come from public and private 
contributions.36  
 
Of the €88b budgeted for rural development up to 2013, about 6% will be dedicated to 
the funding of Leader projects from 2007 to 2013.37 Leader + incorporated further 
improvements to Leader II, including the following: (a) promotion of more ambitious 
pilot strategies for integrated rural development; (b) introduction of priority themes 
around which the local action groups should focus their development strategies; (c) 
introduction of an eligibility criteria for the partnership structure which limited the 
participation of public actors to 50% in the decision-making bodies; (d) an increased 
focus on cooperation between rural areas, including support for joint rural 
development projects between Leader groups.38 
 
The guidelines emphasise the need for an integrated approach, but the development 
strategies were designed to focus on one of the following four themes: (a) adding 
value to local products; (b) improving the quality of life in rural areas; (c) use of new 
technologies to make rural products and services more competitive; and (d) making 
the best use of natural and cultural resources.39 The initiative also involved the 
                                                 
36 See EUROPA, Rural Development: Leader+ Initiative. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rur/leaderplus/index_en.htm, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
37 See Leader Initiative; supra note 30, at p. 1. 
38 See Guidelines on Leader+; supra note 35, at point 12. 
39 See EUROPA, Rural Development: Leader+ Initiative. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rur/leaderplus/intro_en.htm, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
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development of operational programmes with a common evaluation strategy. 
Evaluation studies were carried out to provide a sound basis for programming and to 
inform the public and budgetary authorities about the effects and the value of the 
public intervention. 
 
The evidence shows that the UK participated in the Leader programme and other EU 
rural development initiatives that are funded through the EU structural funds. For 
example, the Rural Development Programme for England (RDPE) has allocated more 
than £21 million during the period 2007-2013 to seven Local Action Groups (LAGs) 
across the East of England based on the Leader approach.40 Scotland received £130 
million for other specific EU initiatives such as Leader (rural communities), EQUAL 
(gender equality), etc.41 The Leader programme accounts for 5% of the total Scottish 
Rural Development Programme (SRDP) allocation (i.e. about £38 million). An extra 
$19.2 million Convergence Funding was extended to seven LAGs in the remote 
Highlands and Islands.42 The EU has allocated 376.7 million Euros to the Welsh 
Rural Development Programme for the period 2007-2013. The Leader programme 
accounts for around 47 million Euros, of that amount.43  
 
Similarly, the Leader II programme supported over 2000 projects and developed over 
2000 new businesses in Northern Ireland. The Leader+ programme in Northern 
                                                 
40 Rural Development Programme for England: The Leader Approach. Available online at 
http://www.eeda.org.uk/953.asp, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
41 Davis, S et al., The Impact of Structural Funds Programmes in Scotland 1994-2006, pp3-4. 
European Policies Research Centre, European Policy Research Paper No 60, 2007. Available online at 
http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/eprc/Documents/PDF_files/R60_Impact_of_SF_Programmes_in_Scotlan
d_1994-2006.pdf, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
42 The Scottish Government, Scotland Rural Development Programme: Leader. Available online at 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/farmingrural/SRDP/LEADER, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
43 Europa, Press Releases; Rural Development Plan for Wales, 2007-2013. Available online at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/104&format=HTML&aged=0&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
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Ireland was also active, and was jointly supported by the EU (with a contribution of 
£10 million) and the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development.44 Of the 171 
million Euros allocated to the Northern Ireland Rural Development Programme for 
the period 2007-2013, the Leader programme accounts for 100 million Euros.45 
 
Owing to the positive progress of the Leader initiative, the principles behind the 
initiative have now been integrated (since 2007) into the EU rural development 
policy. The key principle is the act of promoting a truly local approach as the driver of 
an integrated rural development using EU structural funds.46  
 
7.2.6 Agenda 2000 and rural development regulation 
The successful launch of the Leader initiative, coupled with the MacSharry CAP 
reform in 1992 and the outcome of the first European Conference on Rural 
Development in 1996 at Cork, Ireland, led to the EC regulation on rural development 
and the development of Agenda 2000. 
 
The MacSharry reforms in 1992 (but implemented in 1994) marked the first major 
reform of the CAP, based on the EU’s commitments to the WTO agreement on 
agriculture, and also focused specifically on rural development issues.47 The reform 
introduced a significant reduction in supported prices for beef, grains, and oilseeds to 
                                                 
44 Europa, EU LEADER+ Programme: LEADER in Northern Ireland. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/about_us/office_in_northern_ireland/funding/leader.pdf, last visited 
on 4 November 2009. 
45 Europa, Press Releases; Northern Ireland’s Rural Development Plan, 2007-2013. Available online at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/309&format=HTML&aged=1&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
46 See Leader Initiative; supra note 30, at p. 1. 
47 For more details on the MacSharry Reforms, see EC Decision Making, The MacSharry Reforms of 
the CAP, Maastricht, and the GATT Uruguay Round, a Paper Delivered at the Third Biennial 
International Conference of the European Community, Washington, 27 May, 1993. Available online at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/7239/01/002490.PDF, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
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converge EU prices with those of world market prices. To compensate for these price 
cuts, the reform introduced direct payments to arable and beef farmers. The reform 
introduced the obligatory set-aside measures to reduce excess production of arable 
crops.48 The objectives of the structural policy were also modified in 1993 to facilitate 
the development and structural adjustment of rural areas.  
 
Thus, the MacSharry reform of the CAP was not entirely focused on agriculture but 
rather as a means of achieving a wider goal of an integrated rural development. This 
implied a paradigm shift from a total farm economy (specialisation) to a mix of a well 
developed farm economy as well as a diversified rural economy (diversification).49 
 
The first European Conference on Rural Development served as an opportunity for a 
variety of stakeholders to discuss and contribute ideas to the future of rural 
development policy in Europe. The Conference concluded with a ten-point 
declaration for a rural development programme in the EU, which contributed to the 
design of Leader+. Emphasis was placed on the need for an integrated approach to a 
diversified and sustainable rural development policy.  
 
The Conference also urged Europe’s policymakers to “(a) raise public awareness 
about the importance of making a new start in rural development policy; (b) make 
rural areas more attractive to people to live and work in, and become centres of a 
more meaningful life for a growing diversity of people of all ages; (c) support the ten-
point programme and cooperate as partners in the fulfilment of each and every one of 
                                                 
48 Winter, M., et al., The Effects of the 1992 Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy on the 
Countryside of Great Britain , Final Report, Volume 1 (Project Overview and Summary Findings) pp. 
18-29, Rural Research Monograph Series Number 4 (1998). 
49 For more details on the specialisation and diversification rural development paths, see OECD 
Documents, Better Policies for Rural Development pp. 56-60 (1996). 
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the goals, which are embodied in this declaration; (d) play an active role in promoting 
sustainable rural development in an international context.”50 
 
The outcome of the Cork declaration resulted in the formulation of an EC regulation 
on rural development,51 whose main objectives were to address rural challenges by 
including a number of measures which would promote adaptation and development. 
Such measures include: provision of basic services for the rural economy and 
population; renovation and development of rural areas; diversification of agricultural 
activities to non-agricultural activities; encouragement for tourism and craft activities; 
and financial engineering. The regulation stipulated the approach and principles to be 
adopted when applying these measures. Note 14 of the regulation states that, 
“whereas, given the diversity of the Community’s rural areas, rural development 
policy should follow the principle of subsidiarity; whereas it should therefore, be as 
decentralised as possible and emphasis must be on participation and a ‘bottom up’ 
approach; whereas therefore, eligibility criteria for rural development support should 
not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of rural development 
policy.”52 
 
Subsequently, Agenda 2000 reforms were launched to modernise key agricultural and 
rural development policies and to prepare the EU for further enlargement. The 
reforms focused on the need to update the European model of agriculture, to narrow 
                                                 
50 EC, Agriculture: The Cork Declaration – A Living Countryside, The European Conference on Rural 
Development, Cork, Ireland (7-9 November 1996). Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rur/cork_en.htm, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
51 EC, Council Regulation No 1257/1999 of 17 May 1999, on Support for Rural Development from the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and Amending and Repealing Certain 
Regulations, Official Journal of the European Communities (L160/80). Available online at 
http://www.spatial.baltic.net/programm/_downloads/EC%20No%201999_1257_en.pdf, last visited on 
4 November 2009. 
52 See id., Note 14. 
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the gaps in wealth and economic prospects, and for tight budgetary controls until 
2006.53 Agenda 2000 also introduced the concept of a comprehensive rural 
development policy, which incorporates the development of a multifunctional 
agricultural sector and the promotion of diversification measures that support the 
broader rural economy.54 The reform increased the funding for rural development and 
tied funding for rural development to the EAGGF Guarantee Section, partly for ease 
of administration and also to indicate that the agri-environmental and rural 
development schemes are now an integral part of the mainstream CAP.  
Agenda 2000 reform also created two pillars for the CAP, consisting of Pillar I 
(traditional market measures and price support) and Pillar II (rural development and 
agri-environmental measures). 
 
The Agenda 2000 agreement covered the 2000–06 period, but mandated a mid-term 
review to be carried out in 2003.55 The Luxembourg Council of Agricultural Ministers 
met in June 2003 for the Mid-term Review (Fischler reforms) and agreed on three 
issues:56 (a) the bundling of all production-linked payments into a single farm 
payment to be paid to farmers based on their historical entitlements but linked to land 
rather than production; (b) transfer of money between CAP objectives. For example 
up to 5% of the value of a single farm payment to larger farmers would be transferred 
                                                 
53 EC, Europe’s Agenda 2000: Strengthening and Widening the European Union, Draft of Commission 
Information Brochure for the General Public on Agenda 2000, Priority Public Programme 1999, X/D/5, 
Final Version 31.8. Available online at http://ec.europa.eu/agenda2000/public_en.pdf, last visited on 4 
November 2009. 
54 EUROPA, Agriculture: Agenda 2000 – A CAP for the Future (Rural Development). Available online 
at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/review99/08_09_en.pdf, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
55 EC: Mid-term Review of the Common Agricultural Policy pp. 12-24, Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2002) 394 Final. Available online at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0394:FIN:EN:PDF, last visited on 
4 November 2009. 
56 For more details, see OECD: Analysis of the 2003 CAP Reform pp. 7-9 (2003). Available online at   
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/42/32039793.pdf, last visited on 4 November 2009. Also see 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, EU Ministers Reach Deal on CAP 
Reform, Trading Partners Respond cautiously (2003). Available online at 
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/5780/, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
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to rural development measures; and (c) a continuation of the sectoral reform process. 
In response to this review, the EC established common rules for direct support 
schemes for farmers under the CAP in Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003.57 
 
However, the political relevance of rural issues in the UK was ushered in by New 
Labour’s electoral victory in 1997,58 the formation of the Countryside Alliance in 
1997, the House of Lords 18th report on Agenda 200059, and the increasing pressure 
from environmental interest groups (e.g. Greenpeace UK). Consequently, the 
Countryside Agency was created in 1999, followed by a Rural White Paper in 2000.60 
The principles embodied in this White Paper aligned more closely with those of the 
EU commitment to involving local communities in the task of developing rural areas; 
for example the White paper stated that its goal is one of “helping people in rural 
areas to manage change, exploit the opportunities it brings and enable them to create a 
more sustainable future.”61  
                                                 
57 Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 of 29 September 2003 establishing common rules for direct 
support scheme under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for 
farmers and amending previous related regulations, Official Journal of the European Union (L270/1). 
Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:270:0001:0069:EN:PDF, last visited on 4 
November 2009. 
58 Ward, N. & Lowe, P., Blairism and the Countryside: The Legacy of Modernisation in Rural Policy 
pp. 4-7. Centre for Rural Economy, Discussion Paper Series No 14 (2007). Available online at 
http://www.ncl.ac.uk/cre/publish/discussionpapers/pdfs/dp14%20Ward%20Lowe.pdf, last visited on 4 
November 2009. 
59 House of Lords; CAP Reform in Agenda 2000 – The Transition to Competition: Measures for Rural 
Development and the Rural Environment. The European Communities – 18th Report, European 
Communities Committee Reports, Session 1997-98. Available online at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldselect/ldeucom/084xviii/ec1801.htm, last visited 
on 4 November 2009. 
60 Rural White Paper, Our Countryside: The Future – A Fair Deal for Rural England (2000). Available 
online at http://www.defra.gov.uk/rural/documents/policy/ruralwp/rural.pdf, last visited on 4 
November 2009 
61 House of Commons Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee; Rural White Paper 
p11, Session 1999-2000, HC Paper 32-1, 2000.  
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Its main proposals were: (a) 50% business rate cut for village shops, pubs and petrol 
stations which offer a benefit to the community; (b)giving local councils discretion to 
end the 50% council tax discounts for second homes, with the money going to 
providing cheaper homes; (c) putting £100m towards one-stop health care centres in 
100 communities; revitalising rural post offices with £270m of investment; (d) putting 
£240m into rural transport schemes with a new £15m special transport fund to support 
car clubs, taxi services, and community transport; (e) giving extra rate relief to 
farmers who diversify into new businesses; (f) strengthening the role of parish 
councils to give local people more say in how local services are provided; (f) 
increasing the number of farmers' markets from 250 to 400; (g) building 9,000 
affordable new homes each year across rural districts; (h) giving £37m extra 
regeneration money to market towns to bring in new business; (i) and using 
information technology to connect people in rural areas to goods and services. 
Subsequently, the UK Government initiated an independent review into the delivery 
of government rural policies, led by Lord Christopher Haskins. The report was 
published in November 2003, and one of its main recommendations was that the 
development of rural policy should be separated from its delivery.62 It stressed that the 
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) has responsibility for 
policymaking, and those policies should be carried out through national, regional, and 
local agencies working individually and in concert. Thus, policy and delivery 
functions should be managed separately.  
 
                                                 
62 Lord Haskins Report, Rural Delivery Review: A Report on the Delivery of Government Policies in 
Rural England, Recommendation 2, pp. 34-36 (2003). Available online at 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/rural/documents/policy/ruraldelivery/haskins_full_report.pdf, last visited on 4 
November 2009. For a summary of the key recommendations of the Haskins Reports, see the Secretary 
of State’s Statement of 11 November 2003. Available online at 
http://www.aldeandore.net/PDF%20files/Beckett.htm, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
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Building on the Rural White Paper (2000) and Lord Haskins report (2003), Defra 
formulated the 1994 Rural Strategy document,63 with emphasis on three priority areas 
for rural policy as follows: (a) economic and social regeneration (i.e. supporting rural 
enterprises but targeting greater resources in areas of greatest need); (b) social justice 
for all (i.e. addressing rural social exclusion where it exists and providing fair access 
to services and opportunities); and (c) enhancing the value of the countryside by 
protecting the natural environment. The government announced the Rural Strategy 
2004 on 21 July 2004, followed by the appointment of a sub-committee 
(Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee)64 to undertake further inquiry into 
the strategy to ensure its relevance and practicability. The terms of reference included 
a review of the proposal to establish an integrated agency; the proposal to streamline 
rural, agricultural and environmental funding schemes; the delivery mechanism for 
the strategy, including the IT strategy that underpins it; and the extent to which the 
strategy incorporates the recommendations contained in Lord Haskins’s review of 
rural policy delivery. On 10 February 2005, the UK Government published the draft 
Natural Environment and Rural Communities (NERC) Bill. A sub-committee was 
appointed to undertake a pre-legislative examination of the draft Bill to ensure that 
that it carried forward the main provisions of the Rural Strategy.  
 
The government’s response to the recommendations of this committee65 was positive 
and culminated in the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Bill of 12 
                                                 
63 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs: Rural Strategy, 2004. Available online at 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/rural/documents/policy/strategy/rural_strategy_2004.pdf, last visited on 4 
November 2009. 
64 House of Commons: Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, 5th Report on the 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Session 2004-05. Available online at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmenvfru/408/40804.htm, last visited on 
4 November 2009. 
65 UK Government’s Rural Strategy and the Draft Natural Environment and Rural Communities Bill: 
Government’s Response to the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee’s Report (May 2005). 
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October 2005,66 which set the scene for full engagement with rural issues as well as 
better engagement with EU policies, guidelines, and funding schemes for rural 
development. While these fast-paced developments on rural policy were taking place 
in the UK, there were further developments on the EU front. 
 
7.2.7 Salzburg European Conference on Rural Development and the  
Commission proposal on Rural Development Policy 2007-13 
The second European Conference on Rural Development Policy held in Salzburg 
(November 2003)67 was a follow-up to the Cork Conference on Rural Development. 
The Salzburg Conference was held at a time when rural policy needed to evolve to 
meet the new challenges presented by an enlarged EU. The conference reviewed the 
EU experience of the Leader+ rural development programmes from 2000–06, to draw 
conclusions and lessons for the next generation of programmes during the period 
2007–13. The conference was represented by major stakeholders in rural development 
within the EU, including representatives of member states, other European 
institutions, Leader groups, international organisations, national and regional 
programme management authorities, sectoral organisations, NGOs, experts, etc.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Available online at http://www.defra.gov.uk/rural/documents/policy/ruraldelivery/bill/gov-response-
efra-report.pdf, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
66 UK: Natural Environment and Rural Communities Bill (2005). Available online at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldbills/023/2006023.pdf, last visited on 4 
November 2009. See the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) of the measures contained in the NERC 
Bill, available online at 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/rural/documents/policy/ruraldelivery/bill/20051012ria.pdf, last visited on 4 
November 2009. 
67 EC: Planting Seeds for Rural Future: Rural Policy Perspective for a Wider Europe, Second 
European Conference on Rural Development Organised by the EC Directorate –General for 
Agriculture and the Conference Unit of the Directorate-General for Interpretation, Salzburg Conference 
Centre, 12-14 November 2003 at Salzburg, Austria. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/events/salzburg/proceedings_en.pdf, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
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The conference reached the following conclusions regarding the role of rural 
development policy in the rural economy and for rural communities.68 (a) The 
growing diversity of rural Europe required a comprehensive policy, flexible 
instruments and appropriate resources to address rural issues. (b) Rural development 
could contribute significantly to social and economic development and improve 
territorial, social, and economic cohesion. (c) A consolidation of public support is 
essential for an integrated, territorially-oriented rural development. The panellist 
argued that in this regard, public support for rural development should be treated as an 
investment and not a subsidy. They recommended the formulation of a single rural 
policy, funded by a single rural development fund. (d) The shifting emphasis from 
agricultural policy to rural policy should not diminish the role of agriculture in rural 
development.  
 
The main recommendations by the conference participants were that EU rural 
development measures should be brought under a single fund from 2007 onwards; 
member states were to have greater flexibility and freedom to decide on the allocation 
of their funds; and that while recognising the importance of agriculture, greater 
emphasis should be placed on rural development. The conclusion by the Salzburg 
Conference regarding the continuation of the Leader initiative was positive and stated 
that rural development should be implemented in partnership between public and 
private organisations and civil society in line with the principle of subsidiarity. 
 
                                                 
68 See id., pp. 105-25. 
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The Mid-term Review of CAP and the recommendations of the Salzburg Conference 
led to the Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/200569 of 21 June 2005 on the financing 
of the CAP, and Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/200570 of 20 September 2005 on 
support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD). 
 
7.2.8 Future direction 
Agenda 2000 reforms were set for a period expiring at the end of 2006. Thus, the 
Mid-term Review of the CAP set out the CAP framework from 2007 to 2013. Based 
on the outcome of this review, the EC came up with rules for voluntary modulation of 
direct payments to farmers as contained in Council Regulation (EC) No 3781/200771 
of 27 March 2007. This was followed with regulations on a comprehensive rural 
development policy with emphasis on community participation, and the funding 
arrangements.72  
 
                                                 
69 Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 of 21 June 2005 on the Financing of the Common 
Agricultural Policy, Official Journal of the European Union (L209/1). Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:209:0001:0025:EN:PDF, last visited on 5 
November 2009. 
70 Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on Support for Rural Development by 
the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), Official Journal of the European 
Union (L277/1). Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:277:0001:0040:EN:PDF, last visited on 5 
November 2009. 
71 Council Regulation (EC) No 3781/2007 of 27 March 2007, laying down rules for voluntary 
modulation of direct payments provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing common 
rules for direct support schemes under the CAP and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, 
and amending Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005, Official Journal of the European Union (L95/1). 
Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:095:0001:0001:EN:PDF, last visited on 5 
November 2009. 
72 EC, Agriculture and Rural Development: Rural Development Policy 2007-2013. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rurdev/index_en.htm, last visited on 5 November 2009. See EC, The EU 
Rural Development Policy: Facing the Challenges (2008). Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/events/cyprus2008/brochure_en.pdf, last visited on 5 November 2009. 
Also see EC Fact Sheet: The EU Rural Development Policy 2007-2013. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/fact/rurdev2007/en_2007.pdf, last visited on 5 November 2009. 
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Currently, all UK devolved governments have brought their rural development 
policies in line with the evolving EU policies, as set out in their respective 
comprehensive Rural Development Programmes for the period 2007–13.73 The 
Commission for Rural Communities has also published its review of the state of rural 
areas between 1998 and 200874 to assess developments within this period and 
discover what needs to be done going forward from then. However, it is unlikely that 
the current CAP framework, which expires in 2013, will be the last CAP reform. This 
review did not alter significantly the level of market price support provided to EU 
farmers. Agreements reached in the Doha Round negotiations on the extent of tariff 
reduction and disciplines on export subsidies and trade-distorting domestic support 
arrangements may influence further reform of the CAP. 
 
7.2.9 Discussion of the EU rural situation and key approaches to the 
     EU’s rural development policy 
The EU’s rural development policy evolved, as part of the development of the CAP, 
from a policy which addresses the structural problems of the agricultural sector to one 
that deals with the contemporary multifunctional agricultural sector and the 
challenges faced in its wider rural context. Since the years 2000–06, the UK 
                                                 
73 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs: The Rural Development Programme 2007-
2013 for England– A Summary. Available online at 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/rural/documents/rdpe/rdpe-sum.pdf, last visited on 5 November 2009. See 
Scottish Government: Scotland Rural Development Programme 2007-2013. Available online at 
http://www.liss-scotland.org.uk/news-events/ppt/I%20Clayden,%20SEERAD.ppt#257,2,SRDP, last 
visited on 5 November 2009. See the Welsh Assembly Government: Rural Development Plan for 
Wales 2007-2013. Available online at 
http://wales.gov.uk/depc/publications/environmentandcountryside/farmingandcountryside/ruraldevelop
ment/2007to13rdp/2499334/2575805/ruraldevelopmentplan20072013.pdf?lang=en, last visited on 5 
November 2009. Also see Department of Agriculture and Rural Development: Northern Ireland Rural 
Development Programmes 2007-2013. Available online at http://www.dardni.gov.uk/nirdp-version-4-
post-cap-health-check-approved-by-european-comission-october-2009.doc, last visited on 5 November 
2009. 
74 Commission for Rural Communities (Tackling Rural Disadvantage): The State of the Countryside 
2008. Available online at 
http://www.ruralcommunities.gov.uk/files/The%20State%20of%20the%20Countryside2.pdf, last 
visited on 5 November 2009. 
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government has evolved its rural development policy in such a way as to reflect the 
EU ideals of rural development. Currently, the two systems have been harmonised 
and all rural development programmes in the UK now come under EU funding 
arrangements. 
 
Life in rural locations presents challenges, considering the wide distances from major 
cities and equally long distances between rural areas and between settlements. Rural 
development has grown in importance among the EU member states as a result of 
unfavourable trends affecting a substantial number of the Community’s rural areas. 
The current underlying trends are agricultural decline, employment losses, migration 
of women and the most highly trained young people, increasing rural unemployment, 
closure of business and public services, and environmental damages.75 Together, these 
factors tend to reduce the attractiveness and sustainable development of rural 
locations. Particular structural features of rural areas relative to urban cities are low 
population density, isolation, higher average age, lack of knowledge transfer, 
dependence on external sources of supply, and lack of advanced services/utilities.76 
 
Rural areas represent about 80% of the EU territory. The present trend towards 
concentration of production activities in urban areas is expected to shift towards a 
more balanced geographical distribution.77 The EU enlargement has stirred up the 
debate on the principle of spatial cohesion which lies at the heart of all rural 
                                                 
75EU Approach to Rural Development; VI. F. 1. 2 Regional Level Measures to Aid Regions whose 
Development is Lagging Behind 1 [Obj. 1, Reg (EEC) No. 2052 / 88]. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funds/ispa/enlarge/pdf/rurdev.pdf, last visited on 5 November 2009. 
Also, see Commission for Rural Community Development: Progress Report (Carnegie UK Trust) pp. 
11-26 (2006). 
76 For more details, see J. G. Derounian., Effective Working with Rural Communities: Seizing the 
Opportunities pp. 1-28 (1998). Also see, The Rural Development Commission., Help for Rural 
Communities: Supporting Essential Rural Services & the Voluntary Sector (1994). 
77 See id., p. 1. 
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expectations. Spatial cohesion integrates citizens’ capacity to build their futures, 
beyond distribution of goods and capital.78 It became obvious (from the disciplines 
laid down in WTO agreements on agriculture) that the CAP could not solely deliver 
the goal of rural development, but all other rural sectors have to be mobilised towards 
a sustainable development of a diversified and balanced rural society and 
environment. It has been advocated that setting up a European Rural Fund is an 
absolute essential condition for achieving the objectives of the rural development 
policy, ensuring spatial cohesion in the EU and a key success factor for 
enlargement.79 
 
The EU Commission provided a number of justifications for designing a rural 
development policy. Firstly, rural areas play an increasing role in the recreational 
needs of urban dwellers.80 Secondly, ‘green tourism’ offers these areas an alternative 
economic base. Many rural areas boost landscape amenities whose development could 
be key to local economic prosperity. Thirdly, there is a need to support the ongoing 
development of a healthy agricultural sector. Fourthly, rural areas have the potential 
to improve the quality of life for the whole society by providing a healthy and secure 
environment. Therefore, rural development policy, as part of EU territorial policies, 
was introduced with the aim of maintaining and improving the balanced and dynamic 
economic development necessary to achieve social and economic cohesion within the 
Union.81 
 
                                                 
78 NGO Partners of the European Countryside Movement; Spatial Cohesion within the European 
Union: Which Acknowledgement and Which Tools for Rural Areas 2? Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/debate/document/futur/organ/mer_15mars02_en.pdf , last visited on 
5 November 2009. 
79 See id., p. 2. 
80 See EU Approach to Rural Development; supra note 75, at p. 1. 
81 See id., p. 3. 
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A number of structural instruments have been proposed by the EU that could support 
regional and local development.82 Firstly, rural infrastructure and other factors could 
be developed to prevent rural exodus. Secondly, economic diversification could be 
promoted, especially creating niche products, jobs, and micro-enterprises. Thirdly, 
relevant investments could be made to protect and conserve rural heritage, including 
forestry. Fourthly, local development could be hinged on integrated rural settlement 
development in order to increase the attractiveness and quality of life, and to support 
rural diversification. Fifthly, green tourism could be promoted in rural areas, as well 
as preserving the environment and recreational capacity. Sixthly, investments could 
be directed at the development and use of renewable forms of energy. Other measures 
that could contribute to the maintenance of rural areas include: development of social, 
economic, and cultural services; development of socio-economic links between rural 
and urban locations; maintenance of the young population; and prevention of social 
exclusion.83 
 
Thus, five key approaches could be distilled from the EU’s design of a rural 
development policy: flexible, integrated, thematic, bottom up or community-led and 
strategic approaches. Firstly, the policy offers a flexible approach based on the 
principles of partnership and subsidiarity. Thus in designing rural development 
programmes, member states have a reasonable degree of flexibility in striking a 
balance between the sectoral dimension (i.e. agricultural restructuring) and the 
territorial dimension (i.e. land management and the socio-economic development of 
rural areas). Secondly, the policy is based on an integrated approach. This approach is 
reflected in the objectives of the policy that promote economic, social, and 
                                                 
82 See id., pp. 4-5. 
83 See id., p. 5. 
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environmental concerns for agriculture and also the wider rural economy (i.e. rural 
diversification). 
 
Thirdly, the policy takes a thematic approach, in the sense that measures are grouped 
around the objectives of the policy (known as axes). Rural development programmes 
revolve around three thematic axes: economic issues (i.e. employment creation and 
competitiveness); social issues (i.e. quality of life); and the environment and the 
countryside (i.e. climate change, biodiversity, sustainable use of land, forests and 
agricultural production systems). Fourthly, the policy adopted the ‘Leader’ principle 
of a community-led approach to rural development programmes. The policy 
emphasises participation by the communities through the creation of local action 
groups who carry out locally generated development proposals with the aid of the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development. The three thematic axes are 
cemented by the ‘Leader’ approach, which acts as a horizontal axis for implementing 
the rural development policy.  
 
Fifthly, the policy also adopts a strategic approach to ensure the targeted use of 
resources. This approach involves three measures. (a) The relevant Council 
Regulation and EU strategic guidelines set priorities for rural development, which 
reflects EU policy priorities, e.g. economic growth, job creation, and sustainable 
development. (b) Each member state is required to develop a national strategic plan 
which ensures that the proposals for using the Community fund are in line with EU 
strategic guidelines. The national plans are notified to the Commission which ensures 
that Community, national, and regional priorities are consistent. (c) The Commission 
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and member states closely monitor and assess the results of strategies and 
programmes. 
 
7.3 Australia 
7.3.1 Pre-1970s era 
Similar to the UK, rural areas in the nineteenth century were synonymous with 
agricultural production. Agricultural production was introduced to the Australian 
landscape by colonial forces. The Europeans came with a system of farming which 
has developed over time. Following the Second World War, more intensive forms of 
agricultural production were introduced through massive land clearing and the use of 
novel agricultural inputs such as irrigation, pesticides, fertilisers, etc.84 Thus, the end 
of the Second World War began a series of major changes in agricultural production, 
the global market situation, and agricultural policy. Since then, global capitalism has 
had a significant influence on agribusiness.85 Australia was one of the main suppliers 
of the post-war European market.  
 
During the 1950s and 1960s, agriculture prospered because it was protected, 
subsidised, and regulated by the government.86 Australian rural producers capitalised 
on the substantial subsidies they received and increased production. Australia became 
a large overseas exporter of such agricultural products as wool, sugar, beef, and wheat 
and imported a large volume of processed and manufactured goods. However, as 
                                                 
84 Gasteyer, S.P. & Flora, C. B., Modernising the Savage: Colonization and Perceptions of Landscape 
and Lifescape pp. 128-49, Sociologia Ruralis 40-1 (2000). Also see Barr, N. & Cary, J., Greening a 
Brown Land: The Australian Search for Sustainable Land Use (1992). 
85 Gray, I. & Lawrence, G., A Future for Regional Australia: Escaping Global Misfortune (2001). 
86 Lawrence, G. et al., Changing Spaces: the Effects of Macro-Social Forces on Rural Australia. Paper 
presented at the 22nd Conference of the European Society for Rural Sociology, Greece 25-29 August 
1997. 
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agricultural expansion increased in other Western countries, overproduction occurred 
and consequently the prices of agricultural products crashed globally. Thus, 
agriculture became vulnerable to market forces and in the late 1960s farmers 
experienced cost-price squeeze. In reaction to the pressures felt by farmers, the 
government responded with an assortment of palliatives such as subsidies, 
concessions, tax relief, cheap credits, loans to marketing authorities, etc.87 
 
Britain’s entry into the EU CAP meant that Australia no longer had access to their 
traditional colonial trading partner. The few years following this period witnessed the 
removal of subsidies in Australia. The farmers responded to the crisis by forming the 
National Farmers’ Federation, which adopted the view that the subsidies created 
inefficient farmers and wage inflexibility and thus were regarded as major problems 
afflicting the agricultural sector. Hence, Australian agricultural policy has moved 
(since the mid-1970s) towards a non-subsidised agricultural sector within a free trade 
world market, with corresponding implications for rural development policy. As 
Europe and the US continued to subsidise their agricultural sector, this had a negative 
impact on Australia’s agricultural sector and by extension the condition of rural 
areas.88 
 
7.3.2 Post-1970s era 
The Whitlam Labor Government in the early 1970s introduced a number of statutes 
based on rural adjustment and reconstruction in order to address these problems. The 
support for rural development took the shape of assistance to farmers and all other 
                                                 
87 Lawrence, G., Capitalism and the Countryside: The Rural Crisis in Australia  p. 9 (1987). 
88 Share, P. H. et al., The Vertical and Horizontal Restructuring of Rural Regions: Australia and New 
Zealand; in Alston M., Family Farming in Australia and New Zealand. Key Papers No 2, Centre for 
Rural Social Research, Wagga Wagga, 1991. 
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forms of rural development were based on the self-help and self- reliance principle.89 
Some commentators contend that two interrelated processes are necessary to prepare 
individuals psychologically to reach a level of capability for self-help: the 
development of the individual and the creation of a community culture.90 Thus, these 
policies were seen by the Federal Government as ‘ad hoc’ initiatives to address the 
problems of Australia’s rural communities, and were guided by the concept that 
agricultural activities are tied to rural locations.91  
 
However, following the ousting of that Labor Government, rural and regional policy 
at the Federal level assumed a low profile.92 The incoming administration argued that 
it is the responsibility of State Governments to develop the regions and also the 
responsibility of local governments to develop the rural areas. Following the election 
of the Hawke Labor Government in 1983, there were fresh calls for a Federal role in 
rural and regional development. However, despite the calls, Government decided in 
favour of a more neoliberal non-interventionist policy position. The emphasis on 
                                                 
89 Higgins, V., Self Reliance, Governance and Environmental Management: a Case Study of the Rural 
Adjustment Scheme. A Paper Presented at the 6th Agri.-Food Network Meeting, Rockhampton (1998). 
Also see Higgins, V., Government as a Failing Operation: Regulating Administrative Conduct ‘at a 
Distance’ in Australia, Journal of Sociology 38-3 (2004). Available online at 
http://soc.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/38/3/457.pdf, last visited on 10 November 2009. 
90 Gannon, A., Mastering Change: a New Paradigm in Building Positive Futures for Rural 
Communities pp. 20-41. Presented at the Positive Rural Futures Conference, Brisbane, 28th-30th May 
1998. Also see Lepani, B., Dawson-Callide Valley: Opportunities for an Innovative Approach to 
Improving Employment and Skills Development in the Region. Dusseldorp Skills Forum, Sydney 
(1998). 
91 Herbert-Cheshire, L., Contemporary Strategies for Rural Community Development in Australia: a 
Governmentality Perspective pp. 203-215, Journal of Rural Studies 16 (2000).  Available online at  
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6VD9-3YMW3XJ-5-
1&_cdi=5977&_user=1669875&_orig=search&_coverDate=04%2F30%2F2000&_sk=999839997&vi
ew=c&wchp=dGLbVlW-zSkzk&md5=b68b695f3540f30e85d0a356f5a989d0&ie=/sdarticle.pdf, last 
visited on 10 November 2009.       
Also see Sher, J.P. & Sher, K.R., Beyond Conventional Wisdom: Rural Development as if Australia’s 
Rural People Mattered pp. 2-43, Journal of Research in Rural Education 10-1 (1994). Available online 
at http://www.jrre.psu.edu/articles/v10,n1,p2-43,Sher.pdf, last visited on 10 November 2009. 
92 Australian Labor, Regional Development for a Sustainable Future, pp. 1-2. Policy Document 
Prepared by the Shadow Minister for Trade and Regional Development, 2007. Available online at 
http://www.alp.org.au/download/now/071120____regional_development_for_a_sustainable_futurexx.p
df, last visited on 10 November 2009. 
  
430 
market-led solutions to rural decline and disadvantage resulted in Federal Government 
and State Governments adopting a minimalist role in promoting rural social and 
economic development.93 It should be noted that part of the government’s minimalist 
role included efforts at cushioning the impact of high fuel prices for rural inhabitants 
and the primary industries. Beyond these objectives, rural development tended to be 
lowly funded and emphasis rather placed on community driven self-help responses to 
rural economic and social problems.  
 
However, based on this self-help model, government maintained the view that the 
main issues to address in ensuring rural social and economic well-being are the 
productivity and profitability of primary industries, particularly agriculture. Thus, 
government policies in this regard have been targeted at liberalising the economy and 
promoting economic efficiency and productivity in primary industries. Most of the 
series of reforms in other policy areas were designed to improve Australian 
international competitiveness in the global market place. The policy changes included 
the deregulation of banking and finance, reduction of import restrictions and tariffs, 
freezing of interest rates, floating of the dollar, and tax cuts with a corresponding 
reduction in government spending. These reforms were largely based on the idea that 
Australia’s integration into the global economy would depend on embracing the 
market system of economic organisation, deregulation, and the removal of 
government protection.  
 
                                                 
93 Taylor, M., Economic Restructuring and Regional Change in Australia pp. 255-67, Journal of 
Australian Geographical Studies 29-2 (1991). 
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A number of commentators94 have suggested that government’s intention to improve 
national economic and social well-being may have been counterproductive, because 
those reforms were thought to have exposed many industries, particularly the 
agricultural sector, to the vagaries of a volatile global market. Consequently, these 
policies worsened the existing social and economic problems in rural areas. The 
symptoms of the exacerbation of rural problems manifested in the forms of a 
reduction in agricultural employment, falling levels of economic activity, farm 
amalgamation, outmigration and population decline, service withdrawal, etc. These 
symptoms have been accompanied by rising levels of economic and social 
disadvantage. 
 
7.3.3The emergence of a formal rural and regional development  
         programme 
Since the 1990s the role of agriculture as the prime driver of social and economic life 
in Australian rural areas has somewhat diminished, and with it an increasing 
recognition that the task of rural development would have to go beyond palliative 
measures directed at the agricultural sector. Consequently, the Australian Government 
renewed its interest in rural and regional development in the early 1990s when rural 
disadvantage became evident. The evidence was the outcome of a series of reports 
and inquiries on the state of rural and regional Australia. Following the growing 
evidence of contracting economic and social development in rural and regional areas, 
                                                 
94 Higgins, V., Economic Restructuring and Neo-Liberalism in Australian Rural Adjustment Policy, In 
Burch, D et al., Restructuring Global and Regional Agricultures: Transformations in Australasian 
Agrifood Economies and Spaces (1999).  
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the government included a regional development programme in its White Paper titled 
the ‘Working Nation’ (1994).95  
 
Following the release of the White Paper, the National Board of Employment, 
Education and Training published its report, Making the Future Work,96 which set out 
advice to the government and recommendations on how the task of generating 
employment could be achieved. This strategy promoted regional leadership, 
infrastructure improvements, education, and training schemes. It also led to the 
formation of 66 Regional Development Organisations (RDOs) across Australia, who 
had the responsibility of designing specific regional strategies based on individual 
regional priorities. The RDOs’ responsibilities included fostering regional economic 
development and improving policy coordination between Federal, State and local 
Governments. Despite the sound framework put in place by the government, about 
$263 million (i.e. 4.1%) of the $6.4 billion earmarked for the ‘Working Nation’ 
strategy were budgeted for regional development.97 
 
The Australian Government’s philosophy remained that regions should be assisted to 
help themselves. Hence, the regional development strategies became largely based on 
the bottom-up community-led model. The bulk of the funding was channelled towards 
regional infrastructure development, particularly roads and telecommunications. 
However, most of the projects were concentrated in the growing areas where the long-
                                                 
95 See Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Parliamentary Library, Parliament 
Research Service; Working Nation: A Progress Report, Current Issues Brief, No 32 1994/95 (1995). 
Available online at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/Pubs/CIB/1994-95/95cib32.pdf, last visited on 10 
November 2009. 
96 National Board of Employment, Education and Training; Making the Future Work (1994). Available 
online at http://www.dest.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/8F9D8D21-57E4-4BC9-9E0C-
FEE2F8BE157C/3931/94_19.pdf, last visited on 10 November 2009. 
97 Tonts, M., Some Recent Trends in Australian Regional Economic Development Policy pp. 581-6, 
Journal of Regional Studies 33-6 (1999). 
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term viability of projects could be assured. Thus, many smaller and declining rural 
communities were precluded from benefiting from substantial investment in services 
and infrastructure. The formation of RDOs was not popular with all the states, as 
some (e.g. Western Australian Government) complained of inadequate funding under 
the programme. As a result, only a few RDOs were formed. 
 
Rural and Regional development receded further with the incoming administration of 
the John Howard led Liberal–National Coalition in 1996. One of his first policy 
decisions was to abolish all Commonwealth regional development programmes, with 
a return to the argument that states and local governments should take charge of 
regional and rural economic development. The government policy for regional and 
rural areas focused more on family benefits and support for small businesses (through 
the Diesel Rebate Fuel Scheme).98 In place of regional programmes, the government 
introduced the Job Network and Dole programmes.99  
 
Thus, the Australian Government confirmed through this policy change that they 
would not engage in proactive regional economic development strategies, but would 
contribute to regional development indirectly through further economic reform and 
deregulation. The government’s policy choices were understandable, particularly in 
the light of global trends towards economic rationalism, globalisation, and 
liberalisation (deregulation). On the other hand, the forces of global competition 
                                                 
98 Commonwealth of Australia, Rebuilding Regional Australia, a Statement by the Minister for 
Transport and Regional Development (1996). Available online at http://www.budget.gov.au/1996-
97/regional.pdf, last visited on 10 November 2009. Also see, Regional Australia: Leading the Way, a 
Statement by the Minister for Transport and Regional Development (1997). Available online at 
http://www.budget.gov.au/1997-98/dtrdregi.asp, last visited on 10 November 2009. 
99 For more details, see Junankar, P. N., The New World of Australian Labour Market Programs: An 
Evaluation of the Howard-Reith Labour Market Reforms, pp. 15-27. The Drawing Board: An 
Australian Review of Public Affairs, Vol. 1(1), 2000. Available online at 
http://www.australianreview.net/journal/v1/n1/junankar.pdf, last visited on 10 November 2009. 
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exerted considerable pressure on communities who would have to adapt to the forces 
of change.100  
 
Therefore, the challenge for government was to deliver policies that strike a balance 
between the need for the country to operate in line with these global trends and the 
conflicting need to help rebalance communities which are jolted by the forces of 
change. Some of these changes have manifested in the form of population decline, 
and consequently the rationalisation, privatisation, and centralisation of many public 
services, e.g. schools, hospitals, police stations, public housing, etc. 
 
Nevertheless, most State Governments have designed various policies and structures 
aimed at promoting regional development. However, the role of the states has been to 
encourage, facilitate, and monitor development. For example, the Western Australian 
Government introduced the Regional Development Commissions Act 1993101 to 
promote economic and social development in regional and rural areas. For the 
purpose of the implementation of this Act, the State was divided into nine Regional 
Development Commission areas. The primary focus of these Commissions was on 
regional economic development comprising the following objectives: diversification 
of economic base; developing and integrating core infrastructure and related services; 
developing a favourable business and investment climate; integrating and 
coordinating land use planning; and maintenance and enhancement of the region’s 
competitive advantages.  
                                                 
100 Australian Productivity Commission, Meeting the Challenge of Change in Regional Australia, a 
speech delivered by the Chairman of Productivity Commission in a symposium organised by the 
Institute of Public Administration Australia (2000). Available online at 
http://www.pc.gov.au/speeches/?a=7833, last visited on 10 November 2009. 
101 Western Australian Consolidated Acts, Regional Development Commissions Act 1993. Available 
online at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/rdca1993351/, last visited on 10 October 
2009. 
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While these goals are laudable, there is evidence of poor funding to support them. For 
example, the Wheatbelt Development Commission which covers 44 local government 
areas with a combined population of 70,000 had a total operating budget of $1.2 
million in the 1997–98 financial year.102 These Commissions tend to work better with 
those communities that utilise a community-driven model of operation. Thus, the 
Commissions have been more successful in those areas having adequate economic 
and social capital to initiate and support local development initiatives.103 Conversely, 
the Commissions have been less effective in stimulating economic growth in the 
smallest and most impoverished communities. The general lack of funding for 
regional development programmes probably explains why the Commissions tend to 
adopt the self-help approach among small rural communities, rather than adopt a more 
proactive approach. 
 
However, there are some discernable benefits in the community-led approach (i.e. 
bottom-up approach) to regional and rural development. The devolution of 
responsibility for rural development to sub-regional and local levels of government 
has helped some entrepreneurial communities to reverse long-term patterns of 
economic, social, and demographic decline.104 On the other hand, many declining 
rural communities may not have sufficient resources to undertake successful local 
initiatives. In those communities where successful projects have been initiated, the 
                                                 
102 Wheatbelt Development Commission (WDC): Annual Report 1997-98, p. 40 (1998). 
103 WDC: Annual Report 1994-95, p. 23 (1995). 
104 Cahill, G., Growing Your Own Community, 1995. Melbourne: Rural Industries Research and 
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benefits are often limited and temporary and sometimes undermined by other 
government policies that result in the withdrawal of local services.105 
 
To counteract these problems, a number of commentators have argued for a more 
integrated approach to regional and rural development,106 particularly the model that 
encourages local communities to work together on a collective regional basis with 
adequate government funding (i.e. more like the Leader+ model).107 Such an approach 
could help to pool local people, their resources, and knowledge together for the good 
of communities. Since smaller communities are not expected to achieve the goal of 
development alone, the higher levels of government may have a role to play. This role 
may take the form of creating a regional development framework which facilitates 
partnerships towards development objectives, and local capacity building. Regional 
development objectives could also be widened by the Federal Government to include 
not only the economic aspect of development, but also the social and cultural needs 
and goals of the inhabitants. 
 
7.3.4 Dimensions to the changing rural systems and rural policy 
Rural and regional policies are influenced by demographic, economic, social, 
environmental, and technological changes. One commentator contends that the 
Australian rural policy is influenced by agrarian sentiments (which is common to 
many Western societies) and could possibly explain the inconsistencies between rural 
                                                 
105 Tonts, M. & Jones, R., From State Paternalism to Neo-Liberalism in Australian Rural Policy: 
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policy and other adjacent areas of government policies.108 Nevertheless, government 
policies and provision of important rural services also have a significant impact on the 
direction of rural development.109 There are five major dimensions to be considered in 
relation to the forces that drive rural policy development in Australia.  
 
The first dimension relates to the pace of demographic transition. The rural society 
evolved under agrarian ideals that largely differentiated rural from urban in cultural, 
social, and political terms.110 However, the speed of rural demographic transition is 
increasing and marked by several indicators such as an ageing farm population, 
outward migration of the younger age groups, and significantly lowers population 
growth rates relative to metropolitan areas. Thus, the traditional community fabric 
keeps changing as the local population changes in number and makeup. The rural 
challenge in this regard is to maintain community functions with a smaller, but older, 
population. The demographic patterns are also becoming more diverse and less 
distinct from the people of metropolitan areas. Therefore, public policy interventions 
need to take account of the emerging heterogeneous nature of rural communities and 
carefully target support schemes at the areas that are most in need.111  
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The second dimension that affects regional and rural policy is the pattern of 
government expenditure and support schemes. For example, direct state support for 
primary industry (agriculture and mining) as well as support for regional and rural 
development has always been meagre. This is symbolic of the public policy tension 
between competitive efficiency and equity considerations. The Australian 
Government, based on its current neoliberal economic philosophy is clearly in favour 
of the former, which is typified by the withdrawal of government from service 
provision. This policy has been blamed as being partly responsible for the spiral of 
decline in rural communities.112 The agricultural financial support programmes are at 
less than A$1 billion (i.e. about 4.5% of the gross value of production, GVP) 
compared to the OECD average of 28.9% and the EU’s GVP of 33.7%, based on A$ 
= $US0.90 as at 2007 data.113 Mining receives little support and is wholly 
corporatised and run by some of the largest global mining companies. The case of 
mining is not a matter of concern since it is highly capitalised by global standards. 
However, the Federal Government and State Government’s annual contribution to 
rural development programs is estimated at A$260 million. The combined total of 
primary industry and rural support amounts to A$1.25 billion, which is about 0.4% of 
the nation’s $310 billion non-metropolitan GDP as at March 2008.114  
 
                                                 
112 See Catholic Social Services Australia; Valuing Rural Communities: An Invigorated Approach to 
Rural Development Policy (1998). Available online 
http://catholicsocialservices.org.au/publications/Discussion_Papers/Valuing_Rural_Communities, last 
visited on 10 November 2009. Also see Catholic Social Services Australia; A Litany of Disadvantage: 
Rural Communities of Australia (2000). Available online at 
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10 November 2009.  
113 Sorensen, T., Australian Rural Development: Multiple Problems, Bespoke Solutions, the Abdication 
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(2008). Available online at http://www.anzrsai.org/system/files/f8/f9/f48/f49/o273//SRO11-
19SorensenJan09.pdf, last visited on 10 November 2009. 
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The third dimension relates to the pace of globalisation. However, the Australian 
agricultural sector has been one of the beneficiaries of the convergence of market 
forces and globalisation. Thus, agricultural activities have benefited from new 
technological developments and have increased in scale. For example, the total 
productivity growth rate in this sector has averaged 2.3% per annum over the past 20 
years which is more than double the rate of overall growth of the economy.115 The 
mining industry, which is also rural, has benefited from a boost in productivity arising 
from globalisation. Manufacturing has witnessed a decline and employs less than 10% 
of the workforce, while new rural industries, particularly in the energy sector, are fast 
emerging (i.e. biofuel; and wind, solar and wave generating firms for electricity 
purposes).116 As a result, the primary industry contributes around 8–9% to the GDP, 
60% of exports, 17% of R&D expenditure, but employs only 4% of the labour 
force.117 This negative balance between productivity levels and workforce has 
contributed to persistent outmigration, especially of youths.  
 
The fourth dimension is the increasing environmental regulation, which in most cases 
has boosted efficiency and caused a positive adaptation in farming. The measures are 
designed to control global warming and the attendant climate change, protection of 
biodiversity, encouragement of afforestation, etc.  
 
                                                 
115 Productivity Commission, Trends in Australian Agriculture, Productivity Commission Research 
Paper (2005). Available online at 
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The fifth dimension relates to the complexity and turbulence of rural systems, which 
are generated by the technologically driven pace of change. Thus, contemporary rural 
systems deal with a complex mixture of challenges, such as knowledge expansion, 
creation of human and social capital, environmental regulation, social service 
provision, attraction of private venture capital finance, as well as the need for 
leadership and adaptive capacity. 
 
7.3.5 The regional Australia summit 1999 
Following concerns about the sense of alienation felt by rural and regional Australia, 
the then Deputy Prime Minister/Minister for Transport and Regional Development 
initiated this summit through an address to the National Press Club in February 
1999.118 The aim was to provide an opportunity for people from rural, regional, and 
remote areas to contribute their opinions and perspectives on how best to tackle the 
challenges facing those parts of Australia. The expected outcome was a development 
framework of partnership between the government, business, and community sectors, 
to deliver a prosperous and adaptable future for regional, rural, and remote areas.  
 
Following the address by the Minister for Transport and Regional Development, the 
Australian House of Representatives Standing Committee on Primary Industries and 
Regional Services commenced an Inquiry into Infrastructure and the Development of 
Australia’s Regional Areas. However, in its submission to the House of 
Representatives, the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA) made a case 
for government investment in regional Australia based on its assessment of the threat 
from global economic forces, the impact of structural adjustment, and the lack of 
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investment in rural areas. ALGA was of the view that the development of sustainable 
regional communities represented a challenge for governments at all levels.119  
 
The association identified two crucial roles that government could play in this regard. 
Firstly, government could provide and manage infrastructure development. Secondly, 
government could provide leadership and facilitate behaviour change needed for rural 
and regional sustainability in a complex domestic and global economy. The final 
report of this inquiry was published in June 2009, and established a clear framework 
and guidelines for the funding of regional and local community infrastructure.120 
Some of the main themes explored at the Summit include community and industry 
leadership, finance and facilitating entrepreneurship, communications, infrastructure, 
the role of the three tiers of government, value adding to regional communities, new 
industries and new opportunities, etc.121 The central message delivered by the 
participants was that the time was ripe to reshape the future of rural Australia in order 
to face the challenges brought about by globalisation and the impact of associated 
government policies, such as deregulation, privatisation, etc.  
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The summit realised that there were no easy solutions to rural community problems, 
but emphasised the need to draw on partnerships between communities, businesses, 
and all levels of government. Other stakeholders were also expected to make their 
contributions to locally developed plans. The participants recognised that successful 
communities would be those that were able to reinvent themselves by capitalising on 
their natural resources, natural strengths, and human assets. However, to achieve 
success would require significant investment in education, training, skill development, 
and leadership in order to enhance human capacity of rural Australia. Considerable 
investment is also needed in the area of telecommunications. This investment cannot 
be met by rural communities and thus underscores the need for government 
participation in the process of rural and regional reinvention. 
 
At the conclusion of the summit, a vision for regional Australia was developed122 and 
built on three fundamental principles, as follows: (a) “a ‘bottom-up’ rather than a 
‘top-down’ approach should be built into responses aimed at empowering 
communities at the local level; (b) governments, businesses and communities have a 
joint responsibility to address the problems facing regional Australia and should work 
together in a spirit of partnership; (c) responses should be sufficiently flexible to cater 
for the particular circumstances and needs of regional, rural, and remote 
communities.”123 
 
To achieve the vision for regional Australia, a number of critical success factors were 
identified at the summit: (a) improved access to government assistance programmes; 
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(b) closer coordination between the different tiers of government; (c) options to 
stimulate business investment in regional Australia; (d) improved access to services 
from government, businesses, and other organisations; (e) new government 
mechanisms or processes; (f) improved human resource development, including 
education and training; (g) leadership development and building of community 
capacity; (h) provision of physical infrastructure critical to community and local 
industry development. 
 
In the light of the following requirements, the Summit recommended that 
governments, urban businesses, and industry must become more responsive to these 
critical success factors when designing and delivering programmes and services. To 
become responsive to rural and regional needs the Summit recommended the 
following steps:124 (a) governments must create a climate (particularly tax incentives) 
which encourages investment in rural enterprise; (b) the three tiers of government 
must remove those unnecessary regulatory impediments which increase the cost of 
doing business and hence stifle innovation in rural and regional Australia. 
 
Key business leaders expressed their support for the idea of partnerships, and 
expressed the view that tax incentives were a critical factor in attracting investment to 
areas outside the major metropolitan areas. Consequently, a Steering Committee was 
formed to review the recommendations of the summit and focus on the engagement of 
other stakeholders beyond the government, e.g. the corporate and community sectors. 
Following the success of deliberations at the summit, the Federal Government of 
Australia established a Regional Australia Summit Taskforce comprising all relevant 
                                                 
124 Regional Australia Summit Communiqué, Regional, Rural and Remote Australians Want to 
Determine their Own Futures. Presentation of the Summit Recommendations (1999). 
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Federal Government Departments and Agencies.125 The objective of the Taskforce 
was to ensure that response to the summit was coordinated across all relevant 
government departments and agencies. The Taskforce liaises with the Steering 
Committee to refine and develop policy ideas and options in line with the 
recommendations from the summit. One of the fallouts of the regional summit in 1999 
was government’s decision to increase funding for the agricultural sector in 2004, in 
recognition of the role it plays in generating a significant proportion of national 
GDP.126 
 
7.3.6 The implications of the WTO agreement on agriculture for  
 rural development in Australia 
Australia is a leading member of the Cairns Group with obligations on the WTO 
agreement on agriculture. Since 2006, the Australian Government has been pursuing a 
policy of deregulation. Also, as a nation pursuing neoliberal agricultural policy since 
the 1980s and with a long history of agricultural export, the Australian Government 
regards the concept of multifunctionality in the agricultural sector127 as a protectionist 
measure that encourages high levels of trade distorting domestic support.128 This 
posturing is contrary to the EU agricultural policy which encourages a multifunctional 
                                                 
125 Australian Regional Development Task Force, A Report to Regional Development Ministers and the 
Australian Local Government Association (2000). Available online at 
http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/regional/publications/doc/regional_overview.doc, last visited on 10 
November 2009. 
126 Commonwealth of Australia, Rural and Regional Australia – Sustaining the Nation (2004). 
Available online at http://www.budget.gov.au/2004-
05/ministerial/download/agriculture_fisheries_forestry_mod.pdf, last visited on 10 November 2009. 
127 Multifunctionality, in this sense, means agricultural production that takes into account the need to 
protect the landscape character, biodiversity and other social and environmental concerns. 
128 Tilzey, M., Neoliberalism, the WTO and New Models of Agri-environmental Governance in the EU, 
the USA and Australia pp. 1-28, International Journal for the Sociology of Agriculture and Food 14 
(2006).  Also see Vanclay, F., The Impacts of Deregulation and Agricultural Restructuring for Rural 
Australia, Australian Journal of Social Issues 38-1 (2003). Available online at 
http://www.agsci.utas.edu.au/AJSIimpacts.pdf, last visited on 12 November 2009. 
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agricultural sector and the high levels of state support that is required to pursue such a 
policy. 
 
Some commentators contend that the Australian Government’s negotiating position in 
regard to the WTO agreement is based on the its understanding of the relationship 
between agriculture and the environment, whereby agriculture is linked to production, 
and biodiversity protection issues are not classified within the farming system.129 As a 
result, successive Australian Governments have intervened in the accumulation 
process in order to promote the creation of large agricultural productive units.130 
Environmental problems on the farmland are addressed using a range of market-
oriented measures aimed at seeking the cooperation of entrepreneurs through self-help 
initiatives, e.g. the National Drought Policy131 and the Landcare Programme.132  
 
On the basis of this model of agri-environmental governance, it is expected that the 
Australian Government will insist that agri-environmental support be confined to the 
Green Box to prevent other governments (particularly EU member states) from 
seeking to justify income support to farmers based on socio-cultural or environmental 
grounds. If the Cairns Group position (and Australia is a leading member of this 
group) is accepted at the Doha Rounds, WTO members will be allowed to provide 
environmental subsidies to farmers on the grounds that the payments are linked as 
                                                 
129 Williams, C., Old Land, New Landscapes: A Story of Farmers, Conservation and the Landcare 
Movement, (2004). Also see Figgis, P., The Changing Face of Nature Conservation: Reflections on the 
Australian Experience; in Adams, W. & Mulligan, M., Decolonising Nature: Strategies for 
Conservation in a Post-Colonial Era (2003). 
130 Dibden, J. & Cocklin, C., Sustainability and Agri-environmental Governance; in Higgins, V. & 
Lawrence, G., Agricultural Governance: Globalisation and the New Politics of Regulation (2005). 
131 Australian Government, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF): Drought and 
Exceptional Circumstances. Available online at http://www.daff.gov.au/brs/climate-impact/drought, 
last visited on 10 November 2009. 
132 Australian Government, DAFF: National Landcare Program. Available online at 
http://www.daff.gov.au/natural-resources/landcare/national_landcare_program, last visited on 10 
November 2009. 
  
446 
directly as possible to the environmental outputs that are required. However, the 
American Government has joined the Cairns Group in its argument that land should 
be farmed to protect biodiversity, social mobility, and landscape quality.133  
 
7.3.7 The role of actors on the local development stage & future  
         direction 
These various dimensions to the changing rural systems and the outcome of the 
regional summit have currently combined to stimulate local efforts at rural 
development, and such efforts are tied to local problems, resources, institutions, and 
governance. However, evidence from a recent research into the nature of participants 
at the local development stage reveals that there are various informal and sometimes 
part-time actors.134 These are complexly networked, often with flexible roles across 
several dimensions.  
 
The research identified six major groupings:  
(a) Business actors, which include major corporations involved in mining, 
agribusiness, infrastructure, retail, and services; SME sector; industry bodies and 
associations.  
(b) Community groups, which include area-based groups; economic, social, and 
environmental groups; and national and international groups.  
(c) The three tiers of government (i.e. central, states and territories, and local); 
politicians and bureaucrats.  
(d) Government agencies and clients (e.g. Productivity Commission, Bureau of 
Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Services, etc). 
                                                 
133 Bohmann, M. et al., The Use and Abuse of Multifunctionality. Economic Research Service, US 
Department of Agriculture (1999). 
134 See Sorensen; supra note 113, at p. 14. 
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(e) Research organisations, which includes government; private and corporate, 
Cooperative Research Centres; University-based Research Institutes; Commonwealth 
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation; religious organisations. 
(f) Energetic individuals, e.g. institutional leaders. 
 
The evidence from that research indicates that the synergistic but uncoordinated 
interaction between these numerous and diverse regional and rural actors creates 
pockets of minor development stimuli which, taken together, produces significant 
benefits and changes to the current rural experience in some locations. It follows that 
local action evolves to suit local conditions, and might be effective when several local 
and foreign actors are involved. However, it might be argued that the outcome of such 
interplay could be maximised in a much more coordinated fashion.  
 
Some might question the usefulness of coordination in regard to the current local 
development impetus. For instance, within the private sector there exist similar 
uncoordinated efforts of large corporations, SMEs and Non-Government 
Organisations (NGOs) who operate competitively to deliver economic growth. 
However, it may be useful to refer to the importance of teamwork at the local level, 
the need for cooperation and collaboration between the agencies involved, the need 
for adaptability in analysis of results and action, and the usefulness of a feedback 
mechanism for further improvements in development efforts.  
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Perhaps the most important political development came with the election of the Labor 
Party in the November 2007 Australian General Elections.135 One of the political 
manifestos of the Labor Party relates to the issue of rural and regional development.136 
These developments make a compelling case for a more formal and organised style of 
engagement among the various actors, particularly as the Australian Government has 
provided funding for regional and local community infrastructure in June 2009.137 
 
7.4 Comparative perspectives on rural development policy in both  
      Jurisdictions 
There are interesting similarities and differences between the developments of rural 
policy in the two jurisdictions. The agricultural sector remains relevant in terms of 
greater diversity of produce and large-scale production, but its economic importance 
is steadily declining in both countries. There are similarities in the social and 
economic challenges faced in rural areas as the agrarian society adjusts to changes in 
global markets, production methods, and government policy. Consequently, rural 
areas in both countries have witnessed contraction of local economies, population 
decline due to outmigration, withdrawal of services, and the collapse of social and 
cultural ways of life.  
 
The UK and Australia have a history of proactive government involvement in rural 
development, although the former became involved earlier through the EU CAP. 
                                                 
135 In the 27 November 2007 general elections, the centre-left Australian Labor Party led by Kevin 
Rudd defeated the incumbent centre-right coalition Government led by Liberal Party leader and Prime 
Minister John Howard. 
136 Australian Labor Manifesto, Election 2007; Regional Development for a Sustainable Future. Speech 
by Hon. Simon Crean MP, Shadow Minister for Trade and Regional Development (2007). Available 
online at 
http://www.alp.org.au/download/now/071120____regional_development_for_a_sustainable_futurexx.p
df, last visited on 10 November 2009. 
137 See Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia; supra note 120. 
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However, they have adopted different approaches to addressing rural decline and 
disadvantage at different times. In the UK, rural development has a high place on the 
political agenda (and has done since the 1990s) at both national and European levels. 
The focus in recent times is not merely on increased productivity and competitiveness 
in agriculture, but rather on the viability of rural life. As in the case of Australia, the 
UK adopted the EU approach of a locally driven ‘bottom-up’ rural development 
policy. However, the key difference is that in the UK (EU), this approach has been 
accompanied by substantial financial and administrative support from higher tiers of 
government. Moreover, the EU (UK) formal policy on an integrated approach to rural 
development coupled with the cohesion policy and the CAP ensures that the locally 
driven model of rural development achieves its objectives.138 
 
Developments in Australian regional policy at the Federal and State levels suggest 
that the emphasis has been on market-led solutions. This approach has seen both tiers 
of government adopting minimalist roles in promoting rural economic and social 
development. The case of the UK was similar, until the 1988 EC publication of the 
Green Paper titled ‘The Future of Rural Society’ and the subsequent guidelines 
contained in ‘A Future for Community Agriculture’. These developments at EU level 
triggered an intense degree of debate in the 1990s regarding the future of Britain’s 
countryside, which resulted in a more robust engagement with rural development 
policy by the year 2000.  
 
                                                 
138 CAP2020, The Future of Rural Development: The Role of the CAP and Cohesion Policy. IEEP CAP 
2020 Policy Briefing, No 5 (2009). Available online at 
http://cap2020.ieep.eu/assets/2009/6/3/CAP2020_Policy_Briefing_May_2009__No_5__-
_The_Future_of_Rural_Development.pdf, last visited on 12 November 2009. 
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However, under the market-led model of rural development, the productivity and 
profitability of primary industries, particularly agriculture and mining, were assumed 
to be the critical elements in ensuring regional and rural socio-economic well-being. 
Accordingly, both the UK and Australian Governments have pursued policies aimed 
at liberalising the economy and promoting economic efficiency and productivity in 
primary industries. Hence, rural and regional development policies beyond these aims 
tend to receive little funding and often emphasise community driven self-help 
responses to economic and social problems. However, since the year 2000, the UK 
has adopted the EU Leader model of rural development which emphasises the 
‘bottom-up’ approach involving a network of partnerships, but backed by substantial 
government funding. There are indications that similar networks of partnerships 
towards rural and regional development have emerged in Australia, based on a study 
conducted in 2009.139 However, the Federal Government of Australia has also 
established formal funding for rural and regional infrastructure development in 2009, 
but has no formal engagement with funding rural and regional projects beyond 
agricultural activities. Nevertheless, the evolution of both formal and informal groups 
towards rural and regional development in Australia would suggest that the adoption 
of intra- and inter-regional cooperation and collaboration, such as the Leader 
Programme, would be easy to administer and coordinate. 
 
The most crucial difference between the UK and Australia lies with the role of the 
EU’s CAP. Although the CAP is not essentially a regional development policy, 
subsidies received by UK farmers have a significant impact on the viability of small 
and large farms and by extension enhance local rural economies. CAP payments to 
                                                 
139 See Sorensen; supra note 113. 
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farmers have reduced incidents of farmer outmigration and farm amalgamation, thus 
relatively maintaining economic, social, and cultural activities in rural communities. It 
was estimated that since the EU accession in 1973, the CAP helped to increase 
farmer’s real incomes. Until the early 1980s, the price of farmland more than 
quadrupled, while the price of agricultural produce almost trebled, well ahead of the 
rise in the cost of living. On the other hand, there are arguments in the UK that the 
CAP is the biggest subsidy ‘of them all’ and should be scrapped because of its 
distorting effects on competition.140  
 
In the case of Australia, there is an absence of an equivalent form of price support for 
farmers. The continuous exposure of agriculture to distorted global markets has 
contributed to processes of farm amalgamation, dwindling farm incomes, and a 
decline in agricultural service centres. The ongoing exposure of the agricultural sector 
to open market forces has encouraged a culture of agricultural exploitation which 
seeks constantly to increase the productivity of the land. Since the UK is part of the 
single European market for agricultural as well as for other goods, this has resulted in 
a reduction rather than an increase in agricultural production. Thus, the CAP reform 
indirectly removed the pressure for member states to exploit the land to the fullest 
extent possible, which in turn has triggered the emergence of alternative enterprises 
within rural areas, such as tourism, and the leisure and recreation enterprises.141  
                                                 
140 Vickers, J., State Aid and Distortion of Competition, p. 6 (2005). A Paper delivered at the State Aid 
Conference on 14 July 2005. Available online at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches/spe0605.pdf, last visited on 12 November 2009. 
141 Rizov, M., Rural Development and Welfare Implications of CAP Reforms pp. 209-222, Journal of 
Policy Modeling 26 (2004). Available online at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6V82-4C7W5C0-5-
1X&_cdi=5858&_user=1669875&_orig=search&_coverDate=02%2F29%2F2004&_sk=999739997&
view=c&wchp=dGLzVtb-zSkzk&md5=2caf0eac5ed67a335c49d2cf3c730322&ie=/sdarticle.pdf, last 
visited on 12 November 2009. Also see Rizov, M., Rural Development under the European CAP: The 
role of diversity pp. 621-628, Social Science Journal 42 (2005). Available online at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6W64-4HG6H88-1-
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This diversification effort has been supported by the Leader programme, which 
provides local residents with the necessary skills and resources to pursue such 
strategies. Diversification strategy has been an important theme in Australian rural 
development options. However, the lack of financial resources, local skill 
development, and leadership has been obstacles to the establishment of alternative 
enterprises. Under the Australian federal system of government, collaborative and 
integrated attempts to find solutions to rural problems are often hampered by 
ideological differences; the political parties on one hand, and between the Federal, 
State and local arms of government on the other hand. For instance, the RDOs under 
the ‘Working Nation’ strategy represented an attempt to integrate regional policy 
across the different tiers of government. The RDOs had a slight resemblance to the 
Leader programme and could have been a credible platform for diversification of rural 
development activities. However, the RDOs were truncated by ideological differences 
between the three tiers of government, political tensions and a lack of funding.  
 
Perhaps the Australian Federal and State regional development strategies might 
benefit rural areas if lessons are learnt from the level of financial and administrative 
support given to local programmes in EU member states. The formation of the 
Australian Regional Development Taskforce by the Federal Government in 2000, and 
the release of funding for rural and regional development in 2009, would suggest 
future improvements both in government participation in funding local projects and in 
human-capital development. Thus, the Australian Government would be in a position 
to take the lead in providing a vision for rural development by committing to the 
principles of environmental sustainability, social inclusion, and financial support for 
                                                                                                                                            
1&_cdi=6588&_user=1669875&_orig=search&_coverDate=12%2F31%2F2005&_sk=999579995&vi
ew=c&wchp=dGLzVzz-zSkWA&md5=36ad5ee2143176188609c45da3d2d563&ie=/sdarticle.pdf, last 
visited on 12 November 2009. 
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local initiatives. To reach these objectives, the social cohesion principles of the EC 
may provide a model to be considered by the Australian Government. 
 
The development of infrastructure and a strong commitment to education in rural 
areas could be important contributors to improved social and economic well-being of 
rural inhabitants. These factors could make it possible for people in rural areas to 
develop the alternatives to traditional agriculture, and to retain SMEs, which provide 
both employment and help to sustain the fabric of smaller communities. However, 
many rural regions in Australia are beginning to diversify into new industries, 
particularly in the renewable energy sector. The greater challenge relates to the 
provision of training and education in sparsely populated areas, particularly where the 
population is too small to support traditional educational institutions. However, 
investments in communications infrastructure, and the development of flexible 
delivery of education, offer some prospects of improvement.  
 
7.5 Fuel retailing activities as a component of an integrated  
      rural development policy 
As previously argued in the introduction part of this chapter, fuel retailing is more 
likely to boost rural development activities with the adoption of an integrated 
approach to rural development policy. Such an approach would involve a coordinated 
interplay between state actors (i.e. exogenous factors) and non-state actors (which 
could be endogenous or exogenous). Table 7.1 shows the position of fuel retailing 
activities as a vital component of an integrated rural policy, as well as other 
interrelated factors such as public transport and development of renewable sources of 
energy.  
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Based on the comparative perspectives of rural development policy in the UK and 
Australia, the UK currently operates the integrated approach to rural development as a 
result of the interaction between national policy and European policies on rural 
development, and social and territorial cohesion. This is reflected in the UK-wide 
rural development programmes for the period 2007–13. These rural and regional 
development programmes do not include agriculture, which is separately financed 
through the EU agricultural fund. In the case of Australia, there is also ample 
evidence of the interplay of various state and non-state actors in the process of rural 
and regional development; but the activities of these actors are largely uncoordinated. 
Moreover, there is an absence of a formal and coherent rural development policy. 
Government inputs are largely on an incremental basis. Perhaps the provision of 
funding may encourage impetus for a more organised and integrated form of rural 
development which would take into account the funding of locally generated projects 
(much like the Leader programme approach). 
 
In the absence of an integrated rural development policy, the role of fuels retailing as 
a driving force in rural and regional areas may not produce optimal results. This 
argument is based on the reasoning that an integrated approach to rural development, 
as Table 7.1 would suggest, is likely to boost economic activities, increase fuel 
patronage, and help to drive down fuel prices, as well as the fuel price differentials 
between rural and urban locations. Even where this approach fails to drive down fuel 
prices, the economic welfare generated may be sufficient to enable rural inhabitants to 
afford the relatively higher prices. The other components of an integrated approach, 
such as public transport provision and the increasing dependence on petroleum 
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products substitutes would further reduce dependence on petroleum fuels. Information 
communications and technologies are also likely to minimise transport needs. 
 
Table 7.1  The components of an integrated rural development policy 
Components Rural Policy Objectives Target 
Interagency or Inter-
governmental 
Secretariat 
To ensure that all relevant Government 
Agencies and Departments produce rural 
impact statements with a view to achieving 
concrete objectives; and to reduce wasteful 
duplication of functions and gaps between 
the multiple agencies involved in rural 
development. 
Relevant Government 
Agencies and 
Departments. 
Fuel Retailing Activities To ensure that petroleum product 
substitutes and environmentally friendly 
fuels are retailed, with the objective of 
reducing the cost of fuels and by extension 
a reduction in the cost of rural living. 
Rural communities, 
tourists, visitors, 
industries, etc. 
Public Transport 
Provision 
To reduce the need for private 
transportation, and by extension the 
consumption of fuels. 
Rural inhabitants, 
tourists, etc. 
Rural Energy 
Infrastructure Reform 
To develop and promote alternative energy 
sources and technologies. 
Rural residents. 
Rural Information and 
Communications 
Infrastructure 
To reduce the need to travel, and to 
enhance the attractiveness of rural 
communities. 
Rural residents, 
tourists, retirees, etc. 
Rural Entrepreneurship & 
Venture Capital 
Development 
To stimulate and encourage the growth of 
SMEs; and to expand the range of financial 
options available to rural businesses.  
Rural communities. 
Human Capital 
Development 
To ensure that rural communities have a 
well educated and adaptive workforce. 
Rural communities, 
particularly youths. 
Expansion of Value-
added Activities 
To increase the demand for petroleum 
products; create employment opportunities; 
expand the local tax base thereby 
generating improvements in local services. 
SMEs in rural 
communities. 
Local Government 
Revenue Enhancement 
To ensure that local authorities are well 
funded to execute useful community 
development strategies. 
Local Governments in 
rural areas. 
Source:  This Research 
 
Most importantly, continued application of an integrated approach may at some point 
in the future alter the nature of fuels retailing in rural and regional areas. For instance, 
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agricultural products may be used to produce biofuels on a small-scale basis for use 
within rural areas. Ethanol could be made from food feedstock (e.g. sugar cane or 
corn) or from non-food feedstock (e.g. corn stover, wheat chaff, pine trees). The 
argument against the large-scale production of certain biofuels is that the practice is 
likely to drive the prices of foodstuff higher than it would otherwise have been. 
Ethanol made from these non-food feedstocks could substitute for petrol for use in 
private cars, but this technology in still in its infancy and not yet commercialised.142 
However, these could be produced as small or medium enterprises and its use 
confined within rural and regional locations.  
 
Also, biodiesel could be made from vegetable oil or animal fat (i.e. tallow), and 
vegetable oils could be derived from soy beans, rape seed (canola), palm oil, or 
sunflower oil. This could substitute for petroleum diesel or be mixed in a certain ratio 
with ultra-low sulphur diesel. When produced in limited quantities, these significantly 
cheaper fuels may well serve the needs of rural communities. The crystallisation of 
these developments in the future may change the mix of fuels sold at rural forecourts 
as well as increase the social and economic welfare of the inhabitants by substantially 
reducing the cost of rural living. Likewise, the use of petroleum products for 
electricity generation, domestic heating, and industrial purposes, etc., could be 
replaced with renewable sources of energy derived from wind, tidal, solar, 
geothermal, wave, hydroelectric, etc. 
 
                                                 
142 Heinberg, R., Searching for a Miracle: Net Energy Limits & the Fate of Industrial Society, pp. 31-
56 (2009). Being a Joint Project of the International Forum on Globalization and the Post Carbon 
Institute. Available online at http://www.postcarbon.org/new-site-
files/Reports/Searching_for_a_Miracle_web10nov09.pdf, last visited on 12 November 2009. 
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7.6 Conclusion 
Despite resistance by the UK Government in the 1980s and early 1990s to the EU 
model of rural development policy, the government made quick strides to harmonise 
its rural strategies with those of the EU during the 2000–07 period. The two UK 
Government White Papers on rural strategies signalled the need for a rural 
development policy change from one that emphasises agricultural specialisation to a 
diversified rural economy that takes into account economic, social, and cultural 
values. The adoption of the Leader programme initiative and acceptance of EU 
structural funding by the UK Government ensures that the community-led model of 
rural development receive considerable funding. A mixture of community 
participation and government funding of locally generated projects and initiatives 
have produced an integrated approach to rural development consisting of both state 
and non-state actors who facilitate the process. Such an integrated approach is 
conducive to appropriate contributions of fuel retailing to the overall social, 
economic, and cultural welfare of rural communities. 
 
In response to increasing awareness of problems facing rural Australia, a regional 
summit was launched in 1999 in order to identify the means for responding to rural 
decline and disadvantage. The steering committee released an interim report in April 
2000. One of the submissions to the summit was the report of an Australian study of 
the rationale of the EU Leader programme. The study recommended that its 
achievements be taken into account in generating rural development policy.143 
Moreover, the language of the summit and the recommendations made reflect the 
ideas associated with the Leader programme. Despite this, there is still a belief within 
                                                 
143 Warner, R., A Report on the European Union Rural Development Policy: The LEADER Programme 
– The Rural Community Initiative. Canberra: Submission to the Rural Australia Summit. 
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government circles that economic priorities should take precedence over social and 
cultural goals. This is in contrast with the Cork Declaration which recognises that 
non-economic quality of life issues are crucial to ensuring sustainable social, cultural, 
and economic development in rural areas. 
 
Nevertheless, the summit provides an opportunity for Australia to learn from the 
experience of the UK in its European context, to ensure that the rhetoric of improved 
well-being is translated into reality in Australia’s rural and regional areas. An 
important development in the aftermath of the summit was the Australian 
Government’s formation of a Regional Development Taskforce. However, by the year 
2009 the Australian Government unveiled its funding plans for rural infrastructure 
development. These developments have intercepted the myriad of complexly 
networked groups of informal and part-time actors in the rural development process.  
Thus, the missing element for an integrated approach to rural development in 
Australia is for the Australian Government to abandon its rural policy model of 
community self-help, and rather allocate annual funding to locally generated projects 
and initiatives besides agricultural projects. This thesis argues that it is under such 
conditions that rural fuel retailing activities could achieve optimal contributions. The 
greatest challenges to the achievement of an integrated approach to rural development 
in Australia would be to come to terms with the difficulties imposed by three tiers of 
government; the problems of distance between rural locations (i.e. spatial scale and 
the physical environment); the culture of agricultural productivism; and the 
neoliberalist economic posturing that is unsympathetic to non-market solutions to 
problems of rural development.  
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Chapter 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis investigated the problems of high rural fuel prices and rural–urban fuel 
price differentials in the UK and Australia, based on the premise that a resolution of 
these problems would contribute to rural development. On that basis, the thesis posed 
two main research questions. The first question deals with how the regulation of fuel 
retailing activities in the two jurisdictions could contribute to a rural development 
policy, whereas the second question relates to whether state aid is essential in 
promoting fuel retailing activities in rural areas in the two countries. To analyse and 
answer these questions requires the establishment of an analytical framework and a 
theoretical basis for rural development.  
 
The analytical framework for this study was established based on identified broad 
categories of regulatory support mechanisms and fuel subsidy schemes applied in 
both jurisdictions (see Tables 3.1-3.4). The framework consists of a set of common 
comparators, including sites and licence/franchise regulations, fuel price regulation, 
fuel tax regulation, state aid instruments, and rural development models adopted in 
both jurisdictions. Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical basis for rural development 
policies by clarifying the definition of rurality and the various regional development 
models and approaches to rural development. In the context of this study, the author 
adopted the territorial definition of rurality and a mix of endogenous and exogenous 
approaches to rural development.  
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Thus, the study hypothesises that the regulation of fuel retailing activities (an 
exogenous factor) could contribute to a rural development policy if regulatory support 
mechanisms and fuel subsidy schemes are targeted at rural transport, and energy 
infrastructure reforms. The hypothesis to the second question is that state aid is 
necessary in promoting fuel retailing activities in rural areas, particularly where there 
is evidence of market failure. The second hypothesis is based on the premises that 
socially and economically viable rural areas are essential for a balanced national 
development; and that fuel retailing activities could contribute optimally to an 
integrated rural development policy if state funding is generally applied to all the 
components of a rural development agenda. Therefore, the economic welfare created 
through state funding of rural strategies and locally generated projects would boost 
the fuel retail sector, possibly force pump prices down, and reduce the rural–urban 
fuel price differentials. Moreover, rural residents may still be able to afford the 
relatively higher fuel prices as a result of the enhanced economic prosperity, even in 
the absence of a reduction in pump prices. 
 
This concluding part of the study highlights the research outcomes, and discusses the 
main research findings in terms of their implications for the relevant theories and 
concepts, and implications for practice and further research in this area. This chapter 
also answers the research questions, discusses the hypotheses in the light of research 
findings, makes a thesis statement, makes recommendations, and highlights the 
contributions of this study to the literature on regulation and rural development 
policy. 
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8.2 Discussion of main research findings 
(a) The problems of high fuel prices in rural and remote areas, and the rural–urban 
price differentials as established in Chapter 3 require concerted efforts and 
cooperation between internal parties involved in the fuel supply chain and external 
actors, particularly the Federal (Australia) or National (UK) Governments. The 
multiplier effects of these problems are a cause for concern for local governments and 
rural residents as well as tourists. The consequences are clearly manifest in more 
remote areas than in rural areas closer to urban areas, and include higher cost of 
living, loss of rural services, outmigration, environmental impact, and road congestion 
caused by rural motorists having to drive long distances to obtain cheaper fuels and 
groceries from supermarkets in urban areas.  
 
However, the form of solution to these problems would depend on governments’ 
expenditure priorities, environmental objectives, and rural development policy. These 
could take the form of regulatory support mechanisms (e.g. sites and franchise 
regulations), or government fuel and transport subsidies, or indirect forms of rural 
support based on a rural development policy (e.g. rural infrastructure development, 
funding for SMEs, etc). 
 
(b) The UK and Australian experiences of site regulation reveal that it is ineffective in 
the long run to impose fuel site restrictions on the oil majors.1 The UK had a two-year 
period of site restrictions which aimed at encouraging new entrants and to stem the 
decline in the number of independent fuel retailers. While this policy encouraged the 
expansion of supermarkets, it did little to mitigate the declining market share of the 
                                                 
1 ACCC, Inquiry into the Petroleum Products Declaration, pp. 37-39, Volume 1 Main Report (1996). 
These pages provide details of multi-sites franchise arrangements by the oil majors that undermined the 
sites and franchise legislation. 
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independent retailers. The supermarkets operate fuel retailing on the basis of 
economies of scale and scope, and hence do not operate in rural areas. Thus, the 
expansion of supermarkets resulted in lower pump prices in urban areas but had 
mixed results in rural areas in the sense that rural motorists who live closest to urban 
areas patronise the supermarkets, thereby causing a further reduction in the number of 
rural fuel outlets, shops, and services. 
 
Australia had a longer period of site regulation, lasting from 1980 to 2006. The 
objective was to limit the excessive control which the oil majors had on the fuel retail 
trade, and to facilitate the development of the independent fuel retail sector. The 
problem with seeking an expansion in the number of independent fuel retailers to 
introduce competition and drive fuel prices lower may be a good idea in the urban 
locations. However, the population of a given rural settlement would largely 
determine the number of fuel stations that could operate profitably. Some rural 
locations may not accommodate more than three to four outlets on a profitable basis, 
thus a further increase in the number of retailers would prove to be counterproductive. 
 
In Australia, similarly to the case of the UK, site regulation did not succeed as 
envisaged in preventing further decline in the number of independent categories of 
fuel retailers (see Table 4.4).  However, it enabled the supermarkets to emerge in the 
1990s, and this category of fuel retailers has since substantially grown their market 
share by discounting the price of fuels to boost their grocery trade (as is the case in 
the UK).2  
 
                                                 
2 ACCC Report: Assessing Shopper Docket Petrol Discounts and Acquisitions in the Petrol and 
Grocery Sectors (2004). Available online at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/501158, last visited on 29 September 2009. 
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The Australian experience also reveals that the oil majors tend to resist legislative 
efforts at reducing their control over the oil business in general. In this case, the oil 
majors circumvented site regulation by devising vertical restraints such as multi-
franchising, insistence on 100% ties with franchisees, and equity participation in 
distributorships.3 On the basis of these vertical restraints, oil majors were able to 
retain their control over wholesale and retail prices, which becomes critical when they 
have a need to discount fuel prices or force prices up. 
 
(c) The experience of both jurisdictions regarding licence/franchise regulations, as 
shown in chapter 4, indicates that it is difficult to correct contractual imbalances 
through statutory legislation. This is reflected in the large number of legal cases 
between fuel suppliers and their licensees/franchisees. Additional justification for 
franchise regulations is also based on the legal interpretations of solus (UK) and solo 
(Australia) agreements. These contracts, although necessary and useful, are 
considered to be in restraint of trade and so must pass the test of reasonableness. 
Overall, this regulation has the positive effect of ensuring fewer interruptions in fuel 
supply to retail outlets through improvements in contractual relationships between the 
major suppliers and the retailers. The implication of this for rural and remote areas is 
that fuel prices may have been higher in the absence of franchise regulations. Licence 
regulations in the UK have existed since 1966 to date and were in the form of 
‘undertakings’ obtained from the oil majors, whereas the Australian franchise 
regulations were introduced by legislation and have lasted from 1980 to 2006. 
Nevertheless, the provisions of the Australian Franchise Act form the basis for the 
newly introduced fuel retail legislation (the mandatory Oilcode).  
                                                 
3 ACCC Report, Inquiry into the Petroleum Products Declaration; supra note 1, at p. 37. 
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Licence/franchise regulations do not have a direct effect on fuel prices nor can they 
directly reduce the rural–urban fuel price differentials. However, fuel prices and the 
rural–urban differentials could be greater in the absence of more efficient and 
smoother fuel supplies to rural and urban locations. Nevertheless, the use of multi-
franchising schemes also enabled the oil majors in Australia to counteract the effects 
of the Franchise Act on their bargaining powers. Thus, the huge challenge in making 
the sites and franchise legislation work lies in a government’s ability to prevent oil 
majors’ attempts at circumventing the legislation. 
 
(d) There is no evidence in the history of the fuel retail market that the UK has 
regulated either retail or wholesale margins, and the following possibly explains why. 
The Australian experience reveals enormous difficulties associated with this form of 
government intervention. The arguments against the regulation of retail and wholesale 
margins far outweigh the arguments in its favour.4 The arguments in its favour are 
that regulation of pump prices would eliminate or limit price cycles; and that it would 
furnish price certainty to the benefit of motorists. Conversely, the arguments against it 
are numerous and weighty. Firstly, it could be difficult for regulators to determine 
retail and wholesale margins due to the different cost structures among the various 
categories of fuel retailers. Secondly, these forms of regulation would likely limit or 
eliminate price competition among retailers and thus effectively undermine the very 
basis of competition. Thirdly, it could lead to higher than average prices, if the 
concentration level in the sector is high and the regulators mistakenly set higher retail 
margins than could be determined in a competitive situation. Fourthly, globalisation 
                                                 
4 ACCC Report: Reducing Fuel Price Variability p. 143 (2001). Available online at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/321896 , last visited on 5 September 2009. 
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and deregulation are associated concepts, which are against direct regulation of fuel 
retail prices. 
 
(e) The study finds in chapter 5 that, of the components of fuel pump price, the fuel 
duty and VAT levied on fuels are realistically the two that could be regulated by 
government. However, governments levy fuel tax primarily to generate significant 
revenue for public expenditure; although since the 1990s the UK and Australian 
Governments have increasingly relied on fuel taxation as a means for achieving 
environmental objectives. Thus, the policy direction in regard to fuel tax regulation 
weighs more towards its increase rather than a reduction. An investigation into the 
distributional consequences of high fuel duty on sub-groupings of the population in 
both jurisdictions reveals that rural residents are one of the groups adversely affected. 
 
(f) This study also finds that there are avenues for granting selective fuel tax 
concessions in both jurisdictions, barring environmental objectives. In the case of the 
UK, the government could be guided by the EU system of minimum rates for taxation 
as contained in Council Directive 2003/96/EC.5 This Directive provides for 
differentiated rates of taxation for local public passenger transport, including taxis. 
Projects that qualify for total or partial exemptions include those that are aimed at 
technological development of environmentally friendly products or those that produce 
fuels and energy from renewable sources, e.g. biofuels, wind, solar, tidal forms of 
energy products. Those that qualify for a reduction in tax levels include products used 
                                                 
5 EU Council Directive 2003/96/EC; Community Framework for the Taxation of Energy Products and 
Electricity. Available online at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:283:0051:0070:EN:PDF, visited on 15 
October 2009. 
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for carrying goods and passengers by rail, metro, tram, etc., as well as the use of 
natural gas and LPG. 
 
The Australian Government has tried a number of ad-hoc fuel subsidy schemes, and 
the results have been inconsistent. Most of these were discontinued in line with the 
government’s resolve to pursue its environmental and deregulation policies. However, 
similarly to the EU Directive on differentiated rates of fuel taxation, the Australian 
Government retained some socially important subsidy schemes, particularly those that 
promote the environmental benefits and those that encourage the production of 
environmentally friendly fuels and energy sources.6 
 
Differentiation in rates of fuel taxation, encouragement of the production of petroleum 
products substitutes and renewable sources of energy, and the retention of socially 
essential subsidies are part of the solution to the problems. However, these policies do 
not address who should be the investor in these renewable energy products or who 
should provide the funding for investment in these products.  
 
The UK Government and the devolved administrations have all taken advantage of 
funding under the EU rural development policy and EU structural funds for rural and 
regional development. Subsequently, numerous projects are to be funded as contained 
in their respective rural development programmes for 2007–13.7 Thus, it is also 
expected that increasing use will be made of the EU provision of a De minimis ceiling 
                                                 
6 Tax concessions were discussed in details in chapter 6. 
7 For example, the Scottish Rural Development Programme 2007-13 is a £1.6 billion programme 
designed to develop rural Scotland over the next six (6) years. More details are available online at 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/farmingrural/SRDP, last visited on 6 December 2009. 
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of €200,000 that need not be notified to the EC.8 These could be used to promote the 
production of biofuels and energy products for rural and regional consumption.  
 
Moreover, the scene is set for massive investment in renewable energy in the UK. 
Based on national targets set by the EU, the UK is expected to meet its 2020 target of 
15% of electricity derived from renewable sources of energy. The UK Government 
estimates that at least 32% of electricity consumed in the UK will have to be 
generated from renewable sources in order to meet the 15% target. This would require 
an extra 30 GW of renewable electricity generating capacity.9  
 
Recently, the EC announced that £270 million has been approved for offshore wind 
projects and carbon capture and storage (CCS) plants in the UK.10 Of this amount, the 
Hatfield CCS project received £160 million; the Aberdeen offshore wind farm 
received £36 million; and £66 million was dedicated to the addition of an intermediate 
offshore platform on the planned link between Shetland and Scottish mainland for 
connecting offshore wind and marine generation. 
 
The UK Government also set a robust target to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 
80% by 2050. Meeting this target would depend on progress made towards 
developing renewable energy sources. The UK Energy Research Centre recently 
undertook a study on how the UK Government could achieve the 2050 carbon 
                                                 
8 Europa (Press Releases), State Aid: Commission adopts new De Minimis Regulation, Exempting Aid 
Notification below 200,000 Euros. Available online at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1765, last visited on 16 October 2009. 
9 House of Lords, European Union Committee; The EU’s Target for Renewable Energy: 20% by 2020. 
Vol. 1 (Report), 27th Report of Session 2007-08 (HL Paper 175-1). Available online at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/175/175.pdf, last visited on 28 
November 2009. 
10 European Commission, The EU in the United Kingdom: £270 million of European Money for Wind 
and Carbon Capture & Storage in the United Kingdom (09/12/2009). Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/index_en.htm, last visited on 11 December 2009. 
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reduction target. The study identified multiple possible pathways for an affordable 
transition to sustainable low-carbon energy. However, this could not be achieved 
without a change in lifestyles and energy generating technologies, as well as 
international commitments and agreements.11 The study concludes that investing in 
low-carbon energy technologies now will save the UK Government billions of pounds 
in its goal to reach this target. Therefore, the next decade is likely to witness a 
significant number of renewable projects and investment in renewable energy 
technologies by the UK Government and private investors. It is highly probable that 
some of these projects will be located in rural areas and could help reduce the use of 
diesel fuel for electricity generation. 
 
In the case of Australia, since the year 2000 the Australian Government has allocated 
significant funding towards its programmes contained in ‘Measures for a Better 
Environment’. Under the Greenhouse Gas Abatement Programme, the government 
provided funding to the tune of $100 million per year. Two of the projects receiving 
funding are engaged in the production of ethanol as an alternative transport fuel. The 
Douglas Shire Council and Mossman Central Mill Company in Queensland received 
funding of $7.35 million and $34 million respectively for the production of ethanol 
fuel. British Petroleum received $8.8 million to replace its petroleum production at the 
Bulwer Island refinery with a fuel grade petrol/ethanol blend.12  
 
                                                 
11 The UK Energy Research Centre, Making the Transition to a Secure and Low-Carbon Energy 
Systems: Synthesis Report p. 147 (2009). Available online at 
http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/Downloads/PDF/U/UKERCEnergy2050/0906UKERC2050.pdf, last visited on 
28 November 2009. 
12 Commonwealth of Australia; Report on Fuel Tax Inquiry 202 (2002). Available online at 
http://fueltaxinquiry.treasury.gov.au/content/report/default.asp , last visited on 5 October 2009. 
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The Alternative Fuels Conversion Programme, which was designed to encourage 
public transport buses and the heavier commercial vehicles to operate on either LPG 
or CNG instead of diesel, received a yearly funding of $75 million from 2000–04.13  
 
The Renewable Remote Power Generation Programme, which supports the use of 
renewable energy in remote parts of Australia that currently rely on diesel for 
electricity generation, was allocated funding of $264 million from 2000–04.14 This 
fund has been applied across the States and Territories under sub-programmes. Some 
examples of the sub-programmes are as follows.An allocation of $38.2 was provided 
to the Renewable Energy Rebate Programme to serve remote areas of the Northern 
Territory. The Renewable Energy Diesel Replacement Scheme attracted a budget of 
$22.3 million to serve remote areas of Queensland. The Remote Area Power Supply 
Programme was allocated funding of $18 million to serve remote areas of Western 
Australia. The Renewable Remote Power Generation Programme in South Australia 
attracted funding to the tune of $7.6 million. The Indigenous Community Services 
Project managed by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission attracted 
funding of $8 million.  
 
The Australian Parliament passed a law in 2009 which requires that 20% of the 
Country’s electricity be derived from renewable sources, thus matching the EU target 
of 20%.15 As a result, the Australian Government in its May 2009 budget created the 
Renewable Energy Demonstration Program (REDP) to support the commercialisation 
                                                 
13 See id., p. 204 
14 See id., p. 206. 
15 Australia: Senate Standing Committee on Economics: Exposure Draft of the Legislation to 
Implement the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (2009). Available online at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/economics_ctte/cprs_09/report/report.pdf, last visited on 26 
November 2009. 
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of renewable energy and help facilitate the deployment of new renewable energy 
technologies as a replacement of the use of diesel for power generation in Australia. 
Consequently, in November 2009 the Australian Government approved funding of 
$235 million for four renewable energy projects under the REDP.16 Ocean Power 
technologies received $66.5 million to build a wave power facility which will 
generate 19 MW of energy that will supply green energy to 10,000 homes. This is the 
first commercial-scale ocean energy project in Australia. MNGI Pty Ltd received 
$62.8 million for the 30 MW Paralana geothermal project. Geodynamics was 
allocated $90 million for the 25 MW Cooper Basin geothermal demonstration project. 
Interestingly, $15.3 million was allocated to Hydro Tasmania for the King Island 
renewable energy integration project. This involves the integration of renewable 
technologies into existing electricity networks and mini-grid systems in remote areas. 
 
(g) In both jurisdictions, there are strong arguments in favour of increased availability 
and efficiency of rural public transportation as a way of counteracting the adverse 
effects of high fuel duty and the attendant high fuel prices. This appears a reasonable 
approach because it will tend to reduce the use of private transport and simultaneously 
enable society to reduce carbon emissions. In addition, this solution has implications 
for social isolation amongst those that have transport disadvantage, and will help to 
reduce health costs associated with pollution and road accidents. The latter will 
probably apply more to urban areas than rural areas.  
 
However, this solution does not address the impact of the effects of high fuel prices 
on other consumer goods and services. Neither does it address the main issue of who 
                                                 
16 Renewable Energy Focus, Australia Funds Utility-Scale Wave Power Station (2009). Available 
online at http://www.renewableenergyfocus.com/view/5148/australia-funds-utilityscale-wave-power-
station/, last visited on 26 November 2009. 
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provides the public transport or who should fund it. Where a government pursues a 
policy of deregulation in the transport sector, as is the case in the UK, it becomes the 
responsibility of private investors and local government authorities to provide public 
transport. Private investors may consider such investment as highly risky. Thus, in the 
absence of sufficient local government funding towards rural public transport, there 
could be a vacuum in respect of availability and accessibility of rural bus transport 
unless the Federal Government provides funding under an integrated rural 
development strategy.  
 
(h) The UK and Australian Governments recognise the usefulness of subsidies in 
terms of addressing market failures, and improving social and economic welfare, 
particularly in areas that are economically and socially backward. As a result, both 
governments and the devolved administrations grant public subsidies. However, 
subsidies are granted in the UK in a more structured manner and consist of two levels 
of control: control within the UK using common guidelines as prescribed by HM 
Treasury (SPFM, in the case of Scotland) and control under the EU general 
guidelines. Another distinguishing factor is that state aid proposals in the UK and EU 
undergo a competition impact assessment,17 whereas state aid in Australia is usually 
legislated and does not take account of the impact of competition on subsidies. As a 
result, these legislations are usually short-lived, as the Australian Government realise 
that they have out-lived their usefulness.18  
 
                                                 
17 OFT 829, Guidance on How to Assess the Competition Effects of Subsidies (2007). Available online 
at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft829.pdf, last visited on 26 November 
2009. 
18 This is explained in more detail in Chapter 6. 
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Generally, the EU Treaty prohibits state aid because it can distort competition and 
affect trading among member states. However, there are certain situations where the 
EU Treaty permits the application of state aid. Those exemptions that concern rural 
areas include:19 aid granted to areas where there are serious economic, social, 
geological, or environmental problems; aid that promotes the development of areas 
where the standard of living is low, or where there is serious unemployment; and also 
aid that facilitates the development of certain economic activities or of certain 
economic areas, provided the aid does not affect inter-community trading. For the 
purpose of this kind of state aid, the EC has provided for grants to the tune of 
€200,000 (De minimis aid) without requiring prior notification. This provision, 
coupled with the funding provided by the EC under the Community Structural Funds, 
may provide the much needed opportunity for the UK Government and devolved 
administrations to capitalise and operate an integrated rural development strategy 
based on the community participation model. 
 
(i) The pace of globalisation and technological development and their impact on rural 
areas have led to a gradual shift in paradigm from the classical theories of rural 
development, which perceive rural areas as residual agricultural areas which are 
conditioned by the urban areas, to one which facilitates an understanding of rural 
areas as not necessarily subject to agricultural production or derived from urban area 
types. Apart from the impact of the pace of globalisation which includes the impact of 
the WTO agreement on agriculture, contemporary rural societies in both jurisdictions 
face similar challenges based on the pattern of demographic transition, composition of 
                                                 
19 See Article 87 of the EC Treaty. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/legislation/treaties/ec/art87_en.html, last visited on 6 December 2009. 
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the population, pattern of government expenditure, and increasing environmental 
regulations. 
 
Classical theorists were of the view that rural development takes place as horizontal 
interactions and responses. However, technological advances and global economic 
developments have resulted in new patterns of localisation, particularly among OECD 
countries. These developments have resulted in new ways of organising work and 
business which combines both vertical and horizontal flows. This situation 
encourages more economic activities beyond agricultural production in rural areas, 
particularly the development of small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs). The 
increasing activities of SMEs would in turn result in increased production of goods 
and services, and will furthermore alter the patterns of localisation. These 
developments would also entail increasing levels of infrastructure development, in 
terms of road, ICT, energy, education and training infrastructures, etc. These projects 
are beyond what could be funded by local governments alone and thus would involve 
Federal Governments and private investors playing crucial roles. 
 
These developments have implications for theories on rural and regional 
development, and implications for practice. Classical theories on rural and regional 
development will have to be jettisoned in favour of the new paradigm which 
recognises changes in rural areas in terms of a de-emphasis on agriculture 
specialisation and the promotion of diversification of rural and regional economic 
activities.20  
 
                                                 
20 This has occurred in the UK and is developing in Australia as indicated in Chapter 7. 
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There are implications for practice, in the sense that rural development in OECD and 
EU member states may no longer be driven by endogenous factors alone, but that 
rural development strategies will increasingly involve cooperation among networks 
that include government financial support/incentives and other exogenous factors (i.e. 
a combination of Bryden’s theory21 and the Community-led rural development 
model22). For example, the UK Government has jettisoned its rural policy that 
emphasises support for agricultural activities and has adopted the EU rural and 
regional development policy which emphasises state funding of a diversified rural 
economy based on community-generated projects backed by public funds.23 Similarly, 
the Australian Government has recognised that agricultural activities alone may no 
longer sustain the rural society and has signalled a change towards a more diversified 
rural economy. These are represented by the setting up of a Regional Development 
Taskforce in 200024 and a funding programme for rural infrastructure in 2009.25 
 
8.3 Answer to research questions 
The thesis commenced with the basic premise that the regulation of fuel retailing 
activities could mitigate the problems of high fuel prices and rural–urban price 
differentials and thus contribute to rural development. Based on the foregoing 
                                                 
21 See Chapter 2, pp. 19-21. 
22 See id., pp. 21-24. 
23 EC, Leader Initiative – Local Solutions to Rural Development. Available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/news/regions/071119_1_en.htm, last visited on 4 November 2009. 
24 Australian Regional Development Task Force, A Report to Regional Development Ministers and the 
Australian Local Government Association (2000). Available online at 
http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/regional/publications/doc/regional_overview.doc, last visited on 10 
November 2009. 
25 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Infrastructure Transport Regional Development and Local Government: Funding Regional and Local 
Community Infrastructure, Final Report (June 2009). Available online at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/itrdlg/regionaldevelopment/final%20report/Final%20Report.p
df, last visited on 10 November 2009. 
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discussions of the main research findings, it is obvious that sites and licence/franchise 
regulations have limited effectiveness in terms of mitigating these problems.  
 
Similarly, the Australian experience of wholesale and retail price regulation proves 
that it is problematic to regulate these. Government emphasis on taxing fuels to 
achieve environmental objectives discourages fuel tax concessions for now and in the 
foreseeable future. However, a certain percentage of the proceeds from fuel tax could 
be targeted at improving rural public transport, including transport for special groups. 
Where a government policy of deregulation discourages the provision of public 
transport using public funds, this objective could still be achieved through 
enhancement of local government funding for this purpose.  
 
Government could also extend business fuel tax credits for rural businesses for use as 
an input, as this will likely increase their competitiveness as well as create and retain 
rural employment. A certain percentage of the fuel tax proceeds could be used to 
reduce the cost of operating rural fuel stations, such as testing of underground storage 
tanks, sites remediation, and other environmental costs.  
 
However, these direct forms of fuel retail regulation are not effective in resolving the 
research problems. Thus, some indirect forms of fuel retail regulation that contribute 
to a rural development policy and at the same time address the research problems may 
be necessary. Therefore, this thesis argues that fuel retailing activities will achieve 
optimal contributions within the wider context of an integrated rural development 
policy, backed by significant government funding. Thus, all the components of a rural 
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development policy (see Table 7.1) would require government funding, leading to an 
increase in rural economic welfare.  
 
There are three scenarios of the likely outcomes of pursuing such an integrated 
approach. The first scenario is that government financial assistance for SMEs might 
lead to locally generated proposals that enable the production of petroleum product 
substitutes specifically for rural consumption, such as biofuel plants (e.g. ethanol, 
methanol, biodiesel, etc.). Ethanol could be blended with petrol in a certain ratio to 
reduce the consumption of petrol, or it could be used separately as in Brazil. Biodiesel 
could be used separately or blended with ULSD to reduce the consumption of the 
latter. SMEs could set up LPG and CNG conversion equipment which would enable 
rural residents and businesses to switch to LPG or CNG rather than to use diesel. In 
line with modern fuel objectives, the governments could levy low or zero tax rates on 
these environmentally friendly petroleum product substitutes to enable their economic 
production and pricing.26 Over a period of time, these developments could help 
transform the nature of fuels retailing in rural areas. This transformation would entail 
a change in the fuel mix sold by fuel retailers in these areas. The mix could consist of 
biodiesel, ethanol, LPG, CNG, ULSD, petrol/ethanol blend, ULSD/ethanol blend, 
biodiesel/ULSD blend, and methanol/ULSD blend. Since these are cheaper fuels and 
usually there are excise exemptions for ethanol and biodiesel27, this scenario is likely 
to resolve the twin problems of high fuel prices and high rural–urban fuel price 
differentials. The knock-on effect is likely to boost economic production and increase 
socio-economic welfare. 
                                                 
26 See Chapter 5, p. 57. 
27 See Fuel Tax Inquiry; supra note 14, at pp 156-158.     
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The second scenario is that in the absence of SMEs producing petroleum products’ 
substitutes, the increased prosperity that results based on a government funded, 
integrated rural development strategy would likely generate additional demand for 
fuels and force a reduction in retailers’ margins and thereby reduce pump prices. The 
third scenario is that even without a reduction in pump prices, the extra prosperity 
generated by such an integrated approach may ensure that rural residents and 
businesses are able to afford the relatively higher fuel prices. 
 
8.4 Validation of research hypotheses 
 The first hypothesis states that, ‘the regulation of fuel retailing activities, as an 
exogenous factor, could contribute to a rural development policy if regulatory support 
mechanisms and fuel subsidy schemes are targeted at rural transport, and energy 
infrastructure reforms’. Evidence from this study suggests that a boost to rural public 
transport would reduce the need for private transport and so reduce the consumption 
of fuels, and a reform of the energy infrastructure would reduce the consumption of 
petroleum products in the primary industries and in domestic applications.  
 
In the UK, there are a number of government initiatives aimed at subsidising rural 
transport based on the hypothecation of a certain proportion of the proceeds from fuel 
tax. Such initiatives include the Rural Bus Subsidy Grant, the Rural Bus Challenge, 
and the Parish Transport Fund which are applicable in England and Wales. There are 
also similar rural transport grants introduced in Scotland.  
 
In the case of Australia, government support for rural transport takes the form of fuel 
tax concessions (e.g. FSGS) and a reduction in the cost of transporting fuels to rural 
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and regional locations (e.g. PPFSS). These schemes have been discontinued since 
2006, based on environmental considerations and the government’s policy of 
deregulation. However, the government retained a few socially desirable fuel 
concession schemes. For example, there is a fuel rebate of 4cpl to help reduce 
transport costs for those residing in rural and remote areas. The rebate on ULSD was 
increased from 1cpl to 2cpl to encourage rural residents and businesses to switch to 
more environmentally friendly fuels.28 
 
There is also evidence from this research that a reform of rural energy infrastructure 
would reduce the consumption of fuels for industrial and residential purposes. In 
Australia, there are numerous jointly funded renewable energy projects between the 
Federal Government and the states/territories aimed at replacing the use of diesel fuel 
for electricity generation. The electricity generated also reduces the need for the use 
of diesel in operating industrial and domestic generators. 
 
The second hypothesis states that, ‘state aid is necessary in promoting fuel retailing 
activities in rural areas, particularly where market failures have been identified, 
because economically viable rural areas are necessary conditions for balanced 
national development’.  
However, evidence from this study indicates that the role of state aid in directly 
promoting fuel retailing activities is limited. The Australian Government tried a 
number of fuel subsidy schemes (e.g. PPFSS, FSGS, etc.) aimed at directly reducing 
the prices that fuel retailers charge in rural and remote areas. However, these were 
                                                 
28 See id., p 33. 
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heavily criticised because they were applied in a selective way, the administrative and 
compliance costs also seemed to outweigh the benefits of the schemes.  
 
The UK Government’s regulatory efforts are directed at ensuring the survival of rural 
fuel stations by reducing their costs rather than at reducing the prices they charge. 
Examples are: firstly, the UK Government secured derogation from the EU Petrol 
Vapour Recovery Directive for certain small fuel stations in Scottish rural areas. This 
directive would have involved a capital cost of around £3,000 per station.29 Secondly, 
the Scottish Government operates a rural transport fund, whose budget is partly 
directed at helping rural fuel stations with tank replacement and groundwater 
problems. Thirdly, local authorities in the UK have discretionary powers to provide 
rate relief of around 100% for rural fuel stations.30 The impact of these policies on 
rural fuel expenditure is indirect, because if a community’s only fuel station were to 
close, motorists would have to pay more to travel to the nearest fuel station. However, 
these policies do not address the research problems, and thus a more holistic approach 
seems necessary. 
 
8.5 Thesis statement 
This thesis thus argues that fuel retailing activities are likely to contribute 
significantly to an integrated rural development policy where state funding is 
generally applied to rural development strategies and projects. The economic welfare 
generated through the interaction of exogenous (state intervention and external 
                                                 
29 The Scottish Parliament (The Information Centre), Rural Petrol Prices 4, Research Note 99-52 
(1999). Available online at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/pdf_res_notes/rn99-
52.pdf, last visited on 12 September 2009. 
30 House of Commons Library, Rural Rate Relief 26, Research Paper 01/47 (2001). Available online at 
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2001/rp01-047.pdf, last visited on 15 September, 
2009. 
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investors) and endogenous (local partnerships, and locally generated projects) factors 
is likely to boost fuel retailing activities. Thus, this could lead to a reduction in both 
fuel prices and the rural–urban fuel price differentials.  
 
In the absence of a reduction in fuel prices, rural inhabitants may still be able to afford 
the relatively higher fuel prices as a result of a boost in economic welfare. An 
outcome of such an integrated approach could be the emergence of SMEs that 
specialise in the production of biofuels in limited quantities directed at use within 
rural locations. This prospect could in turn lead to a paradigm shift in fuel retailing in 
rural and remote areas whereby there is a significant change in the current fuel 
product mix. 
 
8.6 Lessons from the UK and Australian experiences of fuel retail 
regulation 
The research revealed a number of lessons to be learned from their experiences. (a) It 
is difficult to regulate an industry or sector where the fixed costs are high compared to 
the variable costs. (b) It is challenging to regulate an industry or sector (such as fuel 
retailing) where the producers of the product are also wholesalers and retailers. (c) 
The fuel retail market is at a mature stage. Therefore, as consolidation takes place, 
inefficient sites are rationalised resulting in their closures. These closures can affect 
rural independent garages leading to socially undesirable consequences. Some areas 
may experience absence or reduction in competition, which could create a monopoly 
situation and attendant high pump prices.  
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(d) The fuel retail trade, like other components of the petroleum value chain, becomes 
more profitable when operating at a significant scale and scope. The supermarkets’ 
successful entry into fuels retailing is based on this principle. (e) It is possible to 
indirectly promote and support the existence of rural fuel retailers, particularly those 
that are shielded from the influence of supermarkets’ fuel pricing strategy. Those that 
are located adjacent to urban areas are vulnerable to the effects of vigorous 
competition arising from price discounting.  
 
(f) It is difficult to legislate against vertical integration as practiced by the oil majors. 
Their control over the fuel retail trade has historical roots.31 Therefore, they are 
capable of circumventing policies such as the sites and licence/franchise regulations 
that tend to limit or affect their operations. However, it may be necessary to regulate 
site allocation and the exclusive agreements between the suppliers and the retailers as 
a short-term measure. Aspects like environment, and health and safety should be 
regulated (care must be taken to assess the compliance costs on rural fuel retailers 
with a view to cushioning this).  
 
(g) Retail and wholesale price regulations are ineffective in the medium–long term, 
mainly because it tends to eliminate price competition, an important element in the 
development of the competition process. (h) Price discrimination is a regular feature 
of the fuel retail trade, owing to differences in bargaining power. However, this 
conduct is regarded as pro-competitive, since it promotes price competition and 
results in benefits to motorists.  
 
                                                 
31 The Competition Commission (CC), PETROL: A Report on the Supply of Petrol to Retailers in the 
United Kingdom, pp. 13-28 (1965). Available online at http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1960_1969/027petrol.htm, last visited on 6 December 2009 
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(i) Government policies to combat greenhouse gas emissions have currently assumed 
the centre-stage in global politics. Therefore, the use of fuel concessions to address 
the problems of relatively high fuel pump prices and high rural–urban fuel price 
differentials is increasingly being discouraged by OECD and EU member states. An 
increase in the provision of rural public transport is thought to be one of the measures 
for tackling these problems. However, some of the socially vital subsidies could be 
used, but targeted at specific rural businesses that use cleaner fuels. (j) The problems 
of high rural fuel prices, rural–urban price differentials, and the attendant high cost of 
rural living could be addressed in a more holistic manner by applying a robust rural 
development policy. (k) Table 8.1 gives a rough indication as to the likely stages of 
fuel retail sector regulation. The first step is to encourage the entry of rural 
independents through incentives, e.g. the fuel rebate/grants schemes and the fuels 
freight subsidy. This stage would likely apply to developing countries that are yet to 
sign up to the Kyoto protocol. 
 
 
The second step is aimed at establishing the presence of independent fuel retailers by 
regulating the contractual relationships between these and their major fuels suppliers. 
This could be followed by policies aimed at cushioning the impact of high pump 
prices on rural businesses and the encouragement of the use of petroleum product 
substitutes. The third step becomes relevant once the independent fuel retail sub-
sector has been established. Subsequently, there could be a relaxation of policies that 
produce market distortions, e.g. the fuel subsidies and restrictive Acts. The latter 
could be replaced with a sector-specific trade practices framework, such as the 
Oilcode.32 Some of the socially vital subsidies such as fuel concessions may or may 
                                                 
32 ACCC Report, The Guide to the Oilcode (2007). Available online at 
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not be retained. Where they are retained, they may be targeted at specific rural 
businesses that use cleaner fuels.  
 
Table  8.1 Stages in the regulation of the fuel retail sector: The UK & Australian  
                     Experiences 
Stages Government Action Regulatory Objectives 
Stage 1  • Fuel rebate/grant schemes and petroleum 
products freight subsidy. 
• Creating independent access to terminals, 
storage and distribution infrastructure 
(facilities). 
• To encourage the entry of 
rural independents and to 
reduce rural pump prices. 
• To increase the prospects of 
increased activities by the 
independent petrol retail 
sector; and to increase 
possibilities for product 
imports. 
Stage 2 • Establishment of minimum conditions for 
dealership or franchise agreements or for 
supplying independent retailers without 
imposing restrictions on either party. 
• Introduction of Sites & Franchise Acts. 
• Introduction of diesel rebate for rural 
businesses, particularly USLD. 
• Introduction of fuel concessions on 
petroleum products substitutes and inputs 
required for a switch. 
• To rectify contractual 
imbalances between the 
major suppliers and their 
independent dealers or other 
unbranded independent 
retailers. 
• To promote the growth of 
the independents as a 
medium-term measure. 
• To cushion high diesel prices 
for rural businesses using the 
product as an input into 
production. 
• To encourage the use of 
more environmentally 
friendly fuels. 
Stage 3 • Removal of fuel grants and freight subsidy 
schemes. 
• Removal of restrictive sites and 
licence/franchise Acts. 
• Retention of fuel and duty concessions for 
specific rural businesses, using ULSD, 
LPG, CNG, and biofuels. 
• Introduction of a comprehensive rural 
development policy. 
• To remove market 
distortions; promote the use 
of environmentally friendly 
fuels; and to embrace 
policies that promote rural 
businesses and enhance the 
socio-economic welfare of 
rural inhabitants.  
 
Source:  This Research. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemId=771848&nodeId=fd100c294232594ec7b32c7bbb9
ef606&fn=Guide%20to%20the%20Oilcode.pdf , last visited on 27 November 2009.  
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8.7 Recommendations 
8.7.1 United Kingdom 
On the basis of this research, I wish to propose a set of eleven recommendations in 
their relative order of importance. 
 
(a) The UK Government may need to take full advantage of the provisions for EU 
state aids (particularly the De minimis provision, the funding provisions for SMEs, 
and funding for rural development programmes), and target the rural communities 
with such funds. These could be used to boost the rural transport grant schemes and 
finance other meaningful rural development projects. 
 
(b) Planning Permission authorities could take into account the need for rural fuel 
retailers to expand their stations in order to increase their offer of non-fuel goods and 
services when allocating sites.  
 
(c) A discretionary business rate relief of 100% could be granted to rural outlets 
throughout the UK.33 
 
(d) Exemptions from compliance with testing of old storage tanks could be made less 
selective, but extended to all rural fuel retailers. However, the lack of tests for tanks 
aged 20–30 years still poses environmental, and health and safety concerns. 
Therefore, the government could ensure that these tests are carried out with taxpayers’ 
money. 
 
                                                 
33 See CC Report; supra note 30, at pp. 129-61.  
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(e) The government may wish to intervene and resolve the problem of who owns the 
disputed vapour recovered during transfer of fuels from road tankers to storage 
tanks.34 Rural fuel retailers cannot afford wetstock losses (fuel losses based on the 
contraction of fuels from 15° C at which they are loaded to the fuel tankers). 
Likewise, their suppliers cannot afford to forfeit the return on investment made in the 
vapour recovery equipment.  
 
(f) Rural fuel retailers could be compensated for losses arising from the use of pre-
loaded tickets as the current means for liquid fuel measurement. All fuel suppliers 
could be advised to make an allowance of 0.2–0.3% for such losses. Subsequently, 
current legislation covering the measurement of liquid fuels may be amended to 
eliminate distortions caused by the replacement of the dipsticks with pre-loaded 
tickets.35 Such distortions are likely to affect the viability of rural sites.  
(g) The derogation from the EU stage I vapour recovery directive could be granted to 
all rural sites in the UK, as opposed to the current selective application to only certain 
rural areas in Scotland. Similarly, the EU stage II vapour recovery directive should be 
waived for all rural sites in the UK.  
8.7.2 Australia 
Similarly, I wish to propose a set of four recommendations based on their relative 
importance. 
 
                                                 
34
Petrol Retailers Association (PRA), Proposals for Amendments to the Measuring Equipment 
Regulations 1983 & the Weights and Measures Order 1985 
35 PRA Information Sheet; Wetstock Loss Explained (2006). 
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(a) The Australian Government may consider adopting a more robust approach to 
rural development policy that goes beyond the development of rural and regional 
infrastructure.  
 
(b) The Australian Government may wish to adopt the proposed residential fuel credit 
scheme, to be applied specifically to remoter country areas where a renewable energy 
project is currently non-existent.36  
 
(c) The effectiveness of terminal gate pricing may need periodic assessment as this 
pricing policy has important implications for fuel pump prices in rural areas. 
 
(d) The deregulation process may need to be monitored stringently, to ensure that all 
industry participants are adhering to the tenets of the Downstream Oilcode. The 
reason is because the Oilcode relies on cooperation among industry participants and 
on the prior disclosure of information (regarded by some industry analysts as weak 
tenets). 
8.8 Research contributions 
This research has in the author’s view made a number of significant contributions to 
the existing body of knowledge.  
 
The first contribution is the application of the modern conception of rurality to the 
regulation of fuel retailing in rural areas, in order to facilitate an understanding of a 
potential paradigm shift in the future role of fuel retailing in these areas within the 
context of an integrated rural development strategy. 
                                                 
36 See Fuel Tax Inquiry; supra note 12, at p. 167. 
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A second contribution is the classification of support schemes for rural fuel retailers; 
rural communities; and rural businesses. These were broken down into two broad 
categories: the regulatory support mechanisms and the fuel subsidy schemes. 
 
A third contribution relates to a clarification of when and how state aid should be 
applied in the context of rural fuel retailing activities. 
 
A fourth contribution is in regard to the application of the wider concept of regulation 
(which includes statutory intervention, markets, contracts, and court interpretations) to 
an investigation of the potential contributions of the regulation of fuels retailing to a 
rural development policy and the applicability of state aid.  
 
A fifth contribution is the identification of the core constituents of a comprehensive 
rural development policy.  
 
A sixth contribution is the identification of the stages towards introducing a 
sustainable independent fuel retail sector based on UK and Australian experiences of 
the regulation of fuel retailing activities. 
 
The overall contribution made by these six specific contributions is in the author’s 
view, a significant one which should assist the design and implementation of further 
research into these subjects. 
8.9 Topics for further research 
The research has generated four related research questions. Firstly, the environmental 
objective of combating or mitigating climate change has become a global 
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phenomenon. Governments of OECD member states are actively encouraging the 
rapid development of the production of biofuels and other renewable forms of energy. 
It might be interesting to research into how government subsidies could help to 
develop these environmentally friendlier fuel and energy options.  
 
Secondly, the downstream petroleum assets such as terminals, storage tanks, and 
distribution infrastructure hold the key to successful regulation of the fuel retail 
sector. Most OECD countries have developed independent downstream assets that 
could be used by the independent wholesale and retail sectors. In some other cases, 
provision is made for the oil majors to grant third-party access to the independent 
sector. The issue of third-party access to these facilities would become an issue for 
developing countries as they restructure and privatise their National Oil Companies. It 
might be important to research into how the independent fuel retail sectors in 
developing countries could secure access to such facilities?  
 
Thirdly, it is well known that the oil majors’ downstream operations are vertically 
integrated, at least financially. A research question might arise as to how compatible 
is vertical integration with a deregulated fuel retail market.  
 
Fourthly, this research indicates that the Australian fuel retail sector, which was 
previously heavily regulated, is now being deregulated. It might be useful for further 
research to be carried out to assess fully whether the previous regime of fuel subsidies 
could survive after implementation of a fully deregulated market.
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